Inspection of the Federal Bureau of Prisons’
Federal Correctional Institution Tallahassee

***
E VA L U AT I O N A N D I N S P E C T I O N S D I V I S I O N
24-005

NOVEMBER 2023

Executive Summary

The DOJ OIG’s Inspections Program
Between Monday, May 22, and Saturday,
May 26, 2023, the U.S. Department of Justice
(DOJ) Office of the Inspector General (OIG)
conducted an unannounced, on-site
inspection of Federal Correctional Institution
(FCI) Tallahassee, a low security female
institution in Florida with a satellite male
detention center.
This was the second unannounced
inspection of a Federal Bureau of Prisons
(BOP) institution under the OIG’s new onsite inspections program. In selecting an
inspection site, we sought an institution
operationally comparable to our first
inspection site, FCI Waseca, but with a
different risk profile. FCI Tallahassee fit our
selection criteria because, like FCI Waseca, it
is a female facility with a similar size inmate
complement. Unlike FCI Waseca, however,
which rated as “low risk” on a prison
inspection tool the OIG is developing and
piloting internally, FCI Tallahassee rated as
“high risk” on that tool.
As we detail in the report, we identified at
FCI Tallahassee many significant issues,
most of which were consistent with findings
in our other recent BOP oversight work and
which we have reported on publicly. We do
not make recommendations in this report
because in our prior work we have
recommended that the BOP address many
of its issues at an enterprise level.
Therefore, through our efforts to resolve
those recommendations, we will monitor
the BOP’s efforts to address these issues at
all of its institutions, including FCI
Tallahassee.

Our inspection identified several serious operational
deficiencies at FCI Tallahassee. Among the most concerning
were the alarming conditions of its food service and storage
operations. Specifically, on our second day at the institution,
we observed inmates being served moldy bread and
vegetables rotting in a refrigerator in a food preparation area
at the female prison. We also observed in food storage
warehouses likely evidence of rodent droppings and rodents
having chewed through boxes of food, as well as bags of cereal
with insects in them and warped food containers. Within
24 hours of the OIG alerting institution management of our
findings, they and other staff removed large volumes of food
from the storage warehouses.
We also identified in the female prison serious infrastructure
problems that created unsanitary and potentially unsafe
conditions. Inside communal inmate bathrooms, we observed
a shower in which discolored water had pooled, a shower that
flooded when used, and an inoperable toilet. We also found
that female housing unit roofs routinely leak and that all five
general population housing unit roofs need to be replaced.
Many female inmates live in housing units in which water
frequently leaks from ceilings and windows on or near their
living spaces. We observed housing areas in which feminine
hygiene products were being used to absorb water from
leaking windows, an electrical outlet that appeared to have fire
damage, a sink that was detached from the wall, and a black
substance on walls and ceilings. Additionally, we observed
worn bedding, rusted inmate storage lockers, and unlocked
supply closets.
Most staff and inmates reported feeling safe and did not
believe that sexual abuse was widespread at FCI Tallahassee.
We nonetheless identified serious issues affecting inmate
safety, including Correctional Officer shortages, a lack of
supervisory oversight at the male detention center, and
operational deficiencies in core inmate management and
security functions, such as weaknesses with inmate search
procedures and limited security camera coverage. Staff and
inmates also told us that staff do not always enforce rules
consistently, and inmates believed that certain staff took
retaliatory measures against them. Additionally, inmates
reported that some Correctional Officers use offensive
language when speaking with them. We found that,
collectively, these issues have adversely affected the trust

i

inmates have in Correctional Officers, which can cause some inmates to be unwilling to report staff and
inmate misconduct due to fear of reprisal.
We also found that FCI Tallahassee’s Health Services Department is experiencing significant staffing
shortages, with 38 percent of its positions vacant, which is consistent with challenges associated with hiring
healthcare professionals across the BOP. While we found that Health Services Department staff work hard
to complete many of the core tasks within timeframes set by BOP policy, staff shortages have negatively
affected healthcare treatment, including causing staff to modify the time of day it distributes insulin and
drugs to female inmates, which may limit the therapeutic benefit of these drugs for certain inmates.
Separately, we observed a healthcare provider failing to ask required questions during inmate intake
screenings and not informing inmates how to access healthcare services.
We note that many of the issues we detail in this report were longstanding and that much of FCI
Tallahassee’s executive leadership team is new to the institution. For example, the Warden reported for
duty there in January 2023. He and the leadership team were aware of many of the issues detailed in the
report and at the time of our inspection had been taking steps to address them. We appreciated the full
cooperation they and their staff provided to the OIG team during the inspection.

Report Highlights

X

Food Service

-----••••
••••

Condition of
Facilities

We identified serious issues with FCI Tallahassee’s food service and storage operations.
•
•

Moldy bread was served to inmates, and rotting vegetables were stored in a food
preparation area refrigerator.
Pests and compromised food containers were present in food storage warehouses.

Significant facilities issues affect the conditions of confinement for female inmates.
•
•
•

Many female inmates lived in housing units with water that frequently leaked from ceilings
and windows on or near their living spaces.
We observed poor conditions, including an inoperable toilet and showers, in communal
bathrooms.
FCI Tallahassee received $3.6 million to replace the roofs of certain administrative buildings
and to replace housing unit windows; however, it had neither requested nor received funding
to address necessary housing unit roof repairs.

Significant staffing shortages affect institution operations.

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t+t+t
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Staffing
Shortages

IA

Safety and
Security

•
•
•

Correctional Officer shortages require the institution to routinely use overtime, which can
negatively affect staff attentiveness and therefore safety and security.
The male detention center operates with a small staff complement and lacks supervisory
correctional oversight.
Staff shortages in the Health Services Department have required it to modify the timing that
drugs and insulin are distributed to female inmates, which may negatively affect their
therapeutic effect.

Most staff and inmates felt safe at the institution; however, we still identified deficiencies in core
security and inmate management functions.
•
•
•
•

Weaknesses in inmate search procedures contribute to the introduction of contraband.
Staff failed to perform inmate monitoring rounds as required by BOP policy.
Inmates and staff said that rules are not enforced consistently among Correctional Officers, and
inmates said that some Correctional Officers use offensive language when speaking with them.
There are not enough cameras to sufficiently observe staff and inmate activities.

ii

Table of Contents
Introduction........................................................................................................................................................ 1
FCI Tallahassee ..................................................................................................................................................................2
FCI Tallahassee Staffing Challenges..............................................................................................................................3
Inspection Results .............................................................................................................................................. 4
Food Service.......................................................................................................................................................................4
Infrastructure and Physical Conditions .................................................................................................................... 12
Safety and Security ........................................................................................................................................................ 21
Use of Restrictive Housing........................................................................................................................................... 29
Staff Discipline ................................................................................................................................................................ 32
Sexual Misconduct Reporting ..................................................................................................................................... 32
Inmate Healthcare......................................................................................................................................................... 34
Inmate Programming.................................................................................................................................................... 36
Conclusion ........................................................................................................................................................ 38
Appendix 1: Purpose, Scope, and Methodology.............................................................................................. 40
Standards ........................................................................................................................................................................ 40
Purpose and Scope ....................................................................................................................................................... 40
Inspection Methodology .............................................................................................................................................. 40
Appendix 2: DOJ OIG Related Work ................................................................................................................. 42
Appendix 3: BOP Policies Cited ....................................................................................................................... 43
Appendix 4: The BOP’s Response to the Draft Report .................................................................................... 44

iii

Introduction
This report details the results of the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) Office of the Inspector General’s (OIG)
unannounced inspection of a Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) prison, Federal Correctional Institution (FCI)
Tallahassee, a low security female institution with an adjacent male detention center located in Tallahassee,
Florida. This is the second unannounced inspection through the OIG’s new on-site inspections program. In
May 2023, we issued a report detailing our first inspection, of FCI Waseca, a standalone low security female
institution.1 In selecting a site for our second inspection, we sought an institution that was operationally
similar to FCI Waseca but had a different risk profile according to a prison inspection risk assessment tool
that the OIG is developing and piloting internally. FCI Waseca scored as “low risk” on the tool, and the
results of that inspection provided the OIG a baseline against which to compare the operations of other
institutions. FCI Tallahassee, conversely, scored as “high risk” according to the tool. The collective results of
the FCI Waseca inspection, the FCI Tallahassee inspection, and future inspections will allow us to calibrate
the tool as we expand our inspection program. Finally, by selecting FCI Tallahassee as the site of our second
inspection, we were able to test the scalability of our inspection protocols because FCI Tallahassee’s
adjacent male detention center makes the institution more operationally complex than FCI Waseca.
The OIG conducted its unannounced,
on-site inspection of FCI Tallahassee
between Monday, May 22, and Friday,
May 26, 2023. 2 The OIG team
consisted of eight OIG staff members
and two medical subject matter
experts contracted by the OIG. While
on site, we made physical
observations; interviewed staff and
inmates; reviewed security camera
footage; and collected records related
to inmate programming and
education, institution staffing levels,
conditions of confinement, inmate
medical and mental healthcare, and
FCI Tallahassee Main Entrance
staff and inmate misconduct,
Source: OIG, May 2023
including sexual misconduct. We also
made follow-up requests of both the
institution and the BOP Central Office
for additional data, interviews, and documents, which we used to further inform our inspection (see
Appendix 1 for more details on the methodology).

1

See Appendix 2, Item I.

Pursuant to the OIG’s planned procedures for initiating an inspection, which we had previously shared with the BOP,
the OIG notified the institution at approximately 8 a.m. on May 22, 2023, that it would be initiating an inspection at noon
that same day.
2

1

FCI Tallahassee
FCI Tallahassee is a low security female prison
that originally opened in 1938 to house male
inmates. The prison was converted to house
female inmates in 1992, and the adjacent
detention center opened in 1996. The
detention center is an administrative security
facility that houses male inmates of all security
levels who are awaiting sentencing or transfer.
FCI Tallahassee leadership uses a centralized
roster to staff both institutions and oversees
the operation of both the female prison and
the male detention center from offices located
at the female prison.

