D E PA R T M E N T O F J U S T I C E | O F F I C E O F T H E I N S P E C T O R G E N E R A L

MANAGEMENT ADVISORY MEMORANDUM
23-095
AUGUST 2023

Notification of Concerns Identified in the Drug
Enforcement Administration’s Use of
Polygraph Examinations in Pre-employment
Vetting

AUDIT DIVISION

D E P AR T M E N T O F J U S T I CE | OF FI C E O F T H E I N S PE C T OR G E N E R A L

August 22, 2023
Management Advisory Memorandum
To:

Anne Milgram
Administrator
Drug Enforcement Administration

From:

Michael E. Horowitz
Inspector General

Subject:

Management Advisory Memorandum – Notification of Concerns Identified in the Drug
Enforcement Administration’s Use of Polygraph Examinations in Pre-employment Vetting

The purpose of this memorandum is to advise you of concerns that the Department of Justice (DOJ) Office of
the Inspector General (OIG) has identified during our ongoing audit of the Drug Enforcement
Administration’s (DEA) use of polygraph examinations in pre-employment vetting.1 We initiated this audit to
assess the DEA’s policies and procedures for conducting pre-employment polygraph examinations, and to
determine whether the DEA’s adjudication of polygraph results is timely, thorough, and objectively decided.2
On March 21, 2019, then Acting DEA Administrator Dhillon issued a memorandum stating that “the DEA will
not hire Special Agent or Intelligence Research Specialist applicants who receive a countermeasures or
significant response result on their DEA-administered polygraph examination.” Since initiating our audit in
August 2022, we identified numerous concerns that we believe warrant the DEA’s immediate attention.
Specifically, we uncovered inconsistencies in the implementation of the 2019 polygraph policy and
significant risks involving the DEA’s polygraph program, including hiring Special Agents and certain other
applicants who have not successfully completed some or all of the polygraph examination, and allowing
Task Force Officers who have failed the polygraph examination to remain on DEA task forces. We also
learned about issues with regard to the handling of polygraphs for applicants with relatives who currently,
or formerly, worked for the DEA.
1

In addition to polygraph examinations, the DEA’s hiring process includes background investigations and hiring panel
reviews to help validate the integrity and character of applicants for its most sensitive positions.

2

Other DOJ components, including the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms
and Explosives, require applicants to successfully complete a polygraph examination as part of the pre-employment
vetting process.
As part of the Intelligence Community, the DEA must abide by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence’s
Security Executive Agent Directives (SEAD). SEAD 2 outlines the regular use of polygraph examinations in support of
personnel security determinations for initial or continued eligibility for access to classified information or eligibility to
hold a sensitive position.

1

Given the DEA’s determination that the successful passing of a polygraph examination is an important part
of the hiring process, these issues have resulted in potential security risks to DEA operations and the
appearance of unfair hiring practices when individuals who have not completed the polygraph process are
nonetheless hired by the DEA.

The DEA’s Use of Polygraph Examinations in Pre-Employment Vetting
The DEA’s current policy requires that a pre-employment polygraph examination be administered to
applicants for four core series positions: Special Agent, Intelligence Research Specialist, Diversion
Investigator, and Forensic Chemist.3 Applicants are given both a Suitability polygraph and a National
Security polygraph examination that include questions related to past drug use, serious criminal activity,
truthfulness on pre-employment documentation, and National Security issues. The DEA uses the polygraph
results to verify information provided to the DEA by an applicant, as well as to evaluate an applicant’s
character or suitability for the position and any potential National Security risk.
Figure 1 reflects the four categories of polygraph results (“No Significant Response,” “Significant Response,”
“Countermeasures,” and “No Opinion”) and any accompanying restrictions based on the outcome of the
polygraph examination.

Figure 1
Potential Polygraph Results
No Significant
Response
• Occurs when no
significant physiological
response occurs in
response to the same
question when asked
several times.
• Applicant is eligible for
the position for which
they applied, and for
any other DEA position
requiring a polygraph
for a period of 3 years.

Significant Response

Countermeasures

No Opinion

• A significant
physiological response
occurs in response to
the same question
when asked several
times indicating
deception.

• A physical, mental,
and/or pharmacological
effort is intended to
alter the physiological
data collected during
the exam.

• A conclusive result
cannot be determined.
An applicant may be
tested no more than
three times to resolve a
“No Opinion” result.

• Applicant is disqualified
from the position to
which they applied and
from any other DEA
position requiring a
polygraph for a period
of 3 years.

• Applicant is disqualified
from the position to
which they applied and
from any other DEA
position requiring a
polygraph for a period
of 3 years.

• Applicant is disqualified
from the position to
which they applied and
from any other DEA
position requiring a
polygraph for a period
of 2 years.

