Tattoo Prohibition Behind Bars: The Case for Repeal
Daniel J. D’Amico*
George Mason University
Abstract
Performing or receiving tattoos is forbidden in American prisons.
What are the intentions behind this prohibition? Does the policy
meet its intentions? Does it promote the broader ends of prison
institutions: to protect justice, provide efficient correctional services,
rehabilitate criminals, and deter crime? I argue that repealing the
prohibition of inmate tattooing would achieve outcomes more in line
with the intentions of prison management than does the current
prohibition policy.
I. Introduction
Correctional institutions in the United States prohibit inmates
from giving and receiving tattoos.1 According to most correctional
code of conduct manuals, tattooing is formally a “minor violation.”2
* The author would like to thank The Ludwig von Mises Institute for financial
support. Mark Thornton, Ed Stringham, and two anonymous referees provided
valuable comments. Several members of The Back Row seminar, including, but not
limited to, David Skarbek, Adam Martin, Michael Thomas, Jeremy Horpedahl,
Emily Schaeffer, and Diana Weinert, provided helpful discussion. Any errors that
remain are the author’s alone.
1 I found no evidence that legitimate tattoo artists have tried to tattoo inmates in
the U.S. This practice is not explicitly forbidden in visitation policy codes (like
inmate tattooing is), but the equipment and disposal procedures necessary would
not be allowed because they are potentially dangerous weapons (needles) and
produce hazardous medical waste.
2 As a representative sample, The Texas Offender Orientation Handbook (2004, p.20)
defines contraband as “[a]ny item not allowed when the offender came to the
TDCJ [Texas Department of Correctional Justice], not given or assigned to an
offender by the TDCJ, and not bought by an offender for his use from the
commissary.” The Florida Criminal Punishment Code (2006, p.33) lists the possession
of contraband as a “3rd degree felony.” Together these two states house a
significant portion of the inmates in the U.S. Other states, such as Alaska, explicitly
list tattoos as violations of inmate conduct (Pugh, 1997).
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When inmates violate these rules, they are subject to informal
punishments. They lose recreation time and visitation privileges, the
tattoo equipment is confiscated and destroyed, and charges count
against parole possibilities in the future. De facto punishment for
tattooing can be more severe when tattooing is considered “gangrelated.” If authorities judge an inmate to be a gang member, the
inmate’s sentence can be converted to a solitary housing facility.3 In
effect, tattooing is more strictly prohibited than the explicit
regulations would lead a casual observer to infer.
The mission statements and inmate codes of conduct for state
correction agencies do not specifically explain the intentions behind
tattoo prohibitions.4 Instead, inmate code of conduct manuals
describe the protocol of tattoo prohibition, correctional department
mission statements list the broad intentions of prisons, and
correctional managers, health researchers, and crime experts point
out the negative consequences of prison tattoos. Prohibition and
enforcement against tattooing is the default policy from the
established perspective that tattooing is harmful.
Current policies and enforcements are meant to be in line with
the general mission statements of correctional departments. The
Texas Department of Criminal Justice describes its mission thus: “to
provide public safety, promote positive change in offender behavior,
reintegrate offenders into society and assist victims of crime” (2004,
p.5). The Michigan Department of Corrections (2008), another high
prison population state, states on its website that its goal is “to
provide the greatest amount of public protection while making the
most efficient use of the State’s resources.” How does the
Security Housing Units (SHUs) are a new technique to combat prison gangs. A
panel of investigators reviews an inmate, similar to a parole board. If they deem the
inmate to be a gang member, then he has an opportunity to inform the board of
other gang members of whom he is aware. If he complies, he can be sent back to
his traditional facility. Gangs self-enforce against defections with violence. The
rational choice for the suspect is often to accept solitary confinement (sometimes
for the duration of his sentence). These sentences can carry irreversible
psychological damage (Tachiki, 1995).
4 The Texas Department of Corrections mentions tattoos in several of its
publications on HIV and AIDS. The Florida Department of Corrections (2006)
repeatedly references tattoos as indicators of gang related activities. In addition, the
California Department of Juvenile Justice (2008) sponsors a tattoo removal
program that describes as its objective “to enhance employment and educational
opportunities for at-risk youth.”