FCI Tallahassee: Institution Profile
Location
Tallahassee, FL
Medical Care Level
2 of 4
Mental Healthcare Level
2 of 4
Staff
Total Positions: 307
On Board: 260

FCI Tallahassee is a Medical and Mental
Healthcare Level 2 institution, meaning that it
generally has the capabilities and resources to
provide care for stable outpatients whose
medical and mental health conditions can be
monitored and managed through routine
appointments.

47 Vacancies

--•••

Female Prison

Male Detention Center

Population
Physical Capacity:
846

Population
Physical Capacity:
294

Actual Headcount:

Actual Headcount:

746

115

As of May 22, 2023, the female prison housed
~88% capacity
~39% capacity
746 female inmates, which was 88 percent of
its physical capacity of 846. It also had the
Security Level
Security Level
largest number of transgender inmates in the
Low
Administrative
BOP: 119 at the time of our inspection. The
female prison has five general population
Housing Units
Housing Units
housing units. Four of these units are single
5 General Population
3 General Population
level and have an open layout where inmates
1 SHU
1 SHU
use common spaces, including shower and
bathroom facilities, during the day and sleep in
As of May 22, 2023
cubicles. The fifth unit, which houses inmates
Source: FCI Tallahassee documentation
enrolled in a residential mental health and
drug treatment program, has two levels that
contain double occupancy cells. Cells in this
unit contain bunk beds, a sink, and a toilet. Inmates housed in this building have access to common spaces,
including showers, located on both levels of the housing unit. The female prison also has a Special Housing
Unit (SHU) for inmates that BOP staff has determined need to be separated from the general population.
SHU inmates are generally housed two to a cell. SHU cells remain locked and contain their own toilets. SHU
showers are standalone and available to inmates three times a week.
FCI Tallahassee offers a variety of programming, including a residential mental health and drug treatment
program, as well as FIRST STEP Act-required Evidence-Based Recidivism Reduction programming and

2

Productive Activities to its female inmates. The institution also offers vocational apprenticeships, as well as
employment for inmates at an on-site call center operated by UNICOR, a government-owned manufacturing
corporation that employs BOP inmates.
As of May 22, 2023, the adjacent detention center housed 115 male inmates, approximately 39 percent of its
physical capacity of 294. The detention center has three housing units, which contain double occupancy cells
that are furnished with bunk beds, a sink, and a toilet. During normal operations, cells remain unlocked
during the day and locked at night. This allows inmates to use common space during the day. The detention
center also has a SHU; SHU cells are locked and contain their own toilet, sink, and shower. Inmates housed at
the detention center tend to remain there only on a short-term basis as they are generally awaiting sentencing
or transfer to another institution. As a result, the BOP does not offer male inmates at the detention center the
same level of programming it offers to female inmates at the female prison.

FCI Tallahassee Staffing Challenges
At the time of our inspection in May 2023, FCI
Tallahassee had a total of 307 positions composed of
292 BOP positions authorized specifically for FCI
Tallahassee, as well as 15 positions supported through
the U.S. Public Health Service and through
supplemental staffing allocations from DOJ.3 We found
that 85 percent (260 of 307) of FCI Tallahassee’s total
positions were filled. Consistent with the vacancy rate
for the institution overall, the Correctional Services
Department was staffed at 89 percent (109 of
122 positions). The Correctional Services Department is
composed primarily of Correctional Officers, who are
vital to the safety and security of the institution as they
are responsible for providing round-the-clock
supervision of inmates. As we describe later in the
report, we found that, due to staff shortages, in order to
fully staff Correctional Officer posts both the female and
male facilities require significant use of overtime, as well
as augmentation—a staffing technique whereby nonCorrectional Officer personnel are reassigned from their
regular duties to serve in Correctional Officer posts.

Figure 1
FCI Tallahassee Staffing Level Overview

350
300

■ Filled Positions ■ Vacant Positions

47

250
200
150
100

260

13

109

50

8

13

0
Overall

Correctional
Services

Health
Services

Source: FCI Tallahassee staffing data as of May 2023

Moreover, we found that staffing challenges at FCI Tallahassee are consistent with staffing challenges across
the BOP and were not limited to the Correctional Services Department. The Health Services Department in
particular was staffed at 62 percent, with only 13 of 21 positions filled, and had vacancies for positions
including healthcare providers. In the Inmate Healthcare section below, we describe the effects of these
Health Services staffing shortages on the provision of inmate healthcare.

The Commissioned Corps of the U.S. Public Health Service is a branch of the uniformed services that supports public
health and helps fill health service roles within federal agencies and programs.

3

3

Inspection Results
Food Service
During our inspection, we identified serious issues with FCI Tallahassee’s Food Service Department.
Specifically, while observing a lunch service at the female prison on our second day, we found that moldy
bread had been served to inmates. In an adjacent food preparation area, we observed discolored and
rotting vegetables in a refrigerator. Additionally, we inspected the food storage warehouses and observed
seriously unsanitary conditions that included likely evidence of rodent droppings and rodents having
chewed through boxes of food, as well as bags of cereal with insects in them and warped food containers.
Due to the severity of the issues we identified and the immediate risks they posed to inmate health, we
informed FCI Tallahassee management of our observations. Within 24 hours of our notification, FCI
Tallahassee staff removed large volumes of food from the storage warehouses. We note that food served at
the men’s detention center is prepared separately from the food prepared at the female prison. However,
food served at both facilities is stored centrally in the warehouses we inspected.
During the 2 years prior to our inspection, the Food Service Administrator position, which is responsible for
food safety within the Food Service Department, had been vacant. In fact, FCI Tallahassee’s current Food
Service Administrator’s first day of duty in that position was the first day of our inspection and therefore he
was not yet in a position to speak to the operation of the Food Service Department. Notwithstanding this
vital vacancy, the issues we identified were wide-ranging and are likely attributable to a number of discrete
failures in food service management, for which many staff members, including FCI Tallahassee
management, are ultimately accountable.
After receiving a draft of this report, the BOP provided updates and documentation to the OIG on its efforts
to improve the Food Service Department at FCI Tallahassee since our inspection. These efforts include a
pest control service provided twice a month, training provided by the Regional Food Service Administrator
to food service staff, a stock rotation plan for the food warehouse, internal sanitation checks of the Food
Service Department, and repairs made to broken seats in the inmate cafeteria.

Food Served to Inmates and Food in the Kitchen Preparation Area
In a June 2022 inmate survey conducted by the BOP, 55 percent of FCI Tallahassee inmates rated the food
quality at FCI Tallahassee as poor and reported that outdated food was served. Further, during our
inspection in May 2023, many female inmates similarly complained to us about the quality of food served at
the institution. Consistent with these concerns, we observed that, during a lunch service at the female
prison, moldy bread had been served to inmates and discolored and rotting vegetables were being stored in
a refrigerator in an adjacent food preparation area. These conditions are potentially hazardous to the
health of inmates and are clearly violative of BOP Food Service policies. 4 See the images below for
examples of our observations.

4

See Appendix 3 (Food Service Manual).

4

Left, Moldy Bread Served During an Observed Lunch Service, Right, Close-up of Moldy Bread Found on an Inmate’s
Lunch Tray During Lunch Service
Source: OIG, May 2023

Left, A Discolored and Rotting Cucumber Found in a Food Preparation Refrigerator, Right, Discolored Celery Found in
the Same Refrigerator
Source: OIG, May 2023

5

Food in Warehouse Storage
As outlined in the BOP’s Food Service policy, the BOP is required to store food so that it will not be exposed
to contamination.5 However, inside the food storage warehouses and an adjacent storage freezer, we
found insects inside and on top of large bags of dry food―likely evidence of rodent droppings and rodents
having chewed through the exterior of food packaging―and damaged containers of food that had warped
or were leaking. We also found that, contrary to BOP Food Service policy, there was a large open hole in a
wall surrounding a pipe’s entrance into the food storage warehouse, which could allow for the introduction
of insects and rodents. See the images below for examples of these issues.

Insects Inside and on Top of a Bag of Cereal
Source: OIG, May 2023 (Red Circles Added to Image)

5

See Appendix 3 (Food Service Manual).

6

Left, Spiderwebs, Insects, and Likely Evidence of Rodent Droppings on Top of and Around Bags of Soy, Right, A Closeup Image of Spiderwebs, Insects, and Likely Evidence of Rodent Droppings on Top of and Around Bags of Soy.
Source: OIG, May 2023

Left and Right, Damage Observed in Food Packaging
Source: OIG, May 2023 (Product Names Blurred in Left Image)

7

Warped Containers of Food
Source: OIG, May 2023 (Product Name Blurred)

Left, Warped Can of Food, Right, Overturned Jug of Liquid That Has Leaked
Source: OIG, May 2023

8

Leaking Boxes Containing Jelly
Source: OIG, May 2023

A large open hole in a wall surrounding a pipe’s entrance into the food storage warehouse could allow for the entry of
insects and rodents.
Source: OIG, May 2023 (Red Circle Added to Image)

9

Conditions in the Inmate Cafeteria
During our inspection, we observed issues with the inmate cafeteria at the female prison. We found
numerous broken stools, with sharp edges that could cause injury or the broken remnants of which could
be used as weapons, as well as cracks in the walls and loose ceiling tiles. We also observed insects collected
in windowsills and one inoperable window that staff told us could not be closed. Staff told us that water
and other debris often entered the inmate cafeteria through the window. The images below show
examples of these issues.

Broken Stools in the Inmate Cafeteria
Source: OIG, May 2023 (Red Boxes Added to Image)

10

Left, Warped Ceiling Tiles in the Inmate Cafeteria, Right, Crack in the Wall in the Inmate Cafeteria
Source: OIG, May 2023 (Red Circle Added to Both Images)

Left, Inoperable Window That Staff Told Us Could Not Be Closed in the Inmate Cafeteria, Right, Insects Collected on a
Windowsill in the Inmate Cafeteria
Source: OIG, May 2023

11

Infrastructure and Physical Conditions
We identified serious infrastructure and facilities issues at FCI Tallahassee that negatively affect the
conditions of confinement for female inmates.6 Specifically, we found that some inmates in the female
prison lived in housing units in which water frequently leaked from ceilings and windows on or near their
living spaces. We also observed poor conditions inside communal inmate bathrooms. According to
Facilities Department staff, roofs covering inmate housing units at the female prison routinely leak and
roofs covering all five of the general population inmate housing units needed to be replaced. At the time of
our inspection, FCI Tallahassee had requested and received approximately $3.6 million to replace windows
in two of its housing units and to replace the roofs covering its administration building, education building,
and Special Housing Unit (SHU) building at the female prison. While these are necessary repairs, FCI
Tallahassee had not yet requested or received funding to replace other roofs covering the five general
population housing units at the female prison.
In addition to infrastructure issues affecting the physical conditions in the female inmate housing units, we
identified additional inmate comfort and security issues there, including worn bedding, rusted storage
lockers, and unlocked supply closets. We observed similar issues with inmate bedding at the male
detention center; however, we did not observe the same level of facility deterioration there as we did at the
female prison. One contributing factor may be that the male detention center is a much newer facility: the
male detention center opened in 1996 while the facility that now houses female inmates originally opened
in 1938.

