Audit of the Department of Justice's 

Use and Support of Unmanned Aircraft 

Systems 


Audit Division 15-11

March 2015 


AUDIT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE’S 

USE AND SUPPORT OF UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS 

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 

Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS), commonly referred to as “drones,” are
remotely piloted aerial vehicles and their associated ground control stations that
receive surveillance imagery. UAS may be equipped with cameras to obtain aerial
surveillance and may operate up to several hours, depending on their design.
Officials from multiple law enforcement agencies have stated that they believe UAS
can be beneficial for reconnaissance, surveillance, and crime scene examinations,
and that their use eliminates the risk to a pilot inherent in the manned aircraft used
now.
The objective of this audit was to assess Department of Justice (DOJ)
component use and support of UAS. This report follows up on the findings of a
September 2013 Office of the Inspector General (OIG) interim report that examined
DOJ components’ domestic use of DOJ-owned UAS and grant funding for non-DOJ
UAS. In addition, this audit also examines how DOJ components have used or
relied on other agencies’ UAS to support DOJ law enforcement efforts.
In our 2013 interim report, we found that DOJ components had only used
small UAS aerial vehicles that weigh less than 55 pounds and we identified no
evidence that these aerial vehicles were capable of being armed or carrying
releasable projectiles. We also found that while the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI) had used UAS and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives
(ATF) had planned to use UAS to support their investigations, neither the Drug
Enforcement Administration (DEA) nor the United States Marshals Service (USMS)
had used or planned to use UAS. DOJ agreed with all eight interim report
recommendations and subsequently instituted a DOJ-wide UAS working group to
develop UAS-specific policies.
This audit found that, as of August 2014, the FBI remained the only DOJ
component that operationally deploys UAS. The FBI has deployed its UAS
exclusively to provide targeted aerial surveillance in the context of 13
investigations, such as search and rescue operations, kidnappings, fugitive
manhunts, national security missions, and anti-drug trafficking interdictions.
Moreover, we confirmed that the FBI obtained all required approvals from the
Federal Aviation Administration to operate UAS in the field between 2010 and 2014.
However, our audit identified discrete program management challenges with
implications for the efficient use of UAS. Specifically, the FBI has centralized its
UAS to one location, differing from the decentralized approach it has applied to
manned aircraft. Moreover, at the time of our review, a single team of two pilots
operated all FBI UAS. We believe these circumstances could limit the FBI’s ability
to deploy UAS to distant locations quickly or to multiple locations simultaneously.

In response to our concern, FBI officials emphasized that the FBI has a longstanding manned aircraft program capable of deploying to multiple locations
quickly. However, they acknowledged that UAS can have operational advantages,
such as the fact that small UAS are more difficult to detect at high altitudes. We
found that the FBI has developed a goal to deploy UAS to more locations within the
next 5 years. Yet we also found that the FBI had not fully developed plans to
implement that goal. Considering that the FBI has already deployed UAS to
address life-threatening situations requiring a quick response, we believe the FBI
should implement a systematic process to reassess regularly UAS capabilities,
technological developments, and resource and training needs, with the goal of
ensuring that the FBI is positioned to deploy UAS efficiently and effectively.
We also found that ATF spent approximately $600,000 to purchase three
different types of rotary-wing UAS with a total of six UAS vehicles but never flew
them operationally. ATF officials told us that they encountered a series of
technological limitations – such as issues related to flight time and maneuverability
– with these UAS and concluded that the systems were unsuitable to support
operations. ATF subsequently suspended all UAS-related activities and disposed of
these UAS.1 However, we found that less than a week after ATF suspended its
original UAS program, an ATF unit, the National Response Team (NRT), purchased
five small commercial UAS for about $15,000. NRT officials told us that although
they attempted one brief UAS flight in July 2014 with one of these units to
document a fire scene, NRT did not coordinate either the purchase or the flight with
ATF’s UAS program office. NRT officials told us that they have since contacted the
program office regarding UAS requirements and grounded these UAS until they
receive further guidance regarding their use.
In addition to the FBI and ATF’s acquisitions of their own UAS, our audit
confirmed that the FBI, ATF, DEA, and USMS received support from UAS operated
by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS). None of these components
had an agency-wide recordkeeping policy or practice to document support provided
by non-DOJ UAS. Similarly, components maintained little documentation of nonDOJ UAS flights in the field. However, DHS flight records indicate that it operated
UAS at least 95 times between 2010 and 2013 for missions involving DOJ. These
records identified 73 flights for missions involving DEA, 13 for the FBI, 4 for ATF,
3 for the USMS, and 2 for multiple DOJ components. Our review of 50 of these
flights found that the extent of DOJ involvement in these missions varied
significantly, and most commonly, the cases receiving non-DOJ UAS support
involved joint task forces whose members included other federal, state, and local
agencies. When these non-DOJ UAS flights took place, components did not have
policies that specifically required the tracking or documenting of non-DOJ UAS use.2
Without such efforts, we believe that DOJ components may not be able to
1

Although the OIG did not audit ATF’s contracts for UAS, we are troubled that ATF spent
approximately $600,000 on six UAS vehicles it subsequently determined to have mechanical and
technical problems significant enough to render them unsuitable for deployment on ATF operations.
2
The FBI has since issued new procedures requiring approval for any non-FBI aviation use,
including UAS.

ii

accurately assess their need for UAS support or how to use UAS most effectively
and appropriately to support their operations.
This report provides four recommendations to help DOJ continue to improve
UAS management and oversight, including that the FBI regularly reassess its UAS
needs and developments, that ATF conduct a UAS needs analysis and reconsider
the best methods to procure UAS prior to acquiring any new UAS, and that the
Office of the Deputy Attorney General ensure the DOJ UAS working group considers
the need for components to track and document non-DOJ UAS support received on
DOJ investigations.