Source: The DEA’s Polygraph Screening Policy

The Office of Personnel Management (OPM) approved the DEA’s use of polygraph examinations for employment
screening for Special Agent positions in November 1994; for Intelligence Research Specialist positions in June 1998; and
for Diversion Investigators and Forensic Chemists positions in December 2020. OPM’s approvals are contingent on the
DEA's compliance with certain conditions, including with the uniform community polygraph standards, which include the
Federal Examiner's Handbook established by the Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency’s National Center for
Credibility Assessment (NCCA). Every 2 years the DEA must certify that it continues to meet OPM standards for the
continued use of polygraph examinations. In December 2022, NCCA’s Quality Assurance program reviewed the DEA’s
polygraph program and identified no deficiencies. OPM renewed the DEA's authority to continue using polygraph
examinations for pre-employment vetting through September 2024.
3

2

Despite its New Policy in March 2019, the DEA Continued to Hire Special Agents and
Intelligence Research Specialists Who Did Not Pass or Had Incomplete Polygraph
Examinations
Prior to March 2019, DEA policy did not prohibit the hiring of Special Agent and Intelligence Research
Specialist applicants with polygraph examination results of “Significant Response” or “Countermeasures.” At
that time, the DEA was the only federal law enforcement agency participating in the National Center for
Credibility Assessment’s (NCCA’s) Quality Assurance Program that allowed the hiring of applicants who did
not pass a polygraph (i.e., receive a result of “Significant Response”).4
As noted, on March 21, 2019, then Acting DEA Administrator Dhillon issued a memorandum stating that “the
DEA will not hire Special Agent or Intelligence Research Specialist applicants who receive a countermeasures
or significant response result on their DEA-administered polygraph examination.” The memorandum noted
that the changes were in line with the national standards and practices of 27 other federal agencies. The
memorandum also stated that this policy was effective beginning with Special Agent job announcement
number BA2019-1, which was open between December 10, 2018, and March 28, 2019, as well as any future
Special Agent or Intelligence Research Specialist job announcements.5 The DEA’s Polygraph Unit then issued
an updated policy reflecting the direction in the Acting Administrator’s memorandum. In March 2021, the
DEA’s Polygraph Screening Policy was amended to also require Diversion Investigators and Forensic
Chemists to successfully complete the polygraph examination to be eligible for hire.
Despite the March 2019 policy change, we found that for the past 2 years the DEA has hired applicants who
received a “significant response” on their pre-employment polygraph examination because the DEA has
continued to use for hiring purposes job announcements that were issued prior to the BA2019-1 job
announcement referenced in Acting DEA Administrator Dhillon’s memorandum. Thus far in our audit, we
have identified 77 applicants (66 Special Agents and 11 Intelligence Research Specialists) who received a
result of “significant response” on a pre-employment polygraph examination after the March 2019 policy
change but were later hired because the candidate’s application was associated with an older job
announcement predating the policy change.6 For example:


We identified a Special Agent who was hired under job announcement number BA2016-1 (open
from October 17, 2016, through October 21, 2016). This Special Agent took the pre-employment
polygraph exam and received a “significant response” result in May 2019, more than 2 years after
the job announcement closed and months after the DEA announced in March 2019 that it would no
longer hire Special Agents who did not successfully complete the polygraph examination. The
Special Agent came on-board with the DEA in March 2021, 2 years after the DEA’s policy change.

The DEA participates in the NCCA Quality Assurance Program. The NCCA is responsible for the development of
federal polygraph standards and for maintaining a Quality Assurance Program to ensure ethical, professional, and
technical standards are maintained by all federal polygraph programs.

4

5

The DEA added language to its job announcement number BA2019-2, which was open between March 28, 2019, and
September 30, 2019, to state specifically that the result of “Countermeasures” or “Significant Response“ on a polygraph
examination makes the applicant ineligible for hire in a DEA Special Agent position for a period of 3 years from the date
of the polygraph examination.”

6

We also identified 43 applicants (41 Special Agents and 2 Intelligence Research Specialists) who were hired and
entered on duty after the March 2019 policy change, despite receiving a “significant response” result on a
pre-employment polygraph examination taken on or before March 21, 2019.

3



We identified a Special Agent who was hired under job announcement number BA2017-2 (open
from December 4, 2017, through December 8, 2017). The Special Agent took the pre-employment
polygraph exam and received a “significant response” result in February 2020, more than 2 years
after the job announcement closed and almost 1 year after the DEA’s March 2019 policy change.
The Special Agent came on-board with the DEA in March 2022, 3 years after the DEA’s policy change.

In our view, the DEA’s use of older job announcements to hire applicants who did not pass a polygraph
examination is contrary to the clear intent of the policy change the Acting Administrator announced in his
March 2019 memorandum. However, DEA Human Resource officials told the OIG that because job
announcements prior to BA2019-1 only required an applicant to complete the polygraph, they interpreted
the March 2019 policy change to mean it was permissible for the DEA to continue to hire applicants already
in the hiring process on job announcements prior to BA2019-1 who received a “significant response” on the
pre-employment polygraph examination.7 After reviewing a draft of this MAM, DEA officials further told the
OIG that the March 2019 policy memorandum was written specifically to allow individuals already in the
hiring process at the time of the policy change to be hired without passing a polygraph examination,
notwithstanding the stated intent of the policy change. When we spoke to DEA Polygraph officials and
Special Agents who have participated on the DEA’s hiring panel, they disagreed with what we were told by
DEA Human Resource officials and said they interpreted the policy to be effective March 2019, and that,
regardless of which job announcement the applicant had applied on, the DEA would no longer hire Special
Agents or Intelligence Research Specialists who failed the pre-employment polygraph exam.8
In April 2023, after we raised questions about the DEA’s implementation of the March 2019 policy change,
the DEA updated its policy to remove the language linking the policy change implementation to Special
Agent job announcement number BA2019-1. Additionally, a DEA official stated that the DEA is in the
process of mitigating the risks associated with applicants currently in the hiring process on a job
announcement prior to BA2019-1 who have not successfully completed the pre-employment polygraph
exam.
In addition to these 77 applicants who were hired after March 2019 despite a “Significant Response”
polygraph finding, we determined the DEA hired and entered on duty at least 3 Special Agents who did not
meet DEA requirements to fully complete a pre-employment polygraph examination, namely both the
Suitability and National Security polygraph. Moreover, the DEA hired these applicants despite the fact that
its pre-March 2019 job announcements stated that applicants must successfully complete and pass the preemployment polygraph exam. Our audit found, for example:


In November 2020, the DEA initiated a pre-employment polygraph exam with an applicant. After
completing the National Security section of the exam with a result of "significant response with
deception indicated" to questions regarding mishandling and compromising classified information,
the polygraph examiner stopped the exam. The Suitability section of the exam was never
administered. This individual entered on duty in May 2021 and is currently employed as a DEA
Special Agent.

7

The reasoning expressed by DEA Human Resource personnel runs contrary to the DEA job announcements that we
have obtained dating back to 2016, which require that applicants successfully complete and achieve favorable results on
a pre-employment polygraph examination. The job announcements state that failure to successfully complete and pass
any of the screening processes will result in the candidate being disqualified and removed from consideration.

8

The DEA’s Special Agent Hiring Panel consists of one Special Agent Staff Coordinator, who oversees the panel, and
three rotating Supervisory Special Agents who are briefed and vote on each applicant.

4



In March 2018, the DEA initiated a pre-employment polygraph exam with an applicant. During the
National Security section, the applicant received a result of “significant response with deception
indicated” to questions regarding providing classified information to unauthorized persons, having
an unauthorized foreign contact, and being involved in terrorist activities. The polygraph examiner
stopped the examination, and the Suitability section was never administered. However, in the DEA’s
records this applicant was mistakenly marked as having completed the polygraph exam. In midSeptember 2018, the DEA’s Special Agent hiring panel selected the applicant for hire. Thereafter,
prior to the applicant entering on duty, the Polygraph Unit notified Human Resources about the
applicant’s failure to complete the Suitability series of the polygraph exam. When the Polygraph
Unit attempted to reschedule the remaining portion of the exam, it did not have a polygraph
examiner available, and the remaining series of the polygraph exam was not administered. The DEA
stated that its Office of Chief Counsel was consulted and provided a decision to uphold the hiring
panel’s selection based on a complete background investigation and review by investigators and
Suitability specialists. This individual entered duty in September 2018 and is currently employed as
a DEA Special Agent.



In December 2017, the DEA initiated a pre-employment polygraph exam with an applicant. During
the Suitability section, the applicant received a result of “significant response with deception
indicated” to a question about committing a serious crime. During the polygraph examination, the
applicant admitted to engaging in inappropriate behavior while a juvenile with a younger juvenile.
The polygraph examiner stopped the examination, and the National Security section was never
administered. Yet, we determined that the DEA’s hiring panel was told, incorrectly, that the
applicant passed the polygraph examination with a result of “no significant response.” This
individual entered on duty in April 2019 and is currently employed as a DEA Special Agent.

In response to the concerns identified by the OIG in this memorandum, the DEA stated that it reviewed a list
of examinees from its polygraph database who were identified as having taken only one series of the
polygraph exam (either Suitability or National Security) and that none of the examinees it identified were
hired into core positions requiring a complete pre-employment polygraph exam. However, the DEA’s
database is not able to identify applicants who initiated but did not complete each series as required by DEA
policy. To perform such a review, the Polygraph Unit must electronically retrieve and review the
corresponding DEA Reports of Investigation to determine if an applicant has completed each polygraph
examination series initiated. In response to a draft of this memorandum, a DEA official informed us that
DEA has determined that its polygraph database contains the capability to track and produce a report on
each series of the polygraph examination. The DEA provided us a spreadsheet, by series, of polygraphs that
were initiated and completed. However, our review determined that the spreadsheet was incomplete and
contained inaccuracies when compared to the results in the DEA Reports of Investigation. Therefore, we
continue to have concerns with the DEA’s efforts to efficiently and effectively ensure applicants have
completed a full-scope polygraph as required by DEA policy. As we continue our audit, we will evaluate the
DEA’s efforts to identify all applicants who have not completed the pre-employment polygraph exam.

