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INTERSTATE

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STAn: OF NEVADA

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DIVISION OF PAROLE &. PROBATIO
14.45 Hoi SprIngs Road Suite '04
Carson CIty, NV 69710
(775) 687-5040
Fax: (775) 687·$402

To:

CALIFORNIA lSC· PAROLE Date:

Fax #:

Pllges:

From:
Subjecr:

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6/8/99
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GARRlDO. PHlLUP

COMMENTS:

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Divirion requested emergency reporting instructions
on the above subiect but Wl15 d~nied by your agency. Subject W35
supervised by U.S. Distrtet Parole and Prob:J.oon in CaliforoU since
1/88. Since your agency doe!! oot provide dual sopervisioo our

agency

h~d

to monitor the! subject through his U.S. P&P Officer

. . . . . . . . (Progress Report ~t[ached). Since granted pMole the
subject has complied with parole fequirem~tlt:s and displayed a
st2ble lifestyle. Subject has married :U1d he is ;l self-employed
graphics design urist and printer. AccQrding to Officer Ii.'• •
the business is legitim:lte and successful. Subject continues to receive
treatment and mcdic.ation {rom a psychiatrist, Dr. @
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~ Due to SUbject's p03itive parole performance £.he U.s. PuoIe
Commisrion granted the subject an early tc.rmin:1tion from prole.
The subject h:lS continued to receive mental hc:tlth tre:ltment and
re..side at the same rt5idence since 1988. Ordering the subject to
return to NeV3cU to await acceptal1ce from your state would be
diseuptive and unproductive for the subject who has muuged co
clunge his bt'h.avior. Please reconsider your dtci3ion.

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORl11f:RN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
PROBATION OFfiCE

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LOREN A.N. 8UDOAESS
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SAN I'IIANCISCO. CA 94' 0,·3.97

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May 17, 1999

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Phillip Craig Garrtdo
1554 Walnul Ave.
Antioch, CA 94509

Dear Mr. Garrido:

This letter is intended (0 contlrm the Early Termination at your term of Parolt: effecrive March
9. 1999. You will be hJppy to know that you are no longer obligaced lO report to the U.S.
Probac..ion Office.
I Wan! ro thank .YOU ,'Of :,our cooperarion over this penod or supcf\'isIOI1 and I hope that
continue [Q do welL
(f rhere is

anythin~ \\C c~n help you 1Y1lh in the furure. 00 nOI htsi()(~ (0 I.:OnIJC(

our office.

Best Regards.

Sr. U.S. Probation Officer

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To the N°evada Parole Commission,
This letter is to infoml the Parole Commission that I Phillip Garrido

was released from the Federal Sentence and all supervision conlpletely.
The reason for my release 26 years early, was due to the complete
recovery and successful reorientation back into the community.
Years of hard work went into this recovery. At this point every
professional involved in my case recognized any further supervision
\vould no longer be of any benefit to Ine, and so I was released back
into the community under no supervision.
At this point it is obvious to me and the professionals nandli ng this
case that I will receive no benefit from continued supervision, but in
fact is nothing rnore than a poor reminder of\vhat I have been told to
put behind me, thus physiologically and realistically is of no further
benefit to my success.
I sign under duress, because of the threat that Nevada would for no
other reason violate my parole.
Botton1 line is if Nevada vvould of been the one to supervise my parole
it is no\v becoming obvious that they do not have the resources nor the
desire to truly help people orientate back into society for under your
present system I would have fallen through the cracks. On the other hand
the Federal Govern_ment has the resources and stayed on Iny back unti I
they were able to isolate a bi-chemical problem.
So now after all this you're infonning me the reason for this
continued supervision is to help me back into society. Frankly your

laws are outdated and need to be revie\ved by professionaJ
psychologist and the Federal CJovernment.

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000329

ATTACHMENT # 14

SPECIAL REPORT
THE CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS AND REHABILITATION'S
SUPERVISION OF PAROLEE PHILLIP GARRIDO

OFFICE OF THE
INSPECTOR GENERAL
DAVID R. SHAW
INSPECTOR GENERAL

STATE OF CALIFORNIA
NOVEMBER 2009

David R. Shaw, Inspector General

Office of the Inspector General

November 4, 2009

Matthew L. Cate, Secretary
California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation
1515 S Street, Room 502 South
Sacramento, California 95814

Dear Mr. Cate:
Enclosed is the Office of the Inspector General's special report of the California Department of
Corrections and Rehabilitation' s (department) parole supervision of parolee Garrido. We .conducted
this review under the authority of California Penal Code section 6126, which assigns the Office of the
Inspector General responsibility for oversight of the department.
The special report concludes that the·department repeatedly failed to properly classify and supervise
parolee Garrido during the decade it supervised him. Throughout the course of its supervision of
Garrido, we found that the department missed numerous opportunities to discover Garrido's victims,
who Garrido held captive in a concealed compound at the back of his residence. We discovered that
the department also failed to properly supervise and train its parole agents responsible for Garrido.
The special report further discloses significant weaknesses in the department's current passive GPS
monitoring program, which result in the program providing the public a false sense of security.
We would like to thank you and your staff for the cooperation extended to my staff in completing this
special report. If you have any questions concerning this report, please contact Sam Dudkiewicz,
Chief Assistant Inspector General, Bureau of Criminal Irivestigations, at (916) 830-3600.
Sincerely,

tJJ,;(~
David R. Shaw
Inspector General

Enclosure

Arnold Schwarzenegger, GO'Vernor
P.O..Box 348780, SACRAMENTO, CA 95834-8780

PHONE

(916) 830-3600

FAX

(9 L6) 928-5996

Contents
Executive Summary

1

Introduction

4

Figure 1: Garrido's residence in Antioch, California

7

Background

8

Figure 2: Timeline of Garrido's legal history

9

Figure 3: Interstate Compact parolees

10

Table 1: Parole supervision levels

13

Parameters of Review

14

Results of Special Review

15

The Department Failed to Properly Supervise Garrido

15

Figure 4: The parole administrator's assessment of Garrido's supervision .. 17
Figure 5: Garrido's GPS "tracks" in concealed compound

23

Figure 6: Utility lines running from Garrido's residence

26

Figure 7: Electrical lines in backyard

27

Figure 8: Eight-foot high privacy side fence in Garrido's backyard

29

Parole Agents Lack Adequate Training

31

Findings
Recommendations

33
_

_

35

Appendix A

36

Appendix B

37

California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation's response
to the special report

39

Executive Summary
On June 10,1991, federal parolee Phillip Garrido and his wife Nancy allegedly kidnapped
11-year-old Jaycee Dugard from South Lake Tahoe, California. Over the course of the
following 18 years, Garrido reportedly sexually assaulted Jaycee-fathering two children-while
holding her captive on the grounds of his residence in Antioch, California. For many of
those years, the California Department
of Corrections and Rehabilitation's
Findings in Brief
(department) parole division supervised
The Office of the Inspector General finds
Garrido. Despite numerous clues and
that during the to-year period the department
opportunities, the department, as well as
supervised parolee Garrido, the department:
federal and local law enforcement, failed
• Failed to adequately classify and supervise
to detect Garrido's criminal conduct,
Garrido.
resulting in the continued confinement
and victimization of Jaycee and her two
• Failed to obtain key information from federal
parole authorities.
daughters. On August 26, 2009, Garrido
and his wife were finally arrested for these
• Failed to properly supervise parole agents
heinous crimes, and Jaycee was reunited
responsible for Garrido.
with her family.
• Failed to use GPS information.
• Provides the public a false sense of security
with a passive GPS monitoring program
that falls short of its potential, raising OIG's
concerns about the department's current and
future uses of GPS monitoring.
• Ignored other opportunities to determine that
Garrido was violating the terms of his parole.
• Failed to refer Garrido for mental health
assessment.
• Failed to train parole agents to conduct
parolee home visits.
• Missed opportunities to discover the existence
of Garrido's three victims, including:
o

Failing to investigate clearly visible utility
wires running from Garrido's house
towards the concealed compound.

o

Failing to investigate the presence of a 12year old female during a home visit.

o

Failing to talk to neighbors or local public
safety agencies.

o

Failing to act on information clearly
showing Garrido had violated his parole
terms.

State of California • November 2009

In 1977, Garrido was convicted in state
and federal court for kidnapping and
repeatedly raping a 25-year-old female
victim. The federal court sentenced
him to 50 years for kidnapping while
Nevada imposed a five years to life term
for forcible rape. In January 1988, after
serving 11 years of his federal sentence,
the federal government paroled Garrido
and released him to Nevada authorities
to serve his state sentence. Seven months
later, Nevada paroled Garrido, returning
him to the jurisdiction of federal parole
authorities to serve the remainder of his
federal parole term. He resided at his
mother's house in Antioch, California
throughout the terms of his federal and
state paroles. In March 1999, the federal
government discharged Garrido from
federal parole, returning him to the
jurisdiction of Nevada parole authorities.
In June 1999, under the terms of an
interstate parole compact, the department
assumed parole supervision of Garrido on
Nevada's behalf because Garrido resided
in California.
Page 1

On August 27,2009, the day after the arrest of Garrido and his wife, the department held a
press conference in which an official hailed the diligence of parole agents who had supervised
Garrido. The official also proclaimed that Garrido had complied with his parole conditions,
never receiving a violation. Other department officials have made similar public statements.
While it is true that Garrido's California parole was never officially violated, our review shows
that Garrido committed numerous parole violations and that the department failed to properly
supervise Garrido and missed numerous opportunities to discover his victims.
The focus of this special report is limited to the department's parole supervision of Garrido.
However, it should be noted that Garrido was on parole under the jurisdiction of federal parole
authorities from August 1988 to January 1999. During that time, Garrido allegedly kidnapped
Jaycee Dugard and sexually assaulted her, fathering two children. Federal parole authorities
also failed to detect Garrido's criminal conduct and his victims.

Recommendations
In this special report, the Office of the Inspector General shines a public light on systemic
problems that transcend parolee Garrido's case and jeopardize public safety. To address the
deficiencies identified in this special report, the department should take the following actions:

Parole Supervision
• Enforce appropriate standards for parole agents to properly supervise assigned parolees and
for parole supervisors to properly supervise parole agents.
• Ensure that all sex offender parolees have been correctly assessed for their risks to re-offend
using the department's revised assessment tool.
• Require parole agents to obtain parole information from federal or other state parole
authorities when a parolee has been recently supervised by these entities.
• Establish a mechanism to obtain and share information with local public safety agencies.

GPS Monitoring
• Develop and implement a comprehensive Global Positioning System CGPS) monitoring policy.
• Move all sex offender parolees to the active GPS monitoring program, or significantly
enhance the passive GPS monitoring program.
• Require parole agents to fully use the capabilities of the GPS monitoring system, such as
establishing a zone to monitor parolees' compliance with conditions of parole that they not
travel more than specified distances from their houses without prior approval.
• Require parole agents to investigate, resolve, and record the resolution to all GPS system alerts.

Bureau of Criminal Investigations, Office of the Inspector General

Page 2

Training
• Provide training to its parole agents and supervisors on:
o

Using its GPS monitoring system to ensure that parolees comply with their conditions of
parole and taking appropriate actions to ensure that parole agents use the system to enforce the
conditions of parole.

o

Properly classifying parolees, including serious sex offenders.

o

Conducting a parolee home inspection, including search techniques on how to be aware of
clues to potential parole violations or other criminal behavior.

o

Contacting neighbors to obtain collateral information on parolee behavior.

o

Referring parolees to mental health assessment when appropriate.

• Implement a field training officer program to provide on-the-job training to parole agents
after they complete the academy and have been assigned parole caseloads.

California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation Response
The department agrees that it needs to improve its parole system, describes its efforts to
transform parole into a risk-based system of supervision, and makes reference to recent
legislation that will become effective January 25, 2010, which will enable the department to
reduce parole agent caseloads and supervisory span of control.

