BILL DE BLASIO, Mayor | RICHARD D. EMERY, Esq., Chair | MINA Q. MALIK, Esq., Executive Director

CROSSING THE THRESHOLD:

An Evaluation of Civilian Complaints of
Improper Entries and Searches by the NYPD
from January 2010 to October 2015
CCRB_HomeEntry.indd 6

2/8/2016 1:53:20 AM

CCRB MISSION AND VALUES
The New York City Civilian Complaint Review Board (the “CCRB” or the “Board”) is
an independent agency, created by Chapter 18-A of the New York City Charter. The Board is
empowered to receive, investigate, prosecute, mediate, hear, make findings, and recommend
action on complaints against New York City police officers alleging the use of excessive or
unnecessary force, abuse of authority, discourtesy, or the use of offensive language.
In fulfillment of its mission, the Board has pledged:
•

To report apparent patterns of misconduct, relevant issues and policy matters to the
Police Commissioner and the public.

Published 2015 by the New York City Civilian Complaint Review Board
100 Church Street, 10th Floor, New York, NY 10007
CCRB URL: http://www.nyc.gov/ccrb
To obtain additional information, contact:
General Information: Telephone: (212)-912-2061 or (800)-341-2272
Or visit, www.nyc.gov/ccrb

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CROSSING THE THRESHOLD:
An Evaluation of Civilian Complaints of
Improper Entries and Searches by the NYPD
from January 2010 to October 2015
TABLE OF CONTENTS
CCRB Mission and Values

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Table of Contents

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Table of Figures

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Executive Summary

2

Introduction: Background of CCRB and Glossary

11

Section One: The Scope of the Study – Statistics and Methodology

14

Relevant Complaint Activity
Relevant Complaint Dispositions
Methodology

14
15
18

Section Two: Entering Premises – Law and Police Practices

20

Law on Entries
NYPD Patrol Guide
NYPD Police Student’s Guide
NYPD Operations Orders and Legal Bulletins.

20
21
23
24

Section Three: Examining Police Conduct in Substantiated Complaints

25

A.
B.
C.
D.
E.
F.

25
35
47
51
52
56

Occupants Do Not Provide Valid Consent
No Exigent or Emergency Circumstances Justify Warrantless Entry
Hot Pursuit Did Not Justify Warrantless Entry
Plain View Doctrine Misapplied to Entries and Seizures
Investigation Cards Are Improperly Used to Gain Entry into Premises
Improper Execution and Use of Warrants to Gain Entry into Premises

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b. Officers Fail to Show Warrants to Occupants

59

Section Four: Relevant Characteristics of Substantiated Complaints

61

Location of Improper Entries and Searches
Types of Premises Searched
Time of Day
Characteristics of Victims in Relevant Complaints
Characteristics of Subject Officers in Relevant Complaints
Command and Assignment of Subject Officers
Ranks of Subject Officers
Tenure and Complaint History of Subject Officers
Plainclothes
Manner of Entry
Damage to Property Allegations
Arrests after Improper Entry
Use of Force Allegations and Alleged Injuries to Victims
Discourtesy and Offensive Language Allegations
Presence of Notice of Claim or Civil Lawsuit
False Official Statements
Failure to Complete a Memo Book Entry
Presence of Video, Audio or Relevant Photographs

61
64
65
65
67
68
71
71
73
73
74
75
75
76
76
77
78
78

Section Five: Discipline and Penalties in Substantiated Cases

79

Analysis of Disciplinary Decisions in Administrative Proceedings
Analysis of Non-Charges Cases

83
87

Section Six: A Review of Exonerated, Unsubstantiated, and Officer Unidentified Allegations

89

Exonerated Entry and Search Allegations
Unsubstantiated Entry and Search Allegations
Failure to Show a Warrant Allegations
“Officer Unidentified” Complaints

89
92
93
93

Section Seven: CCRB Recommendations

94

Appendix A: Commands of Subject Officers

104

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TABLE OF FIGURES
Figure 1: Number of Complaints and Allegations of Premises Entry, Search, and Failure to Show a Warrant
Received By Year between 1/1/2010 and 10/1/2015 .......................................................................................... 15
Figure 2: Total CCRB Complaints Received By Year between 1/1/2010 and 10/1/2015 ........................................... 15
Figure 3: Disposition of Fully Investigated Allegations of Premises Entry, Search, and Failure to Show Warrant
Between 1/1/2010 and 10/1/2015 ....................................................................................................................... 17
Figure 4: Disposition by Year of Fully Investigated Allegations of Premises Entry, Search, and Failure to Show
Warrant Between 1/1/2010 and 10/1/2015 ......................................................................................................... 18
Figure 5: Consent Issues in Substantiated Entry and Search Complaints .................................................................... 26
Figure 6: Exigent or Emergency Circumstances Issues in Substantiated Entry and Search Complaints ..................... 37
Figure 7: Investigation Cards and Warrants in Substantiated Entry and Search Complaints ...................................... 54
Figure 8: Substantiated Entry and Search Complaints In Which Warrants Did Not Authorize Entry......................... 58
Figure 9: Complaints by Borough of Premises Entry, Premises Search, and Failure to Show a Warrant Substantiated
Between 1/1/2010 and 10/1/2015 ....................................................................................................................... 62
Figure 10: Complaints by Precinct of Premises Entry, Premises Search, and Failure to Show a Warrant Substantiated
Between 1/1/2010 and 10/1/2015 ....................................................................................................................... 63
Figure 11: Type of Residential Premises in Substantiated Complaints ....................................................................... 64
Figure 12: Substantiated Complaints by Time of Incident (All Commands) (#) ......................................................... 65
Figure 13 Substantiated Complaints by Time of Incident (Warrant Squad Only) (#) ................................................. 65
Figure 14: Race of Alleged Victims and Victim/Complainants in Substantiated Complaints Compared to New York
City Demographics ............................................................................................................................................. 66
Figure 15: Sex of Alleged Victims and Victim/Complainants in Substantiated Complaints Compared to New York
City Demographics ............................................................................................................................................. 67
Figure 16: Race of Subject Officers in Substantiated Allegations Compared to NYPD Demographics ..................... 67
Figure 17: Command of Subject Officers in Substantiated Allegations ...................................................................... 69
Figure 18: Assignment of Patrol and Housing Bureau Subject Officers in Substantiated Allegations........................ 70
Figure 19: Rank of Subject Officers in Substantiated Allegations .............................................................................. 71
Figure 20: Tenure of Subject Officers at Time of Substantiated Incident (Years) ...................................................... 72
Figure 21: Number of Complaints before Incident by Number of Subject Officers (#) .............................................. 72
Figure 22: Manner of Entry in Substantiated Entry Complaints.................................................................................. 74
Figure 23: CCRB Disciplinary Recommendations in Substantiated Premises Entry, Search, and Warrant Allegations
............................................................................................................................................................................ 80
Figure 24: CCRB Disciplinary Recommendations By Year in Substantiated Premises Entry, Search, and Warrant
Allegations .......................................................................................................................................................... 81
Figure 25: Police Department Discipline in All Substantiated Premises Entry, Search, and Warrant Allegations ..... 82
Figure 26: Police Department Discipline in Allegations with Charges Recommendation .......................................... 84
Figure 27: Police Department Discipline in Allegations with Command Discipline Recommendation ..................... 87
Figure 28: Police Department Discipline in Allegations with Formalized Training Recommendation ...................... 88
Figure 29: Police Department Discipline in Allegations with Instructions Recommendation .................................... 88
Figure 30: Bases for All Exonerated Entry and Search Allegations ............................................................................ 90
Figure 31: Bases for Exoneration in Sample of Exonerated Allegations ..................................................................... 90