Female Prison Inmate Housing Units
As described in the Introduction, general population inmates at the female prison live in five population
housing units. Four of the housing units are single level, and one is double level. The single-level housing
units have an open layout where inmates sleep in cubicles. Cubicles are equipped with bunk beds and
house two to four inmates. As these cubicles are open, during the day inmates can utilize common space,
including shower, television, telephone, and computer areas. The images below show the typical housing
arrangement in the single-level housing units.

6

Prior OIG work has cited failing infrastructure as a significant problem for the BOP. See Appendix 2, Item II.

12

Left, Typical Single-Level Housing Unit in the Female Prison, Right, Typical Inmate Cubicle in a Single-Level Housing
Unit
Source: OIG, May 2023 (Inmates’ Faces Blurred in Left Image and Product Name Blurred in Right Image)

The fifth unit, which houses inmates enrolled in residential mental health and drug treatment programs, has
two levels that contain double-occupancy cells. Cells in this unit contain bunk beds, a sink, and a toilet.
Cells remain unlocked, allowing inmates to utilize common space, including shower, television, telephone,
and computer areas. The images below show the typical housing arrangement in the double-level inmate
housing unit.

Left, the Double-Level Housing Unit in the Female Prison, Right, Typical Cell in the Double-Level Housing Unit
Source: OIG, May 2023 (Faces Blurred in Left Image)

13

Poor Conditions in the Single-Level Housing Units
We observed poor physical conditions in the four single-level housing units in the female prison.
Specifically, we saw evidence of significant water intrusion, caused by compromised roofs, that has resulted
in damage to ceilings and walls. We also saw evidence of water intrusion caused by insufficiently sealed
windows. To address these leaks, staff and inmates have used a series of patchwork repairs, including
plastic covering on damaged ceiling areas and feminine hygiene products on leaking windows. Many FCI
Tallahassee staff told us that they were aware of the leaks inside the housing units and that staff will try to
avoid placing inmates in bunks that are directly affected by leaks.

Evidence of Water Intrusion from the Roof, with Plastic Covering a Single-Level Housing Unit Ceiling
Source: OIG, May 2023

Left, Missing Plaster from the Wall behind a Bunk Bed in a Single-Level Housing Unit, Right, Damaged Wall and
Evidence of Water Intrusion in a Single-Level Housing Unit
Source: OIG, May 2023 (Television Blurred in Right Image)

14

Left and Right, Feminine Hygiene Products Used to Absorb Water Entering a Single-Level Housing Unit through
Insufficiently Sealed Exterior Windows
Source: OIG, May 2023 (Right Image Enlarged to Show Detail)

We also observed the presence of a black substance on surfaces in the single-level inmate housing units,
which can be seen in the images below. According to inmates, in advance of a BOP correctional audit
performed just prior to our unannounced visit, staff had painted over the housing unit ceilings that
contained the black substance.

Left, Black Substance on the Ceiling in a Single-Level Inmate Housing Unit, Right, Black Substance behind an Inmate
Bed in a Single-Level Housing Unit
Source: OIG, May 2023

15

The functionality of single-level housing
unit communal bathrooms was also of
serious concern, having caused a
variety of sanitary issues. Specifically,
we observed inoperable showers with
clogged shower drains, with a black
substance pooling inside one shower, a
shower that would flood the bathroom
floor with water when in use, and a
toilet that was inoperable. Facilities
Department staff told us that they have
had to routinely address plumbing
issues and clogged toilets in the inmate
housing areas.
Left, Black Substance Pooled in an Inoperable Shower in a Single-Level
Housing Unit, Right, Inoperable Toilet in a Single-Level Housing Unit

We also saw the that the structural
Source: OIG, May 2023
integrity of some bathroom surfaces
was compromised. Unlike many
modern correctional facilities in which
surfaces are made of materials that are
tamper proof, many surfaces in FCI Tallahassee’s female prison, including in the bathrooms, are made of
less-durable porcelain. As a result, we saw many chipped shower tiles in the bathrooms. Like the broken
cafeteria stools shown above, broken remnants of porcelain can cause injuries or be fashioned into
weapons. Additionally, when inspecting a toilet stall, we found that a metal access panel in the stall was
unsecured. We found a piece of shoestring attached to an unknown object inside the wall, potentially
indicative of inmates secreting contraband inside the panel. Although we could not access that object, we
alerted FCI Tallahassee staff to our discovery and they told us that they would conduct a search of the area
and resecure the panel.

Left, Chipped Porcelain Tile in a Shower Stall in a Single-Level Housing Unit, Right, Unsecured Wall Access Panel in a
Single-Level Housing Unit
Source: OIG, May 2023

16

Poor Conditions in the Double-Level Housing Unit
Similar to our observations in the singlelevel female prison housing units, FCI
Tallahassee management personnel told us
that the double-level housing unit has a
compromised roof. During our
observations, we saw that numerous tiles
have fallen off or been removed from the
ceiling, likely due to water intrusion.
As evidenced by the images below, we also
found that a sink in an inmate’s cell was
detached from the wall and an electrical
outlet in a common area where inmates use
clothing irons had clear evidence of fire
damage. Additionally, we observed that
inmates had tampered with vent covers in
their cells. Some removed the covers from
vent spaces that could thus be used to hide
contraband, and others placed paper inside
the vents to regulate airflow.

In the double-level housing unit, numerous tiles have fallen off or
been removed from the ceiling likely due to water intrusion.
Source: OIG, May 2023

Left, Bathroom Sink That Is Detached from the Wall in an Inmate’s Cell in the Double-Level Housing Unit, Right,
Electrical Outlet with Evidence of Fire Damage in a Common Area of the Double-Level Housing Unit
Source: OIG, May 2023

17

Left, Unattached Air Vent in an Inmate Cell in the Double-Level Housing Unit, Right, Paper Inside an Air Vent Inside an
Inmate Cell in the Double-Level Housing Unit
Source: OIG, May 2023

Additional Issues Affecting the Physical Conditions in Female Prison Housing Units
In addition to infrastructure issues
affecting the physical conditions in
the female prison housing units, we
identified other inmate comfort and
security issues there. First, we
observed seriously worn inmate
bedding, pillows, and mattresses
throughout the female prison. FCI
Tallahassee financial management
staff explained that one reason why
bedding, pillows, and mattresses
have not been replaced is that those
goods are accounted for in the same
sub-account as are feminine hygiene
products and in recent years the
vendor prices for feminine hygiene
products have significantly increased.
Inmate Pillow
Although we did not fully assess the
institution’s budgeting and financial
Source: OIG, May 2023
management practices during this
inspection, we make note of this
issue so that FCI Tallahassee as well as BOP Regional and Central Office financial managers can make
informed decisions about how to allocate resources.

18

Left, Inmate Blanket with a Sewed Repair, Right, Inmate Blanket with Holes
Source: OIG, May 2023

Second, we saw that inmate storage lockers in much of the female prison had rusted. In the BOP’s 2022
institution survey, inmates complained that many lockers were rusty and that some had dangerous sharp
edges. See images of the lockers below.

Left and Right, Rusted Inmate Lockers in a Single-Level Housing Unit
Source: OIG, May 2023 (Right Image Enlarged to Show Detail)

19

Third, we attempted to open doors of housing unit supply closets and found that, while most doors for
supply closets were closed, the doors were unlocked. We are concerned that these unsecured closets not
only afford inmates access to cleaning chemicals, but they also provide spaces in which inmates can engage
in illicit activity without detection. See images of the unlocked inmate supply closets below.

Unlocked Inmate Supply Closets in Single-Level Housing Units. The OIG opened the doors of these closets.
Source: OIG, May 2023 (Product Name Blurred in Lower, Left Image)

20

Male Detention Center Housing Units
While we observed similar issues with bedding at the male detention center, we did not identify serious
infrastructure issues there and found the physical conditions in its housing units to be far better than those
in the female prison. As explained in the Introduction, male inmates at the detention center are housed two
to a cell. Cells contain two bunk beds, a chair, a small desk with an attached stool, two wall-mounted
lockers, a sink, and a toilet. During normal operations, cells remain unlocked during the day and locked at
night. This allows inmates to use common spaces, which include recreation, telephone, computer, and
shower areas, during the day. The images below show the layout of a detention center housing unit and a
typical detention center cell.