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AUDIT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE’S 

USE AND SUPPORT OF UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS 

TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................ 1 

Prior Interim Report on DOJ Use and Support of UAS .................................... 1 

OIG Audit Approach.................................................................................. 2 

FINDING AND RECOMMENDATIONS ................................................................ 3 

UAS Program at the FBI ............................................................................ 3 

Program Management Challenges ............................................................... 4 

Expanding Regulatory Environment ............................................................ 5 

ATF UAS Efforts ....................................................................................... 6 

First UAS Program Suspended.................................................................... 6 

National Response Team UAS Acquisition..................................................... 7 

DHS UAS Support to DOJ .......................................................................... 7 

Follow-up of the September 2013 Interim Report .......................................... 9 

Recommendations .................................................................................. 10
STATEMENT ON INTERNAL CONTROLS........................................................... 11 

STATEMENT ON COMPLIANCE WITH LAWS AND REGULATIONS ......................... 12 

APPENDIX 1: OBJECTIVES, SCOPE, AND METHODOLOGY ................................ 13 

APPENDIX 2: OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL RESPONSE 

TO THE DRAFT REPORT ........................................................... 15 

APPENDIX 3: THE FBI’S RESPONSE TO THE DRAFT REPORT............................. 17 

APPENDIX 4: ATF’S RESPONSE TO THE DRAFT REPORT .................................. 18 

APPENDIX 5: OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL ANALYSIS AND 

SUMMARY OF ACTIONS NECESSARY TO CLOSE THE REPORT ........ 21 





AUDIT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE’S 

USE AND SUPPORT OF UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS 

INTRODUCTION 

Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS), commonly referred to as “drones,” are
remotely piloted aerial vehicles and their associated ground control stations that
receive surveillance imagery.1 UAS may be equipped with both visual and infrared
spectrum cameras to obtain aerial surveillance and may operate on either electric
or gasoline power for 20 minutes to several hours depending on the design.
Officials from multiple law enforcement agencies have stated that they believe UAS
can be beneficial for reconnaissance, surveillance, and crime scene examinations,
and that by using UAS they can eliminate risk to a pilot, which is inherent in the use
of manned aircraft.
The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) is responsible for establishing the
rules governing federal agencies’ operation of UAS. Agencies must first obtain a
Certificate of Waiver or Authorization (COA) from the FAA before operating a UAS in
the United States. Because a COA generally limits UAS operations to a specific
location, Department of Justice (DOJ) agencies may obtain an emergency COA from
the FAA to operate in a different location provided they face a life-threatening
circumstance and manned aviation is unavailable or unsuitable.
Prior Interim Report on DOJ Use and Support of UAS
A September 2013 Office of the Inspector General (OIG) interim report
examined how DOJ components used UAS domestically and reviewed applicable
UAS policies.2 The report found that DOJ components had only used small UAS
aerial vehicles that weigh less than 55 pounds and identified no evidence that these
aerial vehicles were capable of being armed or carrying releasable projectiles. The
interim report found that while the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) had used
UAS and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) had
planned to use UAS to support their investigations, neither the Drug Enforcement
Administration (DEA) nor the United States Marshals Service (USMS) had used or
planned to use UAS for their operations. Our 2013 report also found that DOJ
award-making agencies had provided $1.2 million in grants to educational
institutions and local law enforcement agencies to support UAS research and
deployment.
Our 2013 interim report provided six recommendations to DOJ to enhance
monitoring and coordination of UAS and UAS awards, and two recommendations
that the Office of the Deputy Attorney General (ODAG) coordinate UAS needs with
1
2

We note that one UAS usually includes multiple UAS vehicles.

U.S. Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General, Interim Report on the
Department of Justice’s Use and Support of Unmanned Aircraft Systems, Report 13-37 (September
2013) (Interim Report).

other federal agencies and convene a working group of pertinent components to
identify cross-cutting UAS issues and develop guidelines. The DOJ agreed with
these recommendations and, since the time the report was issued, has addressed
seven of eight recommendations. There remains one open recommendation
regarding the DOJ working group, and ODAG officials told us that, as of December
2014, it is waiting to finalize DOJ-wide UAS policies until a broader interagency
taskforce addressing UAS use across the federal government issues guidance.
OIG Audit Approach
The objective of this audit was to assess DOJ component use and support of
UAS. To accomplish this objective, we reviewed DOJ efforts to address interim
report recommendations; interviewed officials responsible for establishing and
enhancing UAS policies and procedures; and examined UAS policies, flight logs, and
case documents. We also reviewed how DOJ components used and relied on UAS
owned and operated by the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), which is
part of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), to support their
respective law enforcement efforts.3
Unless otherwise stated in this report, the scope of this review focuses on
DOJ activities from January 2010 to August 2014.

3

On September 27, 2013, the DHS publicly released information indicating that CBP operated
UAS to support, coordinate, or collaborate with DOJ missions between 2010 and 2012.

2


FINDING AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Within DOJ, the FBI is the only DOJ component that operationally
deploys its own UAS, which it has deployed in support of
13 investigations from September 2006 to August 2014. We found
that by having one location for all FBI UAS and relying on a single UAS
team, the FBI could be limiting its ability to deploy UAS quickly and
effectively to distant or multiple locations. ATF had contracted for six
small UAS costing approximately $600,000, but results from testing
led ATF to suspend its UAS program and dispose of these systems.
However, a separate ATF unit subsequently purchased five small UAS
that, after one attempted flight, were also grounded. The FBI, ATF,
DEA, and USMS have all received support from the U.S. Department of
Homeland Security’s U.S. Customs and Border Protection Predator
UAS, most commonly in the context of joint task force investigations
with other federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies.
However, DOJ components do not specifically track the provision of
UAS by DHS or other law enforcement agencies. Without better
tracking and documentation, we believe that DOJ components may not
be able to accurately assess their need for UAS support or how to use
UAS most effectively and appropriately to support their operations.
UAS Program at the FBI
Our September 2013 interim report found that between 2004 and 2013, the
FBI spent approximately $3 million to acquire small UAS it deployed to support its
investigations. As of August 2014, the FBI had acquired 34 UAS vehicles and
associated control stations, of which it considered 17 vehicles and a smaller number
of control stations to be operational.
The FBI reported that between September 2006 and August 2014, it
deployed UAS to support 13 investigations by acquiring imagery for search and
rescue operations, kidnapping investigations, fugitive manhunts, national security
missions, and anti-drug trafficking interdictions.4 Officials with the FBI’s UAS
program told us that small UAS are valuable because they are difficult to detect at
high altitudes and have a much lower operating cost than manned aircraft. Nine of
the FBI’s 13 UAS-supported investigations occurred between January 2010 and
August 2014, and we found that the FBI sought and obtained FAA approval to use
UAS for each of these operations. The FBI told us that that it determined it did not
need to obtain search warrants for any of its UAS operations. We also found that
the FBI has deployed UAS exclusively to provide targeted aerial surveillance in the
context of specific ongoing investigations.