Task Force Officers Allowed to Remain on DEA Task Forces Despite Polygraph Issues
The DEA does not require Task Force Officers from local, state, and other federal law enforcement agencies
to successfully complete a polygraph examination prior to working on a DEA-led task force.9 However, if a
Task Force Officer seeks employment with the DEA for a position that requires a polygraph examination as
Task Force Officers are required to have a letter in good standing from their parent law enforcement agency and are
cleared at the Public Trust level by the DEA’s Security Programs.
9

5

part of the pre-employment process, the Task Force Officer is required to successfully complete a polygraph
examination as part of the DEA’s pre-employment vetting process.
According to the DEA’s polygraph policy, if a Task Force Officer receives a polygraph result of “Significant
Response” or “Countermeasures,” with or without an admission, the task force officer is not only ineligible
for hire by DEA but also must be returned to their parent law enforcement agency. Yet, we have identified
Task Force Officers who received a “Significant Response” result on the DEA’s pre-employment polygraph
examination, and as of January 2023, remained on DEA-led task forces. For example:


In April 2022, a Task Force Officer took the polygraph exam and received a “Significant Response”
result with deception indicated to questions regarding past drug use and truthfulness on
pre-employment documentation. The individual has been allowed to remain on the DEA task force
and, according to the view of DEA Human Resource officials, is eligible for hire because they applied
under job announcement BA2018-1, prior to the DEA’s March 2019 policy change.



In October 2021, a Task Force Officer took the polygraph exam and received a “Significant Response”
with deception indicated to a question regarding truthfulness of pre-employment documentation.
The exam was stopped, and the National Security section of the polygraph exam was not given. The
individual was not hired but has been allowed to remain on the DEA task force.

By allowing Task Forces Officers to remain on DEA task forces after indicating deception to significant
polygraph questions, in violation of DEA policy, the DEA unnecessarily assumes the risk that inevitably
comes with law enforcement officers potentially unsuitable for this important role, which could include the
potential for intentional and unintentional compromise of sensitive DEA operations and jeopardize public
trust.

Potential Inappropriate Influence Related to the Polygraph Examinations of “Legacy”
Special Agent Candidates
The DEA unofficially defines a “legacy” candidate as an applicant who has a relative currently working for the
DEA or that previously worked for the DEA. Multiple DEA personnel we interviewed told us that they have
perceived or experienced pressure to influence polygraph examinations for legacy candidates, be it the
outcome or the expediency with which an examination is performed. To mitigate the risk of improper
influence on the Polygraph Unit, in April 2022, the Polygraph Unit Chief provided informal guidance via
email regarding the handling of conflict of interest and “legacy” applicant polygraph exams. In
February 2023, we informed DEA officials that we had been told of instances where employees perceived or
experienced pressure related to polygraph examinations of legacy candidates. Later that month, the DEA
issued a Notice on Hiring or Advancement of Relatives, reminding all DEA employees to adhere to its
guidelines to prevent nepotism or the appearance of nepotism in the DEA’s hiring process. The informal
guidance and the February 2023 notice were appropriate and useful reminders. They do not, however,
ensure that DEA policy addresses the full scope of issues presented to the OIG during our audit, including
non-family member DEA employees who may have contacted polygraph examiners to expedite or influence
the hiring process on behalf of legacy candidates. We believe that DEA’s policies should be updated to
explicitly prohibit such contacts, which may create actual or perceived pressure on the polygraph unit to
expedite or influence the result of an examination.

6

Conclusion and Recommendations
We believe that the seriousness of the matters described above require immediate attention to address the
significant and unmitigated risks in the DEA’s administration and use of polygraphs in its hiring process. In
addition, these practices have the potential of impacting the DEA’s reputation in the law enforcement
community and the public’s trust. Therefore, the OIG recommends that the DEA:
1. Ensure compliance with DEA policy by no longer hiring applicants for the four core series positions
(Special Agent, Intelligence Research Specialist, Diversion Investigator, and Forensic Chemist) who
have not fully and successfully completed the pre-employment polygraph examination.
2. Complete the initial efforts to identify the Special Agents and Intelligence Research Specialists, as
well as any Diversion Investigators or Forensic Chemists, who did not fully and successfully complete
the pre-employment polygraph exam as required by DEA policy.
3. Mitigate the risks associated with having hired individuals identified in Recommendation 2, including
ensuring all such DEA personnel satisfy the polygraph examination requirement when applying for
positions within DEA, in accordance with DEA policy.
4. Ensure DEA Task Force Officers who have not successfully completed the pre-employment
polygraph examination are returned to their parent law enforcement agency, in accordance with
DEA policy.
5. Implement clear policy designed to prevent inappropriate influence and potential conflicts of
interest in the DEA’s pre-employment polygraph process, including a prohibition on anyone with a
direct or indirect connection to a candidate for employment contacting the polygraph examiner
during the employment process.
Please advise the OIG within 60 days of the date of this memorandum on what actions the DEA has taken or
intends to take with regard to these issues. If you have any questions or would like to discuss the
information in this memorandum, please contact me at (202) 514-3435 or Jason Malmstrom, Assistant
Inspector General for Audit, at (202) 598-5621.
cc:

Janice O. Swygert
Acting Section Chief
External Audit Liaison Section
Office of Compliance
Drug Enforcement Administration
Louise Duhamel
Assistant Director
Audit Liaison Group
Internal Review and Evaluation Office
Justice Management Division
Bradley Weinsheimer
Associate Deputy Attorney General
Betsy Henthorne
Chief of Staff and Deputy Associate Attorney General
Office of the Associate Attorney General

7

ATTACHMENT 1: THE DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION’S RESPONSE
TO THE DRAFT MANAGEMENT ADVISORY MEMORANDUM

U.S. Department of Justice

Drug Enforcement Administrati on
Office of Compliance
8701 Morrissette Drive
Springfield. Virginia 2 2152
July 11, 2023

www.dea.gov
MEMORANDU1vI

To:

David J. Gaschke
Regional Audit Manager
Office of the Inspector General

From :

:Michael L. Ciminelli
Acting Chief Compliance Officer
Office of Compliance

SubJect:

MICHAEL
CIMINELLI

Di;Jital~ sgna:! by
MICHAtLCIMINtLLI
Date : 202307.11
0 7: 28 :58 -04 \JO'

The Drug Enforcement Administration's Resp onse to the Draft Management
Advisory Memorandum - Notification of Concerns Id,mti.fied in the Drug
Enforcement Administration's Use of Polygraph Examinations in Pre-employment
Vetting

On June 15, 2023, the Department of Justice (DOJ), Offi ce of the Inspect or General (OIG)
provi <led its draft Management Advis ory Mem orandum, "N otification of Cone erns Identified in
the Drug Enforcement Administrati on' s Use of P olygraph Examinati ons in Pre-empl oyment
Vetting." In the memorandum, the OIG identified inconsisten cies in the Drug Enforcement
Administration's (DEA) implementati on of a 2019 polygraph poli cy and risks involving the
DEA's polygraph program , including hiring Spe cial Agents and certain other applicants wh o have
not successfully completed some or all of the polygraph ex aminati on process, and all owing Task
F orce Officers (TFO) wh o have failed a polygraph examination to remain on DEA Task Forces.
The OIG made five recommendations t o DEA t o address the risks of the use of polygraphs in its
hiring process. This mem orandum describes the DEA' s acti ons that address the report and its
rec ommendati ons.
Pri or to addressing the rec ommendati ons, DEA must fir st correct the OIG' s statement that DEA
hired applicants "contrary to its March 2019 policy change"
As noted in the OIG mem orandum, "[p ]ri or t o March 201 9, DEA policy did not prohibit the hiring
of Special Agent and Intelligence Research Specialist applicants with polygraph examination
results of' Significant Response ' or ' Countermeasures,"' and th at this was consistent with "the
Nati onal Center for Credibility Assessment's (NCCA' s) Quality Assurance Program that all owed
the hiring of applicants wh o did not pass a polygraph (i e., receive a result of' Significant
Resp onse')." This policy dates back t o 1994, when DEA first requested and re ceived
authorizati on from the Offic e of Personnel Management (OPM) to use the polygraph as a preempl oyment hiring tool. The 1994 DEA policy approved by OPM stated that, "[t]he results of a

8

polygraph examination will never be the sole determining factor in deciding whether an applicant
is employed by the agency." Accordingly, a Significant Response (SR) standing alone did not
disqualify the applicant. This continued to be DEA's policy until 2019. For example, in its
request to OPM for renewal of its pre-employment polygraph program dated September 6, 2018,
DEA noted to OPM that "[a] polygraph result ofNSR [No Significant Response], SR, or CM
[Countenneasures] will be used as one of the determining factors when considering an applicant's
suitability for employment with the agency. " (Emphasis added.)
On March 21 , 2019, DEA's Acting Administrator issued a memorandum changing this policy.
This memorandum stated that "the DEA will not hire Special Agent or Intelligence Research
Specialist applicants who receive a countermeasures or significant response result on their DEAadministered polygraph examination. " However, the memorandum also stated that "[t]his policy
is effective for the current SA job announcement (BA2019-l) as well as any future SA or IRS job
announcements." Thus, the Acting Administrator' s memorandum explicitly applied this new
standard prospectively and did not apply it retroactively to applicants who were already in the
application process prior to the change in policy. Likewise, an April 2020 policy issued to
implement the Acting Administrator's memorandum stated that an unfavorable polygraph result
will disqualify an applicant, but specifically noted, "[f]or SA [Special Agent] jobs," and "any
other DEA position requiring a polygraph," ... "this provision begins with the SA job
announcement (BA2019-l)." Thus, both 2019 memorandum and resulting 2020 policy explicitly
exempted applicants already in the application process from the new standard. These applicants
were governed by the prior standard dating back to DEA's first pre-employment polygraph policy
in 1994, approved and reapproved by OPM multiple times, which did not automatically disqualify
applicants due to an unfavorable polygraph examination.
Each of the 77 applicants referenced in the OIG memorandum who received a "significant
response" result on a pre-employment polygraph examination after the March 2019 policy change,
but had no disqualifying admissions and were later hired, were already in the application process
prior to the March 2019 policy change. Thus, in accordance with the explicit terms of the March
2019 memorandum and 2020 policy, they were covered by the prior standard which did not
automatically disqualify applicants due to an unfavorable polygraph examination. Neither the date
of the polygraph examination nor the date of hiring determined which standard applied. Rather,
the job announcement under which the applicant applied was the detenninative factor. In fact,
DEA has not identified a single applicant who entered the application process under SA job
a1mouncement BA2019-1 or thereafter that was hired after an unfavorable polygraph examination.
While the OIG memorandum notes that some individual DEA employees disagreed with this
interpretation of the March 2019 policy change, DEA's Human Resources Division (HR)- the
subject matter experts who are responsible to apply the policy to hiring decisions- interpreted and
applied it consistently and in accordance with its explicit te1ms. Thus, the hiring of these
applicants was not contrary to DEA policy.
We must also correct an additional statement in the OIG memorandum, that ''the DEA's database
is not able to identify applicants who initiated but did not complete each series [of polygraph
examinations] as required by DEA policy." In fact, records maintained by DEA's Polygraph Unit
(STCP) within the Office of Investigative Technology are accurate, complete, and easily searched.
The results of every polygraph examination are documented in a DEA-6 report which clearly
2