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Police search and seizure—especially of homes—represents one of the most invasive
forms of intrusion of individual liberty. When conducted without proper constitutional authority,
home searches are one of the most serious violations of privacy and, consequently, types of
police misconduct that engender anger at and distrust of police authority.
Entries are fraught with a range of potential dangers to both civilians and officers. Many
officers enter homes early in the morning when occupants are sleeping, in a state of undress, and
engaged in the private routines in preparation for the day ahead—often leaving residents and
their children frightened, confused, and angry. Police officers find themselves in chaotic and
potentially dangerous situations, with an unknown number of occupants in the home and limited
knowledge of what they will encounter. Even when done lawfully, police entries are forceful,
aggressive and surprising, intended to apprehend suspects and seize evidence of a crime.
Data compiled by CCRB indicates that most officers in the New York Police Department
(the “NYPD” or “Department”) enter homes to respond to crimes-in-progress, to render aid to
residents, or pursuant to valid search or arrest warrants. Yet the cost of loss of confidence in the
presumption of lawful conduct as a result of the cohort of improper entries and searches far
outweighs their modest prevalence. Not only are core civil liberties violated, but the necessary
constructive relationship between community members and the police is degraded. The
community’s tolerance for law enforcement activity and compliance with the law rises and falls
upon its sense of police legitimacy and authority. Where officers fail to act in accordance with
the law requiring procedural and substantive warrant requirements, civilians lose trust and
confidence in the police. A lack of procedural justice contributes to a perception that police
ignore the law’s constraints.
To understand the nature and scope of civilian complaints regarding police search and
seizure at premises, the CCRB conducted a study of over five and a half years of fully
investigated complaints. The CCRB is the largest police oversight agency in the nation and is
empowered to receive, investigate, make findings and recommend action upon complaints by
New Yorkers alleging misconduct by NYPD officers. See NYC Charter § 440(c)(1). To further
this mission, CCRB issues monthly, biannual, and special statistical and qualitative reports
analyzing trends and recurring issues arising from the many thousands of civilian complaints it
receives. These reports act as a barometer of police-civilian encounters in a number of ways,
including the police practices that civilians find most troubling. In its role as an independent
investigator of misconduct allegations, CCRB is uniquely positioned to identify the
circumstances that generate civilian complaints, to assess whether officer conduct is improper,
and to offer recommendations to redress misconduct.

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In this study, the CCRB isolated the recurring police practices and misunderstandings of
the law that led to improper entries, searches, and failures to show a warrant to occupants. In
Payton v. New York, the Supreme Court established a bright-line rule for police searches and
seizures on premises: officers must possess a valid warrant, based upon probable cause and
issued by a judge or magistrate, to cross the threshold of a home. Absent consent, exigent or
emergency circumstances, an officer’s warrantless entry into a residence is presumptively
unreasonable and violates the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.
The CCRB found that improper entries and searches arose from misunderstanding or
misapplication of the legal standards for consent, exigent and emergency circumstances, hot
pursuit, and the plain view doctrines—which, if applied correctly, would permit warrantless
entry, search, and seizure. Also, officers improperly used investigation cards (known as “ICards”)—an internal NYPD tool that tracks individuals officers seek to arrest—and,
occasionally, warrants to gain entry into homes. Officers in these cases did not understand the
line drawn by the law at the threshold of an individual’s home, or prioritized the seizure of a
suspect or evidence over the residents’ constitutional rights.
Data in this report is presented in a variety of ways—by complaint, by allegation, by
subject officer, or by victim—depending on the best method for analyzing a particular issue. For
example, in order to assess how often civilians complain of improper entries, complaint activity
is most useful. Yet, in order to assess how many officers participated in an entry or search, or
the characteristics of CCRB’s disciplinary recommendations and penalties imposed upon specific
officers, a granular review by allegation or subject officer is preferable. The CCRB’s key
statistical findings in this study include:


In the years from 2010 to 2014, the CCRB received between 535 and 622 complaints per
year of improper entries, searches, and failures to show a warrant. In the first nine months of
this year, the CCRB received 400 such complaints. Complaints of premises entry, search,
and failures to show a warrant represent approximately 11% of all complaints received
annually by the CCRB between January 1, 2010 and October 1, 2015.1



A single “complaint” may contain multiple “allegations” relating to force, abuse of authority,
discourtesy, and/or offensive language. For example, a single complaint may contain
multiple allegations of improper entries, searches, and/or failures to show warrants

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According to the NYPD, officers executed at least 15,120 search warrants at dwellings from January 1, 2010 to
December 31, 2014. This number includes the Bronx, Brooklyn North, Brooklyn South, Manhattan North,
Manhattan South, Queens North, Queens South, and Staten Island. The dwellings include apartment buildings,
hotels/motels, housing developments, and residences. “Dwellings” do not include “building” and “basement” in this
approximate number of search warrants from January 1, 2010 to December 31, 2014. The figure 15,120 is a low
number because a search warrant would not be counted in the NYPD’s Intel database if a unit did not report the
search warrant.

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depending on how many entries or searches occurred at a location, and how many officers
were alleged to have participated in the entry, search, and/or failure to show a warrant. The
vast majority of complaints regarding improper entries, searches, or warrant executions
involve only a single incident of entry or search, but a few complaints involved more than
one entry or search (occurring on the same day or on different days). Data on complaint
counts are presented separately from allegation counts; they are not added together.


Between January 1, 2010 and October 1, 2015, the CCRB decided 1,762 complaints
corresponding to 2,640 fully investigated allegations of premises entry and/or search, or
failure to show a search warrant. The CCRB substantiated 180 complaints (or 10% of
complaints).
o The 180 substantiated complaints involved 263 subject officers, 487 victims, and
183 unique locations.
o Premises entry and search: the CCRB decided 1,759 complaints corresponding
to 2,465 allegations of premises entry and search. The 174 substantiated
complaints corresponded to 288 allegations, representing a substantiation rate of
10% by complaint and 12% by allegation. The CCRB exonerated 1,527
allegations (62%), and unsubstantiated 493 allegations (20%).
o Failure to show a warrant: the CCRB decided 150 complaints corresponding to
175 allegations of failure to show a warrant. The 7 substantiated complaints
corresponded to 9 allegations, representing a 5% substantiation rate by complaint
and by allegation. The CCRB exonerated 4 allegations (2%), and unsubstantiated
116 allegations (66%).



The CCRB exonerated 704 allegations (approximately 33%) of premises entry and search
allegations because officers possessed a valid search warrant, arrest or bench warrant, or
other court order permitting entry into premises. These 704 allegations corresponded to 663
complaints. One significant factor that may trigger civilian complaints even when officers
execute valid warrants is whether officers show occupants the warrant. Of the 663
complaints in which officers possessed a valid warrant, 138 complaints (21%) included
allegations that officers failed to show that warrant to the occupant.



175 substantiated complaints (97% of all substantiated complaints) occurred in residential
premises, while only 5 substantiated complaints (3% of all substantiated complaints)
occurred in private areas of businesses. Single-family or dual-family homes were improperly
entered or searched in 44 substantiated complaints (approximately 25% of all substantiated
complaints), while multi-story apartment buildings were the locations of almost all the

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remaining improper entries and searches. 33 substantiated complaints (or 18% of all
substantiated complaints) of improper entries and searches of residential premises occurred
in apartment buildings owned and operated by the New York City Housing Authority.


The greatest number of substantiated complaints of improper entries, searches, and failures to
show a warrant occurred in the early morning hours between 5:00 a.m. and 8:00 a.m. All but
one of the 30 substantiated complaints involving the NYPD’s Warrant Squad occurred
between 5:00 a.m. and 10:00 a.m.



Consistent with CCRB complaints generally, African-Americans comprised approximately
55% of the 487 victims in substantiated complaints, while they make up only 23% of New
York City population. White individuals represent 4% of 487 victims in substantiated
complaints, though they make up 34% of New York City population.



Of the 263 subject officers in substantiated complaints, 140 officers (52%) were assigned to
Patrol or Housing Bureau Commands, while 74 officers (25%) were assigned to Warrant
Squad and Detective Bureaus. 45 officers (16%) were assigned to Narcotics Borough
Commands.



101 substantiated complaints (56% of all substantiated complaints) involved officers dressed
in plainclothes at the time of the incident. Police intrusion into homes when officers do not
wear uniforms may contribute to a civilian’s belief that police activity is improper, and may
trigger a complaint.