3

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prohibition on prison tattooing aim to comply with these intentions?
(1) Tattooing carries a risk of transmitting infectious diseases.5
Presumably, prohibiting tattoos avoids health risks. (2) Prisons
function by maintaining a strict level of control and authority over
inmates.6 Tattoos are a communication tool used by inmates and
gangs. Presumably, prohibiting tattoos counters gang power in
prisons. (3) Tattooing is a vestige of criminal culture. Its permanent
and recognizable qualities7 inhibit released inmates from rehabilitating
and reentering traditional society.8 Presumably, prohibiting tattoos
assists rehabilitation efforts.
The purpose of this paper is to challenge each of the
presumptions in the previous paragraph. Is tattoo prohibition in line
with the broad intentions of prison management: to avoid the spread
of infectious diseases, to maintain authority inside of prisons, and to
promote the rehabilitation of inmates? The economics of prohibition
and signaling suggest that current prison tattoo policy works against
these intentions. A repeal of tattoo prohibition in American prisons
would be more in line with the ends of the criminal justice system.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2,
the economics of prohibition are explained. A repeal of tattoo
prohibition could help avoid rather than spread infectious diseases.
Braithwaite et al. (1999) described the obvious health risks of body modifications
but complained of a lack of research and regulatory attention. See also Winslow et
al. (1998). Long (1994) and Nishioka and Gyorkos (2001) explained that tattooing
is associated with different blood-borne diseases. Nishioka et al. (2003) investigated
subjects in Brazil and found that “[h]aving a tattoo was associated with HCV
[hepatitis C virus]...[but] [n]o statistically significant associations were found
between tattooing and HBV [hepatitis B virus] or HIV infection, syphilis or
Chagas’ disease” (p.441).
6 Bruton (2004) described his career as a prison warden as a constant struggle for
power over inmates. Even the most menial actions have profound psychological
implications for maintaining authority. The now infamous Stanford Prison
Experiments also demonstrated this (Milgram, 1969).
7 Prison tattoo artists use makeshift tools that are less precise than those of
professionals. Prison tattoo lines are thick and fade more over time. Images in
prison tattoos are unique as well. Spider webs, tear drops, prison bars, and gang
emblems are all common.
8 Demello (1993) writes, “tattoos and the process of inscription itself create the
cultural body themselves, thereby creating and maintaining specific social
boundaries” (p.10). Post (1968) argues that “the presence of a tattoo, or tattoos can
serve to indicate the presence of a personality disorder which could lead to, or is
characterized by, behavior which deviates from contemporary social norms”
(p.516). See also Rosenblatt (1977).
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The negative health effects of prison tattooing are an unintended
consequence of prohibition policies and not inherent to the practice
of tattooing. In section 3, tattoos are explained as a signal device. The
economics of signaling means that tattoos communicate reputations
amongst inmates to avoid violent conflict. Less violence indirectly
lowers the transmission of infectious diseases and the management
costs of prisons. Section 4 discusses how repealing tattoo prohibition
can reduce recidivism and deter crime. Prison conditions are wellsuited for tattooing to be a profitable enterprise, so inmate artists can
increase their human capital. Finally, section 5 presents conclusions.
II. Allowing Inmate Tattoos Would Reduce the Spread of
Infectious Diseases
Health conditions and medical costs are major concerns for
prison management. Tattooing uses a vibrating or hand-held needle
to inject ink under the top layer of skin to create permanent
markings. Because tattooing involves puncturing the skin with
needles, handling exposed blood, and treating scar tissue, it carries a
risk of spreading infectious diseases (See Winslow, 1998; Braithwaite
et al., 1999; Long, 1994; Nishioka and Gyorkos, 2001; and Nishioka
et al., 2003). The Bureau of Justice Statistics tracks the top 23 medical
causes of death amongst inmates. Six (AIDS, septicemia, influenza,
homicide, viral hepatitis, and anemias) relate to tattooing because
they can be transmitted through tattooing or influenced indirectly by
the practice of tattooing.9 These causes made up 13.8 percent of the
deaths inside American prisons between 2001 and 2004 (Mumola,
2007).