Left, Inmate Housing Unit and Common Area at the Male Detention Center, Right, Unoccupied Inmate Cell at the Male
Detention Center
Source: OIG, May 2023 (Inmate Face Blurred in Left Image)

Safety and Security
Based on interviews with staff and inmates, we found that most FCI Tallahassee staff and inmates felt safe
at the institution. Notwithstanding these sentiments, we identified serious issues that undermine the
institution’s safety and security. Specifically, FCI Tallahassee routinely uses overtime and augmentation—
the temporary assignment of non-Correctional Officer personnel from their regular non-correctional duties
into Correctional Officer posts—to address Correctional Officer shortages.7 While these measures have
allowed the institution to maintain coverage of Correctional Officer posts, they are imperfect and temporary
measures to ensure continuity of inmate supervision that do not solve the core issue of insufficient staffing

In December 2020, the OIG reported that BOP employees worked over 6.7 million overtime hours, the equivalent of
more than 3,000 full-time positions, at a cost of over $300 million, during fiscal year 2019. See Appendix 2, Item III.
7

21

at BOP institutions. Further, even if the institution was able to fill all of its Correctional Officer vacancies, we
believe that FCI Tallahassee management may not be able to appropriately staff the female prison and the
male detention center given the frequency of overtime and/or augmentation as detailed in the section
below. Additionally, the adjacent male detention center operates with a small staff complement and does
not routinely designate a supervisory Correctional Officer to oversee operations. Correctional Officers
assigned to the detention center expressed concerns about their ability to manage the population safely
and effectively absent additional supervisory oversight.
In addition to staffing concerns, we identified significant deficiencies in core security and inmate
management functions, including deficiencies in inmate search procedures, which can contribute to the
introduction of contraband, as well as staff failures to perform inmate monitoring rounds. Inmates and FCI
Tallahassee management also said that Correctional Officers do not enforce rules consistently. As a result,
some inmates may perceive the appropriate enforcement of rules by one officer as unwarranted or
retaliatory. Additionally, inmates reported that some Correctional Officers use offensive language when
speaking with them. Collectively, these issues adversely affect the trust inmates have in Correctional
Officers, which can cause some inmates to be hesitant to report staff and inmate misconduct.
Finally, and as we have found in our prior oversight of the BOP, FCI Tallahassee, like other BOP institutions,
lacks the number of cameras necessary to sufficiently observe staff and inmate activity.8

Correctional Officer Staffing
Correctional Services Department staff, who are primarily Correctional Officers, are responsible for the daily
management and supervision of inmates and the implementation of policies and procedures to maintain a
safe and secure environment for inmates and staff. At the time of our inspection, FCI Tallahassee’s
Correctional Services Department was staffed at 89 percent (109 filled versus 13 vacant positions).
Vacancies in Correctional Officer positions make it difficult for an institution to provide round-the-clock
supervision of inmates. To compensate for vacancies in these critical positions at FCI Tallahassee, institution
management has adopted two stopgap measures used widely across the BOP to maintain coverage of
correctional posts: (1) use of voluntary and mandated overtime and (2) temporary assignment of nonCorrectional Officer personnel into Correctional Officer positions (a practice known as augmentation).
Through these two measures, staff performed nearly 67,000 hours of work covering Correctional Officer
posts—equivalent to approximately 32 full-time positions.

Prior OIG work has cited insufficient security camera coverage as a significant problem for the BOP. See Appendix 2,
Items IV and V.
8

22

While these measures have allowed the institution to
maintain coverage of Correctional Officer posts, they
are imperfect measures. Excessive use of overtime can
cause staff to become tired and less observant, and the
use of mandatory overtime—whereby a Correctional
Officer is required to work an additional shift to fill a
vacant post immediately after completing their original
shift—negatively affects staff morale as it can cause
personal challenges. Moreover, augmentation can
have significant negative effects on other aspects of
institution operations. For example, the Facilities
Department manager told us that the reassignment of
his staff to Correctional Officer positions through
augmentation can delay the timely completion of
maintenance. Given FCI Tallahassee’s age and
significant infrastructure challenges, additional delays
in making repairs can prolong the amount of time
inmates experience poor conditions of confinement.

Figure 2
FCI Tallahassee Correctional Officer
Recruiting and Retention Efforts
We note that the institution is taking steps to
recruit and retain Correctional Officers.
Specifically:

-11
1

FCI Tallahassee staff attend inperson and virtual job fairs, as
well as university recruiting
events.
FCI Tallahassee offers
retention incentives of
$10,000 or 25 percent of base
pay (whichever is higher) for
Correctional Officers who
have completed 1 year of
employment.

Even if FCI Tallahassee’s Correctional Services
Department filled all of its vacant positions, we
question whether it would be able to appropriately
staff both the women’s prison and the male detention
center without the continued use of overtime and/or
FCI Tallahassee offers a
augmentation. At the time of our inspection, 109 of
$1,000 award to existing
122 Correctional Services Department positions had
Correctional Officers who
been filled, which amounts to 13 vacancies. However,
refer new Correctional
in the year prior to our inspection, FCI Tallahassee
Officers to FCI Tallahassee.
management used overtime and augmentation to fill
Despite these efforts, FCI Tallahassee
the equivalent of approximately 32 positions. Given
management reported difficulties in finding
that the extent of staffing gaps the institution covered
talented people who want to work in
through overtime and augmentation represents more
Correctional Officer positions, largely due to the
than double its official number of vacancies less than a
lack of competitive staff salaries for new recruits.
year later, the 122 positions officially allocated to the
Source: BOP data
Correctional Services Department may be too low.
Senior institution personnel echoed this concern over
the number of positions allocated to the Correctional
Services Department. Specifically, a member of FCI Tallahassee’s management team believed that, if the
Correctional Services Department was fully staffed at 122 positions, the staffing complement would be
appropriate to cover the female prison only. Similar to the management team member’s assessment of
appropriate staffing levels at FCI Tallahassee, the OIG recently reported that the BOP lacks reliable
information about appropriate staffing levels at the enterprise and institution levels and recommended that
the BOP develop and implement a reliable method to calculate staffing levels.9 The BOP concurred with this

$

9

See Appendix 2, Item VI.

23

recommendation and reported to the OIG that it was already developing a new staffing tool to assess
appropriate staffing levels.

Supervisory Support at the Male Detention Center
Consistent with the above concerns regarding appropriate Correctional Services Department staffing levels,
many of the Correctional Officers assigned to the male detention center expressed concerns about a lack of
both housing unit staffing levels at the detention center in general and on-site supervisory support in
particular. Specifically, Correctional Officers mentioned that Lieutenants, who serve as supervisory
Correctional Officers, were rarely assigned to the detention center. Correctional Services Department
staffing rosters we reviewed indicated that during the 15 days prior to our on-site inspection a Lieutenant
was assigned to the detention center for only 17.5 hours in total.
Although the female prison has a much larger population than the detention center, the lack of correctional
supervision at the detention center presents a concern. This is because, as an administrative security
facility, the male detention center houses inmates who have just entered BOP custody in advance of their
criminal trial and for whom the BOP may not yet have a full criminal history. As a result, the detention
center may house inmates who pose varying security risks, including inmates who may be ultimately
designated as a high security risk. Conversely, nearly all of the inmates the female prison houses have been
designated low security and the BOP has significant knowledge of their criminal histories and past behavior.
Overall, staff we spoke with expressed the belief that it would be difficult for them to respond safely and
effectively to an inmate disturbance or other emergency in the detention center without a supervisory
Correctional Officer.
A psychological reconstruction report that the BOP completed following an inmate suicide at the male
detention center recommended additional correctional supervision at the detention center in its
assessment of circumstances surrounding the death. FCI Tallahassee’s January 2023 response to this
reconstruction report indicated that a Lieutenant would be posted to the male detention center at all times.
However, as mentioned above, in the 2 weeks leading up to our inspection in May 2023, a Lieutenant was
assigned to the detention center for only 17.5 hours in total.
In addition to their concerns with the lack of supervisory oversight at the detention center, Correctional
Officers also believed that more non-supervisory Correctional Officers should be posted there. During our
inspection, only one Correctional Officer was posted in each of the occupied detention center housing units,
although additional Correctional Officers performed other tasks at the detention center throughout the day,
including facilitating staff and inmate entry and exit and staffing the control room and front desk. However,
staff we interviewed shared the belief that an additional Correctional Officer for each occupied detention
center housing unit was necessary to safely monitor inmate activity and respond to a potential emergency
in the housing units, given the composition of the inmate population at the detention center. Both the FCI
Warden and another member of the management team acknowledged the need for additional staff at the
detention center.

24

Correctional Services Department Operational Deficiencies
In August 2022, the BOP’s Program Review Division
conducted a program review of FCI Tallahassee’s
Correctional Services Department and determined
that it was “At Risk,” meaning that the program was
“found to be impaired to the point that it was not
accomplishing its overall mission and that the existing
internal controls were not sufficient to reasonably
ensure that acceptable performance could be
expected in the future.”10 Of note, the program review
indicated that Correctional Officers were not always
searching inmates in accordance with BOP policy, nor
were they conducting rounds to monitor inmate
activity in housing units. During our inspection in May
2023, we found that these issues were still ongoing, as
described in greater detail below.

Illicit Drugs Present at FCI Tallahassee
Staff told us that synthetic cannabinoids and illicitly
acquired and combined buprenorphine/naloxone
were commonly introduced into the institution.
Synthetic Cannabinoids (colloquially known as K2 or
spice) do not have a medical purpose. They are a
category of synthetic drugs that mimic THC, the main
ingredient in marijuana. The exact ingredients and
strength of these drugs are almost impossible for the
user to know and can cause severe side effects, such
as panic attacks, hallucinations, increased blood
pressure and heart rate, and even death. Typically,
synthetic cannabinoids are sprayed onto plant
matter and smoked.
Buprenorphine and naloxone are opioids that can be
combined and ingested orally through pills or
dissolvable strips. When used appropriately, they
can help treat opioid abuse disorder by helping
patients manage withdrawal symptoms and reduce
cravings. Though the high is less intense than the
high from opioids, “the medication can still produce a
euphoric effect, as it still acts on the same opioid
receptors in the brain and creates a flood of
dopamine in the brain.”

We acknowledge that these issues are not unique to
FCI Tallahassee and that they take time to address.
Further, we note that FCI Tallahassee’s current
Captain, who is the head of the Correctional Services
Department, and the FCI Warden are new to the
institution; the Captain reported for duty in August
2022 and the Warden in January 2023. At the time of
our inspection, both were aware of the issues and
were taking steps to address them by coaching and
retraining Correctional Officers. Notwithstanding
these efforts, such deficiencies persist at FCI
Tallahassee and negatively affect institution safety.

Sources: American Addiction Centers and Prison
Journalism Project

Deficiencies in Inmate Search Procedures
Consistent with the findings from the BOP Program Review Division’s August 2022 program review, we
identified serious issues with inmate search procedures at FCI Tallahassee. While most inmates are not
allowed to leave the institution’s secure inner perimeter, female inmates on sanitation and landscaping
work crews may exit the secure perimeter to perform work on the institution’s vast outer perimeter. FCI
Tallahassee staff told us that these inmates are not routinely searched when they reenter the institution,
affording them an opportunity to introduce contraband, including drugs and nuisance contraband such as
cigarettes and vape devices, into the female prison.