4

We note that the FBI has flown its UAS operationally more than 13 times, because the
support a UAS provides for a case may consist of multiple flights or deployments.

3


Program Management Challenges
In October 2013, the FBI transferred its internal, day-to-day responsibility
for UAS from its Operational Technology Division (OTD), which tests the law
enforcement application of new tools and resources, to its Critical Incident
Response Group’s Surveillance and Aviation Section (SAS), which maintains and
deploys the FBI’s manned aviation fleet.5 We spoke with officials in both OTD and
SAS during our review to verify the inventory of the FBI’s UAS vehicles and discuss
the UAS program’s policies, procedures, and long-range goals. Our review found
that OTD and SAS collaborated successfully to transition UAS responsibility between
these divisions. For example, the FBI temporarily assigned an OTD program
manager to SAS and directed OTD to continue identifying and testing new UAS
platforms for operational suitability and potential referral to SAS. Nevertheless, we
believe that the FBI’s UAS program faces significant challenges that affect
deployment readiness relating to limited geographic dispersion of UAS to the field
and pilot training.
During the time of our review, the FBI maintained its UAS at one location in
the United States and had only one team composed of two pilots on staff who were
adequately trained to operate its UAS.6 This approach differs from the
decentralized deployment approach that FBI officials told us they employ for the
FBI’s manned aircraft. As a result of the FBI’s centralized approach to UAS, the
single team of UAS pilots has needed to travel up to thousands of miles to support
FBI investigations across the United States. UAS pilots told us that when deploying
they either drove or flew on commercial aircraft, and that such travel could take up
to a day or more before they arrived at the scene. We believe that having a
centralized location for all FBI UAS and relying on a single UAS pilot team could
limit the FBI’s ability to deploy UAS quickly and effectively to distant or multiple
locations.
We determined that the FBI has begun taking steps to address these issues.
For example, CIRG officials established a goal of deploying UAS to additional FBI
field divisions over the next 5 years. We found, however, that the FBI had not fully
developed plans to implement such a goal. Additionally, SAS officials told us that
they began training four additional UAS pilots in November 2014. We note,
however, that FBI officials also told us that there have been times in the past where
they have had multiple UAS pilots trained, but these pilots transferred, retired, or
otherwise did not keep current on training.
5

SAS serves as the FBI’s final approval authority for all its UAS operations. While a
supervisor and an Assistant Special Agent in Charge must first approve all requests from FBI Special
Agents for aerial surveillance support, including UAS, it is SAS that is responsible for ascertaining that
no manned aircraft is available or that available aircraft would be unsuitable to meet mission needs.
If SAS determines that UAS should be deployed, SAS is responsible for seeking FAA approval for UAS
operations via a COA or emergency COA.
6

Since 2009, FBI aviation policies governing the operation of UAS have required that UAS
pilots maintain what is referred to as “flight currency” by performing three successful launches and
recoveries of a particular UAS model within the 90 days preceding an operation with that type of UAS.

4


We discussed these concerns with CIRG and other FBI officials. FBI officials
emphasized that they view UAS to be a specialized resource enhancement to the
FBI’s manned aircraft program, which has a proven capability of quickly deploying
to multiple locations. For this reason, these officials told us, the FBI strategically
maintains a very limited operational reliance on still-maturing UAS technology.
Since the transfer of the UAS program from OTD to CIRG, the FBI stated that it has
deployed UAS in only the most specialized and unique circumstances, and always in
tandem with manned aircraft.
Considering that the FBI has already deployed UAS to address lifethreatening situations requiring a quick response, we recommend that the FBI
implement a systematic process to reassess regularly UAS capabilities,
technological developments, and resource and training needs. Such assessments
should also consider the changing regulatory environment, which is discussed
below, that specifies when and where the FBI may operate UAS and how highly
specialized UAS capabilities align with other FBI emergency response resources to
ensure that the FBI is positioned to deploy UAS efficiently and effectively. The FBI
should also ensure that its UAS pilots receive the training and maintain the flight
currency necessary to deploy operable UAS quickly.
Expanding Regulatory Environment
As stated previously, the FBI must obtain COAs from the FAA that specify
when and where the FBI may use UAS. To operate a UAS outside an original COAapproved area, the FBI must either apply for a new COA or obtain an emergency
COA by demonstrating that an imminent threat to life or safety exists and that
manned aircraft are unavailable or unsuitable for the particular circumstance. The
FBI stated that it has taken from as little as a few hours to up to 3 days to receive
an emergency COA.
In response to this concern, we found that the FBI and FAA were drafting
rules that would expand the locations and times that the FBI could operate UAS
without requesting an emergency COA. Under this “COA via Notification”
framework, the FBI anticipates it will be able to deploy and operate UAS over lessdensely populated domestic airspace, referred to as Class G airspace, by notifying
the FAA where FBI will be operating UAS.
We believe that such an arrangement could have been useful in a recent FBI
UAS deployment where ground-based tactical teams conducted surveillance on four
houses in separate locations in conjunction with executing a search warrant related
to a kidnapping investigation. According to FBI records, the FAA cleared UAS use
under an emergency COA to provide surveillance on just one location, but when the
ground team commander requested the UAS change locations, several hours
elapsed before a new emergency COA could be obtained.
Had this potential framework been in place, the FBI would have been able to
operate the UAS over the other locations so long as: (1) the FBI notified the FAA
and (2) the parameters of those locations matched the parameters of the location
already approved in the original COA. Nevertheless, under the terms of the drafted