Inmate health conditions and their costs are not completely
captured in death statistics. The consequences of an ineffective policy
are felt before deaths are observed. AIDS and HIV are the biggest
tattoo-related causes of death, but their frequency among inmates has
fallen recently. As of 2004, more than 23,000 inmates were infected
with HIV, almost 2 percent of the prison population, concentrated in
the Northeast (Maruschak, 2006). “Spending on medical care for
State prisoners totaled 3.3 billion dollars, or 12 percent of operating
expenditures in 2001” (Stephan, 2004, p.1). Because prison
populations hold disproportionately high amounts of infectious
diseases, inappropriate tattoo techniques carry more serious
9

Homicides can be avoided through tattoo signaling; see Section III.

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consequences than on the outside. Inmate deaths, the quality of
health care, and the financial costs of prisons are influenced by
tattooing policy.
Repealing tattoo prohibition in prisons can directly and indirectly
reduce the spread of infectious diseases in American prisons. In a
market, quality tattoo standards could rise as sellers competed with
one another for customers by devoting resources currently used to
evade punishment to enhance the health conditions of tattoo
processes. When tattoos serve as a signaling device they threaten
retaliation against violent conflict. By raising the perceived costs of
violence to inmates, signals reduce the amount of violence. Less
violence indirectly lowers the spread of infectious diseases.
The low quality/high health risks of prison tattooing are a result
of the prohibition rather than an inherent quality of tattooing.
Tattoos in prison carry greater health risks than ordinary tattooing in
legitimate society. The health risks for legitimate tattooing are
commonly overstated. Any activity involving injections and scar
tissue risks infection, but it is important to understand those risks in
an empirical context. The U.S. Centers for Disease Control has been
tracking tattoo-related disease data in the private sector since 1985
and has not documented a single case of HIV transmission; “[b]y
comparison there have been 7 cases of HIV transmission associated
with dentists and dental workers.” Similarly, “[o]f the 13,387 annual
cases of hepatitis, only 12 are associated with tattoo studios. By
comparison, 43 cases…are associated with dentists”
(tattooartists.com). The recent surge in tattooing puts these figures in
further perspective. According to the Harris Poll National Survey
(Server, 2003), “36 percent of Americans aged 25–29 had at least one
body tattoo by 2003” (qtd. in Genser, 2007). Winslow et al. (1992)
and Braithwaite et al. (1999) reported increased tattoo popularity,
explained potential health consequences, and argued for education,
regulation, and licensing. Despite the health risks of tattooing, no
epidemic has been observed, and popularity continues to rise. The
large amount of legitimate tattooing and small amount of associated
diseases implies that the health problems of tattooing have been
solved in and by the private sector. It is frequently noted, but not
elaborated upon, that the health consequences associated with
tattooing usually come from amateur, makeshift, and prohibited
tattooing rather than from legitimate and commercial tattooing.
A large portion of the research investigating the health risks of

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tattooing focuses on prison tattooing. Charamonte et al. (1982),
Martin et al. (1998), Pallas (1999), and Samuel et al. (2001) all find
correlations between blood-borne diseases and tattooing in prisons in
different settings. They show that prison tattooing is more dangerous
than commercial tattooing for two reasons. First, the materials used
are more likely to cause infection. Second, the available pool of
prisoners is more prone to infection by nature of their proximity,
drug habits, sexual practices, and violence. Tattooing is included as a
cause of infectious disease in prisons because of its injection process,
but it gains most of its harmful effects from the prohibition policy.
Charamonte et al. (1982) reported, “prisoners and wardens showed
an increased prevalence of HBV… Illicit drug abuse was found to be
a relevant risk factor for HBV infection among prisoners under 35
years of age... whereas no correlation emerged between the presence
of HBV serum markers and tattoos” (p.53). Martin et al. (1998)
observed that 46.9 percent of inmates in Spain were infected with
HIV, and “while tattoos were associated with HIV among prisoners,
other authors have found that this either disappears or is greatly
modified when stratifying by intravenous drug use” (p.330).10 Samuel
et al. (2001) argue for policies that encourage “sterile tattooing” in
New Mexico prisons, given the coincidence between tattooing and
drug use.