According to BOP policy, the BOP’s internal audit process, known as program review, is “intended to determine
compliance with applicable regulations, policies, and adequacy of internal controls, and the effectiveness, efficiency, and
quality of program and operations.” The Program Review Division conducts program reviews on 18 program areas of an
institution’s operations, including Correctional Services. For BOP Policy on program reviews, see Appendix 3
(Management Control and Program Review Manual).
10

25

Institution staff told us that sanitation and landscaping crew inmates are potentially able to collect drugs
and other contraband from the outer perimeter of the prison grounds. Unlike the secure inner perimeter,
which is enclosed behind tall double fences, the outer perimeter is enclosed behind a short single fence,
large portions of which are easily accessible to the public from a municipal park. From such a location,
individuals could easily throw contraband onto prison property for inmates to collect and bring back into
the institution. The image below shows FCI Tallahassee’s outer perimeter fence from the vantage point of
the adjacent municipal park.

FCI Tallahassee’s Outer Perimeter Fence as Observed from the Adjacent Municipal Park. Plastic bags are on the
municipal park side of the fence.
Source: OIG, May 2023

BOP policy does not require that work crew inmates always be visually searched when reentering the
institution through the secure inner perimeter; however, it does allow for periodic searches. 11 According to
staff, such searches rarely occur. One explanation they offered as to why these searches rarely occur was
that female staff must perform visual and pat searches of female inmates, a requirement of Prison Rape
Elimination Act regulations.12 Due to a variety of reasons, including that the majority of staff at the
institution are male, as well as seniority-based post assignment procedures, female staff are rarely posted

11

For BOP policy on inmate searches, see Appendix 3 (Searches of Housing Units, Inmates, and Inmate Work Areas).

12

28 C.F.R. § 115.15(a).

26

to the rear gate. While a female staff member could be relieved of her post and report to the rear gate,
such post changes are disruptive and thus avoided when possible.
The OIG has previously identified that BOP’s practice of assigning posts solely by seniority has resulted in
the assignment of male Correctional Officers to posts where staff must regularly conduct searches of female
inmates. In our September 2018 Review of the Federal Bureau of Prisons’ Management of Its Female
Inmate Population, we recommended that the BOP improve the availability of female staff in female
institutions at posts where inmate searches are common, through the establishment of gender-specific
posts or other methods. 13 Although we closed that recommendation in March 2020, after the BOP reported
that it had the authority to make certain posts gender specific and received authority to recruit only females
for certain Correctional Officer vacancies, our findings at FCI Tallahassee indicate that operational
challenges related to the availability of female staff to perform searches of female inmates persist.
Staff also expressed concerns about female inmates
introducing contraband through the front entrance of the
female prison. Specifically, they told us that inmates on the
sanitation crews collect trash in garbage bags from publicly
accessible areas in front of the female prison and the male
detention center. Staff explained that, when reentering the
female prison from the front entrance, these inmates are
screened by metal detectors; however, their garbage bags,
which also enter the institution for future disposal, are not
always screened or inspected. The image on the right shows
cigarettes and vape devices that are thought by staff to have
entered the institution this way. During our inspection, we
saw inmates enter through the front gate without having
their garbage bags screened, although it did not lead to the
discovery of contraband during our inspection.
In contrast to inmate search procedures, we observed that
staff search procedures were consistent with BOP policy,
whereby staff entering the prison should be required to place
their belongings in an x-ray machine and pass through a
metal detector before entering the building. We also
observed that, if the metal detector alerted to the presence
of metal, the front entrance officer conducted a secondary
screening with a handheld metal detection wand. We did not
have an opportunity to observe staff screening procedures at
the male detention center.

13

See Appendix 2, Item VII.

27

Cigarettes and Vape Devices Discovered by
Staff Prior to Our Inspection
Source: OIG, May 2023 (Brand Names Blurred)

Failure to Complete Rounds
Failure to conduct rounds increases the risk that inmates attempt self-harm, engage in physical violence, or
participate in other illicit behavior such as drug use. However, institution staff told us that their Correctional
Officer colleagues do not always conduct rounds of inmate housing units. These statements were
consistent with findings of the BOP Program Review Division’s August 2022 Correctional Services program
review, conducted by staff external to FCI Tallahassee, which found that staff were not always conducting
rounds in the SHUs consistent with BOP policy. During our on-site review of video footage, we also found
that a staff member failed to make required rounds during two consecutive overnight shifts in the male
detention center, leaving inmates unobserved for multiple hours each night. Upon discovery, the
responsible supervisor indicated that institution management would file an incident report and that the
offending staff member would be subject to potential discipline. The supervisor expressed frustration at
this noncompliance due to the fact that, as mentioned above, an inmate committed suicide at the male
detention center less than a year prior to our inspection.

Inconsistent Application of Rules and the Use of Offensive Language among Correctional
Officers Directed at Inmates
In May 2022, BOP staff external to FCI Tallahassee performed a Women’s Institution Cultural (WIC)
assessment and determined that institution staff were not providing the inmate population at FCI
Tallahassee with consistent guidance on behavioral expectations. During our inspection, staff we
interviewed suggested that differences in staff experience and tenure have negatively affected the
consistency and quality of communication from staff to inmates. Additionally, and related to the inmate
search issues described above, a commonly repeated inmate complaint was that some staff search inmate
property while others do not. Further, some inmates believed that this inconsistency was evidence that
staff who searched their property were unfairly retaliating against them. An FCI Tallahassee senior
management staff member acknowledged that Correctional Officers are not always consistent in
performing their duties.
In addition to staff and inmate statements regarding the consistency with which Correctional Officers
perform searches, inmates reported to us that some staff have communicated disrespectfully toward them
and other inmates. The May 2022 WIC assessment similarly called attention to punitory communication
from staff directed at inmates, as well as the use of insulting and derogatory terms. That WIC assessment
also stated that staff repeatedly misgendered transgender inmates after inmates informed staff of their
preferred gender identity.
We found that these issues collectively have undermined trust between staff and inmates. We believe that
this lack of trust has contributed in part to why some inmates told us that they were hesitant to report staff
or inmate misconduct due to fear of reprisal. This hesitance is concerning because, to ensure the safety of a
BOP institution, it is vital that inmates feel comfortable reporting misconduct, including sexual misconduct.

28

Security Cameras
Although security cameras can serve as a force multiplier for visual coverage in a BOP institution, according
to management and staff both the female prison and male detention center at FCI Tallahassee lack the
number of cameras necessary to sufficiently observe staff and inmate activities. We found that these
facilities have many blind spots that create opportunities for inmates to engage in inappropriate behavior
without detection. At the time of our inspection, FCI Tallahassee’s female prison had 60 cameras and the
male detention center had 53. As a point of reference, FCI Waseca—an institution we recently inspected
with a population and security level designation similar to FCI Tallahassee’s female prison—had
162 cameras. Although we acknowledge that FCI Tallahassee has a different physical layout, we note that
staff and management at FCI Waseca, which had more than double the number of cameras, believed that
they needed many more cameras to sufficiently observe staff and inmate activities.
During our review of security camera footage at FCI Tallahassee, we found that the footage was of high
quality and that the associated video recording system has the capacity to retain footage for 14 days.
Institution internal investigative staff told us that they would prefer the retention timeframe to be longer
because some allegations of misconduct are made more than 14 days after the misconduct has occurred;
without available camera footage, they said, it can be difficult to investigate such allegations.
The OIG has long identified insufficient camera coverage and recording system storage limitations as
challenges, both for the BOP throughout its institutions and for the OIG in its own investigative capacity. In
a 2016 report, we found that ‘‘deficiencies within the BOP’s security camera system have affected the OIG’s
ability to secure prosecutions of staff and inmates in BOP contraband introduction cases, and these same
problems adversely affect the availability of critical evidence to support administrative or disciplinary action
against staff and inmates.” 14 In response to our June 2016 findings and recommendations, the BOP
completed a multiyear update to cameras at 45 institutions; however, serious issues with the BOP’s security
camera systems remain. Given the persistence of BOP camera issues, Congress passed and the President
signed the Prison Camera Reform Act of 2021, which requires the BOP to develop a plan to evaluate and
reform its security camera capabilities.15

Use of Restrictive Housing
As of May 23, 2023, 24 inmates were housed in the SHU at the female prison and 4 inmates were housed at
the SHU in the male detention center.16 Inmates are generally housed in the SHU if they:

14

See Appendix 2, Item IV.

The Prison Camera Reform Act became law in December 2022. Under the law, among other things the BOP is required
to submit to Congress a plan to “evaluate the security camera, land-mobile radio, and public address systems.” Prison
Camera Reform Act of 2021, Pub. L. No. 117-321, 136 Stat. 4430 (2022), www.congress.gov/117/plaws/publ321/PLAW117publ321.pdf (accessed September 26, 2023).
15

Six of these 24 inmates were from FCI Marianna, which is located in Marianna, Florida, approximately 75 miles from FCI
Tallahassee. Because FCI Marianna’s satellite female prison camp does not have its own SHU, when its inmates must be
separated from the general population they are temporarily transferred to the SHU in the female prison at FCI Tallahassee.
16

For BOP policy on restrictive housing, see Appendix 3 (Special Housing Units).

29



are suspected of having committed serious misconduct and are awaiting the completion of an
investigation and disciplinary hearing;



are serving a disciplinary sanction after having been found to have committed misconduct at the
completion of an investigation and disciplinary hearing;



have been assessed by staff to pose a safety risk to the institution and are awaiting transfer to
another institution (certain inmates in this status may have already completed their disciplinary
sanction); or



need to be separated from another inmate or a staff member for their own safety.