Substantiated complaints of improper entry, search, or failure to show a warrant often also
raise other related allegations. For example, 157 substantiated complaints (87% of all
substantiated complaints) included an allegation of discourtesy by an officer; 84
substantiated complaints (46%) included a force allegation; 26 substantiated complaints
(15%) included an offensive language allegation; and 25 substantiated complaints (14%) also
contained an allegation that officers damaged property.



In 94 substantiated complaints (52% of all substantiated complaints), officers detained,
arrested, or issued summons to individuals after improperly entering or searching their
premises. In criminal proceedings, arrests, summons, or evidence seized pursuant to an
illegal entry or search would be dismissed or excluded.



Of the 263 subject officers involved in the 180 substantiated complaints of improper entry,
search, and failure to show a warrant, the CCRB referred 14 instances of a false official
statement to the Department’s Internal Affairs Bureau (“IAB”) for further investigation.

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

Of the 297 allegations substantiated between January 1, 2010 and October 1, 2015, the
CCRB recommended charges and specifications as discipline in 174 allegations (59%),
command discipline in 75 allegations (25%), and formalized training or instructions by a
commanding officer in 43 allegations (15%).



The NYPD possesses final authority over whether and what type of discipline to impose on
officers. Of the 297 substantiated allegations, the Department has informed the CCRB of its
final disciplinary decision in 185 allegations (62%). Of these 185 allegations, the
Department imposed a penalty in 64% (or 118) allegations, and imposed no penalty in 36%
(or 67) allegations.



Charges and specifications, which are recommended in the most serious of cases, have been
prosecuted since April 2013 by the CCRB’s Administrative Prosecution Unit (“APU”). APU
has procured guilty verdicts after an administrative trial for 12 allegations of improper entry
and search, and has resolved another 11 allegations through plea agreements with subject
officers. Not guilty verdicts were issued for 15 allegations of improper entry or search after
trial conducted by APU.
Key findings from CCRB’s qualitative analysis of substantiated complaints include:



A hotly-contested issue in CCRB complaints is whether civilians provided voluntary consent
to allow police entry or search. 42 substantiated complaints (24%) of the 174 substantiated
complaints of premises entry and search involved a dispute between officers and civilians
over consent. Among the sample of 91 unsubstantiated complaints reviewed by the CCRB, a
dispute over consent was the reason for the unsubstantiated finding in 33 complaints (36%).



In 19 substantiated complaints (11%) of the 174 substantiated premises entry and search
complaints, the CCRB found consent provided by an occupant to be involuntary and
produced by police coercion. Coercion took various forms, including threats, intimidation,
and physical force.



The Department introduced a policy in 2008, requiring certain officers to obtain a signed
“consent to search” form from an occupant when they wish to seize evidence or a wanted
person within a particular location. The incidents examined by the CCRB revealed that very
few officers subject to the Department’s policy use or attempt to use the form.



Many substantiated CCRB complaints arise from routine law enforcement activities by patrol
officers in and around homes, such as responding to radio calls involving reports of crimesin-progress and vertical patrols of apartment buildings. Patrol officers in substantiated
complaints often misunderstood the exigencies that allow immediate, warrantless entry into

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homes, and entered homes though the circumstances permitted them time to obtain a warrant
to do so.


The intersection of two legal doctrines—the law surrounding street encounters and the hot
pursuit of individuals under arrest—led to improper entries by officers into homes. While
officers who possess reasonable suspicion that an individual is committing, has committed,
or will commit a crime may pursue that individual if he flees, they may not pursue that
individual into a home unless they have probable cause to arrest him. Yet officers in several
substantiated complaints initiated a pursuit based only upon reasonable suspicion. In these
cases, the hot pursuit doctrine does not justify subsequent entry into a home.



58 subject officers found to have committed misconduct (20% of the 263 officers in 180
substantiated complaints) were members of the Warrant Squad—a unit that more than any
other should understand the law of warrants. An issue leading to improper entries involves
the use of arrest or bench warrants issued several months or even years earlier to enter homes
without A valid arrest or bench warrant allows officers to enter a residence to search for and
arrest the subject of the warrant if they reasonably believe it to be the suspect’s residence and
they reasonably believe the suspect is present at the time they enter. investigative steps taken
to form a reasonable belief that the subjects of the warrants still resided in the home and
could be found within. A valid arrest or bench warrant allows officers to enter a residence to
search for and arrest the subject of the warrant only if they reasonably believe it to be the
suspect’s residence and they reasonably believe the suspect is present at the time they enter.
According to recent estimates, over 1 million bench warrants are open in New York City,
heightening the need to confirm that individuals sought on those warrants still live at the
address listed on those warrants.



Another issue in substantiated complaints is whether officers understand the need for search
warrants when executing an arrest warrant at a third-party residence. For example, a
detective with the Warrant Squad told the CCRB in a 2015 interview that “The [arrest]
warrant is for the person itself, it’s not for the location. There’s no restrictions. If the person
is believed and you can articulate and know for a fact that an individual is at a certain
location, any entry or means to get in there and arrest the individual is appropriate.”



The Warrant Squad’s investigation of investigation cards (also referred to as an I-card) is an
area of concern among the CCRB’s substantiated complaints, especially when I-cards are
used in conjunction with warrants issued years before to gain entry into a home. Officers
often attempt to apprehend the individual listed as a suspect on an I-card by going to
residences where they believe the individual to be present. While arrest of those individuals
in public places needs no warrant, arrest of those individuals inside homes most certainly do.
I-cards are not warrants since they have not been issued by a judge or neutral magistrate. I-

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cards invite improper entries—either because officers are left with little choice but to cross
the threshold of a home when they see a suspect, or because civilians allow entry based on a
misunderstanding of I-cards as warrants. One Warrant Squad detective acknowledged that,
though an I-card did not provide permission to enter a residence, he was required to enter
because “once [the resident] opens up the door and I see the wanted perpetrator there, I need
to take him.”


Civilians emphasize the failure of officers to show them a warrant as a reason they refuse to
accept the legitimacy of police presence in their homes. One woman told the CCRB that she
was sleeping in her apartment when officers opened her unlocked front door at 7:30 a.m. to
look for her son. She said, “I asked [the officer], did he have a warrant? Did he have a
physical warrant to pick up my child? He said no, he only had a complaint in his hand.”
When an officer asked to enter her son’s room, she responded, “[A]bsolutely not if he didn’t
have a physical warrant, and he was already in my apartment. I knew my rights. He came
into my apartment without a warrant.”

To address the misunderstandings or misapplications of the law that lead to improper
entries and findings of misconduct, a summary of the CCRB’s recommendations follow:
1. Recommendation: The Department should record, as part of its body-worn
camera program, all non-exigent home entries (and, when possible, all home
entries) to document their propriety. The Department should craft rules to
protect privacy if entry videos are released. Video footage has been a sea change
in the ability to investigate and determine whether misconduct occurred. While
police video recording in and around homes is another significant intrusion of
individual privacy and must be properly regulated, videos of all searches of homes
have the potential to document material issues in home entry and search cases—
including consent, the existence of exigent or emergency circumstances, and the
facts leading to hot pursuit, among others.
2. Recommendation: The Department should expand its current policy regarding
the consent to search form and require all officers in the Department to use the
form to document consent to search homes and businesses. A significant
number of complaints involve disputes between civilians and officers over consent
to enter and search and their homes. Expanding the Department’s consent to search
form—in addition to enforcing the current policy requiring certain officers to use
the form—is essential to resolve these disputes. Further, a signed form may lead to
exoneration of officers named in misconduct complaints, while also protecting the
rights of civilians.