Compared to the costs of legitimate tattoos, the costs of prison
tattoos are high, but still relatively low compared to other behaviors
in prison, especially drug use. To the extent that tattooing affects the
spread of disease in prisons, the prohibition policy exaggerates the
problem. Prohibition and enforcement against tattooing means that
inmates face higher costs when performing and receiving tattoos.
But as long as the benefits of tattooing outweigh the costs, inmates
are willing to do it. Tattoo prohibition, like all prohibitions, is a
supply side control.11
Inmates gain a high utility from having tattoos, hence their
popularity among criminals (Scutt and Gotch, 1974). Tattoos and
criminality go hand and hand as cultural images, partly because gangs
use tattoos to identify their members (Demello, 1993 and Belsky,
1981). Inmates spend high prices in money, trade, and risk to obtain
tattoos. They risk being punished, accept poor quality, and undergo
10 See
11 For

also Pallas (1999).
a general discussion of supply side controls, see Thornton (1991, p.73–77).

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unhealthy procedures. Expending such high costs seems irrational
until the full benefits are understood. On religious orthodoxy,
Iannaccone (1992, 1994) argued that high sacrifices are weighed
against the even higher rewards of membership in the religious
community. Prison gangs and inmates perceive similarly high rewards
from having tattoos.
Bruton (2004) reports, “[t]attoo artists usually learn their trade
outside. Inside, they are highly sought after by inmate customers.
Tats are hot items in prison. They can be status symbols or simply
inmate art” (p. 71). Inmate artists respond to this high demand by
offering services for cash and trade. Prison is an environment of
extreme resource scarcity, yet tattoos are still performed. A tattoo
artist ensures himself profit and protection. Harming a tattooist or
any productive person cuts off the market from the fruits of his
labor. Inmates are eager to protect productive resources.
High demand and supply-side prohibitions induce changes in the
tattooing process. Inmates are willing to expend costs and forgo
quality to avoid being detected or caught in the act. Thornton (1991)
describes the predictable magnitude: “[t]he amount of resources
devoted to the enforcement of prohibition will determine the degree
of risk placed on market participants and therefore the effects
prohibition will have on production and consumption” (p.73).
Prohibition makes consumers substitute for low quality goods,
and producers have opted for more dangerous production processes
in several historical cases. The phrase “back-alley abortions” refers to
the unsanitary and dangerous techniques used by doctors who
performed abortions on the black market (Joffe, 1991 and Kissling,
1993). During the 1920s America prohibited alcohol; consumption of
beer and wine fell, but the consumption of more pungent and easier
to smuggle hard spirits increased (Thornton, 1991, p.100–105;
Warburton, 1932; and Fisher, 1927, p.29). Similar arguments apply to
drugs today. More dangerous drugs like crack and heroin arose after
the launch of the war on drugs. While open markets could provide
for quality competition over non-addictiveness, buyers and sellers in
the black market value portability and stealth.12
The same effects of prohibition affect prison tattoos. Rather than
Thornton (1991, p.89–110) argues this and surveys Rottenberg’s (1968) work on
heroin. Crawford et al. (1988), Reuter et al. (1988), and Ostrowski (1989) make
more contemporary arguments concerning the potency of drug trades. Miron and
Zwiebel (1995) explain the economic case against drug prohibition.
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using traditional tattoo equipment and sterilization procedures,
inmates improvise makeshift tools from sharpened wire, sewing
needles, and consumer electronics. They also do not sterilize the
equipment. These techniques help tattooers avoid punishment, but
they sacrifice quality. Bruton (2004) reports again:
[e]ntrepreneurs make tattoo guns in all sorts of creative
fashion. A gun can be built using a thin guitar string as the
needle that is mounted in a plastic ballpoint pen shaft with a
rubber band or Pink Pearl eraser, masking tape, and a
toothbrush to link the needle to a motor. These motors are
taken from electric razors, cassette-tape recorders, or CD
players. Power comes from either batteries or an AC/DC
adapter plugged into a socket. When using an audio
component, the volume control dictates the speed of the
needle’s vibration… To keep their businesses alive, tattoo
artists must also be artists at ingeniously hiding their
equipment... They break down their guns back into innocentlooking pens and audio players or stash the components
inside shampoo bottles (p.72).