9

states the outcome of the examination and whether the applicant successfully completed both the
Suitability and National Security series. DEA can quickly query any applicant's name and read
the full details of their polygraph examination. Thus, the statement that DEA is unable to identify
applicants who initiated but did not complete each polygraph series is incorrect.
To address the recommendations, DEA provides the following response:
Recommendation 1: Ensure compliance with DEA policy by no longer hiring applicants for
the four core series positions (Special Agent, Intelligence Research Specialist, Diversion
Investigator, and Forensic Chemist) who have not fully and successfully completed the preemployment polygraph examination.
DEA Response:

DEA concurs with this recommendation.
In accordance with the policy issued in March 2019, DEA no longer hires applicants for the four
core series positions (Special Agent, Intelligence Research Specialist, Diversion Investigator, and
Forensic Chemist) who have not fully completed the pre-employment polygraph examination or
who received an unfavorable result. Upon review of job announcement BA2018-l, there were 15
applicants remaining in the hiring process. Three of these applicants received an SR during their
polygraph examination and were not hired. One applicant from BA2018-l remains in the
application process. This applicant fully and successfully completed the pre-employment
polygraph examination and is pending a final offer of employment. No other applicants remain in
the hiring process from pre-BA2019-1 job announcements.
DEA has removed the provision exempting prior applicants from the policy. DEA has separately
provided OIG the updated Polygraph Screening Policy dated April 21, 2023 . DEA has
consistently followed the policy established in 2019 since its inception and will continue to do so.
Accordingly, DEA requests closure of this recommendation.
Recommendation 2: Complete the initial efforts to identify the Special Agents and
Intelligence Research Specialists, as well as any Diversion Investigators or Forensic
Chemists, who did not fully and successfully complete the pre-employment polygraph exam
as required by DEA policy.
DEA Response:

DEA concurs with this recommendation.
DEA has identified Special Agents, Intelligence Research Specialists, Diversion Investigators, and
Forensic Chemists who did not fully and successfully complete the pre-employment polygraph
exam as required by DEA policy. The results of that review are now being verified. Once the
verification process is complete, DEA will request closure of this recommendation.

3

10

Recommendation 3: Mitigate the Iisks associated with having hired individuals identified in
Recommendation 2, including ensuring all such DEA personnel satisfy the polygraph
examination requirement when applying for positions within DEA, in accordance with DEA
policy.
DEA Response:
DEA concurs with this recommendation.
DEA has completed a review of examinees from the Polygraph Enterprise System (PES) who
were identified as having unsuccessfully completed the pre-employment polygraph exam. DEA
has determined that none of the examinees currently identified were hired into core positions after
unsuccessfully completing the pre-employment polygraph examination process in accordance with
current DEA policy. DEA previously provided a detailed analysis documenting this to OIG on
May 9, 2023. This process is continuing to ensure we have identified all such examinees and
appropriate mitigation action has been taken. Once this process is complete and verified, DEA
will request closure of this recommendation.
Recommendation 4: Ensure DEA Task Force Officers, who have not successfully completed
the pre-employment polygraph examination, are returned to their parent law enforcement
agency, in accordance with DEA policy.
DEA Response:
DEA concurs with this recommendation.
To address this recommendation, DEA conducted an analysis ofTFOs who applied for DEA
employment and did not successfully complete the pre-employment polygraph examination. DEA
identified 4,270 current deputized TFOs. This list was then forwarded to STPC to determine if
any of the TFOs also appeared in the PES as having taken a polygraph examination for preemployment in a core-position with DEA. Of the 4,270 TFOs, nine were identified as having
taken a polygraph examination with an unsuccessful result after the October 25, 2021 updated
polygraph policy. Steps are now in progress to return those TFOs to their parent agencies. Once
this is completed, DEA will provide OIG with supporting documentation for closure of this
recommendation.
Recommendation 5: Implement clear policy designed to prevent inappropliate influence
and potential conflicts of interest in the DEA's pre-employment polygraph process,
including a prohibition on anyone with a direct or indirect connection to a candidate for
employment contacting the polygraph examiner duling the employment process.
DEA Response:
DEA concurs with this recommendation.