As of May 23, 2023, none of the 24 female SHU inmates had been housed there for more than 35 days and
the majority had been housed there fewer than 20 days. At the male detention center, the SHU housed four
inmates, two of whom had been there for 5 or fewer days. The third inmate had been housed in the SHU
for 76 days and was awaiting transfer to another institution; the fourth inmate, who had a history of
assaulting staff and was awaiting sentencing, had been housed in the SHU for 138 days.
SHU inmates in both facilities are subject to significant restrictions compared to inmates in the general
population. Specifically, they are confined to a locked cell with an opportunity for at least 5 hours of
outdoor recreation per week. SHU inmates are generally housed two per cell. SHU cells in the male
detention center include a toilet, sink, and shower. SHU cells in the female prison include a toilet and sink
only. Female SHU inmates are escorted from their cell to single-use showers three times a week. FCI
Tallahassee staff told us that they double-cell inmates whenever possible; but they noted that there are
certain times they cannot do so, such as when there is an odd number of inmates assigned to the SHU. The
Warden must approve any decision to single-cell an inmate. The images below show living conditions in the
female prison and male detention center SHUs.

Left, Vacant SHU Cell at the Female Prison, Right, SHU Shower at the Female Prison
Source: OIG, May 2023

30

SHU Outdoor Recreation Cages at the Female Prison
Source: OIG, May 2023

Left and Right, SHU Cell in the Male Detention Center
Source: OIG, May 2023

31

Staff Discipline
Institution management and staff who oversee FCI Tallahassee complained about the amount of time it
takes to close a staff administrative misconduct investigation and expressed the belief that such delays
make the BOP’s staff discipline process ineffective at enforcing standards of conduct. This is a common
refrain we have heard from institution and BOP leadership in recent years. In a May 2023 OIG report on the
BOP’s strategies to identify, communicate, and remedy operational issues, we reported that former BOP
leadership told the OIG that the BOP’s employee discipline process was “horrible” and that “it takes too long
to get anything done.”17
As of June 2, 2023, there were 191 ongoing misconduct investigations involving FCI Tallahassee staff. We
found that the average time these staff misconduct cases have been ongoing exceeds 2 years. In an
additional six cases, the underlying misconduct of staff had been substantiated but the cases were pending
a disciplinary sanction decision. Depending on the severity of staff misconduct allegations and the risk that
a staff member may pose to the institution, the Warden may elect to remove a staff member from regular
duty pending the outcome of a misconduct investigation. During our inspection, three staff members who
had been posted to the female prison were transferred to the male detention center while investigations
into their alleged misconduct involving female inmates were ongoing.
In addition to the amount of time it takes to close a staff administrative misconduct investigation, FCI
Tallahassee management attributed the backlog in staff misconduct investigations to recent vacancies in the
Special Investigative Agent (SIA) position, which is responsible for investigating staff misconduct. Prior to the
August 2022 arrival of the SIA in place at the time of our inspection, the position had not been permanently
staffed for nearly 4 months. The Warden and the new SIA told the OIG that reducing the backlog of staff
misconduct investigations is a priority for the institution. BOP Director Colette Peters has also publicly
stated the importance of reducing the length of time that it takes to investigate staff misconduct across the
BOP and has implemented reforms, including centralizing the reporting structure of all SIAs under the BOP’s
Office of Internal Affairs and allocating resources to hire more SIAs across the BOP.

Sexual Misconduct Reporting
Many staff and inmates told us that they do not believe that sexual misconduct is widespread at the institution,
and we found that inmates had multiple ways to report sexual misconduct, including to the OIG.18 Further,
inmates had access to sexual abuse counseling services, if necessary. We found that inmates were generally
aware of their options if they experienced or witnessed sexual misconduct; but we identified opportunities for
FCI Tallahassee and the BOP to reinforce how inmates can report sexual abuse to the OIG and ensure that such
reporting is confidential.
To encourage inmates to report sexual misconduct to staff, the institution has posted educational posters
throughout both the female prison and the male detention center. We also saw that staff carry pocket-size
cards reminding them how to respond if an inmate reports sexual misconduct. See examples of these

17

See Appendix 2, Item VI.

For the purposes of this report, we use the term “sexual misconduct” to encompass all forms of sexual misconduct,
including harassment and assault.
18

32

materials below. Further, while we were on site, institution leadership posted a new poster with a picture of
the Sexual Misconduct Reporting Coordinator and encouraged inmates to reach out to the coordinator if
they wanted to report sexual abuse.

Example of BOP Sexual Misconduct Reporting Information, in both English and Spanish, Observed in All Common
Areas throughout the Facility
Source: OIG, May 2023
Prison Rape Elim ination Act {PREA)

Prison Rape Elimination Act {PREA)

Immediately Notify Operations Lieutenant

FIRST RESPONDER DUTIES; Upon notification of an allegation
that an inmate was sexua lly abused.
Immediately Notify the Operations Lt.
I Separate th e alleged victim and abuser.
1 Maintain visual of both inmates.
I Preserve & protect the crime scene and evidence:
• Upon removal of inmates secure the cell/area
• Ensure the perpetrator does not destroy physical evidence.
• Request the alleged victim not to take any actions that
could destroy physical evidence (ex. washing, brushing teeth,
changing clothes, urinating, defecating, drinking or eating)

• During normal business hours the Op's Lt will notify:
- SIS
- Captain
- Chief Psychologist
- Health Svcs Admin
- Associate Warden (over Psychology)
-Warden
• During non-business hours the Op's Lt will notify:
- SIS
- Captain
- Chief Psychologist
Institution Duty Officer (will notify the ADO, AW over Psychology)
Maintain Confidentiality at all times

Left, Front of Card Given to Staff, Right, Back of Card Given to Staff
Source: OIG, May 2023

We also asked inmates to show us how they would report sexual misconduct to the OIG through the inmate
computer system, TRULINCS. Most inmates were able to do so, but some were not aware that the report
would be forwarded to the OIG. One reason for this is that, to send a report of sexual misconduct through
TRULINCS to the OIG, a BOP inmate (at any institution) must select a drop-down option labeled “DOJ Sexual
Abuse Reporting” and the TRULINCS screen prompts do not clearly indicate that the message will
confidentially be sent to the OIG. We note that the Orientation Handbook provided to all BOP inmates

33

explains that, when inmates report sexual misconduct through the DOJ Sexual Abuse Reporting option, the
message will be confidentially relayed to the OIG. This information is useful; but, given the lack of clarity in
the TRULINCS sexual abuse reporting interface, we believe that the BOP should take steps to reinforce how
to transmit sexual abuse messages via TRULINCS so that they are confidentially delivered to the OIG.
While staff and inmates told us that they did not believe that sexual abuse was widespread at FCI
Tallahassee, we note the following:
•

In March 2022 a former Correctional Officer was sentenced to 48 months in federal prison following
his conviction on one count of sexual abuse of a ward while on duty at FCI Tallahassee. In a
separate case, in May 2023 another former FCI Tallahassee Correctional Officer pleaded guilty to
one count of sexual abuse of an individual in federal custody while he was employed at FCI
Tallahassee.



Based on our review of additional sexual misconduct reporting data from May 2022 through May
2023, we found that investigations into allegations against five other FCI Tallahassee staff members
were ongoing and allegations against one other staff member, who no longer works at the
institution, had been sustained following investigation.



During the period from May 2022 through May 2023, there were no substantiated allegations of
inmate-on-inmate sexual misconduct occurring at either the female prison or the male detention
center.

We report this data for informational and transparency purposes and note that the volume of sexual
misconduct investigations, especially those for which the underlying investigation has yet to be concluded,
should not be used, alone, to assess the pervasiveness of sexual misconduct or lack thereof at an
institution.

Inmate Healthcare
As part of our inspection at FCI Tallahassee, the OIG undertook a comprehensive review of the institution’s
delivery of medical and mental healthcare. We were particularly concerned about the substantial number
of vacancies in the Health Services Department.19 While FCI Tallahassee’s Health Services Department
appeared to be able to address the most critical and time-sensitive medical and mental healthcare needs of
inmates, its low healthcare provider staffing levels have had an effect on the time of day that prescription
drugs are distributed to inmates, which can negatively affect the efficacy of those drugs. Additionally, we
learned that FCI Tallahassee medical providers have difficulty communicating with Spanish-speaking
inmates because not many staff speak Spanish. Further, we identified concerns with the provision of
medical care unrelated to staffing levels, specifically, the completeness of the inmate medical screening
process, as well as the volume at which certain drugs are prescribed for generalized pain. Finally, we
describe an issue affecting the institution’s emergency response capability that is also related to broader

The OIG has previously reported how staffing shortages among healthcare professionals can negatively affect the
provision of healthcare at BOP institutions. See Appendix 2, Items VIII and IX.
19

34

institution infrastructure issues: an elevator servicing the Health Services Department was inoperable at the
time of our inspection.

Health Services Staffing and Effects on Care
As noted in the Introduction, the BOP has difficulty hiring healthcare professionals across its institutions. As
of May 2023, FCI Tallahassee’s Health Services Department was 62 percent staffed (13 out of 21 positions
filled) with longstanding vacancies in registered nurse and mid-level provider positions (which include Nurse
Practitioners and Physician Assistants). To address these shortages, Health Services Department staff have
taken on additional duties to maintain operations. For example, we learned that physicians are often tasked
to conduct intake screenings, a responsibility normally assigned to nurses and mid-level providers. Based
on a review of Health Services performance metrics, the Health Services Department has been able to
complete many core tasks within BOP-established timeframes. Specifically, FCI Tallahassee documentation
indicates that, during the first quarter of calendar year 2023, 95 percent of inmate physicals and 99 percent
of chronic care clinics (i.e., clinical encounters during which medical providers meet with inmates to discuss
how to manage chronic health conditions) were completed within timeframes outlined in BOP policy.
Further, the Health Services Department had been providing pregnancy tests for all female inmates upon
their admission to the institution.
Despite these positive metrics, we identified a concern with Health Services Department operations that was
caused by staff shortages. Specifically, at the time of our inspection FCI Tallahassee’s female prison was
temporarily modifying the time in the afternoon that it distributes insulin and single-dose controlled
substance medications to inmates (i.e., pill line) to 2:00 p.m. instead of its regularly scheduled 4:30 p.m. Our
contract medical experts were concerned that providing insulin well before dinnertime at the institution
may make it more difficult for diabetic inmates to control their glycemic levels. Further, both our contract
medical experts and an institution psychologist expressed concern that the pill line time change may cause
inmates who are prescribed certain psychiatric medications that facilitate sleep to receive these medications
too early in the day for them to be effective.
We identified another staffing issue that could compromise patient care, specifically FCI Tallahassee lacked a
sufficient number of Spanish-speaking staff to either speak directly with Spanish-speaking inmates or
translate on their behalf during clinical encounters. To address this issue, a member of FCI Tallahassee’s
management staff told us they are trying to develop a contract to procure a telephonic translation service
for use during clinical encounters; but at the time of our inspection, the contract development process was
in an early stage.