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3. Recommendation: The Patrol Guide should be revised to contain a stand-alone
section on the law of search and seizures at homes and businesses. The Police
Student’s Guide should be revised to contain a stand-alone section that
addresses the Payton rule as it applies to searches and seizures generally.
Currently, the Patrol Guide contains separate sections regarding arrests with a
warrant and the execution of search warrants. This division is mirrored in the
Police Student’s Guide. What is missing from these sections are the first principles
of Payton and its progeny—that to gain entry into a home for search or seizure, an
arrest or search warrant must be secured. CCRB recommends a combined,
comprehensive section on search and seizure at homes generally. In addition, the
Patrol Guide’s section on investigation cards should be revised to state clearly they
are not warrants, and in what circumstances officers should be required to obtain a
warrant instead of relying solely on an investigation card for arrest.
4. Recommendation: The Department should make a series of roll-call
announcements reminding officers of the requirements of Patrol Guide 214-23
regarding noise violations. Many complaints arise from incidents where officers
arrive at residences to address noise complaints or because they have heard loud
noise themselves. These incidents often involve parties, large gatherings, or other
chaotic, unpredictable circumstances that can pose great risk to both officers and
civilians. Officers should be reminded that entry to correct a noise violation is a
last resort and a decision to be made by a precinct commander or duty captain only.
5. Recommendation: The penalties imposed by the Department on officers who
improperly enter and search homes should deter future misconduct and reflect
the serious harms suffered by civilians.
Both CCRB disciplinary
recommendations and final disciplinary decisions by the Police Commissioner
should address the causes of improper entries and searches—often a basic
misunderstanding of the law—through the expanded use of formalized training.
However, where charges and specifications are appropriate and result in a guilty
verdict after trial, the penalty should reflect the significant intrusion on individual
liberties that unlawful entries and searches and homes represent.
Section One of this report provides basic statistics regarding relevant complaint activity,
dispositions of the relevant complaints, and outlines the methodology of this study. Section Two
reviews the principle sources of legal and procedural guidance for the NYPD in the area of
searches and seizures at homes and businesses. Section Three is a qualitative, descriptive
analysis of the substantiated complaints of improper entries, searches, and failures to show a
warrant, including numerous case examples. Section Four contains a statistical analysis of
significant aspects in substantiated complaints—including location of complaints, demographics
of victims and subject officers, the assignment, rank, tenure, and complaint history of subject

9

officers, and related allegations. Section Five examines discipline, trial decisions, and penalties
imposed by the Department in substantiated cases of improper search, entry and failure to show a
warrant. Section Six explains the basis for the exonerated and unsubstantiated complaints.
Finally, Section Seven discusses the recommendations generated by this study in detail.

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INTRODUCTION: BACKGROUND OF CCRB AND
GLOSSARY
The Charter of the City of New York establishes the Civilian Complaint Review Board
and empowers it to receive and investigate complaints from members of the public concerning
misconduct by officers of the NYPD. See NYC Charter § 440(a). The CCRB is required to
conduct its investigations “fairly and independently, and in a manner in which the public and the
police department have confidence.” Id. Under the City Charter, the CCRB has jurisdiction to
investigate the following categories of police misconduct: Force, Abuse of Authority,
Discourtesy, and Offensive Language, collectively known as “FADO.” Id. § 440(c)(1). The
CCRB will also note “other misconduct” when it uncovers certain conduct by NYPD officers
during the course of its investigation that falls outside its jurisdiction, but that the Department
has requested be noted or remains important to bring to the Department’s attention. Examples of
“other misconduct” include failures by officers to enter necessary information in their activity
logs (memo books), failures to complete required documentation of an incident, and evidence
suggesting that officers have made false official statements.
The “Board” consists of thirteen individuals. Of the 13 members, five are chosen by the
Mayor, five are chosen by the City Council, and three members with experience as law
enforcement professionals are chosen by the Police Commissioner. Apart from the members
selected by the Police Commissioner, none of the Board members may have experience as law
enforcement professionals or be former employees of the NYPD. The Mayor selects one of the
thirteen members to serve as Board Chair.
The Executive Director is appointed by the Board and is the Chief Executive Officer,
who is responsible for managing the day-to-day operations of the Agency and overseeing its 180
employees. The Agency consists of an 110-member Investigations Division responsible for
investigating allegations of police misconduct within the Agency’s jurisdiction (“FADO”), and
for making investigative findings. The most serious police misconduct cases are prosecuted by a
16-member Administrative Prosecution Unit. The prosecutors within the Unit are responsible
for prosecuting, trying and resolving the most serious misconduct cases before a Deputy
Commissioner of Trials at One Police Plaza. The Agency also includes a Mediation Unit with
trained mediators who may be able to resolve less serious allegations between a police officer
and a civilian. The Outreach Unit acts as a liaison with various entities, and is responsible for
intergovernmental relations, outreach presentations, and community events throughout the five
boroughs of New York City.
Members of the public who file complaints regarding alleged misconduct by NYPD
officers are referred to as “complainants.” Other civilians involved in the incident are

11

categorized as “victims” or “witnesses.” Officers who commit the actions that are alleged to be
misconduct are categorized as “subject officers,” while those who witnessed or were present for
the alleged misconduct are categorized as “witness officers.” The CCRB’s Intake team receives
the complaints filed by the public in-person, or by telephone, voicemail, an online complaint
form, or referred to the agency by the NYPD’s Internal Affairs Bureau.
When a complaint is filed with the CCRB, the CCRB assigns it a unique complaint
identification number. The CCRB also refers to “complaints” as “cases.” The vast majority of
complaints regarding improper entries, searches, or warrant executions involve only a single
incident of entry or search, but a few complaints involved more than one entry or search
(occurring on the same day or on different days). A single complaint or case may contain
multiple “allegations” relating to force, abuse of authority, discourtesy, and/or offensive
language. Allegations regarding improper entries, searches, or failures to show a warrant are
considered allegations falling within the CCRB’s abuse of authority jurisdiction. A single
complaint or case may contain multiple allegations of improper entries, searches, and/or failures
to show warrants. Each allegation is reviewed separately during an investigation.
During an “investigation,” the CCRB’s civilian investigators gather documentary and
video evidence and conduct interviews with complainants, victims, civilian witnesses, subject
officers and witness officers in order to determine whether the allegations occurred, and whether
they constitute misconduct. At the conclusion of the investigation, a closing report is prepared
summarizing the relevant evidence and providing a factual and legal analysis of the allegations.
The closing report and investigative file is provided to the Board for disposition. A panel of
three Board members (a “Board Panel”) reviews the material, makes findings for each
allegation in the case, and if allegations are substantiated, provides recommendations as to the
discipline that should be imposed on the subject officers.
The “Disposition” is the Board’s finding of the outcome of a case (i.e. if misconduct
occurred). The Board is required by its rules to use a “preponderance of the evidence” standard
of proof in evaluating cases. Findings on the merits result when CCRB is able to conduct a full
investigation and obtain sufficient credible evidence for the Board to reach a factual and legal
determination regarding the officer’s conduct. In these cases, the Board may arrive at one of the
following findings on the merits for each allegation in the case: “substantiated,” “exonerated,”
or “unfounded.” Substantiated cases are those where there was a preponderance of evidence
that the acts alleged occurred and constituted misconduct. Exonerated cases are those where
there was a preponderance of the evidence that the acts alleged occurred but did not constitute
misconduct. Unfounded cases are those where there was a preponderance of the evidence that
the acts alleged did not occur. “Unsubstantiated” cases are those where the CCRB was able to
conduct a full investigation, but there was insufficient evidence to establish whether or not there

12

was an act of misconduct. In many cases, the CCRB is unable to conduct a full investigation or
mediation and must “truncate” the case.2
A complainant may “mediate” his or her case with the subject officer, in lieu of an
investigation, with the CCRB providing a neutral, third-party mediator.
The CCRB’s Administrative Prosecution Unit (APU) prosecutes cases in which the
Board has substantiated misconduct and recommended discipline in the form of Charges and
Specifications. The APU began operating in April 2013, after the CCRB and the NYPD signed a
Memorandum of Understanding establishing the unit.