State of California • November 2009

Page 3

Introduction
On June 10, 1991, in South Lake Tahoe, at approximately 8:00 am, 11-year-old Jaycee Dugard
walked to a nearby bus stop under the observation of her stepfather. He observed a two-tone
gray sedan, with an adult male and an adult female inside, travel by his house. The vehicle
made a U-turn and moments later stopped near Jaycee. The female passenger grabbed Jaycee
and pulled her into the vehicle. The vehicle then sped away.
Over the course of the following 18 years and despite law enforcement efforts, Jaycee's
whereabouts remained unknown until a series of events unraveled beginning August 24,
2009. On that date, Phillip Garrido, along with two young females, went to the University
of California (UC), Berkeley Police Department to obtain a permit for a campus event.
The representative with whom Garrido spoke was alarmed by his peculiar behavior and the
disquieting appearance of the girls. She asked Garrido to return the next day.
Surprisingly, he did return on August 25 and met with the representative and a UC Berkeley
police officer. The police officer, like the representative, had concerns about Garrido and
the girls accompanying him. The officer stated that Garrido was rambling on and on about
his religious beliefs, and that it sounded like a cult situaLion to her. According to the officer,
Garrido appeared to have a mental illness, and if he was required to take medication, she said,
it was apparent he was not. Because of his sex offender status, the officer was also concerned
for the safety of the two young girls accompanying Garrido. The officer noted that the girls,
who called Garrido "daddy," and whom Garrido referred to as his daughters, acted as if
Garrido's strange behavior was normal. As a reSUlt, the officer called Garrido's parole agent to
report her meeting with Garrido and relay her concern. Unfortunately, the officer was unable to
talk to the parole agent but left him a voicemai! explaining her observations.
Following up on the officer's information, Garrido's parole agent later that day went to
Garrido's residence with another agent. The parole agents handcuffed Garrido and detained
him outside the residence while they searched the house. The parole agents found Garrido's
wife and mother in the residence but no one else. The agents then drove Garrido to the parole
office for questioning. During the trip, Garrido explained that the girls who accompanied him
to UC Berkeley were the daughters of a relative and that he had permission from their parents
to take them to the university. Garrido told the parole agents that a parent had picked up the
girls when he returned from UC Berkeley.
At the parole office, Garrido's parole agent reviewed Garrido's parole file with a supervisor.
Taking into account Garrido's cooperation, along with the information in Garrido's file and
other information they obtained, the parole agent and supervisor determined that Garrido had
not violated any conditions of his parole. A new condition had been instituted in Garrido's
parole the month before, in July 2009, prohibiting Garrido from being in the presence of
minors, but on August 25, the parole agent and supervisor decided that the condition didn't
apply to Garrido because Garrido had no prior or current convictions involving minors.
Accordingly, the parole agents returned Garrido to his house with instructions to report to the

Bureau of Criminal Investigations, Office of the Inspector General

Page4

parole office the following day to further discuss his visit to UC Berkeley and to follow up on
the parole agent's concerns related to the young girls.
The next morning, August 26, 2009, as Garrido arrived at the parole office, the parole agent
spoke with the UC Berkeley police officer, thereby obtaining a more detailed description of her
interaction with Garrido and her concern about the safety of the two young girls. The parole
agent was surprised at the officer's description of the girls' relationship with Garrido because
the agent believed that Garrido had no young children.
As the parole agent was on the phone with the officer, he observed that Garrido was
accompanied by his wife and three young girls. After completing his conversation with the
officer, Garrido's parole agent wisely isolated the females-including Garrido's wife-to identify
them. The oldest of the three young females identi fied herself as Alyssa, the second oldest as
Angel, and the youngest as Starlet. During further questioning, Alyssa advised that she was
the girls' mother. The parole agent believed that Alyssa looked too young to be the mother and
asked her age. Alyssa said that she was 29 years old, laughingly explaining that she often gets
that comment and that people believe she is the girls' sister.
As the parole agent continued his questioning, Alyssa and Garrido's wife became defensive
and agitated, wanting to know why the parole agent was interrogating them. The parole agent
explained that he was investigating Garrido's visit to UC Berkeley with the two young girls.
Alyssa said she was aware that Garrido had taken the girls to UC Berkeley and that he was a
sex offender who was on parole for kidnapping and raping a woman. She added that Garrido
was a changed man and a great person who was good with her kids. Alyssa subsequently stated
that she didn't want to provide any additional information and that she might need a lawyer.
The parole agent then directed Garrido to a room and asked him to explain the relationship of
the three young girls. Garrido thought for a moment and responded that they were all sisters
and that the father was his brother who lived nearby in Oakley, California. Garrido stated that
the parents were divorced, the girls were living with them and other people, and he did not
know his brother's address or phone number.
Because of the inconsistencies in their stories, the parole agent isolated Garrido in an office
with another parole agent and returned to the females. The parole agent told Alyssa that she
needed to provide him with identification or with the phone number of a relative or friend
whom he could call for verification of her identity. Alyssa told the parole agent that she
had learned a long time ago not to carry or give any personal information to anyone. When
questioned about this comment, Alyssa responded that she needed a lawyer.
Being suspicious about the identities provided, the parole agent called the Concord Police
Department and requested an officer respond to assist in the questioning. As they waited for the
officer to arrive, Alyssa said she was sorry that she had lied. She explained that she was from
Minnesota and had been hiding for five years from an abusive husband. She was terrified of being
found, she said, and that was the reason she could not give the parole agent any information.

State of California • November 2009

PageS

Two Concord police officers arrived and questioned Alyssa, but she maintained the story she had
provided earlier to the parole agent. Finally, a Concord police sergeant interviewed Garrido alone
in a room. After a short while, the sergeant told the parole agent that Garrido had admitted that he
was the father of the two girls. The parole agent then resumed questioning Garrido. Eventually,
Garrido admitted to kidnapping and raping Alyssa. The parole agent provided this information
to the Concord police sergeant. During further questioning, Alyssa identified herself as Jaycee
Dugard and confirmed that she had been kidnapped and raped by Garrido. Police officers
subsequently arrested Phillip and Nancy Garrido on numerous felony charges.
Garrido and his wife allegedly kidnapped Jaycee and held her hostage for almost two decades.
During that time, Garrido kept Jaycee and the two children in makeshift structures located
at the rear of his one-half acre residence in Antioch, California, as shown in Figure I below.
In addition to kidnapping, Garrido's crimes reportedly included repeated sexual assaults of
Jaycee, resulting in the birth of her two daughters.
The Office of the Inspector General became aware of the Garrido case through media coverage
of his arrest and the discovery of Jaycee Dugard and her two daughters. We routinely review
the effectiveness of department operations, including the parole division, when we become
aware of significant cases. We conduct these reviews under the authority of California Penal
Code section 6126, which assigns the Office of the Inspector General responsibil ity for
oversight of the department. Accordingly, in September 2009-after Garrido was arrested-we
worked collaboratively with the department, local law enforcement agencies, and the EI
Dorado County District Attorney's Office to complete this review. The department provided
its full cooperation throughout our review, providing documents-including its August 2009
internal review of its supervision of Garrido, a review that reached conclusions similar to
ours-and insights into its parole operations.

Bureau of Criminal Investigations, Office of the Inspector General

Page 6

Figure 1: Garrido's residence in Antioch, California
Adjacent lots. The lines dividing property lots and indicating the back yard fence were added by the
Office of the Inspector General.

Source: GoogleMaps; © 2009 Google - Imagery © 2009 TerraMetrics, NASA, Map data © 2009 Google

State of California· November 2009

Page 7

Background
Parolee Information
In 1977, Phillip Craig Garrido was convicted in federal court of kidnapping a female in South
Lake Tahoe and convicted in Nevada for raping her. According to court documents, Garrido
approached the v.ictim outside of a store at approximately 7:30 p.m. on November 22, 1976.
Garrido asked for a ride, explaining that his car was disabled. The victim agreed to help
Garrido. After driving for a short time, Garrido instructed the victim to turn the vehicle into an
empty lot, where he grabbed her, handcuffed her hands behind her back, and placed a leather
strap around her neck and under her knees in order to keep her in a bent-over position which
concealed her from view. Garrido drove the victim approximately one hour to a storage shed
that he maintained in Reno, Nevada. Over a six-hour period, Garrido repeatedly sexually
assaulted the victim in the modified shed, which had evidently been set up in advance for this
purpose. At approximately 3:00 a.m. the next morning, a police officer on routine patrol noticed
a broken lock on the door to the shed and investigated. In the sequence of events that followed,
the police officer rescued the victim and arrested Garrido, who was charged with kidnapping
and rape. In a post-arrest interview, Garrido admitted to using marijuana and LSD, adding that
he took "at least 100 hits of LSD each month."
The federal court subsequently sentenced Garrido to 50 years for kidnapping, and a state court
in Nevada sentenced him to five years to life for rape. After serving nearly 11 years of his
federal sentence, the federal government inexplicably paroled Garrido in January 1988 and
transferred him to the Nevada Department of Prisons to serve his five years to life sentence.
Eight months later, Nevada, also inexplicably releasing Garrido from prison, placed him on
parole for the rest of his life, beginning in August 1988.
Nevada returned Garrido to the federal government to serve his federal parole term. During
his federal parole period, Garrido and his wife lived with his mother at her residence at 1554
Walnut Avenue in Antioch, California. In June 1991, Garrido allegedly kidnapped Jaycee
Dugard from South Lake Tahoe and transported her to his residence in Antioch. In March
1999, the U.S. Parole Administration terminated Garrido's federal parole supervision, returning
him to the jurisdiction of Nevada for state parole supervision. Garrido's Certificate of Early

Termination of federal parole contains a commendation for having responded positively to
federal parole supervision, and for the personal accomplishments he had attained. The federal
government's release of Garrido from federal parole is included as Appendix A to this report.
The department assumed the parole supervision of Garrido in June 1999 because he resided
in California. The department continued in this role until Garrido's arrest in August 2009.
Figure 2 summarizes Garrido's adult interactions with the legal system. A more detailed list of
Garrido's contacts wi th local public safety agencies is incl uded inA ppendix B of this report.

Interstate Compact on Parole
The State of Nevada gave Garrido a term of lifetime parole supervision. Because he was
living in Antioch, California, however, the department accepted the responsibility to supervise

Bureau of Criminal Investigations, Office of the Inspector General

Page 8

Figure 2: Timeline of Garrido's legal history.
Sources: Garrido's California and federal parole files and local police reports.
March 1970: Garrido arrested by local law enforcement for drug related charges.
He receives probation.
,:~j,.--

March 1972: Garrido arrested on drug related charges. He receives probation again.
April 1972: Garrido arrested for Contributing to the Delinquency of a Minor, Rape, and Adult
Providing Dangerous Drugs to a Minor. Case was dismissed for "Furtherance of Justice."

~~l~.....- November

1976: Garrido arrested for Kidnapping and Rape.

ImI--March 1977: Garrido convicted on federal Kidnapping charges. Sentenced to 50 years.
April 1977: Garrido convicted of Forcible Rape by state of Nevada.
~
Sentenced to five years to life.
April 1977 -January 1988: Garrido incarcerated in federal prison.

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January 988: Garndo paro ed from federal incarceration and transferred to Nevaaa
Department of Prisons.
Uanuary -August 1988: Garrido Incarcerated in Nevada State Prison.
August 1988: Garrido paroled from Nevada State Prison; goes to Jive with wife at his
mother's residence in Antioch Callf0mia.
August 1988 - January 1999: Garrido supervised by federal parole authorities.

U;[g~-June

1991: Garrido allegedly kidnaps Jaycee Dugard from South Lake Tahoe.

lim
ImI- March 1993: Garrido violates federal parole and returns to prison for four weeks.
1m! He is released in April 1993 to prior restrictions and electronic monitoring.