4

11

DEA cun-ently has established policy governing the Standards of Conduct and Misuse of Official
Positions. The policies were designed to prevent inappropriate influence and potential conflicts of
interest. All DEA employees must complete an annual signed certification to attest that they
understand the conduct that is expected of them as DEA employees and the potential penalties
imposed for breach of those standards.
To further address the issue of possible influence and potential conflicts in the pre-employment
polygraph process, STCP issued a standard operating procedure (SOP) establishing procedures to
prevent inappropriate influence and potential conflicts of interest in the DEA's pre-employment
polygraph process. TI1e SOP prohibits examiners from administering a pre-employment
polygraph examination to specifically identified categories of applicants where there may be a
potential conflict of interest or the appearance of a conflict, including relatives of a cmTent or
former DEA supervisor (GS-14 and above). In such cases, the examination will be administered
by the STCP Unit Chief or another supervisory-level examiner. The SOP also requires that any
attempts by any DEA employee to exert influence or pressure upon an examiner regarding the
outcome of any polygraph examination must be reported by the examiner to the STCP Unit Chief
immediately. This SOP was communicated in an April 25, 2022 email from the STCP Unit Chief
to all examiners and has since been incorporated into the Polygraph Standard Operating
Procedures Handbook.
DEA is currently reviewing what additional steps may be appropriate to address this
recommendation.
If you have any questions or concerns regarding DEA's response please contact me at (57 1)
776-2846 or via e-mail at Michael.L. Ciminelli@dea. gov.

5

12

Appendix 2: Office of the Inspector General Analysis and Summary of Actions
Necessary to Close the Recommendations
The OIG provided a draft of this memorandum to the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA). The DEA’s
response is incorporated in Appendix 1 of this final MAM. The DEA concurred with each of the
recommendations and as a result, the recommendations are resolved. The following discussion provides
the OIG analysis of the response and summary of actions necessary to close the recommendations.
Analysis of DEA Response
In its response, the DEA took issue with a statement in the draft memorandum that the DEA hired applicants
“contrary to its 2019 policy change.” Because this relates directly and specifically to Recommendation
Number 1, we discuss this matter below. The DEA’s response also took issue with the statement that its
polygraph database is not able to identify applicants who initiated but did not complete each series of the
polygraph examination as required by DEA policy. The DEA stated that it can quickly query any applicant’s
name and read the full details of their polygraph examination. However, in February 2023, a DEA official
told us that the database was not able to identify applicants who initiated but did not complete each series
of the polygraph exam and that the DEA would need to procure software to allow for the tracking of such
information. After this MAM was issued in draft, a DEA official informed us that the DEA had determined
that the current database has the necessary functionality to track and produce a report on each series of
the polygraph examination. Subsequently, the DEA provided us a spreadsheet of polygraph series that
were initiated and completed. However, we reviewed the spreadsheet and determined that it was
incomplete and contained inaccuracies when compared to the DEA’s Reports of Investigation. Accurately
tracking such information will help the DEA ensure that only those applicants who have fully and
successfully completed each series of the pre-employment polygraph examination, as required by DEA
policy, are eligible to move forward in the hiring process. We considered the information DEA provided in
response to our draft MAM and updated this final MAM, as appropriate.
Recommendations for DEA:
1.

Ensure compliance with DEA policy by no longer hiring applicants for the four core series
positions (Special Agent, Intelligence Research Specialist, Diversion Investigator, and Forensic
Chemist) who have not fully and successfully completed the pre-employment polygraph
examination.
Resolved. The DEA concurred with our recommendation and stated in its response that in
accordance with its March 2019 polygraph policy, the DEA no longer hires applicants for the four
core series positions (Special Agent, Intelligence Research Specialist, Diversion Investigator, and
Forensic Chemist) who have not fully completed the pre-employment polygraph examination or
received an unfavorable result. The DEA stated that upon review of job announcement BA2018-1
there were 15 applicants who remained in the hiring process. Three of the applicants received a
“significant response” during their polygraph examination and were not hired. One applicant, who
fully and successfully completed the pre-employment polygraph examination, is pending a final
offer of employment and remains in the hiring process. The DEA did not provide information on the
hiring outcomes for the 11 other applicants on job announcement BA2018-1 but stated that no
other applicants remain in the hiring process from job announcements prior to BA2019-1. In
addition, although the DEA provided this information about each of the 15 applicants remaining
from job announcement BA2018-1, it has not yet provided the OIG with documentation to support
this information.
13

Moreover, in the preamble to its response to recommendations in Appendix 1, the DEA stated that
the hiring of applicants who did not successfully complete the pre-employment polygraph was not
contrary to the DEA’s March 2019 policy change. The DEA told the OIG that, notwithstanding the
prohibition on hiring individuals who had passed a polygraph examination, the 2019 policy was
intentionally written to allow the hiring of individuals who were already in the hiring process at the
time of the 2019 policy change, even if they had not passed a polygraph examination. The DEA
stated that since the policy was effective beginning with Special Agent job announcement number
BA2019-1, which was open between December 10, 2018, and March 28, 2019, it was allowed to
continue to hire applicants who did not successfully complete the polygraph examination under job
announcements prior to BA2019-1. However, the DEA’s March 2019 memorandum stated that it
would require applicants to successfully complete the polygraph examination consistent with
national standards and practices of 27 other federal agencies. While the policy also stated that it
was effective with the BA2019-1 job announcement, it did not state whether the DEA was permitted
to hire from prior job announcements. Our finding that the DEA continued to use old job
announcements—for up to 5 years after the policy changed—to hire individuals who failed the
polygraph examination is contrary to the principles of its policy change.
In response to the actions taken to address this recommendation, the DEA stated that it has
removed from its polygraph policy the provision exempting applicants from job announcements
prior to 2019 and that it will not hire applicants who did not successfully complete the
pre-employment polygraph examination. The DEA provided the OIG with its updated Polygraph
Screening Policy dated April 2023. The DEA’s Human Resources has not yet provided us evidence of
its policy requiring applicants for its four core series positions to fully and successfully complete the
pre-employment polygraph exam and the controls put in place to ensure applicants who fail or who
do not fully complete the polygraph exam are not hired.
This recommendation can be closed when we receive evidence that the DEA has ensured
compliance with its policy by no longer hiring applicants for the four core series positions (Special
Agent, Intelligence Research Specialist, Diversion Investigator, and Forensic Chemist) who have not
fully and successfully completed the pre-employment polygraph examination.
2.