5


framework, the FBI would still be required to comply with established COA safety
requirements such as maintaining a line of sight with the UAS and restricting UAS
operations to a defined type of area to mitigate the risk to other aircraft, persons,
and property.
ATF UAS Efforts
Our September 2013 interim report found that ATF possessed UAS and
planned to deploy them operationally. Specifically, between September 2011 and
September 2012, ATF’s UAS program spent approximately $600,000 to purchase
three different types of rotary-wing UAS with a total of six UAS vehicles.7
First UAS Program Suspended
ATF officials told us that they acquired these UAS to provide video
surveillance that could integrate with other surveillance platforms and equipment
already in use. During our fieldwork, ATF’s Special Operation Division, Technical
Operations Branch (TOB) served as ATF’s UAS program office and was therefore
responsible for coordinating aviation requests for ATF operations and developing
UAS training and operational procedures.8
ATF officials reported that ATF never flew its UAS in support its operations
because TOB testing and pilot training revealed a series of technological limitations
with the UAS models it had acquired. In particular, ATF determined the real-time
battery capability for one UAS model lasted for only about 20 minutes even though
the manufacturer specified its flight time was 45 minutes. ATF determined that the
other two models of UAS acquired also were unreliable or unsuitable for
surveillance. One UAS program manager told us ATF found that one of its smaller
UAS models, which cost nearly $90,000, was too difficult to use reliably in
operations. Furthermore, the TOB discovered that a gas-powered UAS model,
which cost approximately $315,000 and was specified to fly for up to 2 hours, was
never operable due to multiple technical defects.
In June 2014, the Special Operations Division concluded that ATF’s UAS were
unsuitable for operational use, suspended all ATF UAS-related activities, and
reassigned all UAS staff until after DOJ issues and ATF reviews new UAS policy
recommendations. In September 2014, the TOB transferred its six UAS vehicles
and other related equipment purchased prior to June 2014 to the Naval Criminal
Investigative Service at no cost.
Although the OIG did not specifically audit ATF’s UAS contracts, we are
troubled that the process ATF used to purchase these UAS resulted in ATF spending
approximately $600,000 on UAS models it ultimately determined to have significant
7

ATF does not possess manned aviation assets and instead has largely relied on DEA for
aviation surveillance support, subject to DEA aircraft availability.
8

In October 2014, the Special Operations Division transferred ATF aviation and UAS program
office responsibilities from the TOB to the Enforcement Support Branch.

6


mechanical and technical problems that rendered them unsuitable to deploy in
support of ATF operations. Therefore, we recommend that ATF direct responsible
officials to perform a thorough needs analysis regarding the potential UAS
capabilities it requires that ensures the best approaches to procure UAS prior to
restarting future UAS acquisition activity.
National Response Team UAS Acquisition
Less than a week after ATF’s Special Operations Division suspended its UAS
program, ATF’s National Response Team (NRT) purchased five small, commercially
available UAS at a total cost of about $15,000. The NRT acquired these UAS, which
each weigh approximately three pounds, to help document fire and explosion crime
scenes. NRT officials told us they used one of these units to conduct one brief UAS
flight in July 2014 to document the aftermath of a Louisiana apartment fire that
resulted in the deaths of three residents. However, NRT officials stated that after
this use, they became aware that they were required to obtain an FAA COA before
operating UAS. These officials told us they then contacted TOB regarding UAS
requirements and subsequently grounded their UAS until they obtained further
clarification and guidance on deployment requirements.
The NRT’s use of UAS demonstrated at least two issues requiring improved
coordination within ATF. First, because the Special Operations Division was
responsible for ATF’s UAS program and its UAS responsibilities encompassed all of
ATF, it should have communicated its decision to suspend UAS activities across the
entire agency. However, we found that the decision to suspend UAS activity was
not communicated outside of TOB, resulting in the NRT obtaining additional UAS
less than a week after TOB’s decision to suspend ATF UAS activity. Second, ATF
policy stated that all UAS operations in ATF fell under the purview of the Special
Operations Division, and its TOB had developed a standard operating procedure for
UAS governing both deployment and pilot training requirements. Yet NRT did not
coordinate with TOB to acquire and operate UAS. Therefore, we recommend that
ATF adequately communicate all UAS policy and guidance to its operational units
and ensure that those units comply with such guidance.
DHS UAS Support to DOJ
While some DOJ components maintain aircraft to support their operations
and the operations of other components, they may occasionally rely on aviation
support from non-DOJ law enforcement agencies when they deem such support
necessary or expedient. At times, this support has included the use of UAS.
Specifically, four DOJ law enforcement components – the FBI, ATF, DEA, and USMS
– have received UAS support from the U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP),
part of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), which operates a fleet of
Predator-B UAS. In response to our request, the CBP provided to us evidence
indicating it operated UAS at least 95 times on missions that involved DOJ
components in some way. Of these flights, the CBP identified that DEA was
involved in 73, the FBI in 13, ATF in 4, the USMS in 3, and 2 for multiple DOJ
components.