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1m)
mIl

March 1999: U.S. Parole Administration terminates Garrido's federal parole supervision.
Nevada begins its parole supervision of Garrido.

2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008

April 2008 Department begins GPS monitoring of Garrido.
August 2009 Garrido and his wife arrested for kidnapping and sexually assaulting

~009

Jaycee Dugard.

June 1999 - Augus 2009. Department performs parole supervision of Garrido on the
behalf of Nevada.

State of California· November 2009

Page 9

Figure 3: Interstate Compact parolees.
Source: Department's Monthly Report of Population .
• Out of state parolees supervised by California

2,500

• California parolees supervised by other states

+----------

1,500

500

1990 1991

1992

1993 1994

1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001

2002 2003 2004 2005 2006

2007 2008 2009'

Data compiled as of December of each year. 'Data as of September 2009.

Garrido on Nevada's behalf under the terms of the Interstate Compact for Adult Offender
Supervision.
This exchange is not unusual for the department. The department routinely accepts parolees
from other states under the terms and conditions laid out in the Interstate Compact for Adult
Offender Supervision, originally enacted in 1937. All 50 states are members of this compact,
which is the statutory authority regulating transfer of adult parole and probation supervision
across state boundaries. Under the terms of the compact, states are generally mandated to
accept parolees from other states. Therefore, the department had no choice but to accept
Garrido for supervision after he was released from federal parole, and the State of Nevada
made the request in June 1999.
In September 2009, as illustrated in Figure 3, the department supervised 1,466 out-of-state
parolees while 935 California offenders were supervised by other states. In previous years the
number of California parolees supervised by other states exceeded the number of out-of-state
parolees supervised by the department. In 2008, the department reported the annual cost of
supervision at $4,338 per parolee. Therefore, because the department is supervising 531 more
out-of-state parolees than the number of California parolees being supervised by other states,
the department in 2009 will incur a net cost of approximately $2.3 million.
The increase of out-of-state parolees in the last few years increases the workload for the
department's parole agents in general. When Garrido was fitted with a GPS tracking device in
April 2008, his parole agents carried the 40: 1 workload specified for specialized caseloads.

Bureau of Criminal Investigations, Office of the Inspector General

Page 10

Parole Agent Tools For Supervising Parolees
The department has stated its commitment to the protection of the community and the effective
rehabilitation of offenders. Accordingly, a parole agent has broad discretion over a parolee's
life and uses various tools to guide, direct, and oversee the actions of parolees. Conditions
of parole, to which a parolee agrees prior to release from prison, allow parole agents to
search a parolee's person or residence at any time. Other tools include drug testing, behavior
management courses, periodic required reports submitted by parolees, and global positioning
system (GPS) monitoring.
In November 2006, California voters passed Proposition 83, which,
among other things, required lifetime GPS monitoring of felony
registered sex offenders. Prior to the passage of the proposition,
the department implemented a GPS monitoring program in June
2005 with a pilot project that tracked high-risk sex offenders. The
pilot program was designed to assist parole agents and local law
enforcement in supervising these parolees. Based on the project's
results, the department requested, and received, additional funding
to place GPS devices on all registered sex offenders (Penal Code §
290) on parole in California. The department included in this effort
parolees who were convicted prior to the passage of Proposition
83, and therefore were not legally mandated to be monitored.
Accordingly, the department required parolee Garrido to begin
wearing a monitoring device in April 2008.

GPS monitoring device

Source: Office of the
Inspector General

The department Secretary stated in January 2009 that monitoring every sex offender on state
parole with GPS technology was a "significant milestone to protecting public safety by holding
these individuals accountable for [their] actions and their whereabouts. The [department] is
holding true to a commitment it has made to fit every sex offender parolee with a GPS device
and monitor them aggressively."
Through the use of satellites, the GPS device transmits a parolee's location, speed of
movement, and direction of travel to a receiver. This information is then available to parole
agents to track when and where a parolee has gone.
Parole agents may also establish zones within the GPS system to determine if parolees adhere
to travel or time restrictions. Using the GPS monitoring software, parole agents can draw
boundaries on the map that tracks a parolee, thereby creating zones that a parolee must avoid
or remain within. Parole agents can draw boundaries around a school, and the residence and
workplace of a victim, to keep the parolee out, and draw boundaries around the perimeters of
the parolee's house and surrounding property, to keep the parolee in. Parole agents can also
establish larger zones, like a 25-mile radius from a parolee's house beyond which the parolee
may not travel without permission, and time zones during which a parolee must be at a ce11ain
location. The GPS monitoring device worn by the parolee transmits a signal every minute,
tracking the parolee's location. The system sends alerts to the parole agent if the parolee travels
outside of a permitted zone, crosses an off-limits boundary or violates a curfew.
State of California • November 2009

Page 11

Parolees are monitored at either the active or passive level, depending upon the parolee's
assessed risk to the community. At the active monitoring level, transmissions from the parolee's
monitoring device are uploaded at near real-time intervals and parole agents are alerted
immediately if a parolee crosses a boundary or violates a curfew. At the passive monitoring
level, transmissions from the parolee's monitoring device are uploaded at set intervals and
alerts are usually sent to the parole agent the next day.
As of June 2009, the department reported monitoring nearly 7,000 sex offender parolees with
GPS devices; approximately 2,200 were classified as active with 4,800 classified as passive.
During fiscal year 2008-09, the department spent nearly $14 million on GPS monitoring, not
including the costs of personnel who administer and monitor the information provided by
GPS units.
The department plans to expand its use of GPS to monitor parolees in the future. In the
department's September 18,2009, Population Reduction Plan filed with the United States
District Court, the department reported that it will seek legislation to establish a program of
alternative custody options for lower-risk offenders. Under this program, certain offenders,
including those whose offenses are non-violent, non-serious and non-sexual, would be eligible
to serve the last 12 months of their sentences under house arrest with GPS monitoring. The
department estimates that this would involve approximately 4,800 additional inmates.

Parole Supervision Levels
The department assesses parolees and assigns them to a level of supervision that is
commensurate with their risks to reoffend. The department has three general levels of
supervision: High Control, the most intensive level of supervision; is applied to parolees with
the highest risk of reoffending; mid-level Control Service applies to parolees with an average
risk of reoffending; and Minimum Service is the least intensive supervision level, applied to
parolees least likely to reoffend.
Additionally, the depaJ1ment has created specialized caseload specifications for parole agents
who supervise parolees monitored with GPS at either the active or passive level. The table
below summarizes the activities required for each of the supervision levels.

Bureau of Criminal Investigations, Office of the Inspector General

Page 12

Table 1: Parole supervision levels.
Source: October 2008 department Field Agent Guide.
Level of Supervision
Activity
Face to Face Contacts

Specialized
Caseload

High Control

Control Service

Minimum Service

First working day
following release
from custody,
but no more than
48 hours after
release.

First working day
folloWing release
from custody,
but no more than
48 hours after
release.

First working day
following release
from custody.

At the parolee's
residence within
30 days of
release.

At residence
within six
working days
from initial
release or
revocation
release date.

First face-toface residential
contact must
be within six
working days of
initial release
or revocation
release date.

Two per month.
Four in parolee's
residence per
quarter.

Initial Interview

At residence
within ten
working days of
initial release
or revocation
release date.
One every
other month at
residence.

One contact at
residence within
30 calendar days
of reduction to
minimum service.
One face-toface or collateral
contact every
120 days.

Two each
month; one at
the residence,
one at agent's
discretion.

Conducted no later than the third working day following release from custody.

Collateral Contacts

Two per month.

Two per quarter.

One every
90 days.

One every
120 days.

Anti-Narcotic Testing

One per month.

One per month.

Two per quarter.

This testing
condition will be
waived.

State of California • November 2009

Page 13

Parameters of Review
To develop the information contained in this special report, the Office of the Inspector General
completed the following activities:
• Reviewed Garrido's parole file.
• Interviewed available parole agents who had supervised Garrido during his lO-year
supervision period.
• Inspected Garrido's residence in Antioch, California.
• Interviewed Garrido's neighbors in Antioch, California.
• Reviewed a portion of Garrido's GPS data.
• Obtained the August 2009 case management review assessment completed by the parole
administrator over the parole district supervising Garrido.
• Reviewed Garrido's mental health records maintained by the department's Parole Outpatient
Clinic.
• Interviewed staff at the department's parole academy and reviewed lesson plans used to
instruct parole agents at the academy.
• Contacted local law enforcement agencies to identify Garrido's interactions with local public
safety agencies.
• Contacted key staff from the department's Interstate Compact Parole Unit and reviewed
related documents.
• Interviewed Garrido's brother, Ron Garrido.
• Interviewed the Chief of the Nevada Department of Public Safety, Division of Parole and
Probation.
• Reviewed Garrido's federal parole file.
• Interacted with officials from the department and other law enforcement authorities.

Bureau of Criminal Investigations, Office of the Inspector General

Page 14

Results of Special Review
The Department Failed to Properly Supervise Parolee Garrido
A review of the decade in which Garrido was under the department's jurisdiction reveals
repeated departmental failures to properly supervise Garrido. These fail ures extend to the
supervision and management of parole agents who had oversight of Garrido. Consequently, the
department missed opportunities to detect Garrido's ongoing violations of parole conditions
and continuing criminal activity.
Consistent with the Office of the Inspector General's jurisdiction to oversee the department,
the focus of this special report is the department's parole supervision of Garrido. However, it
should be noted that Garrido was on parole under the jurisdiction of federal parole authorities
from August 1988 to January 1999. While on federal parole, in June 1991, Garrido allegedly
kidnapped Jaycee Dugard and thereafter sexually assaulted her, fathering two children.
Accordingly, it should also be noted that the federal parole authorities failed to detect Garrido's
criminal conduct and his victims, although they did re-incarcerate him for four weeks in 1993.

The department initially praised its supervision of Garrido
Soon after Garrido was arrested, department officials held a press conference to announce that
the department had assisted in identifying Jaycee Dugard and the two children Garrido had
allegedly fathered with her and had played a role in arresting Garrido for those and related
crimes. An official stated that he was "proud of the parole agents" and spoke of the diligence
displayed by the department's parole agents in bringing Garrido into custody. Near the end
of the news conference the official stated that Garrido "had no parole violations during the
entire period of time, so he was compliant with his conditions of parole." Subsequently, the
department has repeatedly reiterated this conclusion.
While it is true that Garrido's parole was never officially violated in California, meaning that
the department took no action to register that Garrido had violated his parole, our review shows
that violations should have been registered. It is now apparent that the department failed in
varying degrees during the parole period to properly supervise Garrido and missed numerous
opportunities to discover his victims.

The department repeatedly failed to provide proper parole supervision
At the request of the department, OIl August 29,2009, the parole administrator for the parole
district that supervised Garrido completed an assessment of the department's handling of
Garrido's case. As part of our special review, we requested, and the department provided,
a copy of the administrator's assessment. The administrator reviewed all documents and
records in the parole file, including every entry made by parole agents and parole supervisors.
In addition to our own review of the department's supervision of Garrido, we also used the
administrator's assessment due to his knowledge of the complexities of the department's parole
supervision requirements.