Fully investigated cases comprise complaints disposed of as “substantiated,” “unsubstantiated,” “exonerated,”
“unfounded,” “officers unidentified,” or “miscellaneous.” Miscellaneous cases are those where an officer retires or
leaves the Department before the Board receives the case for decision. Truncated cases are disposed of in one of the
following ways: “complaint withdrawn,” “complainant/victim uncooperative,” “complainant/victim unavailable,”
and “victim unidentified.”
2

13

SECTION ONE: THE SCOPE OF THE STUDY – STATISTICS
AND METHODOLOGY
The CCRB receives hundreds of complaints each year from members of the public who
believe officers have entered and searched their homes and businesses improperly. The CCRB
conducts full investigations into a significant number of these complaints and, over the last five
and a half years, substantiated approximately 10% of these incidents as improper. To conduct
this study, the CCRB reviewed not only substantiated complaints, but also a sample of
exonerated and unsubstantiated complaints.

Relevant Complaint Activity. Between January 1, 2010 and October 1, 2015, the
CCRB received 3,369 complaints with 4,811 allegations of: (1) premises entered and/or
searched; and (2) failure to show a warrant (Figure 1). From year to year during this period,
complaint activity fluctuated. The CCRB received the lowest number of relevant complaints in
2013—535 complaints—and then experienced a 16% increase in complaints the next year—622
complaints. In the first nine months of 2015, the CCRB has received 400 relevant complaints.
Assuming the rate remains the same, the CCRB estimates that in 2015 it will receive
approximately 533 relevant complaints—which would be the lowest number of complaints in the
six-year period between January 1, 2010 and December 31, 2015.
The decline in premises entry and search complaints received in 2015 mirrors the overall
decline of all types of complaints received by the CCRB. However, in examining the period
between 2010 and 2015, total CCRB complaint activity has steadily declined, while complaints
of improper entry and search has fluctuated—increasing some years, and decreasing in others.
Complaints of premises entry and search have comprised approximately 10% of the total number
of complaints received by CCRB between 2010 and 2013, though in 2014, this percentage rose
to 13% (Figure 2).
Complaint activity regarding improper entries and searches should be assessed in the
context of overall police-civilian encounters at homes and businesses. Though exact numbers
cannot be determined, some data exists. According to the NYPD, officers executed at least
15,120 search warrants at dwellings from January 1, 2010 to December 31, 2014.3 In addition,
some of the approximately 33,000 arrests by NYPD officers between January 1, 2014 and
September 27, 2015 were made in dwellings.

3

This number includes the Bronx, Brooklyn North, Brooklyn South, Manhattan North, Manhattan South, Queens
North, Queens South, and Staten Island. The dwellings include apartment buildings, hotels/motels, housing
developments, and residences. “Dwellings” do not include “building” and “basement” in this approximate number
of search warrants from January 1, 2010 to December 31, 2014. The figure 15,120 is a low number because a search
warrant would not be counted in the NYPD’s Intel database if a unit did not report the search warrant.

14

Figure 1: Number of Complaints and Allegations of Premises Entry, Search, and Failure to
Show a Warrant Received By Year between 1/1/2010 and 10/1/2015

Figure 2: Total CCRB Complaints Received By Year between 1/1/2010 and 10/1/2015

Relevant Complaint Dispositions. Between January 1, 2010 and October 1, 2015,
CCRB Board panels decided 1,762 complaints with 2,640 fully investigated allegations of

15

premises entry and/or search, and/or failure to show a warrant (Figure 3). During this time
period, the CCRB substantiated 297 such allegations, corresponding to 180 unique complaints.
The 288 substantiated allegations of premises entry and/or search corresponded to 174
complaints, and the 9 substantiated allegations of failure to show a warrant corresponded to 7
complaints.
Of the 174 substantiated complaints of premises entry and/or search, 88 complaints were
ones where the CCRB substantiated both an improper entry and search; 76 complaints were ones
where the CCRB substantiated an improper entry only; and 10 complaints were ones where the
CCRB substantiated an improper search only.
In addition, during the period from January 1, 2010 to October 1, 2015, the CCRB noted
“Other Misconduct” in two complaints where officers were required to obtain a signed consent to
search form but failed to do so.
The substantiation rate of complaints with allegations of premises entry, search, and
failure to show a warrant, is lower than the substantiation rate for all fully investigated
complaints. Between 2010 and 2014, the CCRB’s substantiation rate for all fully investigated
complaints was 13%. During the first half of 2015, the CCRB’s substantiation rate for all fully
investigated complaints was 21%. The substantiation rate of premises entry and search
complaints decided between January 1, 2010 and October 1, 2015 is 10% (Figure 3).
However, broken down by year, the CCRB’s raw count of substantiated allegations and
the CCRB’s substantiation rate has increased significantly since 2010 (Figure 4). In 2010, the
substantiation rate of premises entry, search, and failure to show a warrant allegations was 7%,
which fell to a substantiation rate of 2% in 2011. In 2012, however, this trend reversed course.
The CCRB substantiated more allegations of premises entry, search, or failure to show a warrant
each year from 2012 to 2015, and the substantiation rate increased as well: 9% in 2012, 11% in
2013, 15% in 2014, and 19% for the allegations decided up to October 1, 2015.

16

Figure 3: Disposition of Fully Investigated Allegations of Premises Entry, Search, and
Failure to Show Warrant Between 1/1/2010 and 10/1/2015
Disposition of Allegation

Number of premises entered
and/or searched allegations

Number of failure to show a
warrant allegations

288 (174 cases)

9 (7 cases)

Exonerated

1527

4

Unfounded

33

22

Unsubstantiated

493

116

Officer Unidentified

105

23

Miscellaneous

19

1

Total Number of Fully
Investigated Allegations

2465
(corresponding to 1759 cases)

175
(corresponding to 150 cases)

Substantiation Rate by
Complaint

10%

5%

Substantiation Rate by
Allegation

12%

5%

Substantiated

17

Figure 4: Disposition by Year of Fully Investigated Allegations of Premises Entry, Search,
and Failure to Show Warrant Between 1/1/2010 and 10/1/2015

Methodology. To conduct this study, the CCRB reviewed the 180 complaints decided
by a Board panel between January 1, 2010 and October 1, 2015 that corresponded to 297
substantiated allegations of the following types: (1) premises entry and/or search; and (2) failure
to show a warrant. Both of these allegations are abuse of authority allegations within the
CCRB’s FADO jurisdiction. In addition, the CCRB reviewed the two complaints in which the
Board noted “Other Misconduct” arising out of an officer’s failure to obtain a signed consent to
search form. The CCRB examined several characteristics of these complaints, including type of
premises involved, time of day, command, assignment and rank of subject officers, presence of a
warrant or investigation card, the presence of exigent or emergency circumstances, and disputes
over consent to entry and search. The CCRB reviewed the investigative files for each
substantiated complaint, including closing reports; the factual and legal analysis of investigators
and attorneys; audio recordings and transcripts of interviews with complainants, victims, and
witnesses; audio recordings and transcripts of interviews with subject and witness police officers;
relevant video, audio or photographs of the underlying incidents; and related documents such as
arrest reports, warrants, investigative cards, and other investigative activity by officers.
In addition to reviewing substantiated complaints, the CCRB reviewed exonerated
complaints to determine the presence of a valid warrant or exception to the warrant requirement.
The CCRB reviewed a random sample of cases in the latter category to examine the types of
circumstances that served as a permissible basis for warrantless entry. The CCRB also reviewed

18

a random sample of unsubstantiated allegations to analyze why it was unable to come to a
finding on the merits in these cases.
The level of discipline and penalties imposed for improper searches and entries is crucial
to understanding whether the CCRB can redress police misconduct. To do so, the CCRB
analyzed its disciplinary recommendations in substantiated complaints, along with the
Department’s final disciplinary decisions. Where available, the CCRB reviewed the documents
describing the basis of the Department’s disciplinary decisions.
The law that controls government intrusion in private homes arises out of federal and
state law, including the New York Criminal Procedure Law. The CCRB summarized the
relevant federal and state constitutional provisions, common law and statutes that relate to
warrantless entry, as well as entries pursuant to a search or arrest warrant. The CCRB also
examined the sections of the NYPD Patrol Guide and NYPD Operations Order relevant to the
issues examined in this report. The CCRB also examined the July 2014 NYPD Police Student’s
Guide.