7


The CBP UAS reports did not detail the level of DOJ involvement in each flight
because the reports served only as technical summaries of UAS operations.
However, through interviews with component officials, including field personnel who
received non-DOJ UAS support, and based on a sample review of case files
pertaining to 50 DHS UAS flights, we found that the extent of DOJ involvement in
these flights varied significantly. For example, ATF specifically requested that the
CBP conduct three UAS flights to help it prepare to serve a search warrant
pertaining to a firearms trafficking investigation adjacent to the U.S.-Canadian
border. In several other instances, DOJ components requested UAS assistance to
assist local police emergencies.
Most commonly, the cases receiving non-DOJ UAS support involved DOJ
components serving on joint task forces with other federal, state, and local
agencies. We identified 13 flights in our sample of 50 flights that involved DOJ-led
domestic task forces, and 31 flights where DOJ was involved in international
taskforces.9 In those latter cases, the lead agency was not always clear because
such operations fall under the purview of different law enforcement agencies.10
We also reviewed how DOJ components tracked and approved non-DOJ UAS
support of their investigations. We found that from 2010 through 2013, DOJ
components had no central record of the approval for or instances of support
provided by DHS UAS. This is because none of these DOJ components had a
component-wide recordkeeping policy or consistent practice to document support
provided by non-DOJ aviation assets. In addition, we found that few cases had
corroborating records in the field specifically indicating UAS had been deployed. We
could confirm DHS UAS use in our sampled flights mainly through the recollections
of individuals involved in the cases supported. We note that prior to our audit,
there was no requirement for field divisions to document specific instances of nonDOJ UAS support. However, in 2014 the FBI issued a new procedure requiring
internal notification and approval for any non-FBI aviation use, specifically including
UAS.
As reported in the OIG’s previous audit reports on FBI and DEA Aviation
Operations, information regarding the use of different kinds of aviation assets
allows the components to manage better these assets and ensure the appropriate
use of UAS in support of the highest-priority investigations.11 By not tracking or
9
Of the six remaining UAS flights in our sample, three supported the ATF case noted above
and another supported a local police case with no DOJ involvement beyond a listing as point of
contact. We were unable to confirm that the remaining two UAS flights actually occurred.
10

The 31 international flights in our sample involved multi-agency, anti-trafficking taskforces;
15 UAS flight records listed support for Operation Bahamas, Turks and Caicos from 2010 to 2012 and
16 flights for operations elsewhere in the Caribbean during the summers of 2012 and 2013. In both
operations, the DEA undertook some level of coordination responsibility, but did not necessarily or
consistently assume a lead agency role for UAS operations.
11
U.S. Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General, Audit of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation’s Aviation Operations, Audit Report 12-21 (March 2012) and U.S. Department of Justice
Office of the Inspector General, Audit of the Drug Enforcement Administration’s Aviation Operations,
Audit Report 12-05 (December 2011).

8


documenting non-DOJ UAS requests and support, DOJ components reduce their
ability to accurately assess their need for UAS support or determine how to use UAS
most effectively and appropriately to support their operations. We therefore
recommend that the Office of the Deputy Attorney General (ODAG) ensure the DOJ
UAS working group considers the need for DOJ components to track or document
non-DOJ UAS support received on DOJ investigations.
Follow-up of the September 2013 Interim Report
Our interim report found that while the DEA and USMS obtained UAS for
testing, neither component has deployed them to support their operations. During
this audit, we found both agencies had disposed of their UAS as of May 2014 and
have no plans to acquire UAS in the future. The interim report also provided six
recommendations to DOJ to enhance monitoring and coordination of UAS and UAS
awards. We confirmed that the Office of Justice Programs (OJP) and Office of
Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) have taken actions to implement
these recommendations and improve their ability to track UAS-related awards,
enhance reporting of UAS information, and institute prerequisites for applicants to
prove they can be authorized to operate a UAS. All of these recommendations to
COPS and OJP are closed.
In addition, the interim report recommended that the ODAG convene a
working group of pertinent components to identify crosscutting UAS issues, develop
guidelines, and coordinate UAS needs with other federal agencies. DOJ agreed with
the recommendations and, since the report was issued, has progressed in
implementing them. DOJ stated that the UAS working group began meeting in
October 2013 and is continuing to meet periodically. We confirmed that officials
from the FBI, ATF, USMS, DEA, OJP and COPS have participated in these meetings.
The DOJ Office of Privacy and Civil Liberties has also participated.
However, ODAG officials also told us that the working group would not
finalize DOJ-wide UAS policies until a broader interagency taskforce, which includes
DOJ participation, issues federal government-wide UAS guidance. On February 15,
2015, the White House issued a Presidential Memorandum (Memorandum) directing
federal agencies to take steps to protect privacy, civil rights, and civil liberty
interests while promoting UAS accountability and transparency.12 In particular, the
Memorandum requires that federal agencies adopt specific UAS policies and
procedures regarding collecting, using, retaining, and disseminating UAS-acquired
information. Such UAS policies must also apply Privacy Act protections and prohibit
using UAS to discriminate against individuals or violate the First Amendment. With
the issuance of this Memorandum on UAS, DOJ officials anticipate that the DOJ
working group will soon release a draft UAS policy to DOJ components for
comments.
12

Presidential Memorandum: Promoting Economic Competitiveness and Innovation While
Safeguarding Privacy, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties in the Domestic Use of Unmanned Aircraft
Systems, February 15, 2015. This memorandum was issued outside the scope of our audit work,
however, we will consider these requirements when assessing any policies recommended by the DOJ
UAS working group pursuant to our recommendations in this report.

9


Recommendations
We recommend that the FBI:
1. Implement a systematic process to reassess regularly UAS capabilities,
technological developments, and resource and training needs, with the
goal of ensuring that the FBI is positioned to deploy UAS efficiently and
effectively.
We recommend that ATF:
2. Direct responsible officials to perform a thorough needs analysis regarding
the potential UAS capabilities it requires that ensures the best approaches
to procure UAS prior to restarting future UAS acquisition activity.
3. Adequately communicate all UAS policy and guidance to its operational
units and ensure that those units comply with such guidance.
We recommend that the ODAG:
4. Ensure the DOJ UAS working group considers the need for DOJ
components to track or document non-DOJ UAS support received on DOJ
investigations.