State of California • November 2009

Page 15

For the 123 months that the department had jurisdiction over Garrido, the administrator found
that there were only 12 months of satisfactory supervision. Put another way, 90 percent of the
time the department's oversight of Garrido lacked required actions (see Figure 4).
As Figure 4 illustrates, the department's inadequate supervision of the Garrido case began
from the start of its jurisdiction, and although it improved significantly over the last two years,
inadequate supervision persisted throughout most of the 10-year span. The administrator noted
that a parole agent failed to conduct a required home visit when Garrido was first assigned to
California parole. In fact, a parole agent did not visit the residence until May 2000, almost one
year after the department began its parole supervision. Similarly, between June 2001 and July
2002, parole agents failed to visit Garrido's home. Between June 2004 and August 2005, parole
agents visited Garrido only once.
The administrator concluded that at least six parole agents had supervised Garrido during this
period; this number may be higher because some of the parole file entries were illegible. The
admi nistrator noted that the parole agent who was supervisi ng Garrido at the time of his arrest
had only been supervising him since October 2008.
Additionally, the administrator found that parole agents failed to perform a multitude of
required home visits, collateral contacts, and drug testing throughout the period of parole
supervision. He found that even after April 2008, when Garrido was placed on the passive GPS
monitoring program-and as a result the parole agent commenced more frequent home visits
(see Figure 4)-the parole agent failed to ensure that Garrido completed required drug testing.
At the outset of Garrido's parole supervision, the department was confused regarding his parole
status and failed to perform even minimum levels of supervision. After being released from
federal parole in March 1999, Garrido first reported to the department on June 8, 1999, at the
department's request.
The department had accepted Garrido for parole supervision from the State of Nevada at
Nevada's request in June 1999. Garrido met with his parole agent at the parole office and
explained that he believed that Nevada should have discharged him from parole supervision
when the federal government discharged him in March 1999. Over the subsequent five months,
the only activity the department performed on Garrido's case was to discuss his objections to
being subject to continued parole supervision. Therefore, it was not until November 9,1999,
that the department began to actively supervise Garrido.
For reasons discussed in detail below, the department then inappropriately assigned Garrido
to its minimum level of supervision rather than to its high control level of supervision, which
would have been consistent with Garrido's being a sex offender. Consequently, between
November 1999 and May 2000, the only contact the department had with Garrido was five
brief monthly written reports that Garrido submitted to the parole agent, and one phone call
that Garrido placed to the parole agent advising the agent he had completed his required annual
registration as a sex offender with the local law enforcement agency.

Bureau of Criminal Investigations, Office of the Inspector General

Page 16

Figure 4: The parole administrator's assessment of Garrido's supervision.
The parole administrator who assessed the department's supervision of Garrido based his assessment
on quarterly periods.

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parole supervision specifications met
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It was not until May 2000 that it occurred to the department that as a sex offender, Garrido
should be supervised at a more intensive level. The department also began subjecting Garrido
to drug testing at this time. However, as Figure 4 shows, and as the administrator concluded
in his August 2009 assessment, after three months of proper supervision, in July 2000 the
department again mishandled Garrido's parole supervision.
Within the department there are conflicting views regarding which parole supervision standard
should have been applied in assessing the department's parole supervision of Garrido.
The administrator who completed the department's August 2009 assessment of itself used
two criteria to assess the department's supervision of Garrido: the Control Service level of
supervision for the years before Garrido was fitted with a GPS unit in April 2008, and the
Specialized Caseload level of supervision after April 2008. Control Service was the level of
supervision the department decided to apply to Garrido when it realized he was a registered sex
offender (Penal Code § 290) in May 2000.
The administrator said that when he assessed the department's supervision of Garrido after the
parolee was placed on GPS monitoring in April 2008, he applied more intensive requirements.
The department had established new specifications for parolees included in the GPS monitoring
program and required parole agents to supervise the GPS parolees as high-risk sex offenderswhich called for the department's most intensive high-control level of supervision-with the
additional requirement that the parolees participate in the department's Parole Outpatient Clinic
program for mental health assessment. Accordingly, the administrator used the Specialized
Caseload supervision requirements to evaluate the department's supervision of Garrido after
April 2008.
The administrator's assessment of the depaltment's supervision of Garrido is depicted in Figure 4.

In stark contrast to the administrator's assessment, department executives told us that they
believe the department's supervision of Garrido met or exceeded requirements in the last

State of Califomia • November 2009

Page 17

three years of supervision prior to Garrido's arrest. The executives believe that the department
did not provide clear supervision expectations to parole agents who monitored parolees with·
GPS. Therefore, the executives assert that the department should continue to use the less
intensive Control Service supervision requirements to evaluate the department's supervision of
Garrido. The executives concluded that if this lesser criterion is used, the department met the
supervision requirements in 2007 and exceeded them in 2008 and 2009. As discussed above,
the department's supervision of Garrido improved during these later periods.
However, it is our assessment that the executives' conclusions are in error. As the administrator
stated above, parole agents were told that they were supposed to supervise GPS parolees as
high-risk sex offenders, which calls for the high-control level of supervision. He provided
us with a document that the department furnished to parole agents to specify the supervision
requirements. The written requirements in this document are the standards that the
administrator used in assessing the department's supervision of Garrido.
Additionally, two different documents we received support the administrator's choice of
criteria to apply in his assessment. First, Garrido's parole file contains a document that
Garrido and his parole agent completed when Garrido began GPS monitoring on April 14,
2008. The form is entitled "HIGH RISK SEX OFFENDER (HRSO) SPECIAL CONDITION
ADDENDUM" and gives the parolee instructions on wearing the GPS device. The reference
to Garrido as a high-risk sex offender is consistent with the administrator's understanding.
Second, the department's Field Agent Guide, dated October 2008, specifies that parole agents
are to monitor parolees on passive GPS monitoring-such as Garrido-at the more intensive
level of supervision used by the administrator in his evaluation.
One executive, however, stated that the Field Agent Guide is just a guide: he noted that
a statement at the front of the manual warns that the guide "should not be construed as
departmental or divisional policy nor should it be relied upon as a complete expression of
policy or procedures." Additionally, the executive pointed out that the guide is dated October
2008, and notes that Garrido began GPS supervision six months earlier, in April 2008.
Therefore, the executive concluded that the department's supervision should continue to be
assessed at the lesser "Control Service" level of supervision.

The support for the criteria the administrator used in his assessment appears to have more merit
than that provided by the executive. As a result, we believe that the administrator's assessment
of the department's supervision of Garrido, as depicted in Figure 4, is a fair assessment of the
department's work on Garrido's case. Nevertheless, as we discuss in detail below, throughout
the entirety of its supervision of Garrido, the department failed to supervise Garrido at its most
intensive High Control level of supervision, the level required for supervising a violent sex
offender. The department confirmed this conclusion when it determined through applying an
updated assessment tool called STATIC-99-subsequent to Garrido's arrest-that High Control
was the appropriate level of supervision for Garrido.

Bureau of Criminal Investigations, Office of the Inspector General

Page 18

The department faded to properly classify Garrido
One explanation for the department's improper supervision of Garrido is that it initially
misclassified Garrido as a low-risk parolee. (n 1999, when the department began supervising
Garrido, its policy was to classify as High Control for at least one year all parolees required
to register as a sex offender under Penal Code section 290. This classification should have
applied to Garrido due to his prior rape and kidnapping crimes. Nevertheless, the department
initially classified Garrido for Minimum Supervision, its least intensive supervisory level. As
a result, until May 2000-almost one year after it began supervising Garrido-the only contact
the department had with Garrido was three office visits, some phone conversations, and five
monthly written reports that Garrido submitted to his parole agent.
According to the parole agent who supervised Garrido during this period, Garrido initially
questioned the legality of the department imposing parole restrictions on him on the behalf of
Nevada and argued that when the federal government released him from parole, that release
also applied to Nevada's parole authority. Because the department had very little information
from the federal parole authorities or Nevada, the parole agent delayed his supervision of
Garrido five months until the department's legal office reviewed the case. Then the parole
agent assigned Garrido to minimum supervision.

In 1999, had the department taken the additional step of reviewing the information contained
in Garrido's federal parole file, it would have received information that could have assisted the
department in correctly assessing Garrido and perhaps even discovering the hidden compound
in the rear of the Antioch property. Included in the federal parole file was information about
Garrido's mental health assessments, failed drug and alcohol tests, and a 1993 parole violation
that led to Garrido being briefly re-incarcerated. This information could have influenced the
parole agent's supervision level for Garrido. Additionally, included in the federal parole file
was information regarding a federal agent's search of the soundproofed recording studio that
Garrido maintained in the back of his residence. This studio was located in the concealed
compound and was where Garrido allegedly kept Jaycee the first year of her captivity and
repeatedly raped her. (nformation about this recording studio could have provided the parole
agent with the knowledge that Garrido's residence extended well beyond the back fence.
Additionally, in January 200 1, the parole agent handling the Garrido case completed a "Sex
Offender Risk Assessment" to evaluate the appropriateness of Garrido's then-current level of
supervision. The assessment places offenders in three categories: low-risk offender, moderaterisk offender, and high-risk offender. The parole agent unfortunately evaluated Garrido as a
low-risk offender, even though that category clearly did not apply. The parole agent chose this
description as most applicable to Garrido:
One or possible registerable [sic] sex offenses in the record along with other nonsex-related offenses. Controlling offense is non-sexual. Offending sexually is more
opportunistic or situational than a primary deviant sexual orientation. These cases can
be reasonably handled on a control service caseload. [Emphasis added]

State of California • November 2009

Page 19

A "controlling offense" is the crime that sent the parolee to prison. Garrido's controlling offense
was clearly sexual in nature: kidnapping an adult female and sexually assaulting her over a sixhour period. The circumstances of the crime show premeditation and deliberation; he handcuffed
the victim and placed a leather strap around her neck and under her knees to conceal her in a
bent-over position while transporting her for an hour to a modified storage shed. Further, Garrido
had drugs, a bed, and sex-related devices in the shed. This information was readily available to
the parole agent and should have caused the agent to elevate Garrido's assessment.
Since the controlling offense was of a serious sexual nature, the parole agent's selection was
incorrect. The appropriate classification for Garrido was high-risk offender as described below:

Controlling offense is sexual, or is related to an established pattern of deviant sexual
behavior. There are usually other sexual offenses in the background. No or minimal
history of non-sex offenses. Offenses clearly deviant sexually oriented. These cases
need referral to the Parole Outpatient Clinic. They need to be handled by the Sex
Offender Specialist Caseload. [Emphasis added]
Had the department identified Garrido as a high-risk offender and supervised him at the more
intensive High Control level, it would have been able to focus more attention on his activities.
The parole administrator who completed the case management review assessment reached a
similar conclusion in his review, finding that the department should have supervised Garrido at
its High Control level of supervision because of his previous sexual criminal behavior. Because
at the time of this assessment Garrido was not monitored by a GPS monitoring device, the even
more intensive Specialized Caseload level of supervision would not apply.
In June 2006, the department implemented a new assessment tool, "STATIC-99," designed to
estimate the probability of sexual and violent recidivism among adult males who have been
convicted of at least one sexual offense against a child or non-consenting adult. The department
issued instructions that the assessment must be used to evaluate all sex offenders being paroled
from prison; however, remiss from that directive were sex offenders, like Garrido, who were
currently on parole. Instead, the department later told staff that additional policies would be
forthcoming.
The department revised its STATIC-99 policies in 2007 and again in 2008; however, neither of
these revisions included instructions on applying the STATIC-99 assessment to sex offenders who
were currently on parole. To date, the department has never developed those written policies.
In July 2009, one month before Garrido's arrest, a parole supervisor completing a case review
directed a parole agent to request a STATIC-99 assessment for Garrido. On September 17,2009,
three weeks after the arrest, the department performed the assessment, which finally correctly
identified Garrido as a high-risk sex offender. This finding corroborates our conclusion that the
department's decision to place Garrido on minimum supervision was a grave error.