Primitive equipment and stealth techniques are trends in prisons in
several countries. Kaminski’s (2004) report on Polish inmates during
the 1980s describes the prohibition of tattooing (p.28, p.30) and the
ingenuity of inmates:
A set of three or more needles is bound together with thin
thread. The best black pigment is usually made from the
burned sole of a shoe, while the lower quality black, blue, or
red one is made from the ink of a ballpoint pen. (p.118).
The costs borne by inmates as a result of tattoo prohibition represent
wealth, energy, and resources they would be willing and capable of
investing in higher quality processes at current quantity levels. Repeal
would reverse incentive structures and encourage product
differentiation among competing tattoo artists. Increases in health
quality competition amongst tattoo providers would reduce the
spread of infection to the degree that it is currently caused by
tattooing and more.

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III. Allowing Tattoos Would Reduce Violence in Prison
With many black-market behaviors, fraud persists. Prostitutes rob
their clients, drug dealers dilute their products, and loan sharks
change the terms of their agreements. All these result from
ineffective contracting. Without a formal administration of justice,
black market traders have no recourse against fraud. Traders for
prison tattoos are in a similar, but not identical, predicament.
Reputation, trust, and reliability are foundational to functioning
markets. Without these, individuals are averse to potential losses and
do not engage in trade. The output of the economy without trust is
stagnant. When formal enforcement mechanisms are absent,
economists have witnessed reputation mechanisms emerge to
overcome risk and uncertainty.13 In black markets with one-time
trades, reputations may never develop. Such is the case in
prostitution, drug dealing, and loan sharking; violence is the sole
enforcement technique. A small but direct effect on violence from
tattoo prohibition comes from inmates trying to enforce their
contracts. If an inmate wants to buy or sell tattoo services, he also
wants assurance over the exchange. Although the number of tattoo
transactions that go foul is likely low, the potential for violent
contract enforcement is more present than it would be without
prohibition.14
Violent enforcement for prison tattooing is rare because prison is
a closed environment. Inmates repeatedly deal with one another and
build reputations of trust and reciprocity. Kaminski (2004) described
how thick tattoo markets led to quality competition among Polish
inmates:
The best illustrators offered catalogs of pictures and bon
mots, as well as multiple colors. A customary limited warranty
against suppuration [puss] that could convert a lovely picture
into a monstrous daub gave clients the right to a free
correction…. Prison professionals claim an ability to tattoo
any living or inanimate pattern (p.118–119).
Stringham (2003) explains how individuals without state enforcement used
reputations to develop stock markets. Leeson (2007) describes how outsiders are
allowed entrance into trading groups.
14 Levitt and Venkatesh (2000) pointed out the strong correlation between new
illicit substance trades and violent enforcement. Thornton (1991, p.89) similarly
refers to Kyvig (1979, p.123, p.167) and Erickson (1969).
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If quality competition emerged in Polish prisons, surely competitive
differentiation could develop in an open and legitimate market
elsewhere.
Tattoos are used as signaling devices inside and outside of prison.
A tattooed person signals to people outside of his community
rejection, rebellion, autonomy, or individuality (Kang and Jones,
2007, p.45; Demello, 1993; Post, 1968; and Rosenblatt, 1977). For
individuals within the same cultural community, tattoos signal
membership, solidarity, and commitment. Similar to open society,
prison tattoos send signals among friends and enemies
simultaneously. A recognizable tattoo can communicate dedication,
commitment, and reputation to a person’s allies while warning rivals
of his affiliations, level of authority, and criminal history. Demello
(1993) describes his prison experience, in which gang membership
was celebrated by receiving a tattoo:
The type of imagery that a convict will choose for a tattoo is
based both on where the convict came from and on his
present situation in prison. One of the most popular tattoos
in prison is the loca, which gives the name of the convict’s
neighborhood of origin, or else his gang affiliation… They
also identify him as a member of a certain group which has
important social ramifications when he encounters members
of rival groups (p.11).
To an opposing inmate, a tattoo serves as a warning. It signals the
high costs of conflicting with the tattooed inmate. A violent
encounter with a tattooed gang member is, in effect, a conflict with
an entire gang. If a challenger sees a tattoo and interprets the signal as
a higher cost to fighting, then the challenger is less likely to fight.