19

SECTION TWO: ENTERING PREMISES – LAW AND
POLICE PRACTICES
Search and seizure in homes and businesses by NYPD officers is governed by four
principal sources of authority. First, the United States and New York State Constitutions, as
interpreted by courts and codified in the New York Criminal Procedure Law (“CPL”), establish
the legal standards for entry into premises and outline the limited exceptions to the warrant
requirement. Second, the NYPD Patrol Guide contains certain procedures that must be followed
when effecting arrests and conducting searches. Third, the NYPD training curriculum offers
recruits a further explanation of the relevant law and Patrol Guide procedures. Fourth, the
NYPD issues various Legal Bulletins and Operations Orders containing a recitation of the law
applicable to issues such as search and seizure at homes. What emerges from a comprehensive
review of the various documents issued by the Department regarding search and seizure is a
distinction made for officers between arrests for individuals and searches for evidence, and a
further distinction between officers engaged in patrol and those assigned to investigative
commands. While these distinctions may reflect the operational differences among various
NYPD commands and assignments, they leave certain officers with the impression that warrants
are not particularly relevant to their law enforcement activity in homes.

Law on Entries. Restrictions on searches and seizures at homes stem from the Fourth
Amendment of the United States Constitution, which provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
In Payton v. New York, the Supreme Court held that, in order to cross the threshold of an
individual’s home for search or seizure, an officer must possess probable cause and a valid
warrant.4 Absent consent or exigent or emergency circumstances, an officer’s warrantless entry
into a residence is presumptively unreasonable and violates the Fourth Amendment. Probable
cause to arrest an individual, standing alone, will not justify a warrantless entry into a residence
to make the arrest. Similarly, probable cause to search for contraband or evidence of a crime at a
particular residence will not justify a warrantless entry into and search of that residence.
4

Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980). However, police officers do not need an arrest warrant to arrest
individuals in a public place as long as the officers possess probable cause to do so. See United States v. Santana,
427 U.S. 38, 42 (1976); C.P.L. § 140.10(1). The Second Circuit recently decided that Payton is implicated when the
arrestee is inside of his residence at the time of arrest, regardless of whether officers cross the residence threshold.
United States v. Allen, No. 13-3333-CR, 2016 WL 362570 (2d Cir. Jan. 29, 2016).

20

In addition to the protections afforded to them by the United States Constitution,
individuals in New York are governed by New York common law and the New York State
Constitution, in which there is a provision identical to that of the Fourth Amendment of the
United States Constitution. In several contexts in the area of search and seizure, New York State
courts have imposed greater restrictions on local police activity than are imposed on federal law
enforcement. Courts have interpreted the Fourth Amendment and its state analogue to define
what constitutes unreasonable searches and seizures, what constitutes probable cause, and when
lawful searches and seizures can be conducted in the absence of a warrant. The NYPD is also
subject to the provisions of the New York Criminal Procedure Law, which codifies the standards
and procedures to apply for and execute a search or arrest warrant. Finally, administrative
judges in the Department’s trial room applying legal precedents have further refined the scope of
permissible police searches and seizures without a warrant.
A valid arrest or bench warrant allows officers to enter a residence to search for and
arrest the subject of the warrant if they reasonably believe it to be the suspect’s residence and
they reasonably believe the suspect is present at the time they enter.5 If the subject of a valid
arrest or bench warrant is present in a third-party’s residence, the police must secure a search
warrant for the third-party residence in order to search it for the subject of the warrant.6 Once
officers have lawfully entered a residence, they may conduct a quick and limited walk-through
when it is reasonable to conclude that third-persons may be present who could pose a threat to
the officers or who may destroy evidence.7
For businesses, officers generally have the same right as any civilian to enter commercial
premises during normal business hours and make observations in the areas open to the public.8
However, certain areas within commercial premises may be private and closed to public access;
officers must obtain a warrant to enter or search these areas.

NYPD Patrol Guide. The NYPD Patrol Guide does not contain a section devoted to
search and seizure generally at homes and businesses. Instead, the Patrol Guide splits discussion
of search and seizure across two sections on arrests and arrest processing, and separate sections
on searches and search warrants.
Patrol Guide Section 208-01 relates to the “Law of Arrest” and contains the “conditions
under which a uniformed member of the service may make an arrest.”9 This section outlines the
geographic scope of an officer’s authority to “arrest with a warrant” and to “arrest without a
5

Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980).
Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 212-13 (1981).
7
Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 337 (1990); People v. Febus, 157 A.D.2d 380 (1st Dep’t 1990).
8
People v. Saglimbeni, 95 A.D.2d 141 (1st Dep’t 1983).
9
NYPD Patrol Guide 208-01, Law of Arrest at 1 (eff. 8/1/2013).
6

21

warrant,” but contains no reference to arrests at homes. Section 208-42 relates to “Arrest on a
Warrant” and provides the procedures to be used when “arresting a person for whom a warrant
has been issued.”10 While the section sets forth the procedures to be used once an arrest warrant
has been obtained, it does not outline the circumstances that necessitate the presence of an arrest
warrant—namely, an arrest inside a home. Once an arrest warrant is present, this section
instructs officers that, if premises are involved, they should knock and announce their presence,
absent a fear for safety, flight by the suspect, or destruction of evidence. Officers are required to
“[i]nform the defendant of the warrant and offense charged unless physical resistance, flight or
other factors make such procedure impractical,” and show the warrant to the arrestee upon
request.11 This section also notes that, if an arrest warrant is to be executed at a third-party
residence, a search warrant must also be secured.
Patrol Guide 212-75 instructs officers how to apply for a search warrant that authorizes a
“search of premises” for the purpose of seizing property.12 This section notes that a search
warrant may “authorize the search of a designated premises for a person who is the subject of an
arrest warrant,” but does not state that such a warrant is necessary. Section 212-105 outlines the
procedures applicable to the execution of a search warrant, including an affirmative obligation
for officers to “show a copy of the search warrant to any of the occupants” when they are able to
do so safely.13
“Investigation Cards” are described in Patrol Guide section 208-23.14 The investigation
card database is a computerized system used by the NYPD to track individuals sought as
suspects in or witnesses to a crime. The “investigation card” system, in general terms, allows
officers to enter details of an individual in the computerized system and create an “investigation
card” for that individual. The officers can identify the individual as: (1) a “perpetrator,” meaning
that there is probable cause to arrest him; (2) a “suspect,” which means there is no probable
cause to arrest him; or (3) a “witness” sought for questioning. The section does not discuss
whether officers should look for the subject of investigation cards at homes, and if they do, what
level of authority investigation cards provide for entry into homes. Most importantly, this
section omits a clear statement that investigation cards are not warrants.
The Patrol Guide, by dividing up arrests for persons from searches for evidence, fails to
include the basic principles that searches and seizures at homes must be conducted pursuant to
probable cause and a warrant. No Patrol Guide section contains the standards for voluntary
consent, though “consent” is referenced throughout the Patrol Guide. Nor does the Patrol Guide
incorporate the Department’s guidelines regarding the use of the consent to search form,
discussed further below. The Patrol Guide also does not contain sections outlining the legal
10

NYPD Patrol Guide 208-42 at 1 (eff. 8/1/2013).
Id.
12
NYPD Patrol Guide 212-75 at 1 (eff. 2/18/2015).
13
NYPD Patrol Guide 212-105 at 1, 3 (eff. 10/16/2013).
14
NYPD Patrol Guide 208-23 (eff. May 14, 2015).
11

22

standards for exigent and emergency circumstances justifying warrantless entry, with the
exception of Patrol Guide 215-03 relating to the removal of a child from a home where there is
an imminent danger to the child’s life or health.