Bureau of Criminal Investigations, Office of the Inspector General

Page 20

Parole supervisors failed to detect inadequate oversight of Garrido
Parole supervisors also failed to detect and address the inadequate oversight and assessment
of Garrido by the parole agents responsible for his supervision. The department requires
parole supervisors to periodically review case files to ensure that parole agents are properly
supervising their assigned parolees. The administrator conducting the August 2009 probe into
the Garrido case found 10 instances where parole supervisors did not perform the mandated
reviews, including between April 2001 and October 2003 when no reviews were conducted.
Equally alarming, however, are the 15 instances we found in which parole supervisors
completed case reviews but failed to identify and correct obvious deficiencies in the manner
parole agents handled Garrido's case.
The department failed to provide timely mental health assessment
Additionally, the department did not refer Garrido for mental health assessment until October
2007-more than eight years after it began supervising him-even though the State of Nevada
and California state regulations require such an evaluation upon initiating parole.
According to the department's record of supervision for Garrido, a parole agent determined
in October 2007 that as a registered sex offender, Garrido needed to be referred for a mental
health evaluation. Accordingly, he referred Garrido to the department's Parole Outpatient
Clinic, which provides mental health treatment to parolees. However, the department should
have referred Garrido to these services much earlier. When the State of Nevada paroled Garrido
in August 1988, one of the conditions of his parole was "Outpatient substance abuse and/or
mental health counseling." The document establishing those parole conditions was present
in the department parole file for Garrido. Nevertheless, when the department assumed parole
jurisdiction of Garrido in June 1999, it failed to refer him for a mental health assessment.
Further, the department did not follow California regulations requiring parole agents to refer all
serious sex offenders to the Parole Outpatient Clinic for a mental health assessment. Title 15 of
the California Code of Regulations, section 3610 states in relevant part:
Mandatory referral to a POC [Parole Outpatient Clinic] for a mental health
assessment shall be made by the parole agent of record for the following:
... sex offenders as designated in PC [Penal Code] section 290, for whom a mental
disorder may have been a contributing factor to their commitment offense.
Accordingly, in 1994 the department began requiring all parolees with histories of sex offenses
covered under the provisions of Penal Code section 290 to receive an evaluation through the
Parole Outpatient Clinic. Had the department acted in a timely manner and referred Garrido for
an assessment, it would have provided the department another opportunity to determine that
Garrido had been misclassified as a low risk parolee.

State of California • November 2009

Page 21

The depal1ment recommended Garrido's discharge from parole supervision
On four different occasions, the department recommended to Nevada that it discharge Garrido
from parole: in November 1999-five months after it had begun supervising Garrido-and again
in July 2004, December 2005, and April 2008. In each of these instances, a parole supervisor
concurred with a parole agent's recommendation for discharge. Nevada did not heed the
department's suggestion and continued to subject Garrido to parole supervision. It should be
noted that applying the typical California standard for sex offenders to Garrido's case would
likely have produced Garrido's release from parole after three years.

The department did not use available GPS information
The department also failed to use readily available information from its GPS monitoring
program to identify that Garrido was not adhering to the terms of his parole. In April 2008, as
part of a larger effort to place monitoring devices on all parolee sex offenders, the department
placed a GPS ankle monitoring device on Garrido to electronically monitor his movements.
Given his assessed status as a low-risk sex offender, the department placed Garrido on its
passive GPS monitoring program.
One of the potential uses of the GPS device was to determine whether Garrido traveled more
than 25 miles from his residence of record without prior approval from parole authorities-a
limitation the department placed on Garrido as a condition of his parole. According to a
department official in its electronic monitoring unit, the department can establish an electronic
zone around a parolee's home. The GPS monitoring system will detect this breech and notify
the assigned parole agent. Under the passive GPS monitoring program, the system would
notify the parole agent the next day.
However, the parole agent did not use the tool available to him to establish a restricted travel
zone to monitor Garrido. If done, the system would have alerted parole authorities that Garrido
was repeatedly out of compliance with his conditions of parole. We reviewed GPS information
for Garrido over a 32-day period from July 23, 2009 to August 23,2009. During this limited
time period, we discovered that Garrido went outside of the 25-mile zone seven times,
traveling to Berkeley, Oakland, or San Francisco. The department's parole file does not reflect
that Garrido asked for, or received, permission to go outside the 2S-mile zone from his house
during this time period. The same data we reviewed is readily available to parole agents.
More concerning was that the department ignored alel1s it received from a restricted time zone
that it did establish for Garrido. In the GPS moni toring system that the department used until
June 2009, parole agents established a time zone surrounding Garrido's house, programming the
system to send an alert if Garrido left his residence at night, between about midnight and 7:00
a.m. This important information would help a parole agent ascertain if Garrido was participating
in improper activities. System records show that between April 2008 and June 2009, parole
agents received 14 alerts that Garrido had left his residence after the curfew. Disappointingly,
parole agents ignored each of these alerts, letting them go without any apparent follow-up or
investigation. Ignoring the alelts generated by the system defeats the purpose of this tool.

Bureau of Criminal Investigations, Office of the Inspector General

Page 22

Figure 5: Garrido's GPS "tracks" in concealed compound
Parole agents also ignored
Note: Back yard fence line superimposed by the Office of the
other alerts from the
Inspector
General. Source: Department GPS monitoring system for
department's new GPS
the date of April 15, 2008
system. Between June 5,
2009-when the department
began using its new GPS
system-and August 26,
2009, when Garrido was
arrested, the new GPS system
generated 18 alerts for
Garrido. Most of these alerts
related to Garrido failing
to charge the battery on his
device as required, but one
of the alerts indicated that
the strap securing the device
to Garrido may have been
disconnected. System records
show that the parole agent
acknowledged the first three
alerts, but did not record
whether he investigated the alerts or if the causes for the alerts were resolved. The parole agent
explained that he was unaware that he needed to complete this step. Regrettably, the parole
agent never even acknowledged the remaining 15 alerts, including the alert relating to the strap
securing the device to Garrido's ankle. This indicates that the department continues to fail to
properly use its new system, as it did its previous system.

The parole agent could have also used the GPS information to learn that Garrido spent a
great deal of time in the makeshift concealed compound. Figure 5 presents GPS "tracks"
for a single 12-hour period on April 15,2008, showing Garrido's movement at his residence
that day. Each of the red dots represents a "track," or Garrido's location when the GPS
monitoring unit he wore on his ankle sent a periodic signal to the department's monitoring
system. Figure 5 shows that Garrido spent a significant amount of time in the concealed
compound located behind his residence.
Unfortunately, the parole agent did not view this data and make that discovery. The department
told us that the location of a recorded track may vary from the actual location of the parolee by
as much as 36 feet. Nevertheless, had the parole agent viewed the GPS information, it should
have led him to determine that the boundaries of Garrido's backyard extended beyond what he
bel ieved them to be.
Additionally, we identified significant abnormalities in Garrido's GPS information that, if
identified, should have led to further investigation. During a 32-day period between July
23,2009 and August 23,2009, the department lost the GPS signal from Garrido's ankle
monitoring device almost every night for prolonged periods of time, typically nine or more
State of California • November 2009

Page 23

hours. According to the department official over the electronic monitoring unit, the lost GPS
signal could have been caused by the physical construction of Garrido's house, which may
have blocked the GPS unit's ability to transmit a signal. However, he also stated that parolees
have developed masking techniques to block GPS signals. The official stated that the current
GPS monitoring system-which the department has used since June 2009-will send an alert to a
parole agent if it has lost a signal for 24 or more hours, while the previous system-used prior to
June 2009-sent an alert after a GPS signal was lost for six or more hours.
Even though Garrido's parole agents were repeatedly alerted to the loss of GPS signals, the
parole records reflect that no action was ever taken. Between April 2008 and June 2009, the
GPS system alerted parole agents 335 times that Garrido's GPS monitoring device lost a signal
for prolonged periods of time. This was almost a nightly occurrence. System records show that
parole agents ignored 276 of these alerts altogether. Curiously, the system shows that a parole
agent acknowledged the other 59 alerts, but never described in the parole file the actions-if
any-taken to investigate the cause of the alert. The Record of Supervision form in the parole
file is a legal document and is intended to provide an accurate record of any and all efforts to
supervise a parolee. Accordingly, the department requires parole agents to document in these
forms any activity, action, or piece of information pertaining to a parolee. Parole agents should
have investigated the cause of this abnormality and documented their findings in the parole file.
The department failed to provide GPS supervision policy
One explanation for parole agents not using this important tool to monitor Garrido is that the
department has provided no policies guiding parole agents in monitoring parolees assigned to the
passive GPS monitoring program. According to the parole agent responsible for the parole unit
that monitored Garrido, parole agents that supervise parolees on the GPS monitoring program
received guidance on how to monitor parolees at a series of training classes as it was initiating
the GPS monitoring program. The manual provided to parole agents during the training states
that parole agents must review a parolee's GPS tracks every day. Nevertheless, in this training,
parole agents were told that they were to only review GPS data on a daily basis if parolees were
monitored at the active GPS level. Parole agents did not need to review GPS data for parolees
monitored at the passive GPS level unless the GPS system alerted them to a violation of parole.
Apparently, Garrido could have travelled anywhere, even to the locations of his previous
crimes, and it is likely that he would have gone undetected as long as his GPS device continued
to transmit a signal.
The depal1ment has not provided policies to guide and direct the parole agents who monitor
parolees outfitted with GPS monitoring devices. According to department officials, the
department is in the process of developing policies to guide parole agents who monitor
parolees tracked by the GPS system. However, it had not distributed these policies to the field
when we completed our fieldwork in October 2009.
Garrido case raises larger concerns
The department Secretary has said that the department is holding true to a commitment to fit
every sex offender parolee with a GPS device and monitor them aggressively. However, due
Bureau of Criminal Investigations, Office of the Inspector General

Page 24

to the stark differences between the way the active and passive GPS programs now operate,
this is an inaccurate characterization. Those parolees monitored under the active system are
in fact aggressively monitored, while those monitored in the passive program, like Garrido,
are not. The department's failure to use available GPS information to monitor Garrido, and
our finding that it disregards alerts that the system generates, raises concerns not only about
its current use of GPS but also its planned future expansion of GPS monitoring. As discussed
in the Introduction, the department currently has approximately 7,000 sex offender parolees
wearing GPS monitoring devices-4,800 of whom are monitored at the passive level. Under its
Population Reduction Plan submitted to the United States District Court, the department plans
to use GPS to monitor another 4,800 low-level inmates who will be released up to 12 months
early from prison. The department refers to this program as "Alternative Custody."
Although the inmates to be included in the Alternative Custody program are non-violent, nonserious, and non-sex offenders, should the department use its current passive GPS monitoring
program to monitor these inmates, the Office of the Inspector General is concerned that public
safety could be put at risk. The current passive GPS monitoring program appears to provide
little, if any, value to proactive parole supervision. The department's failure to use the system
to monitor conditions of parole for Garrido, or to periodically review GPS information for all
passive GPS parolees, utterly defeats many of the preventive purposes of tracking parolees.
As currently implemented, the system, at best, provides a potential record of a parolee's actions
after violations have occurred. The Office of the Inspector General used the system data after
Garrido's arrest to find that he repeatedly violated the terms of his parole by traveling more
than 25 miles from his home and frequented the compound behind his backyard where he
allegedly committed his heinous crimes. Although these capabilities are valuable to the law
enforcement community in apprehending parolees who reoffend, the department is remiss in
failing to use the preventive capabilities of GPS.

It cannot be overstated: the passive GPS monitoring program, as currently applied, provides
a false sense of security to the public, who have been told that the department uses GPS
to monitor parolees. Indeed, the Garrido case shows that the current passive GPS model is
ineffective in proactively monitoring parolees.