10


STATEMENT ON INTERNAL CONTROLS
As required by the Government Auditing Standards, we tested, as
appropriate, internal controls significant within the context of our audit objectives.
A deficiency in an internal control exists when the design or operation of a control
does not allow management or employees, in the normal course of performing their
assigned functions, to prevent or detect in a timely manner: (1) impairments to
the effectiveness and efficiency of operations, (2) misstatements in financial or
performance information, or (3) violations of laws and regulations. Our evaluation
of the internal controls of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF), the Drug Enforcement
Administration (DEA), and the United States Marshals Service (USMS) was not
made for the purpose of providing assurance on their internal control structures as
a whole. Management at these components is responsible for the establishment
and maintenance of internal controls.
As discussed in our report, we identified an instance where an ATF unit
purchased UAS without consulting the ATF’s designated UAS program office after
that office had suspended ATF’s UAS program. This unit also operated at least one
of these UAS without the required Certificate of Waiver or Authorization from the
Federal Aviation Administration. Therefore, we have made recommendations above
to help ensure that ATF improves its internal controls so that its units are uniformly
aware of and comply with all rules, regulations, and guidelines related to Unmanned
Aircraft Systems.
Our review also found that DOJ components did not track or document nonDOJ UAS requests and reliance, thereby risking a reduction in their ability to assess
current or future demand for UAS or other aviation support readily and accurately.
Because we are not expressing an opinion on the internal control structure of
these components as a whole, this statement is intended solely for the information
and use of the auditees and is not intended to limit the distribution of this report,
which is a matter of public record.

11


STATEMENT ON COMPLIANCE WITH LAWS AND REGULATIONS
As required by the Government Auditing Standards, we tested, as
appropriate given our audit scope and objectives, selected transactions, records,
procedures, and practices to obtain reasonable assurance that the FBI, ATF, DEA,
and USMS’s management complied with federal laws and regulations for which
noncompliance, in our judgment, could have a material effect on the results of our
audit. The management at these components is responsible for ensuring
compliance with federal laws and regulations applicable to the Department of
Justice. In planning our audit, we identified the following laws and regulations that
concerned the operations of the auditee and that were significant within the context
of the audit objectives:




49 U.S.C. §§ 40102(a)(41), 40125
41 C.F.R. Part 102-33
Rules prescribed by the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration under
14 C.F.R. § 91.903

Our audit included examining the FBI and ATF’s compliance with the
aforementioned laws and regulations, and whether non-compliance could have a
material effect on their operations. We did so by interviewing aviation program
personnel, requesting and reviewing FBI and ATF reports, assessing oversight
procedures, and examining records. As neither the DEA nor USMS had active UAS
programs, this examination was unnecessary for these auditees.

12


APPENDIX 1
OBJECTIVES, SCOPE, AND METHODOLOGY
Objectives
The objective of this audit was to assess DOJ component use and support of
UAS. The interim report on this topic has already provided an overview of domestic
DOJ component use of their own UAS programs as of May 2013 and reviewed DOJ
awards supporting the provision of UAS to other law enforcement agencies and
non-profit organizations and its findings are incorporated by reference. Therefore,
this final audit report: (1) updates the status of DOJ components’ own UAS
activities and (2) assesses DOJ components' use of or participation in law
enforcement operations using non-DOJ owned or controlled UAS.
Scope and Methodology
We conducted this performance audit in accordance with generally accepted
Government Auditing Standards. Those standards require that we plan and
perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe
that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and
conclusions based on our audit objectives.
Our audit focused on the UAS activities conducted by the FBI, ATF, DEA, and
USMS. The scope of our review primarily focused on UAS activities from September
2013 to August 2014, but we considered the FBI’s use of its UAS from 2006 to
August 2014 and non-DOJ UAS support to DOJ operations from 2010-2013. To
accomplish the objectives of our audit, we interviewed more than 40 DOJ personnel
with an interest in UAS operations at DOJ. We examined both DOJ and non-DOJ
UAS flight and approval records, UAS procurement documents, and UAS imagery
and related case information.
Our audit work included interviewing officials from the Department of
Homeland Security, Office of Air and Marine (OAM), which operates the U.S.
Customs and Border Protection’s (CBP) fleet of Predator-B UAS. We interviewed
OAM officials to discuss how the CBP generated the list of flights supporting nonDHS agencies and obtain un-redacted copies of the 2010 to 2013 daily OAM
Assistant Commissioner’s Reports (CBP Daily Reports) to analyze. Additionally, we
met with DHS Office of Inspector General officials to discuss the scope of their audit
of DHS UAS operations. We also requested that DOJ components provide
corroboration of any DHS UAS flights they requested or from which they received
assistance between 2010 and 2013.
Judgmental Sample Selection
To test the accuracy of existing records of non-DOJ UAS use for DOJ
operations, we judgmentally selected 50 of the possible non-DOJ UAS flights for

13


further review from both DHS UAS records indicating DOJ component involvement
and self-reported confirmation accounts of DHS UAS use from DOJ components.13
We selected 38 of the possible 95 UAS flights referenced in the CBP Daily Reports.
In addition, we selected 12 flights identified by DEA that were not in the CBP UAS
Reports, or were from CBP Daily Reports associated with the 2 Caribbean
operations but that did not reference DOJ. In total, we selected 50 non-DOJ UAS
flights for further review.
We conducted audit work at DOJ, the FBI, and ATF headquarters in
Washington, D.C., and USMS and DEA headquarters in Arlington, Virginia. We also
conducted in-person and telephone interviews with DOJ field office officials in
Seattle, Washington (FBI); Minneapolis (FBI) and St. Paul, Minnesota (ATF);
San Antonio (FBI) and Houston, Texas (ATF, DEA, and USMS); Phoenix, Arizona
(USMS); Miami, Florida (DEA); and San Juan, Puerto Rico (DEA). In our
discussions with field division personnel, we also verified, to the extent possible,
other records reflecting the use of UAS.
For purposes of this review only, if a DOJ component was aware of or
facilitated UAS use then we included that case in our count. Of the 50 possible UAS
flights we tested occurring between 2010 and 2013, we were unable to confirm the
existence of 2 UAS flights. We also found one UAS flight listed by DHS records as
supporting the FBI that only supported a local police department with no DOJ
involvement. Therefore, we concluded 47 out of 50 showed evidence of DOJ
component involvement or knowledge at some level. This judgmental sample is not
projectable onto the universe of possible UAS flights.
Further, concluding a level of awareness by DOJ components does not mean
we can conclude that DOJ actually requested or even received non-DOJ UAS
assistance on an actual DOJ case 47 times for this sample. In some cases,
components had only a generalized knowledge that non-DOJ flights occurred but
not the specific flight dates. In such cases, we aggregated as confirmed those UAS
flights records listing support to DOJ if they had flight hours and occurred in the
specified location (usually in or near either the Bahamas or Dominican Republic).
We concluded that many of the variances between the records of DHS and the field
divisions within DOJ components resulted from differences in attribution as to
whether an actual DOJ operation was supported by the UAS flight or if a taskforce
operation was involved.