NYPD Police Student’s Guide. The NYPD Police Student’s Guide is a written
curriculum for a recruit in the Police Academy. While the Guide contains the basic legal
standards for entries on premises, it characterizes the warrant requirement as one inapplicable to
most officers, or something necessary only if the officer cannot first obtain consent or possess
exigent circumstances.
The material in the Police Student’s Guide most relevant to entries into premises is
contained in the chapter on “Authority to Arrest.” Officers are instructed on the legal standards
and police procedures for arrests, probable cause, proper sources of probable cause, and arrests
with and without a warrant. Officers are told that “[m]ost of the arrests that you will make will
be without a warrant,” though “[w]hen time permits—as when detectives conduct lengthy
investigations—police should seek judicial approval, by obtaining a warrant, prior to making an
arrest.”15 This text suggests that most of officers’ arrests will be made on the street, even though
a significant proportion of a patrol officer’s duties involve responding to calls regarding crime
complaints and emergencies at homes and businesses. Responding to these calls often involve
making arrests on premises, and being cognizant of the need for warrant to do so.
Within the 30-page chapter, approximately half a page addresses “Limitations of
Warrantless Entries of Private Premises in order to Make Routine Arrests.” These two
paragraphs inform officers of Payton v. New York and Riddick v. New York, and those cases’
prohibition on “routine summary arrest of a person within a private residence unless one of the
below listed conditions is present.”16 Those conditions are listed in the following order as
“exigent circumstances,” “consent of a co-occupant,” or “a warrant.” Officers are then told that
they must be “prepared to explain your reasons for going into a private premise without a
warrant to effect an arrest.” Officers are referred to Legal Bureau Bulletin Vol. 10, No. 4 for
further discussion of the topic.
In contrast to the Guide’s hierarchy of how premises may be lawfully entered, Payton
treats warrantless entries as presumptively unreasonable. The Guide suggests to officers that
warrants are necessary only if consent cannot be obtained or exigent circumstances cannot be
established, rather than the limited exceptions to the warrant requirement. Further, the chapter
on Arrest in the Guide contains no reference in Steagald and the requirement that entry into a
third-party residence to arrest the subject of an arrest warrant also requires a search warrant.
Another relevant piece of information provided to officers is the Police Student Guide’s
description of the “Computerized Investigation Card System (I-card),” which is described as “an
15
16

NYPD Police Student’s Guide, Authority to Arrest at 3 (July 2014).
NYPD Police Student’s Guide, Authority to Arrest at 24 (July 2014).

23

internal tool available to investigative units that allows detectives to place suspects into a
‘Wanted File’ without having to file an arrest warrant with the court, when probable cause has
been established and the suspect is properly identified.”17
This material, as a whole, leave officers with the impression that arrest warrants are
necessary only in a few circumstances, and only after consent and exigent circumstances have
been exhausted. Further, the guide suggests to officers that I-cards can serve as a substitute for
an arrest warrant, and does not clearly state that investigations cards provide no authority to enter
a home.

NYPD Operations Orders and Legal Bulletins. In 2008, the NYPD established the
use of a Consent to search form and issued an Operations Order outlining the circumstances
under which the form must be presented to civilians for their review and signature.18 Pursuant to
the order, uniformed members of the service assigned to investigatory commands and units,
including the Detective Bureau and Organized Crime Control Bureau (“OCCB”), are required,
when they believe seizable property or wanted persons are present at a particular location, to
approach the legal owner or lawful custodian of an address, vehicle or item to be searched,
request that they sign a consent to search form, and notify their supervisor that the form has been
signed and the search is to be conducted. The order further instructs members of the service to
explain to an individual that they have the right to refuse a search and to request that a warrant be
obtained to conduct the search. Members are also instructed that consent must be voluntarily,
knowingly, and intelligently provided, and that threats and promises cannot be used to secure
consent. Members are told to immediately cease the search if consent is withdrawn prior to the
completion of the search, and then to seek a search warrant.
The NYPD Legal Bureau also issues periodic bulletins on various aspects of search and
seizure law, among other topics. Relevant bulletins have been issued on arrests without
warrants, the Payton rule regarding arrests in the home, warrantless searches of third-party
homes, and the plain view doctrine.19

NYPD Police Student’s Guide, Authority to Arrest at 8 (July 2014).
See NYPD Operations Order 29, “Establishment of Department Form ‘Consent to Search (PD541-030) - For
Uniformed Members of the Service Assigned to the Detective Bureau, O.C.C.B. and Other Investigatory
Commands,” June 18, 2008.
19
See, e.g., NYPD Legal Bureau Bulletin Vol. 10, No. 4 (arrests without warrants); Vol. 11, No. 5 (warrantless
search of third-party home); Vol. 20, No. 8 (arrests in the home); Vol. 13, No. 5 (plain view doctrine); Vol. 17, No.
6 (same).
17
18

24

SECTION THREE: EXAMINING POLICE CONDUCT IN
SUBSTANTIATED COMPLAINTS
The CCRB reviewed all substantiated complaints of misconduct involving premises
entry, search, and failure to show a warrant decided between January 1, 2010 and October 1,
2015. A qualitative and descriptive review of these complaints depicts the recurring types of
officer misconduct at homes and businesses. This section is organized according to the legal
doctrines that permit officers to enter, search, and seize persons or evidence on premises—
consent, exigent or emergency circumstances, hot pursuit doctrine, the plain view doctrine, and
the presence of a valid warrant—with case examples to illustrate how officer conduct did not
meet the relevant standard. The problematic use of investigation cards (I-cards) in substantiated
complaints is also discussed in detail, given its presence in a number of substantiated complaints.
Finally, officers’ failures to show a warrant to occupants of a home demonstrate the emphasis
placed by community members upon officers acting pursuant to lawful procedures. A
quantitative analysis provides basic statistics on the prevalence of each type of officer
misconduct within the substantiated complaints.

A. Occupants Do Not Provide Valid Consent
Voluntary consent to enter and search is often the dispositive issue in search and seizure
cases because, if an individual provides consent, an officer’s warrantless entry and search of the
premises is permissible.20 The vast majority of substantiated cases were ones in which the
CCRB found that occupants did not consent to an officer’s entry or search, and indeed,
affirmatively refused consent (Figure 5). In some of these cases, and others, the CCRB found
that any consent provided by the occupant did not authorize an officer’s subsequent entry or
search because the consent was produced by police coercion, such as threats, intimidation, or
misrepresentations that the officer possessed a warrant. In addition, the CCRB found in a few
cases that officers procured consent from an individual who did not possess authority to provide
consent, or that officers exceeded the scope of the consent. Finally, in one case, officers
continued their entry or search even after an occupant withdrew consent.

20

United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 165-66 (1974); People v. Gonzalez, 39 N.Y.2d 122 (1976).

25

Figure 5: Consent Issues in Substantiated Entry and Search Complaints
Number of
Substantiated
Complaints

Percentage of
174
Substantiated
Complaints

Occupant did not provide consent to enter and/or search
(including cases where occupants affirmatively refused
consent).

157

90%

Occupants affirmatively refused consent.

24

14%

Disputed consent: officers claimed occupants consented
to entry and/or search, occupants denied doing so.

42

24%

Consent invalid because it was product of police coercion
(threats, intimidation, misrepresentation of warrant,
physical force).

19

11%

Consent invalid because consenting individual did not
possess authority over premises.

3

2%

Search exceeded scope of consent.

2

1%

Consent withdrawn.