The department missed other opportunities to discover the victims

In addition to failing to perform the required activities noted above, the department also
missed several opportunities to discover the existence of Garrido's victims. According to the
department's 10-year supervision records of Garrido, its parole agents performed face-to-face
contacts with Garrido at his home on at least 60 occasions. Yet parole agents did not identify
clues suggesting that something was amiss. Later in this report we discuss concerns we have
related to the training parole agents receive to prepare them to complete thorough and effective
inspections of a parolee's residence.
As shown in Figure 6, clearly visible utility lines, including coaxial cable and telephone lines,
ran in makeshift fashion from the corner of Garrido's house to a carport in the back yard. These

State of California • November 2009

Page 25

utility lines then proceeded to the hidden compound in the back of the property where Garrido
had a computer, television, and other electronic devices.
Additionally, as shown in Figure 7, electrical lines came through the fence into the back yard
and ran along the back yard fence, going toward the back of the property. These utility wires
supplied electricity and other utilities to the various structures that Garrido maintained in the
rear of his residence and were in place at the time Garrido kidnapped Jaycee in June 1991.
As a condition of Garrido's parole, any law enforcement officer, including his parole agent,
has authority to search his residence without first obtaining a search warrant. According to
Garrido's most recent parole agent, the agent did inspect Garrido's house and even went into
the backyard. However, the parole agent said that the yard appeared to end at the inner fence
of Garrido's residence. The agent said that he never noticed the utility wires running from the
house toward the back yard or the electrical wire that came through a hole cut in the fence into

Figure 6: Utility lines running from Garrido's residence.
Photos taken from the points of view indicated on the schematic below.
Source: Office of the Inspector General.

schematic, Garrido lot (not to scale) .

........................................................................................................................................................
··

·
·

.
...

utility lines

concealed compound

I

,
I

shed

Garrido's
house

I
I
I

:"---back yard fence
•
................................................

I

.

•

II - view of side yard fence from parking area - see schematic for frame of reference.

m- view of shed from inside hidden compound - see schematic for frame of reference.
Bureau of Criminal Investigations, Office of the Inspector General

Page 26

the back yard and then extended to the rear of the property. However, those wires were clearly
visible in several locations in the back yard.
Previous parole agents who supervised Garrido also recorded that they performed searches of
Garrido's residence. One parole agent even developed a diagram of the house. However, none
of the parole agents documented in their notes that they ever noticed, investigated, or inquired
about the wires.
A trained law enforcement officer searching Garrido's back yard should have observed the
utility wires, particularly since those wires were visible in multiple locations. At a minimum,
the presence of those wires should have raised suspicions that Garrido was engaged in some
type of illegal conduct, perhaps even serjous criminal activity. Utility wires can be an indicator
of crimes such as electricity theft, marijuana cultivation, or the presence of a computer used for
Figure 7: Electrical lines in back yard.
Photos taken from the points of view indicated on the schematic below.
Source: Office of the Inspector General.

schematic, Garrido lot (not to scale) .

........................................................
··

·•

"t······

side yard fen e

concealed compound
shed

"

" ..

..
•

electrical lines

I
I
1
I
I

Garrido's
house

,

'''--- back yard fence

•
...............................................
,

I
I

,

.•

- view of side yard fenceline from back yard - see schematic for frame of reference.

m- view of side yard fence from back yard - see schematic for frame of reference.
State of California • November 2009

Page 27

child pornography. Because Garrido was a registered sex offender, with extensive drug use in
his past, those suspicions would have been merited.
Had the parole agents identified these signs of potential criminal conduct, their suspicions may
have led to inquiries that could have resulted in the discovery of the concealed compound at the
rear of Garrido's property. Furthermore, as discussed previously, the department would have
known that Garrido's yard extended beyond the back fence and included at least one building if
it had reviewed information contained in Garrido's federal parole file.
The department, however, was not alone in its failure to observe these clues that Garrido's
property extended beyond the interior backyard fence. According to local law enforcement
documents, in July 2008, a regional sex offender taskforce searched Garrido's residence during
a sweep of known sex offenders living in Antioch. The department did not participate in the
operation. During the sweep, officers searched the inside and outside of Garrido's residence,
including the back yard. The officers reported finding nothing suspicious, also stating that they
believed the property line ended at the interior back fence.
Juvenile present during home visit
Another opportunity the department missed to discover the existence of Garrido's victims living
in the back part of his property occurred in June 2008. According to records prepared by the
parole agent who supervised Garrido at that time, the parole agent went to Garrido's residence
on June 17, 2008, to perform a periodic face-to-face visit. Present at the house with Garrido
was his wife, his mother, and a 12-year-old female. According to the parole agent's notes, he
questioned Garrido about the young girl. Garrido replied that the girl was his brother's daughter.
The parole agent apparently accepted Garrido's explanation and left. There is no indication in the
department's record of supervision that the parole agent performed any further inquiries.
On the day that Garrido was eventually arrested for kidnapping, rape, and other sexual crimes,
he gave a similar story to his parole agent. He told his parole agent that his three victims,
including the two girls he allegedly fathered with Jaycee, were his brother's children.
Because Garrido's commitment offense, or controlling offense, did not include minors, his

parole at the time did not contain a condition prohibiting him from being in the presence of
minors. Therefore, the presence of the 12-year-old girl alone did not violate Garrido's parole
conditions. However, based on Garrido's criminal history, the parole agent should have
confirmed the story that Garrido provided. Included in Garrido's parole file was information
related to a 1972 arrest for drugging and raping a minor. The charges were evidently dropped
when the minor refused to testify against Garrido. Nevertheless, this arrest in Garrido's past
should have spurred the parole agent to further investigate Garrido's story. We easily contacted
Garrido's brother and determined that he did not have a daughter. If the parole agent had taken
this basic investigative step, he would have determined that Garrido was being dishonest and
could have investigated further.

Bureau of Criminal Investigations, Office of the Inspector General

Page 28

Parole agents failed to speak to key co.llateral contacts
Parole agents also failed to talk to key sources to obtain important collateral information that
may have led them to discover Garrido's victims. Parole agents are required to periodically
contact collateral sources of information to ensure that a parolee is adhering to his or her paroJe
terms and conditions. The department defines a collateral contact as any communication with
another person concerning a parolee. Parole agents often talk to parolees' spouses, roommates,
employers, and relatives. Neighbors and local law enforcement agencies are also good sources
of information because they may be aware of behavior the parolee exhibits when the parole
agent is not present.
We reviewed the department's supervision record of Garrido and found no instances of parole
agents speaking to Garrido's neighbors. We went to Garrido's neighborhood and spoke to five
of Garrido's neighbors. From
our interviews, we learned
Figure 8: Eight-foot high privacy side fence in Garrido's back yard.
that some of the neighbors
Source: Office of the Inspector General.
had concerns about Garrido's
"weird" behaviors, and that
two neighbors had seen
children at his house. These
comments are consistent with
parole agent comments in
their records over the years
that Garrido exhibited strange
behavior.
Another neighbor, whose
backyard shared a fence with
Garrido, told us he once
met Jaycee. The neighbor
described a conversation
he had in the summer of
1991-when he was about
eight years old-with a young blond glrl through the chicken wire fence that used to separate
his yard from Garrido's. He said that the girl told him her name was Jaycee and she lived there.
The neighbor reported that as he was talking to Jaycee, Garrido came out and took her into the
house. Soon thereafter, Garrido built an eight-foot privacy fence that separated their yards.
Had a parole agent talked to people living in the neighborhood, he may well have learned this
same information. That information, aJong with the fact that Garrido is a registered sex offender,
may have led a parole agent to further investigate Garrido and perhaps discover Jaycee.
Furthermore, local law enforcement and emergency services agencies had numerous contacts
with Garrido. However, because the department has not established a policy to require
parole agents to periodically contact local law enforcement agencies, the department was not
aware of these interactions. While the department has good relationships with many local
State of California • November 2009

Page 29

law enforcement agencies and often shares information on parolees, it usually does so in the
context of locating absconded parolees or those believed to be involved in ongoing criminal
behavior.
According to the Contra Costa County Sheriff's Office, it or other public safety agencies had
at least 30 interactions with Garrido or other persons at his address. Included in these contacts
was a November 30, 2006 call from a resident who lived next door to Garrido. The call
included the following information:
... neighbor at 1554 Walnut [Garrido's residence] has several tents in yard with
people living in them and there are children there. [Reporting party] was concerned
because neighbor has sexual addiction.
On another occasion, the fire department responded to Garrido's residence in June 2002 on a
report of ajuvenile with a shoulder injury that occurred in a swimming pool. Had the parole
agent obtained this information, he would have observed that the report included ajuvenile and
a swimming pool, neither of which were observed at the Garrido residence during the parole
agent's home visits. The pool and the juvenile were located in the concealed compound.
However, no indication of these contacts appears in the department's parole file on Garrido.
Accordingly, parole agents were never able to include this valuable information in their
evaluation of Garrido's adherence to his conditions of parole. Indeed, had a parole agent
supervising Garrido contacted local law enforcement or emergency services agencies and
obtained the above information--especially the information from the November 30, 2006
call-he could have detected Garrido's criminal activity.
Subsequent to Garrido's arrest, the director of the department's Division of Adult Parole
Operations sent a memorandum to parole staff stating that the parole mission goes beyond
simply holding offenders accountable when parole agents become aware of potential parole
violations. Rather, staff should use their knowledge and resources to detect violations that may
not be readily apparent during routine visits with an offender. The memorandum also states
that through the delicate balance between essential services and controls and staff expertise
and dedication, the division is able to best achieve its mission. One of the controls described is
collateral contacts. The memorandum states:
Collateral contacts provide the agent with insight that is not controlled by the parolee.
A good collateral contact could include speaking with neighbors about the parolee's
behavior, law enforcement communications centers to determine if there have been
any recent police contacts/cal Is at the parolee's residence, the parolee's employer or
co-workers, or any known service providers.
Parole agents failed to act promptly on known information
At the time of Garrido's arrest, Garrido's parole agent did not address or resolve two specific
improprieties of \ovhich the parole agent should have been aware. A Berkeley police officer told
the parole agent about Garrido's visit to the campus. The lone fact that Garrido had traveJled
Bureau of Criminal Investigations, Office of the Inspector General

Page 30

to UC Berkeley should have immediately caused the parole agent to investigate further, since
Berkeley is approximately 40 miles from Garrido's Antioch residence. As discussed, Garrido's
parole terms limited his travel to a 25-mile radius from his home without permission from his
parole agent.
More significantly, the parole agent was aware that Garrido had in his presence two girls who
referred to hlm as "daddy" and to whom Garrido referred as his daughters. The parole agent's
suspicions should have been raised immediately since the agent believed Garrido had no young
children. Further, one of Garrido's existing parole prohibitions was that he have no contact
with females between the ages of 14 and 18 years. Specifically, the prohibition states:
You shall not have contact with females between the ages of 14 and 18. 'No contact'
means exactly that. No contact in any form, whether direct or indirect, personally, by
telephone, letter, electronic, computer, or through another person.
The parole agent questioned Garrido about the identity of the children and searched his
residence, but upon reviewing his parole file with a supervisor, decided that the condition
prohibiting Garrido from contacting minors was imposed in error. However, Garrido's parole
file also included information related to his 1972 arrest for drugging and raping a 15-year old
girl. While this 1972 arrest did not result in a conviction, the arrest, along with the violent
nature of Garrido's 1976 kidnapping and rape crimes, provides a reasonable basis for enforcing
the previously imposed parole restriction regarding juvenile females. Given the UC Berkeley
police officer's observations of the two girls accompanying Garrido, the more responsi ble
course of action would have been to investigate the identities and welfare of the children
that night. The parole agent was told that the two girls were calling Garrido "daddy" at UC
Berkeley, a statement the parole agent knew to be untrue. However, the parole agent apparently
accepted Garrido's story that the two children belonged to his brother. Instead of contacting
Garrido's brother on the spot to resolve this conflict, the parole agent drove Garrido back to his
residence, released him and instructed him to return to the parole office the next day.
Given Garrido's violent criminal past and his increasingly bizarre behavior as documented by
the parole agent and observed by the UC Berkeley police officer, it is not unreasonable to fear
that the parole agent's failure to further investigate that night may have placed Garrido's three
captives in greater danger or prompted Garrido to flee. Clearly, the parole agent had legitimate
concerns for the well being of the two girls in question; why he did not pursue these concerns
that evening is unclear.