Complete the initial efforts to identify the Special Agents and Intelligence Research
Specialists, as well as any Diversion Investigators or Forensic Chemists, who did not fully and
successfully complete the pre-employment polygraph exam as required by DEA policy.
Resolved. The DEA concurred with our recommendation and stated in its response that it has
identified Special Agents, Intelligence Research Specialists, Diversion Investigators, and
Forensic Chemists who did not fully and successfully complete the pre-employment polygraph
examination as required by DEA policy. The DEA stated that a review of those results is currently
on-going.
This recommendation can be closed when we receive evidence that the DEA has completed its
review to identify the Special Agents and Intelligence Research Specialists, as well as any Diversion
Investigators or Forensic Chemists, who did not fully and successfully complete the pre-employment
polygraph exam as required by DEA policy.

3.

Mitigate the risks associated with having hired individuals identified in Recommendation 2,
including ensuring all such DEA personnel satisfy the polygraph examination requirement
when applying for positions within DEA, in accordance with DEA policy.
14

Resolved. The DEA concurred with our recommendation and stated in its response that it has
completed a review of examinees from its polygraph database who were identified as having
unsuccessfully completed the pre-employment polygraph examination. The DEA stated that none of
the examinees who were identified as unsuccessfully completing the pre-employment polygraph
examination were hired into core positions. Additionally, the DEA stated that it provided an analysis
documenting its review to the OIG in May 2023, and a review of that analysis is on-going by the DEA
to ensure it has identified all such examinees and appropriate mitigation action has been taken.
This recommendation can be closed when we receive evidence that the DEA mitigated the risks
associated with having hired individuals identified in Recommendation 2, including ensuring all such
DEA personnel satisfy the polygraph examination requirement when applying for positions within
DEA, in accordance with DEA policy.
4.

Ensure DEA Task Force Officers who have not successfully completed the pre-employment
polygraph examination are returned to their parent law enforcement agency, in accordance
with DEA policy.
Resolved. The DEA concurred with our recommendation and stated in its response that it has
conducted an analysis of Task Force Officers who applied for DEA employment and did not
successfully complete a pre-employment polygraph examination. The DEA stated that it identified
4,270 deputized Task Force Officers and provided the list of officers to the Polygraph Unit to
determine if any of the Task Force Officers had received an unsuccessful polygraph examination
result associated with an application for one of the DEA’s four core positions. The DEA stated that
nine Task Force Officers were identified as having received an unsuccessful polygraph result after
October 25, 2021, when the polygraph policy was established for Task Force Officers. The DEA
stated that it is in the process of returning these nine Task Force Officers to their parent agencies.
This recommendation can be closed when we receive evidence that DEA Task Force Officers who
have not successfully completed the pre-employment polygraph examination are returned to their
parent law enforcement agency, in accordance with DEA policy.

5.

Implement clear policy designed to prevent inappropriate influence and potential conflicts of
interest in the DEA’s pre-employment polygraph process, including a prohibition on anyone
with a direct or indirect connection to a candidate for employment contacting the polygraph
examiner during the employment process.
Resolved. The DEA concurred with our recommendation and stated in its response that it has
established policy governing the Standards of Conduct and Misuse of Official Positions, which are
designed to prevent inappropriate influence and potential conflicts of interest. All DEA employees
must complete an annual signed certification to attest that they understand the conduct that is
expected of them as DEA employees and the potential penalties imposed for breach of those
standards.
The DEA also stated that it issued standard operating procedures to prevent inappropriate influence
and potential conflicts of interest in the DEA’s pre-employment polygraph process. Specifically,
polygraph examiners are prohibited from administering a pre-employment polygraph examination
to specifically identified categories of applicants where there may be a potential conflict of interest
or the appearance of a conflict, including relatives of a current or former DEA supervisor (GS-14 and
15

above). In such cases, the examination will be administered by the Polygraph Unit Chief or another
supervisory-level examiner. Additionally, any attempts by DEA employees to exert influence or
pressure upon a polygraph examiner regarding the outcome of any polygraph examination must be
reported to the Polygraph Unit Chief immediately. The DEA stated that these standard operating
procedures were communicated to the Polygraph Unit in April 2022 and has since been
incorporated into the DEA’s Polygraph Standard Operating Procedures Handbook. The DEA has not
yet provided the OIG with its updated standard operating procedures. The DEA also stated that it is
currently reviewing additional steps that may be appropriate to address the recommendation.
This recommendation can be closed once we receive evidence that the DEA has implemented clear
policy designed to prevent inappropriate influence and potential conflicts of interest in the DEA’s
pre-employment polygraph process, including a prohibition on anyone with a direct or indirect
connection to a candidate for employment contacting the polygraph examiner during the
employment process.

16