Inmates face uncertainty in their dealings with other inmates. A
new inmate can be a weak exploitable resource, a productive
contributor to the closed economy, or a liability that jeopardizes the
social order. By displaying tattoos, inmates communicate what their
behavior will be in future strategic situations. Small amounts of
signaling have significant effects upon the outcomes of strategic
scenarios.15 Allowing inmates to signal through tattooing can
Gibbons (1992, p.210–211) surveys several case studies: “Stein (1989) shows that
policy announcements by the Federal Reserve can be informative but cannot be
too precise, and Mathews (1989) studies how a veto threat by the president can
15

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promote peace and stability rather than violence and retaliation.
Kaminski (2004) described his experience in the Polish prison
hierarchy as a constant trial of physical strength, mental ingenuity,
and creative humor. To preserve order in the prison’s environment
of uncertainty and resource scarcity, inmates challenged newcomers
and assigned them positions within the cell’s social hierarchy.
Bottoms (1999) gave a thorough description of social orders inside
prisons that contrasts with the traditional impression of criminals as
irrationally violent. Easily interpreted signals make the process of
social order in prisons work faster, more reliably, and be less prone to
violence.
Tattoos serve a signaling function for individuals as well as gang
members. The content and amount of tattoos on an inmate, can tell
others how long he has been in jail, where he is from on the outside,
and even the specifics of his crimes. The more intricate the tattoo
process is, the more details that can be signaled. Prohibition forces
the tattoo process to be crude rather than precise. With high levels
of demand, the tattooing process would be more capital intensive
without prohibition. The extent that the production process would
adopt more sophisticated techniques is proportional to the extent of
signals that are currently being suppressed. The extent that violence
would decline is proportional to the degree that current signals are
being disrupted.
Whether criminalizing a given behavior lowers the marginal costs
of committing additional crime, or because physical force carries an
explicitly useful function in black markets, violent crime goes hand
and hand with prohibition policies.16 In prison, assets are power. With
high demand for drugs, violent enforcement, and sexual favors,
inmates who control these markets are powerful and influential.
When new products and services enter the prison market, these
authorities are challenged. Tattooing is knowledge and human capital
intensive. Profits are earned through investment and effort rather
influence which bill gets through Congress.”
16 Evidence suggests that violence rises and falls in tandem with the existence of
prohibition. Thornton (1991, p.122-123) discusses Fisher (1928) who “notes that
crime declined by 37.7 percent during” prohibition, but this was due to a decline in
less serious crime, whereas “violence or theft of property increased by 13.2 percent.
Homicide increased by 16.1 percent and robbery by 83.3 percent over the period.”
Thornton (1991) surveys violence from prohibitions found in Warburton (1932),
the Harrison Narcotics Act (1914) and Wooddy (1934, p.90-99).

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than monopolistic force. When larger proportions of the prison
market are devoted to tattoos instead of to naturally monopolistic
goods, the power and authority of those markets is reduced.
With less violence in prisons, infectious diseases are indirectly
reduced because fighting is an additional way diseases are spread.
Less violence in prisons means a more manageable correctional
environment and a freeing up of resources to better provide other
aspects of law enforcement (e.g., police, courts, judges, etc.).
Efficiency within and among the services of criminal justice results in
a safer civil society.
An immediate concern arises: will inmates steal tattooing
equipment and use it as weapons? Allowing inmate tattoos aligns the
incentives of tattoo artists and customers to protect equipment
against theft. Artists make profits off their equipment and are
inclined to protect it to a proportional amount. Evidence suggests
that prisons currently contain makeshift tattoo guns, yet they do not
get used as weapons, in part because the market for weapons in
prison is as similarly diverse as the market for tattoos. Inmates use a
variety of makeshift weaponry to accomplish many ends. Some
weapons incapacitate their victims; others ensure death quickly,
slowly, or painfully. Tattoo needles are expensive resources to use as
poor substitutes compared to current alternatives.
IV. Allowing Markets Could Assist Rehabilitation, Lower
Recidivism, and Deter Crime
The early punishment theories that guided penal practices were
utilitarian inspired forms of rehabilitation. People believed that
enduring pain and consequences would influence the preferences and
habits of criminals, changing them into better people (Bentham,
1830). By the 1970s rehabilitation techniques changed to
psychological therapy, work training programs, and education. But
amidst these costly programs were rising trends in violent crime and
growing recidivism (Ryberg, 2004, p.3, and Martinson, 1974).