Other Issues Affecting Care
Although not directly related to staff shortages, we also identified concerns with the inmate medical
screening process. While observing multiple inmate medical intake screenings at the male detention center,
OIG staff, as well as our contract medical experts, found that that the healthcare provider performing the
screenings did not ask all the screening questions that were pre-populated in the BOP’s medical record.
Further, we found that the provider did not inform these inmates how to access healthcare services, such as
how to request to see a medical provider or how to obtain medications, as needed. According to a member
of FCI Tallahassee’s management staff, this information should be communicated to inmates during the
medical portion of the intake screening.

35

Further, based on our review of internal Health Services
Department meeting minutes, we learned of an internal
debate among clinical staff about the frequency with which
two medications, a 5 percent concentration lidocaine patch
and a 1 percent concentration diclofenac gel, were prescribed
to inmates to address pain symptoms (see the text box).
While these medications do not have an acute risk of abuse,
some clinical staff indicated that the cumulative cost of these
prescriptions was an area of concern and that pain should
first be treated with over-the-counter pain relievers available
for purchase at the inmate commissary.

Lidocaine and Diclofenac
Lidocaine is a local anesthetic, and diclofenac
is a nonsteroidal anti-inflammatory drug;
both are used treat pain. Depending on the
dose and delivery modality, they are available
to the public as over-the-counter or
prescription medications. At the BOP,
lidocaine and diclofenac are available only as
prescription medications.
At FCI Tallahassee, lidocaine was commonly
prescribed in a 5 percent concentration in
transdermal patch form and diclofenac was
commonly prescribed in a 1 percent
concentration in gel form.

Although we did not determine the exact financial impact of
the lidocaine patch and diclofenac gel prescribing behavior at
FCI Tallahassee, we found that FCI Tallahassee healthcare
Sources: BOP medical data and the Mayo
providers prescribed these medications at a rate significantly
Clinic
higher than providers at two other institutions of comparable
size and medical care level. From January 1, 2022, through
August 22, 2023, we found that FCI Tallahassee providers
wrote 531 total prescriptions for 5 percent lidocaine patches or 1 percent diclofenac gel to 375 distinct
inmates. In contrast, during the same time at FCI Waseca, providers wrote only 16 total prescriptions for
these medications to 9 individual inmates; at Federal Prison Camp Alderson, providers wrote only 25 total
prescriptions for these medications to 19 individual inmates.
Finally, we found that the elevator servicing the Health Services Department at the female prison was
nonoperational at the time of our inspection. The Health Services Department has offices and examination
rooms on two levels of an administrative building, and, depending on the nature of an inmate’s illness or
injury, staff may have to move a nonambulatory inmate between floors. According to Health Services
Department staff, it is difficult to move inmates via backboard or medical chairs throughout the space and
such movements can delay emergency response. A member of FCI Tallahassee’s management staff told us
that before the elevator can be repaired the FCI Tallahassee Health Services and Safety Departments must
agree on safety protocols governing the appropriate use of the elevator. Determining the appropriate use
of the elevator is of heightened concern because a nurse had been badly injured after a safety gate
malfunctioned and the nurse then inadvertently walked into the open elevator shaft while pushing a
medical cart.

Inmate Programming
As required by the FIRST STEP Act of 2018, BOP institutions must conduct a needs assessment on all
sentenced inmates entering their custody to identify specific Evidence-Based Recidivism Reduction (EBRR)
programs and Productive Activities (PA) that will best prepare inmates for their reentry into society.20 FCI
Tallahassee offers female inmates a variety of these programs, including literacy classes, women’s
programming, psychology programming, religious programming, vocational training courses, and UNICOR

20

18 U.S.C. § 3632(a).

36

employment. FCI Tallahassee also runs a variety of leisure, wellness, and adult continuing education classes
that provide opportunities for learning and engagement outside of an EBRR or PA curriculum.
The Psychology and Education Departments, which run most inmate programming, are nearly fully staffed;
however, wait lists for several programs exceeded 500 names at the time of our inspection. Staff attributed
the size of these wait lists to two causes. First, many inmates who do not intend to participate a program
add their names to a wait list because they are under the false impression that they will earn additional
early release time credits by signing up for multiple programs. Second, similar to issues with Correctional
Officer staffing, the Psychology and Education Departments’ staffing levels may not be aligned with the
institution’s need. An Education Department management official said that, while the Education
Department is fully staffed on paper, she would like to hire two additional instructors to better address
program demand. Similarly, a Psychology Department management official told us that the institution could
better address inmate mental health needs, especially those of male inmates, by hiring an additional
psychologist to serve full-time at the detention center.
In an effort to triage program wait lists, FCI Tallahassee staff prioritize program enrollment for inmates with
upcoming projected release dates and for whom the program would fulfill a need identified on the inmate’s
individualized needs assessment. While this approach may mitigate the risk of inmates being released from
FCI Tallahassee without being offered programs aligned with their reentry needs, it also has unintended
consequences: inmates with long sentences and low FIRST STEP Act-identified needs may not be able to
participate, for significant periods of their incarceration, in any program with a lengthy wait list.
Due to the relatively short-term period that some male inmates are incarcerated at the detention center,
educational programming offered there is limited to a self-study General Educational Development class.
Staff told us that, given the current staffing complement and the programming requirements at the female
prison, they would not be able to offer additional programming at the male detention center. They also
added that, due to staffing constraints among recreation staff, male inmates do not always receive required
recreation time.

37

Conclusion
During our inspection, we observed many serious operational deficiencies at FCI Tallahassee. Among the
most significant was the alarmingly poor and potentially dangerous food service conditions. We observed
moldy bread being served to female inmates, rotting vegetables in a food preparation refrigerator, likely
signs of rodent and pest infestation in food storage warehouses, and compromised food containers in the
warehouses. We also found significant issues with the institution’s infrastructure, including leaking roofs in
need of repair, female inmates living in housing units with ceilings and windows leaking water in or near
their living spaces, a shower in which discolored water had pooled, and communal bathrooms in need of
repair. Further, we identified additional inmate comfort and security issues including worn bedding, rusted
inmate storage lockers, and unlocked supply closets.
While most staff and inmates reported feeling safe at the institution, we identified serious issues affecting
inmate safety, including Correctional Officer shortages; a lack of supervisory oversight at the male detention
center; and operational deficiencies in core inmate management and security functions throughout the
institution, including problems with inmate search procedures and security camera coverage. We also
learned that Correctional Officers may not be consistently enforcing institutional rules and some
Correctional Officers may use offensive language when interacting with inmates. We found it likely that
these issues collectively have adversely affected the trust inmates have in Correctional Officers, which can
cause some inmates to be unwilling to report staff and inmate misconduct due to fear of reprisal.
We also found that 38 percent of positions in the Health Services Department are vacant and that these low
healthcare staffing levels have caused FCI Tallahassee to modify the time that it distributes insulin and drugs
to female inmates, which may limit their therapeutic benefit for certain inmates. Additionally, we learned
that FCI Tallahassee medical providers have difficulty communicating with Spanish-speaking inmates
because not many staff speak Spanish. Further, we identified concerns with the provision of medical care
unrelated to staffing levels, specifically the completeness of the inmate medical screening process, the
volume at which certain drugs are prescribed for generalized pain, and the ability to promptly address a
medical emergency due to an inoperable elevator in the female prison treatment area.
In recent years, the DOJ OIG has cited many of the issues we identified at FCI Tallahassee as BOP-wide
challenges, including its aging infrastructure, staffing issues, insufficient security camera coverage, and
difficulties preventing the introduction of contraband. Further, we have reported on how staff shortages,
especially among healthcare professionals, can negatively affect the provision of healthcare at BOP
institutions. In addition, prior OIG work has identified significant enterprise-wide delays in the BOP’s staff
discipline process and has described how those delays make it difficult for the BOP to enforce standards of
employee conduct that help to ensure the efficient and safe operations of its institutions. See Appendix 2
for details on related DOJ OIG work.
Given the OIG’s past reporting on these systemic issues and the recommendations we have made to the
BOP to address them at an enterprise level, we do not make specific recommendations in this report to
address the manifestation of these issues at FCI Tallahassee. However, through our efforts to ensure the
implementation of recommendations made in our prior work, we will monitor the BOP’s efforts to address
these issues at all BOP institutions, including FCI Tallahassee. Finally, through our future inspections and
BOP oversight work, we intend to assess how other institutions are monitoring the quality of food served to
inmates, as well as healthcare administration. With this additional information, we will be better positioned

38

to make recommendations, where appropriate, to ensure that all BOP institutions comply with applicable
laws and regulations and fulfill the BOP’s mission of fostering a humane and secure environment and
ensuring public safety by preparing individuals for successful reentry into our communities.

39

Appendix 1: Purpose, Scope, and Methodology
Standards
The DOJ OIG conducted this inspection in accordance with the Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity
and Efficiency’s Quality Standards for Inspection and Evaluation (December 2020).