Parole Agents Lack Adequate Training
One reason that department parole agents failed to detect the existence of the compound in the
far rear of Garrido's property is that they had inadequate training. The department's 10-week
academy does not provide parole agents with satisfactory training on how to perform home
inspections. Nor is there adequate on-the-job field training for parole agents after they complete
the academy. Training that provides parole agents with guidance on how to perform effective
home inspections, including how to be aware of and receptive to signs of parole violations or

State of California • November 2009

Page 31

other criminal behavior, should be provided to parole agents. This knowledge is imperative if
failures like those in Garrido's case are to be avoided. Such training should be mandatory.
We went to the department's parole academy and interviewed academy coordinators to
determine the training they provide to parole agents. The coordinators told us that parole agents
are trained to ascertain whether a parolee is in compliance with his specific conditions of parole
by observing the home and interviewing the parolee. Parole agents are trained to obtain an
"overall picture of compliance" during the home inspection by performing a "cursory" search
of the parolee's residence, the coordinators explained.
The coordinators acknowledged, however, that they do not provide parole agents with specific
or clear protocols on where or what to search for. For example, they said that a parole agent is
not required to search a parolee's backyard, unless an agent suspects that evidence of a parole
violation would be found there. When we interviewed Garrido's most recent parole agent, he
told us that he had received no training at all in the academy on how to conduct parolee home
inspections.
The department seems to recognize, however, at least in part, the need to address and correct
the profound breakdown that occurred in the Garrido case. Subsequent to Garrido's arrest, the
acting director of the department's Division of Adult Parole Operations sent a memorandum
to parole staff stating that home inspections should incorporate, among other things, "A
walk-through of the entire residence, to include the yard (back and front) to establish an
understanding of how the residence is laid out and who resides within the residence and the
confines of the property."
There is no field training program for new parole agents after they graduate from the
department's academy, and supervisors are not required to provide on-the-job training to new
parole agents. Instead, after completing the lO-week course of instruction in the academy,
new parole agents complete two years of service to be considered journey-level parole agents.
During this period, parole agents meet with their supervisors periodically to discuss their cases.
The department provides the parole agents with no formal on-the-job training during this twoyear period.
The unit supervisor overseeing the Garrido case confirmed this information. He told us that the
two-year program for new parole agents consists of periodic case reviews and parole agents
filling out month-end reports to capture the number of hours they spent in specific task areas.
The unit supervisor said that he does not normally accompany a new parole agent to provide
training on skills such as how to perform a home inspection, and that he relies on the academy
to provide such training.
Additionally, the unit supervisor told us that he believed it would be helpful to new parole
agents if the department had field training officers to teach and guide new agents when they
come out of the academy. This concept is similar to the models used by police and sheriff
agencies. The Office of the Inspector General agrees.

Bureau of Criminal Investigations, Office of the Inspector General

Page 32

Findings
As a result of this special review into the department's parole supervision of parolee Phillip
Garrido, the Office of the Inspector General finds the following:

Parole Supervision
• The department incorrectly classified Garrido as a low-risk offender and later failed to use a
newly-developed assessment tool to correctly classify him as high-risk.
• Although its supervision of Garrido improved significantly over the final few years, the
department repeatedly failed to adequately supervise Garrido throughout the IO-year period
of its parole supervision.
• Parole supervisors failed to provide proper supervision over parole agents overseeing Garrido.
• The department failed to obtain key parole information on Garrido from federal parole
authorities.

GPS Monitoring
• The department's current passive GPS monitoring program is ineffective as a proactive tool
and provides a false sense of security to the public.
• The department has no policies guiding parole agents on how to monitor parolees assigned to
the passive GPS monitoring program.
• The department failed to use its GPS system to monitor Garrido's compliance with a 25-mile
travel restriction.
• The department routinely ignored alerts from the GPS system indicating that Garrido was not
following parole instructions or had repeated and regular loss of GPS signal.
• The department's failure to use available GPS information to monitor Garrido raises
concerns not only about its current use of GPS but also its planned future expansion of GPS
moni tori ng.

Missed Opportunities
• Department fail ures resulted in several missed opportunities to discover the existence of
Garrido's three victims that he held captive in a concealed compound on his property.
o

Parole agents failed to observe and investigate clearly visible utility wires running from
Garrido's house back towards the concealed compound.

o

A parole agent failed to verify Garrido's explanation regarding a 12-year old female present
during a home visit.

o

Parole agents failed to talk to Garrido's neighbors.

o

Parole agents failed to contact local public safety agencies to obtain information regarding
contact they had with Garrido.

State of California • November 2009

Page 33

o

Parole agents failed to refer Garrido for the required Mental Health assessment for more
than six years.

o

Parole agents failed to act on information clearly showing Garrido had violated his parole
terms.

Training
• The department does not provide adequate training to parole agents to conduct parolee home
inspections.

Bureau of Criminal Investigations, Office of the Inspector General

Page 34

Recommendations
In this special report, the Office of the Inspector General discloses systemic problems that
transcend parolee Garrido's case and jeopardize public safety. To address these deficiencies,
the department should take the following actions:

Parole Supervision
• Enforce appropriate standards for parole agents to properly supervise their assigned parolees
and for parole supervisors to properly supervise parole agents.
• Ensure that all sex offender parolees have been correctly assessed for their risks to re-offend
using the department's revised assessment tool.
• Require parole agents to obtaIn parole information from federal or other state parole
authorities when a parolee has been recently supervised by these entities.
• Establish a mechanism to obtain and share information with local public safety agencies.

GPS Monitoring
• Develop and implement a comprehensive Global Positioning System (GPS) monitoring policy.
• Move all sex offender parolees to the active GPS monitoring program, or significantly
enhance the passive GPS monitoring program.
• Require parole agents to fully use the capabilities of the GPS monitoring system, such as
establishing a zone to monitor parolees' compliance with conditions of parole that they not
travel more than specified distances from their houses wi thout prior approval.
• Require parole agents to investigate, resolve, and record the resolution to all GPS system alerts.

Training
• Provide training to its parole agents and supervisors on:
o

Using its GPS monitoring system to ensure parolees comply with their conditions of parole
and taking appropriate actions to ensure that parole agents use the system to enforce the
conditions of parole.

o

Properly classifying parolees, including serious sex offenders.

o

Conducting a parolee home inspection, including search techniques on how to be aware of
clues to potential parole violations or other criminal behavior.

o

Contacting neighbors to obtain collateral information on parolee behavior.

o

Referring parolees to mental health assessment when appropriate.

• Implement a field training officer program to provide on-the-job training to parole agents
after they complete the academy and have been assigned parole caseloads.

State of California • November 2009

Page 35

Appendix A
Garrido's Release from Federal Parole
/ ..r-

;--.. . . .

,,""'"

,.
1·'-\.
J.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTI<>

;~)

CERTIFICATE OF EARLY TERMINATION

Uni.ted States Parole Commission

GARRIDO, Phillip Craig

36377-136

Date Sentence
Imposed:
3/11/1977
District of
Supervision:

1/20/1988

Date Supervision Began:

Northern California

The Commission has issued the following order:

YOU ARE HEREBY DISCHARGED FROM PAROLE

By this action, you are no longer under the jurisdiction of the U.S. Parole Commission.
Mer a thorough review of your case, the Commission has decided that you are deserving of an
early discharge. You are commended for having responded positively to sup~rvision and for the
personal accomplishment(s) you have made. The Corn.=ission trusts that you will continue to be
a productive citizen and obey the laws of society.

March 9, 1999

R.aymond E. Essex'

Date

Administrator
[ ;;:::, Cop,

[ J u.s. Probation Officer Copy

[J

File Ccpy

Pa!(.le Form H·15

Page lotI

Bureau of Criminal Investigations, Office of the Inspector General

Page 36

Appendix B
Summary of Parolee Garrido's Significant Contact with Public Safety Agencies

Date Description
May 28,1970

Garrido arrested by local law enforcement for drug related charges. He receives
probation.

March 3, 1972

Garrido is arrested on drug related charges. He receives probation,

April 14,1972

Arrested by local law enforcement for Contributing to the Delinquency of a Minor,
Rape, and Adult Providing Dangerous Drugs to a Minor. Case was dismissed for
"Furtherance of Justice."

November 23,1976
March 11,1977
April 11, 1977
January 20,1988

Garrido arrested for kidnapping and rape in Reno, Nevada.
Garrido sentenced on federal kidnapping charges. Sentenced to 50 years.
Garrido convicted offorcible rape by the state of Nevada, sentenced five years to life.
Garrido paroled from federal incarceration and on January 22, 1988, received into
custody by Nevada Department of Prisons.

August 26,1988

Garrido paroled from Nevada prison to begin federal parole supervision at his mother's
house in Antioch, California.

August 16, 1990

Report of white male chasing two adult females in Oakley, California. In September
2009, reporting party identifies subject as Garrido after viewing his picture on
television.

June 10, 1991

Garrido allegedly kidnaps II-year old girl from South Lake Tahoe, California.

April 22, 1992

Possible sighting of kidnapped II-year girl in Antioch, CA reported to local law
enforcement. Description of vehicle, but no identification of suspect.

March 18, 1993

February 10, 1997
March 9, 1999
March 18, 1999

Federal government issues arrest warrant for Garrido for failing to report to federal
probation officer as required and failing to palticipate in drug testing and aftercare
counseling as directed. Garrido is incarcerated on April I, 1993 and released on April
29, 1993.
Local law enforcement issues Garrido a traffic citation.
U.S. Parole Administration terminates Garrido's federal parole supervision.
Local law enforcement issues Garrido a traffic citation.

June 8,1999

Garrido begins parole supervision with California Department of Corrections

June 9,1999

Garrido registers with local law enforcement as a sex offender.

Decem ber 23, 1999
April 13,2000

Local law enforcement performs check on Garrido at his residence because of his
status as a sex offender.
Garrido registers with local law enforcement as a sex offender.

April 3,2001

Garrido registers with local law enforcement as a sex offender.

April 8, 2002

Garrido registers with local law enforcement as a sex offender.

June 17,2002

Fire department responds to Garrido residence on repolt of a juveni Ie with shou Ider
injury that occurred in swimming pool.

July 20, 2002

Local law enforcement performs traffic stop on Garrido.

March 31,2003

Garrido registers with local law enforcement as a sex offender.

August 26, 2003

Local law enforcement stop a vehicle registered to Garrido.

April 8, 2004

Garrido registers with local law enforcement as a sex offender.

April 5, 2005

Garrido registers with local Jaw enforcement as a sex offender.

State of California • November 2009

Page 37

October 11, 2005
April 6, 2006
November 30, 2006

December 4, 2006
April 5, 2007
August 23, 2007

Local law enforcement performs traffic stop on Garrido.
Garrido registers with local law enforcement as a sex offender.
Garrido's neighbor reports to local law enforcement several tents in Garrido's
yard with people living in them and that there are children present. The neighbor
is concerned because Garrido has sexual addiction. No action taken by responding
officers.
Local law enforcement queries Garrido in law enforcement database.
Garrido registers with local law enforcement as a sex offender.
Local law enforcement queries Garrido in law enforcement database.

March 5,2008

Garrido calls the fire department to repoli an elderly person fell.

March 6,2008

Local law enforcement queries Garrido in law enforcement database.

March 14,2008

Local law enforcement queries Garrido in law enforcement database.

March 28,2008

Local law enforcement queries Garrido.in law enforcement database.

April 8, 2008

Garrido registers with local law enforcement as a sex offender.

April 8,2008

Local law enforcement queries Garrido in law enforcement database.

April 14, 2008

Parole agent places GPS tracking device on Garrido.