13

Because DHS officials told us their records were not kept for the purpose of tracking third
party support and were maintained by a separate federal Department, we could not directly verify
their accuracy.

14


APPENDIX 2
OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL RESPONSE

u.s.

Department of Justice

Office of the Deputy Attorney General

March 19,2015

ME M O RAND UM
TO:

Michael Horowitz
Inspector General
U.S. Department of Justice

FROM:

Benjamin Fitzpatrick
Senior Counsel to the Deputy Attorney General

SUBJECT: 	

Response: Audit of the Department of Justice's Use and Support of
Unmaruled Aircraft Systems

lP

We appreciate the audit undertaken by the Office of the Inspector General regarding the
Department's use and support of unmanned aircraft systems (UAS). Th is audit fo llows an
interim report issued in September 2013, which contained eight recommendations, all of which
the Department accepted. As a result of that report, the Department, al the direction of the Office
of the Deputy Attorney General (ODAG), convened a DOJ-wide UAS working group to addrcS!;
policy issues relatcd 10 the Department's usc ofUAS.
The final report of this audit makes four recommendations, one of which is directed to
ODAG:
Recommendation to ODAG: Ensure the DOJ UAS working group considers the
need for DOJ components to trock or document non-DOJ [JAS support received
on DOJ investigations.
Response: Concur. ODAG has already di rected the Office of Legal Policy,
wh ich chairs the UAS working group, to consider thc need to troek or document
non-DOJ VAS support that Department components receive on [)OJ
investigations.
The remaining three recommendations are directed at the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Fireamls and Explosives, and will be addressed in those agencies'
respo nscs.

15 


Memorandum to Michael Horowitz
Subject: Respo nse: Audit of the Department of Justice's Usc and
SlIP]Xlrt of Unmanned Aircraft Systems

ec:

Mark Giuliano, Fedcral Burcau oflnvcstigation
B. Todd Jones, Burc!lU of Alcohol, Tobacco,

Fi rearm~

Stacia Hylton, United Slates Marshals Service 

Michele Leonhart, Drug Enforcement Administration 


16 


and Explosives 


Page 2

APPENDIX 3
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION RESPONSE 14

U.s. O" iWl n mr.nt or JUJ l icl'
Frderal Oureau of hl\'CSl ignlion

Washington. D. C. 205J5~OO I
March 18.2015

The Honorable Michael E. HorowItz.

Inspector General

Office oflhe InsJX.~lor General
U.S. Department of Justice
950 I>c:nnsylvania Avenue, N. W.
Washington . DC 20530

Dear Mr. Honmitz:
The Fcdcml Bureau of invcslig:lIion (FBI) appreciatC5 the opportunity 10 re\'icw Ilnd
respond to your on1cc's report entilled, "'Audit afthe Depa"",tmr nfJuwice 's Us,- and S'IPPO'" 0/
UnllIWlfIl!li Aircraft S}':ul!ms. ,­

We arc plt'ascd you determined the FBI has dcplo}ed ils Unmanned Aircmt1 )slems
(VAS) in accordance with all Federal Aviation Adminislrati n (FAA) appm\lals IlJld in
furtherance- of in\'cstigolions "exclusively to pro\i.dc Ulrgcted acriol sur...cillance.­
As }OU aptly note, the FBI has already deployed UAS to address life-threaten ing
simalions requirinK a quick response. We agree: with your thought'i on implementing n
syslem!lIic process 10 ensure the FB I's AS are po itioned most efficiently and effectively.
In thm re~ard. \\c eoncur \\ith )ouronc recommendation direc ted towards the FBI.
Should you htl\·c any quc:stions. plcasc fccl free 10 contoct mc. We ~rcmly npprwil1tc the
professionalism ofyo ur audi t sl!lfT throughout this IJUlUf.....

Sincerely.

14

Attachments t o t his response wer e not incl uded in th is fi nal repo rt.

17

APPENDIX 4
BUREAU OF ALCOHOL, TOBACCO, FIREARMS
AND EXPLOSIVES RESPONSE
tJ.S. bepl l1menl of J usli«
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobocco.
Firearm! IUld Explosivcs
Assislanr Dir-rClor

_.....,....
6OWO:ADW
1)10

MAR 18 2Q1;

MEMORANDUM TO: 	Assistant Inspector General
Evaluation and Inspections Division
Officc of the Inspector General
FROM : 	 Assistant Director

Office of Professional Responsibility and Securily Oper1l1ions
SUBJECT: ATF's response 10 the Office oflnspeetor General', Draft Repon of 

DOl's Use and Support of Unmanned Aircraft Systems 


This memonndum serve.s 10 transmit ATF', response 10 the: above..cited Draft Repo!1. Attached is It
summary of the status of the actions taken relative to the cited rtCommendalions.
Should you have any questions or need additional infonno.tion , plcase conlnel the Chief of ATF' s Audit
Liaison Branch, Adam Pallotta at (202) 648-8706.

Michael Gleysleen
Attachment
cc; Director
Assistant Director (OlTlCe of Field Operations)
Chief Counsel
ASslS1ant Direc.lor, Audit Liai50n Group, Dcpartmenl ofJustice

18 


u.s. Departmul of Justke

•

Bureau of Alcohol. Tobacco,

Fi....... and Explosl...
AJJISlonl Director

liAR I 0 lQil
700000:MHW
8300

MEMORANDUM TO: AssiSlanl Director
(Office cfProfessional Responsibility and Seeurity Operations)

FR.OM: Assistant Director 

(Field <:>per.lions) 

SUBJECT: 	Review of the Dcputmcnl of Justicc's Use and Support
of Unmanned Aircnft Systems

jThe Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Fireazms and Eltplosives (ATF) appreciates the opportunity to
respond to the recommendations contained in the above cited report. We welcome the Office of
tN!: l/upl!dor GenenJ.·s (OIG) cnnmudive comments and remnunendAtions on this matler.