Purpose and Scope
The OIG has determined that it can enhance the effectiveness of its oversight, and its ability to alert the BOP
of concerns, by conducting short-notice and unannounced inspections of BOP facilities, as appropriate.
Pursuant to the OIG’s planned procedures for initiating an inspection, which we had previously shared with
the BOP, the OIG notified FCI Tallahassee at approximately 8 a.m. on May 22, 2023, that it would be initiating
an inspection beginning at noon that same day. The OIG team, which consisted of eight OIG staff members
and two medical subject matter experts contracted by the OIG, conducted the on-site inspection on
Monday, May 22, through Friday, May 26, 2023. The focus of our inspection was the state of institution
operations at the time of our inspection, although for certain portions of our analysis our scope included
roughly the 1 year that preceded our inspection, beginning in May 2022.
In selecting a site for our second inspection, we sought an institution that was operationally similar to our
first inspection site, FCI Waseca, but had a different risk profile on an inspection risk assessment tool that
the OIG is developing and piloting internally. FCI Waseca scored as low risk, and the results of that
inspection provided the OIG a baseline against which to compare the operations of other institutions.
Conversely, FCI Tallahassee scored as high risk and the collective results of the FCI Waseca inspection, the
FCI Tallahassee inspection, and future inspections will allow us to calibrate the tool as we expand our
inspection program. Finally, by selecting FCI Tallahassee as the site of our second inspection, we were able
to test the scalability of our inspection protocols because FCI Tallahassee’s adjacent male detention center
makes it more operationally complex than FCI Waseca.
The scope of this inspection did not include specialized testing to definitively determine, for example, the
potential presence of mold and other hazardous substances. In addition, although this report includes
information on allegations of sexual misconduct, we report this data for informational and transparency
purposes and note that the volume of sexual misconduct investigations (especially those for which the
underlying investigation has yet to be concluded) should not be used, alone, to assess the pervasiveness of
sexual misconduct or lack thereof at an institution.

Inspection Methodology
To better understand FCI Tallahassee’s operations, we toured the institution, interviewed its inmates and
staff, and reviewed its operational records.

Observations
We toured the interior and exterior of the female prison and its adjacent male detention center, including
general population inmate housing units; the Special Housing Units (SHU); Health Services Department
examination spaces; front lobby staff entrances and screening areas; programming areas used by the

40

Psychology, Education, and Recreation Departments; the mail room; the evidence storage area; the UNICOR
call center; the visitation room; inmate intake and screening areas; Facilities Department areas; food storage
warehouses; and food preparation and inmate dining areas in the female prison.
We also reviewed security camera footage, as well as the functionality of the security camera system.
Further, we tested ambient temperatures throughout the institution, as well as the functionality of showers,
sinks, and toilets in inmate housing areas.

Interviews
We conducted on-site interviews with FCI Tallahassee inmates who were housed in both the general
population and the SHU, as well as on-site interviews with institution staff. Staff we interviewed included
the Warden; Associate Wardens, one of whom serves as the institution’s Sexual Misconduct Reporting
Coordinator; supervisory and nonsupervisory Correctional Officers; healthcare providers; inmate case
managers; teachers; food service workers; and staff responsible for institution safety, facilities management,
the UNICOR call center, and the inmate trust fund program. Following our on-site work at FCI Tallahassee,
we also conducted virtual follow-up interviews with select FCI Tallahassee staff and the BOP’s Central and
Regional Offices.

Document Review and Analysis
We reviewed FCI Tallahassee records related to facilities management, staffing levels, use of overtime and
augmentation, use of restrictive housing, provision of inmate healthcare and programming, food service,
inmate discipline, staff misconduct, sexual misconduct reporting, and FIRST STEP Act implementation.

External Subject Matter Experts Assisting the OIG
To assist the OIG in its efforts to assess the provision of healthcare to FCI Tallahassee inmates, the OIG
contracted the services of two healthcare subject matter experts: one physician and one registered nurse.

41

Appendix 2: DOJ OIG Related Work
I.

For the FCI Waseca inspection report, see DOJ OIG, Inspection of the Federal Bureau of Prisons’ Federal
Correctional Institution Waseca, Evaluation and Inspections (E&I) Report 23-068 (May 2023),
oig.justice.gov/reports/inspection-federal-bureau-prisons-federal-correctional-institution-waseca.

II.

For prior OIG reporting on the BOP’s infrastructure management challenges, see DOJ OIG, Audit of the
Federal Bureau of Prisons’ Efforts to Maintain and Construct Institutions, Audit Report 23-064 (May
2023), oig.justice.gov/reports/federal-bureau-prisons-efforts-maintain-and-construct-institutions.

III.

For prior OIG reporting on the BOP’s use of overtime, see DOJ OIG, Management Advisory

Memorandum: Analysis of the Federal Bureau of Prisons’ Fiscal Year 2019 Overtime Hours and Costs,
Audit Report 21-011 (December 2020), oig.justice.gov/reports/management-advisory-analysis-federalbureau-prisons-fiscal-year-2019-overtime-hours-and.

IV.

For prior OIG reporting on the insufficiency of the BOP’s security camera systems and contraband
introduction at BOP institutions, see DOJ OIG, Review of the Federal Bureau of Prisons’ Contraband
Interdiction Efforts, E&I Report 16-05 (June 2016), oig.justice.gov/reports/review-federal-bureau-prisonscontraband-interdiction-efforts.

V.

For additional prior OIG reporting on the insufficiency of the BOP’s security camera systems, see DOJ
OIG, Management Advisory Memorandum: Notification of Needed Upgrades to the Federal Bureau of
Prisons’ Security Camera System, E&I Report 22-001 (October 2021), oig.justice.gov/reports/managementadvisory-memorandum-notification-needed-upgrades-federal-bureau-prisons-security.

VI.

For prior OIG reporting on the BOP’s staffing challenges and investigative backlog of employee
misconduct cases, see DOJ OIG, Limited Scope Review of the Federal Bureau of Prisons’ Efforts to
Identify, Communicate, and Remedy Operations Issues, E&I Report 23-065 (May 2023),
oig.justice.gov/reports/limited-scope-review-federal-bureau-prisons-strategies-identify-communicateand-remedy.

VII.

For prior OIG reporting on the BOP’s management of female inmates, see DOJ OIG, The Federal Bureau
of Prisons’ Management of Its Female Inmate Population, E&I Report 18-05 (September 2018),
oig.justice.gov/reports/review-federal-bureau-prisons-management-its-female-inmate-population.

VIII.

For prior OIG reporting on the BOP’s medical staffing challenges, see DOJ OIG, Review of the Federal
Bureau of Prisons’ Medical Staffing Challenges, E&I Report 16-02 (March 2016),
oig.justice.gov/reports/review-federal-bureau-prisons-medical-staffing-challenges.

IX.

For additional prior OIG reporting on the BOP’s medical staffing challenges, see Pandemic Response
Accountability Committee, Review of Personnel Shortages in Federal Health Care Programs During the
COVID-19 Pandemic (September 2023), www.pandemicoversight.gov/media/file/healthcare-staffingshortages-report.

42

Appendix 3: BOP Policies Cited
Topic Discussed in Report

Relevant Program Statement
4700.06

Food Service

www.bop.gov/policy/progstat/4700.06_cn.pdf

Food Service Manual

(accessed September 15, 2023)

June 8, 2022
1210.23
Program Review

Link (if Public)

www.bop.gov/policy/progstat/1210_023.pdf

Management Control and
Program Review Manual

(accessed September 15, 2023)

August 21, 2002
5521.06
Inmate Searches

Searches of Housing Units,
Inmates, and Inmate Work
Areas

www.bop.gov/policy/progstat/5521_006.pdf
(accessed September 15, 2023)

June 4, 2015
5270.11
Special Housing Units

www.bop.gov/policy/progstat/5270.11.pdf

Special Housing Units

(accessed September 15, 2023)

November 23, 2016

43

Appendix 4: The BOP’s Response to the Draft Report
U.S. Department of Justice
Federal B urea u o f Pri son.

l\hshi1Jgm,r, DC 20 J -i

Offirt, of tire Din ,,;;l or

October 30, 2023

MEM:ORANDUMFOR

RENE L. ROQUE
ASSISTANT IN'SPECTOR GENERAL
EVALUATIONS AND INSPECTIONS

FROM:
SUBJECT:

~~

Response to the Office of Inspector General's (OIG) Draft Report:
lnc,pection of the Federal Bmeau of Prisons' Federal Correction.11
lnc,titution Tallahassee, Assignment Number A-2023-003

The Federal Bureau of Pric,ons (FBOP) values the opportunity to formally :respond to the Office of the
Inspector General's (OIG) above-referenced draft report which identified four areas of concern food service, condition of facilities, staffing shortages, and safety and security.

In response to this inspection, the FBOP has taken several steps to enhance operations at the
Federal Correctional Institution, Tallahassee (FCI Tallahassee), particularly in the area of food
service. As noted by OIG, these corrective measures include, "a pest control service prov-ided
twice a month, training provided by the Regional Food Service Administrator to food service
staff, a stock rotation plan for the food warehouse, internal sanitation checks of the Food Serv-ice
Department, and repairs made to broken seats in the inmate cafeteria." Report at 4.
Additionally, the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) Food Safety and Inspection
Service subsequently visi ted the FCI Tallahassee and verified no violations were found :regarding
meat and poultry.
FBOP :recognizes the importance of improving its physical infrastructme. increasing staffing,
and improving safety and security. FBOP has incorporated each of these issues into its new
strategic framework and has previously provided OIG with information about actions that it is
taking to address each area. For example, FBOP is developing an infrastructure strategy that will
increase the overall effectiveness of facilities management. 1 For example, FBOP has awarded a
contract to enable the development of a methodology to address infrastructure needs. This will
include funding priorities for critical :requirements, the identification of a cost benefit process
:regarding replacement versus :repair. and a system by which the BOP can support its future
budget requests for modernization and :repair. Moreover, FBOP continues development of its
of the Federal Bureau of Prisons' Efforts to Maintain and Constrnct fustitutions, Appx 6 at 43, available
at https://oigjustice.gov/sit es/defau11/:files/reports/23-064_1.pdf.

1 See Audit

44

OIG F om!.1l Dnft Report: Inspection of the Feder.,} Bureau of Prisons' Fe<Eal Conedi.onal Institution Talbhas:s,,e

October 30, 2023
Page 2 of2

automated staffing tool that will provide an updated, standardized, and trnn'>parent view of
staffing guidelines: and by conducting analysis and implementation work to address: the impact of
staffing shortages. augmentation and overtune use. and staffing incentives:. Finally. FBOP has
provided OIG w ith its comprehensive strategy for transitioning to a fully digital security camera
system.
No recommendations were issued with this: report and OIG indicates that although FCI
Tallahassee ' s: executive leadership is: ~new to the institution," the Warden and his leadership
team were already "taking steps to address" many issues identified in the report at the time of
OIG ' s inspection. See Report at ii. FBOP remains committed to addressing any resolved
recommendations: from the related products: referenced in the Report and it looks fo:n.vard to
continuing its work with OIG on the on'iite inspections: program.

45