May 21, 2008

Garrido calls the fire department regarding the health of an elderly female.

June 24, 2008

Local law enforcement queries Garrido in law enforcement database.

June 27, 2008

Local law enforcement queries Garrido in law enforcement database.

July 2, 2008

Local law enforcement queries Garrido in law enforcement database.

July 10,2008

Sex offender task force executes search warrant at Garrido's residence as part of a
sweep of area registered sex offenders.

August 1, 2008

Local law enforcement queries Garrido in law enforcement database.

November 10, 2008

Local law enforcement queries Garrido in law enforcement database.

April 4,2009
April 14, 2009

Garrido registers with local law enforcement as a sex offender.
Local law enforcement queries Garrido in law enforcement database.

June 3, 2009

Call to fire department from Garrido residence re: health of elderly female.

June 8, 2009

Call to fire department from Garrido residence re: health of elderly female.

June 22, 2009

Call to fire department from Garrido residence re: health of elderly female.

August 25, 2009

DC Berkeley police call Garrido's parole agent to report concerns regarding minors
accompanying Garrido on campus. The parole agent goes to Garrido's residence and
brings him to parole office for questioning. The parole agent returns Garrido to his
residence and instructs him to report to the parole office the next day.

August 26,2009

Garrido reports to the parole office with his wife, a female adult, and two female
juveniles. The parole agent separates the females from Garrido and interviews them,
but is unable to obtain clear identification. The parole agent then interviews Garrido
and receives conflicting information. The parole agent contacts Concord Pol ice who
interview Garrido and determines Garrido is the father of the juveniles. The parole
agent again interviews Garrido who confesses that he kidnapped and raped the female
adult. Garrido is arrested.

Bureau of Criminal Investigations, Office of the Inspector General

Page 38

California Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation's response to the special report

STATE OF CALIFORNIA -OEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS ANO REHABILITATION

(page 1)

ARNOLD SCHWARZENEGGER, GOVERNOR

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
P.O. Box 942883
Sacramenlo, CA 94283-0001

November 2, 2009

Mr, David R. Shaw
Inspector General
Office of the Inspector General
P.O. Box 348780
Sacramento, CA 95834-8780
Dear Mr. Shaw;
Thank you for your report on the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation's
supervision of parolee Phillip Garrido. \Vbile we appreciate the efforts of law enforcement and
parole in apprehending Garrido, we regret he was not caught sooner. As you note, the
Department recognized many of the issues raised in your report as part of the internal review that
we provided to your office. And we agree that although the Department improved its
supervision of Garrido in recent years, even further improvements in our system of parole
supervision are needed.
That is why in March of this year, th~ Department annoUnced that it would be seeking reforms of
its parole system. The Department sought to recreate parole, transforming it into a risk-based
system of supervision that targets its resources on dangerous offenders. The Department also
explained that parole agent caseloads needed to be reduced so that high-risk parolees could be
properly supervised. Dangerous offenders demand more time and attention from our parole
staff.
We are grateful the Governor and Legislature recently passed into law a parole reform package
that will enable the Department to create the type of risk-based supervision that is needed. When
the law becomes effective on January 25, 2010, the Department will be ready to implement a
system of parole supervision that uses risk to ensure that the most dangerous offenders receive
the closest supervision. As part of this system, the Department will ensure, as the Inspector
General has recommended, that all parolees will be assessed for risk and that clear, riskappropriate supervision standards will guide our parole agents. Perhaps most significantly, with
this legislative change, the Department will be able to reduce parole agent caseloads and the
supervisory span of control and thereby be able to resolve the challenges created by a strain on
parole supervision with too many offenders and too few agents, supervisors and managers.
Thus, closer supervision can be paid to high-risk parolees. The Department appreciates that
resources will soon be available for these very important purposes.
At the same time, the Department will continue to improve GPS policies and training as we
become increasingly familiar with the possibilities of this evolving technology and as the
technology itself improves. Over the last several years, the Department has been aggressive in

State of California • November 2009

Page 39

Califorl1ia Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation's response to the special report

(page 2)

Mr. David R. Shaw
Page 2

placing all sex offenders on GPS even though GPS as a community corrections model is still in
its infancy. In the future, we will ensure that parole agents periodically review all GPS tracks.
We believe that GPS continues to be a valuable tool in the parole supervision model,
demonstrated by its utilization on numerous occasions to detect and prevent criminal activity,
and we will continue to strive to exceed local and national GPS standards.
Again, it is regrettable that the victims in this case were not discovered sooner. We are
conuuitted to doing everything we can to improve our system so that high-risk parolees are more
closely supervised. We look forward to implementing our vision of parole reform so that those
improvements are realized.
I would like to thank the Inspector General for this report. If there is anything further, I can be
reached at (916) 323-6001.
Sincerely,

MATTHEW L. CATE
Secretary

t
I
I

Bureau of Criminal Investigations, Office of the Inspector General

Page 40

SPECIAL REPORT
THE CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND REHABILITATION'S
SUPERVISION OF PAROLEE PHILLIP GARRIDO
OFFICE OFTHE INSPECTOR GENERAL
DAVID R. SHAW
INSPECTOR GENERAL
SAMUEL DUDKIEWICZ
CHIEF DEPUTY INSPECTOR GENERAL (A)
DEBRA DEROSIER
DEPUTY INSPECTOR GENERAL, IN-CHARGE
DAVE BIGGS
DEPUTY INSPECTOR GENERAL
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
NOVEMBER 2009
WWW.OIG.CA.GOV

ATTACHMENT # 15

ATTACHMENT # 16

Grant Results
CY 1978 through CY 2010

# of Grants from CY 1978 through CY 2010

3,150

-- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -2 - - -0%
# of Grants from 1978 through 1980
# of Grants from
# of Grants from
# of Grants from
# of Grants from
# of Grants from
# of Grants from
# of Grants from
# of Grants from
# of Grants from
# of Grants from

1981
1984
1987
1990
1993
1996
1999
2002
2005
2008

throuqh
through
throuqh
through
throuqh
through
through
throuqh
through
through

1983
1986
1989
1992
1995
1998
2001
2004
2007
2010

105
172
92
139
39
53
148
550
521
1,329

3%
5%
3%
4%
1%
2%
5%
17%
17%
42%

*Note: From 1978 through 2007 there were 1821 Grants
**Note: From 2008 through 2010 there were 1329 Grants
***These data values may differ from those previously published due to database updates.

1/Revised January 18, 2011

"

Suitability Hearing Summary
CY 1991 through CY 2010

CALENDAR
YEAR

SUITABILITY
HEARINGS
SCHEDULED

---SUITABILITY
HEARINGS
CONDUCTED*

1991

1,729

1992

-

-----

--

---

-

-

-

--

-

-- -------

NUMBER OF
GRANTS**

INMATES
PAROLED***

SOURCE****

1,283

49

33

Historical

1,743

1,327

16

12

Historical

1993

1,613

1,304

19

15

Historical

1994

1,970

1,475

12

11

Historical

1995

2,128

1,845

8

7

Historical

1996

2,287

2,182

10

9

Historical

1997

2,274

2,170

16

16

Historical

1998

2,172

2,028

27

26

Historical

1999

1,950

1,782

13

13

Historical

2000

2,164

1,678

52

41

Historical

2001

3,630

2,631

83

66

Historical

2002

4,807

3,156

168

116

Historical

2003

4,479

2,354

168

120

Historical

2004

4,542

2,300

214

149

Historical

2005

4,933

2,571

161

111

Historical

2006

6,928

3,639

241

146

Historical

2007

6,181

3,118

119

87

Historical/LSTS

2008

7,073

3,473

293

180

LSTS

2009

7,121

3,420

542

193

LSTS

2010

5,639

2,714

494

138

LSTS

'Note: Suitability Hearings Conducted is comprised of Grants, Denial, Split Decisions and Continuations. Based
on the use of various databases we are unable to determine if Stipulations, Postponements and Waivers were at
hearing or pre-hearing events.
"Note: The "Number of Grants" column is comprised of the number of hearings resulting in a grant during the
calendar year specified.
"'Note: The "Inmates Paroled" column indicates the number of inmates that were paroled as a result of a
hearing in the specified year, regardless of the actual year of release. For example, an inmate who received a
grant hearing result in 1991, but was not released until 1993 is tabulated in 1991. This is because the hearing in
which he/she was granted parole occurred in 1991. Calendar Years 2008,2009 and 2010 totals in this section
are approximations and may differ from previous publications due to database updates.
····Note: Calendar years 1991 through 2006 is comprised of data from an archived database. Calendar year
2007 is comprised of data from both the archived database and from the Lifer Scheduling and Tracking System
(LSTS). Specifically, January 1,2007, though October 31,2007 data is from the archived database and data
from November 1, 2007 through December 31, 2007 is from LSTS. Calendar years 2008 to present is from
LSTS.
·····Note: These data values may differ from those previously published due to database updates.
1\Numbers may fluctuate due to future release dates, Credit for Time Served, and Updates to archive databases.
Revised January 18, 2011

,

';

Suitability Hearing Summary
CY 1978 through CY 1990

--

----SUITABILITY
CALENDAR HEARINGS
YEAR
SCHEDULED
1978

~

1

--- - - - - - SUITABILITY
HEARINGS
NUMBER OF
INMATES
CONDUCTED*
GRANTS** PAROLED***
~~~

1

1

--~~--

-~-~~-.

SOURCE****

1

Historical

1979

1

1

1

1

Historical

1980

2

2

0

0

Historical

1981

321

321

31

25

Historical

1982

776

776

29

25

Historical

37

Historical

54

Historical

1983

839

839

45

1984

707

706

59

1985

823

810

64

61

Historical

1986

942

820

49

40

Historical

1987

877

747

40

34

Historical

1988

28

24

Historical

1,017

870

1989

1,138

945

24

17

Historical

1990

1,817

1,439

74

56

Historical

*Note: Suitability Hearings Conducted is comprised of Grants, Denial, Split Decisions and
Continuations. Based on the use of various databases we are unable to determine if Stipulations,
Postponements and Waivers were at hearing or pre-hearing events.

**Note: The number of Grant totals is comprised of the number of results occurring during the
calendar year. It does not represent the number of inmates released during that year. If the inmate
had a future release date he/she would have remained in custody until that time.
***Note: The number indicates inmates who were granted parole in that specific year, regardless of
the actual year of release. For example, an inmate who received a grant hearing result in 1991, but
was not released until 1993 is tabulated in 1991.
****Note: Calendar years 1978 through 1990 is comprised of data from an archived database.
LSTS.
*****Note: These data values may differ from those previously published due to database updates.

Numbers may fluctuate due to future release dates, Credit for Time Served, and Updates to archive databases.
Revised January 18, 2011

INMATES SERVING A LIFE SENTENCE WHO WERE GRANTED PAROLE DATES
1400
1200
1000
800

+ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -__- - - -

600

+----------------------------------.'------

400

+-----------------------------..r:----------

200

r--~:;;;-jiiill-~:;;;; ;:~---_=~;;fJr------------

..

o
78-80

81-83

84-86

87-89

90-92

93-95

96-98

99-01

02-04

05-07

08-10

INMATES SERVING A LIFE SENTENCE WHO WERE GRANTED PAROLE DATES
1400
1200

+------------------------------------

1000 + - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 800

+------------------------------------

600

1----------------------------------

400

1----------------------------

200

+-----------------------------

o

-~---"T

78-80

81-83

84-86

87-89

90-92

93-95

96-98

99-01

02-04

05-07

08-10

PERCENTAGE BY YEAR IN WHICH INMATES SERVING A LIFE SENTENCE WERE GRANTED PAROL£ DATES

.78-80
.81·83
.8<:-86

.8;-89
aOO-!l2

a 93·95
.96·98
-99-01
02-0>
a~7

aOS-l0