In the mid-1970s the law and economics school modeled criminal
behavior as rational and responsive to incentives (Becker, 1968), and
punishment theory changed to retribution techniques and
deontological justifications. Prison sentences were “deserved”
punishments; the goal of prisons was maximum confinement at low
costs (Hart, 1969). Rehabilitation was used so far as it could lower
recidivism, but theorists, correctional managers, and policy makers

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are still unsure what techniques really change criminal behaviors.17
Given more criminalized behaviors, discovering effective
rehabilitation programs has become more challenging. The successful
rehabilitation of a drug addict is different from rehabilitating a cybercriminal. Current punishment theory and practice relies on
meticulously engineered responses. The costs of planning are high.
Legislators, judges, police, and correctional managers must
continually guide their bureaucracies to keep up with entrepreneurial
criminals.
On the other hand, there are several cases in which creative
wardens took laissez-faire approaches to inmates participating in
market behaviors. These cases have been successful on three margins.
Inmates exchanged with one another in peaceful and nonviolent
ways. Unused prison labor was harnessed into profitable enterprises
and lowered prison budgets. Inmates gained real work experience.
Once released, these skills changed criminals' opportunity costs to
commit crime. Market-based relationships amongst inmates had good
results on several specific margins, they also cost little to no effort in
terms of planning.
Benson (1990) described a dense market microcosm at Maine
State Prison that attracted attention from Reason magazine in 1982
(Shedd, 1982).
[The warden] lifted the limit on inmates’ economic activity,
and by 1978, the cap of 5,000 dollars and 5 novelty patterns
that existed in 1976 was tripled. A “miniature economy”
developed inside the prison… Some entrepreneurs were
extremely successful… [One inmate] now out of prison
running a novelty firm that employs former prisoners… It
wasn’t called that, but Maine State Prison had a rehabilitation
program that was working (Benson, 1990, p.337).
Avio (2003) surveys the prison economics literature. On the margins of escape
rates, physical health, counseling, recreation facilities, recidivism, and other proxies,
Hatry et al. (1993) found that private prisons are at least as good and maybe better
than public prisons. Lanza-Kaduce et al. (1999) supports the claim that private
institutions reduce recidivism better than public ones. Despite incentive
arrangements that would encourage private firms to cut quality and save on costs,
contract specificity proves to be a better way to monitor quality standards amongst
private firms compared to the public sector. As Tabarrok (2003) says, “you get
what you contract for” (p.1).
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German correctional institutions recently experimented in the
production of high-end fashion apparel. The clothing line, Haeftling,
German for “inmate,” uses prison labor to make clothing
traditionally worn by inmates and sells it to European fashion
markets. It was successful as a prison work program and a profitable
fashion enterprise after its debut. “With 40 per cent of Tegel’s
prisoners unemployed, the Internet project has come as a welcome
boost to the jail… The cash from the sales is divided among the
bankrupt city of Berlin, the prison and the inmates” (Paterson, 2003).
The Financial Times listed Haeftling among successful prison initiatives
that lowered tax burdens and provided inmates with labor
opportunities (Rigby, 2005).
Louisiana’s Angola prison hosts a rodeo where inmates perform
to paying audiences. Inmates sell handmade crafts to more than 5,000
attendees during full-day festivals.18 The rodeo has been successful
for more than 40 years, and has improved conditions and won
awards for the once controversial prison. Finally, and most pertinent
to the topic at hand, Canadian prisons opened state-sponsored tattoo
parlors for inmates (Grinberg, 2007, and Weeks, 2005). Before the
program opened, state research reported that “45 percent of
Canadian inmates acquire a tattoo while in prison” (Krauss, 2005).
Coupled with a needle sharing program and inmate autonomy, the
tattoo initiative was meant to alleviate the spread of infections and
associated high medical costs. The program only lasted a short while,
however, which did not allow for quantifiable results.