!Bs52ll!!J!l:a!l,!JIgUOO!l'1
'l:: Dlred rnpollslble ofl'lcUlls to perform a tllOI'Oulh aHCb analysis
rqlrdbla the poteati.a UAS clpabWtfes It reqllira that msures the best apprGlldles to
procure VAS prior to ",tartiDc future UAS IcqulslUGD activity.

Response (Coacur): AlthouGh ATF bas no immediate plans 10 purcha$e UAS, the Deputy
~istant Director (DAD) for Propams (Field Opc::aIions) will issue. manorandwn to the
~f, Special Opemions Division (SOD), stallnK that 8 needs analysis should be conducted in
the Ntln ,hOUJd ATF consider pLlrChuiaa VAS.
IRcw..m
1.1: Adequately commuak:lt. aU VAS polk)' and eulduce to its
operatloaal units aad e.nsure. that tllose uaitJ comply wltb sudl euldaace.
Rtspoase. (Concllr): I will issue a memonndwn to all special agents in charge clarifying policy
to explain that any pwthase of equipment requires DAD approyaJ and must be coordinated

tIvough SOD,
Additionally. in order to trick the use ofUAS and compliance with policy, the ATF cue
manapnent .poem has been upcIa.cd with mandalory entry fields 10 cap... deploymCl14 DAD

19 


-2­

Assistant Oiredor 

(Office ofProfessional Responsibility and Security Ope..-tionJ) 


Buthorization. and open!in, aaencies. Additionally, review oelhis data. will be iMOrporated into 

ATF', annual Sclflnspcction Progrwn. 

Again, thank you for the opportunity to work with you on these matten ud we hope we have
been responsive to your recommendations. If you have any questionl, please contact our Chief
orSt_1f, Muy H. Wanea 11202·648-3410.

.......-I,!>:I-­
Ronald B. Turk

20 


APPENDIX 5
OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL

ANALYSIS AND SUMMARY OF ACTIONS 

NECESSARY TO CLOSE THE REPORT

The Office of the Inspector General (OIG) provided a draft of this audit report
to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI); the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco,
Firearms and Explosives (ATF); the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA); the
United States Marshals Service (USMS); and the Office of the Deputy Attorney
General (ODAG). The ODAG’s response is incorporated in Appendix 2 of this report.
The FBI’s response is incorporated in Appendix 3, and ATF’s response is
incorporated in Appendix 4. The DEA and USMS declined to provide a formal
response. The following provides the OIG analysis of the responses and summary
of actions necessary to close the audit report.
Recommendation to the FBI:
1. 	

Implement a systematic process to reassess regularly UAS
capabilities, technological developments, and resource and training
needs, with the goal of ensuring that the FBI is positioned to deploy
UAS efficiently and effectively.
Resolved. The FBI concurred with our recommendation. In addition to its
response, the FBI provided us a document that the FBI considers to be law
enforcement sensitive in nature, and therefore could not be publicly released.
In this document, the FBI identified the steps it is already taking towards
addressing training and resource needs. The FBI also stated that it is waiting
for Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) approval of the draft FBI-FAA
framework before advancing its UAS program.
This recommendation can be closed when the FBI provides us evidence that
it has implemented a systematic process to ensure that the FBI is positioned
to deploy UAS efficiently and effectively. Such assessments should consider
the changing regulatory environment and how highly specialized UAS
capabilities align with other FBI emergency response resources. The FBI
should also ensure that its UAS pilots receive the training and maintain the
flight currency necessary to deploy operable UAS quickly.

21


Recommendations to ATF:
2. 	

Direct responsible officials to perform a thorough needs analysis
regarding the potential UAS capabilities it requires that ensures the
best approaches to procure UAS prior to restarting future UAS
acquisition activity.
Resolved. The ATF concurred with our recommendation. In its response,
ATF stated that it has no immediate plans to purchase UAS, but the Deputy
Assistant Director for Field Operations will issue a memorandum instructing
Special Operations Division to conduct a needs analysis should ATF consider
purchasing UAS in the future. This recommendation can be closed when we
obtain evidence that ATF issued this memorandum.

3. 	

Adequately communicate all UAS policy and guidance to its
operational units and ensure that those units comply with such
guidance.
Resolved. The ATF concurred with our recommendation. In its response,
ATF stated that the Assistant Director for Field Operations will issue a
memorandum to all ATF special agents clarifying ATF UAS policy, including
that the purchase of any UAS equipment first requires the Deputy Assistant
Director’s approval and must be coordinated through Special Operations
Division. This recommendation can be closed when we receive evidence that
ATF issued the memorandum to ensure that its operational units comply with
ATF’s UAS guidance.

Recommendation to the ODAG:
4. 	

Ensure the DOJ UAS working group considers the need for DOJ
components to track or document non-DOJ UAS support received on
DOJ investigations.
Resolved. The ODAG concurred with our recommendation. In its response,
the ODAG stated that it has directed the Office of Legal Policy, which chairs
the DOJ’s UAS working group, to consider the need to track or document
non-DOJ UAS support that components receive to support investigations.
This recommendation can be closed when we receive evidence that the DOJ
UAS working group has considered the need for DOJ components to track or
document non-DOJ UAS support received on DOJ investigations, and formally
communicate any decision to the FBI, ATF, DEA, and USMS.

22


 
 
 
 
 
 
 

 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

The Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General
(DOJ OIG) is a statutorily created independent entity
whose mission is to detect and deter waste, fraud,
abuse, and misconduct in the Department of Justice, and
to promote economy and efficiency in the Department’s
operations. Information may be reported to the DOJ
OIG’s hotline at www.justice.gov/oig/hotline or
(800) 869-4499.

 
 
 
 

Office of the Inspector General
U.S. Department of Justice
www.justice.gov/oig