Unlike the market programs at Maine State, Germany, or Angola,
which allowed for free exchange and production of goods and
services, the Canadian tattoo program was a costly subsidy operating
at $100,000 per year per prison. To expand the program to all
Canadian prisons would have cost $5.8 million plus $2.6 million in
start up costs. Political leaders ended the program, but continue
alternative programs that attempt to combat the spread of HIV and
hepatitis (CanWest, 2006, and CBC News, 2006). The Canadian
program failed not because of any unfeasibility in allowing tattooing
but because of its unnecessary costs and subsidies. In contrast, the
only policy suggestion of this paper is that current prohibitions and
enforcements be repealed to reverse the incentive arrangements that
The charter and history of the Angola Prison Rodeo are available at:
http://www.angolarodeo.com.
18

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127

encourage the spread of disease and violent conflicts. Allowing a
functioning market in prison tattoos to emerge could mimic the
observed market microcosms in other cases. Inmates would be
inclined to enhance their skills, signal high quality services, invest in
better equipment, compete with each other, and peacefully coexist.
Other market products would likely emerge as inmates sought
ways to offer payment for tattoos. Using their time in jail to invest in
human capital would produce tacit knowledge and job training that
could be carried into legitimate society. With more skills in hand,
released inmates would face a higher opportunity cost of committing
crime.
Recidivism is a major concern of correctional policy. In recent
years empirical research has exposed several counteracting forces.
When the rewards of criminal behavior outweigh the costs of being
captured and the rewards from other legitimate behavior, an
individual commits crime (Becker, 1968). After a stay in prison, this
cost-benefit calculation changes. An experienced criminal knows first
hand the costs of crime, he has had the opportunity to learn new
criminal skills from veteran criminals, and he has access to a network
of criminals met inside. Avio (2003, p.12) summarizes the interaction
of these effects.
On the outside, tattoo artists endure years of apprenticeship
before obtaining certified positions. Inmates have a comparative
advantage at fulfilling this requirement. Inmates can build their skills
during sentences and compile long portfolios to demonstrate the
quality of their work. Having a job on the outside is a major influence
on whether an inmate will commit crime again.19 The higher the
rewards for legitimate work, the less likely the criminal is to be
attracted by the rewards of crime.
Prison tattoos can be used to detect and prevent crime. Criminals
are entrepreneurial and adaptive to law enforcement. No sooner do
police investigators develop a new technique to catch criminals than
do criminal actors respond through innovative evasions. One of the
key areas that police focus on to catch criminals is communication.
The extent that tattoos communicate amongst criminals is a fraction
of the potential that recording and remembering criminal tattoos can
yield for police investigation. Tattoos on inmates can be remembered
Wilson et al. (2001) wrote a comprehensive analysis of prison work programs and
concluded “that participants in the work programs are less likely to recidivate than
those who do not participate in a treatment program” (Bushway, 2003, p.2).
19

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and recorded by correctional staff to build evidence because they are
distinguishable marks that help witnesses describe their aggressors.
Tattoos are permanent, unlike telephone conversations or the written
word, and they can be used to trace a lineage of authority amongst
secretive gangs.
In 2004 Ed Ricord, a Florida correctional officer, created a
searchable database to track tattoos on Florida inmates. The database
recorded 372,644 tattoos on current and former state prisoners along
with height, hair color, eye color, and age. With a few keystrokes,
investigators can narrow down a suspect from a witness’s description.
The database was successful in catching a murderer the same year it
was produced, and Florida awarded Ricord a state cost-savers award
for his self-motivation (Bennet, 2004, and Ulferts, 2004).
Repealing tattoo prohibitions in American prisons would lower
the costs of inmates obtaining tattoos, and so more inmates would
obtain more tattoos. This would make databases such as Ricord’s
easier to build and more useful when applied. Such databases and
crime detection techniques would make crime more difficult to
succeed and lower the expected rewards. One would expect crime
rates to fall, if only marginally.
V. Conclusions
The harmful effects of inmate tattooing in American jails are
predominantly caused by prohibition rather than by practice. By
repealing this prohibition, improvements in health conditions and
decreased rates of violence should occur. More general benefits to
allowing inmate tattooing include decreased crime rates and lower
recidivism. In closing, the benefits of repealing tattoo prohibition
clearly outweigh the alleged benefits of persisting with tattoo
prohibition in American prisons.
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