1

0.6%

Type of Consent Issue

Based on its review of the cases involving consent issues, the CCRB recommends:
(1) Every NYPD officer carry and be required to use the Department’s consent to search
form to document a resident’s consent to enter and search his or her home, absent
exigent or emergency circumstances.
(2) The NYPD should require, as part of its body-worn camera program, officers to
record an occupant’s consent to enter and search, along with the interaction between
the officer and occupant that leads to consent.
(3) The NYPD Patrol Guide should be revised to include the legal standards for
voluntary consent, and to incorporate the Department’s consent to search policy.
To determine consent, the CCRB applies well-established legal standards regarding
voluntariness. Voluntariness is assessed from the totality of circumstances, including whether an
individual was in custody at the time of providing consent, threats, coercive techniques, or

26

deception used by police, and the background of the individual.21 Consent is involuntary where
police misrepresent to an occupant that they have a valid warrant that allows their entry into the
premises.22 In addition, where police refuse to answer questions about a warrant or incorrectly
state that a warrant is unnecessary, they leave an inhabitant with the impression that they have no
right to refuse the search, also rendering the consent involuntary.23 A third-party may consent to
a search if they share common authority over the premises to be searched, unless a co-occupant
is physically present and refuses consent.24 Even if the third-party did not have actual authority
to consent to the search, a police officer may rely on a reasonable belief that the third-party had
authority to consent.25 If police conduct a warrantless search based on consent, the scope of their
search must be limited to the terms of the individual’s consent—what a typical reasonable person
would have understood by the exchange between the officer and the occupant.26 Police who
have been provided consent only to “enter” or “check the residence for suspects” may not
possess consent to search the entire premises.27
1.
Disputed Consent.
In 42 complaints, almost a quarter of the 174
substantiated cases of premises entry and search, civilians and officers disputed whether consent
was given. Officers alleged that civilians consented to their entry, either explicitly with words or
implicitly by actions such as opening the door and stepping aside, or gesturing in a manner that
indicated consent. The officers did not record the civilians’ consent on a Department consent to
search form. In contrast, civilians claimed that the officers never asked for consent before
entering, or entered despite their clear, vocal refusal. In a large number of these situations, the
CCRB must unsubstantiate the case because there is no preponderance of the evidence that
resolves the direct dispute between the civilian and the officer over the issue of consent. In some
cases, however, the CCRB possesses sufficient evidence to find that the civilian did not provide
consent, leading to a conclusion that officers improperly entered or searched the premises.
Officers in substantiated cases of improper entry and search often enter homes over a
civilian’s protests in order to arrest a crime suspect, even where they do not have a warrant.
Though an officer’s claim that the civilian consented may obscure the legality of their conduct in
some cases, contemporaneous evidence can corroborate the civilian’s refusal. In a 2013 incident,
a man was awoken in his home in the morning by banging on his front door and ringing of his
doorbell. When he opened the front door of his house, he encountered an officer pointing his
gun at him and asking him to step outside. Police had tracked the signal of a stolen cell phone to
his backyard, where they recovered the phone from a BBQ grill. Two officers and a sergeant
from an Anti-Crime unit accused the man’s son of stealing the phone and sought permission to
See, e.g., People v. Gonzalez, 39 N.Y.2d 122 (1976); People v. Matta, 76 A.D.2d 844 (2d Dep’t 1980).
Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 (1968).
23
See, e.g., People v. Bowers, 15 Misc.3d 760 (Sup. Ct., Kings Co. 2007).
24
Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103 (2006).
25
Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177 (1990); People v. Adams, 53 N.Y.2d 1 (1981).
26
People v. Gomez, 5 N.Y.3d 416 (2005).
27
See, e.g., People v. O’Neill, 11 N.Y.2d 148 (1962); People v. Flores, 181 A.D.2d 570 (1st Dep’t 1992); People v.
Jimenez, 163 Misc. 2d 30 (N.Y. Crim. Ct. 1994).
21
22

27

search his home for his son. The man said his son was at basketball practice. One officer
responded, “You’re f---ing lying,” and then said “I can do anything I want,” when the man
refused to allow the officers in his house. One officer walked inside the house with his gun
drawn, where he encountered the man’s daughter and five-year-old son. The officers claimed
that the daughter provided them consent to search the house, while the daughter said the officers
did not ask for permission nor did she provide consent. The officers searched the second and
third floors of the house, along with bedrooms and bathrooms, but did not find the son. The
sergeant forced the man to wait outside in his boxers in the rain until the crime victim could pass
by in a patrol car and make an identification. Once the crime victim confirmed that the man did
not steal the phone, he was allowed back inside his home. At that point, officers noticed
surveillance cameras around the house, and requested permission to view the footage. The man
refused to show the footage to the sergeant because of his attitude, but did show it to a lieutenant
who arrived later. The footage confirmed that an unknown person hid the cell phone in the
man’s backyard, and corroborated the man’s account of events.28
In a 2012 incident, officers claimed that a civilian consented to their entry into her
apartment to look for the subject of an investigation card. The CCRB credited the civilian’s
statement that she refused consent, since a 911 call she made while the officers were in her
apartment documented her saying that the officers did not have an arrest or search warrant for
anyone inside the apartment, and once connected to the NYPD’s Internal Affairs Bureau
(“IAB”), she was recorded stating that the officers entered her apartment without her consent.
In several instances, officers executing a warrant at a home have claimed that a resident
consented to entry—which would serve an alternative basis for lawful entry even if there were
defects in the warrant. For example, in a June 2014 incident, a lieutenant and several officers in
plainclothes from a Warrant Squad knocked on the door of the complainant’s apartment in a
NYCHA building at 6:00 a.m. while conducting a warrant sweep. The officers possessed an
arrest warrant issued in November 2013 for an individual that listed the complainant’s address.
The officers conducted no investigation prior to the warrant sweep to determine whether the
suspect still lived at address on the 8-month-old warrant. When the complainant opened her
door, she told the officers that the individual they sought did not live in her apartment. Officers
claimed that the complainant stepped away from the door and allowed them in when they asked
if they take a look around her apartment. The complainant alleged that she told the officers they
needed a search warrant to enter her apartment, refused to allow them into her apartment, and
that the officers pushed their way in anyway. The officers threatened to arrest her and her son
when they became angry and combative at the officers who entered. The 911 call made by the
The surveillance video also contradicted the sergeant’s attempt to minimize his involvement in the incident by
claiming that, by the time he arrived at the man’s front door, his two subordinate officers had already gone inside the
home. The video showed the sergeant closing the door after one officer entered the man’s home, and opening the
door to allow another officer to enter. The CCRB noted and referred a “false official statement” to IAB for further
investigation. The sergeant also told the CCRB that, throughout the one hour he was present at the home, the
officers never discussed obtaining a search warrant.
28

28

complainant during the officers’ search of her bedroom corroborated her refusal of consent,
documenting her saying, “I want badge numbers . . . you’re supposed to have a search warrant,
not an arrest warrant . . . that’s a f---ing arrest warrant.”
In a 2013 incident, a civilian was woken at 7:30 a.m. by loud banging on her door by
members of the Intelligence Division who were looking for the male subject of an arrest warrant.
When she asked the officers if they had a warrant, they told her it could not be shown because of
“ongoing investigation.” She argued with the officers about a warrant until one officer put his
foot inside her doorway, pushed her out of the way, and told other officers to search her entire
home. As the officers searched her home, the resident told them, “You’ve entered my home.
You still haven’t shown me a warrant.” One officer said to her, “Give me your ID so I can have
some kind of verification.” At this, the resident responded, “What do you need my ID for? This
is my household. You came to my house like you knew what you were coming here for. You’re
searching my house, you pushed me out of the way, you’re telling me you’re going to arrest me
because I’m asking you for a warrant, which I have the right to ask for. If you want to come to
my household, you have to have a warrant.” The resident, nervous, shaking and crying, retrieved
her cell phone to call a relative for assistance. An officer snatched the cell phone out of her hand
so she couldn’t make a call, leaving bruises on her hand. Officers eventually left the home
without showing her a warrant. The resident said during her CCRB interview, “Still to this day I
don’t know what they came to my house for, [I] don’t know if they’re going to come back
again.” The sergeant that executed the warrant explained during his CCRB interview that he was
assisting the gang squad to conduct a “case takedown.” He had received an arrest warrant for
suspect and a list of addresses where he should look for him. The police connected the suspect
to the civilian’s apartment based only on the fact that the suspect’s brother had used the
civilian’s address, among eight other addresses, as that of a family member six months prior to
the incident.29 The sergeant claimed that the civilian was friendly, invited the officers in by
opening the door fully and stepping out of the way, and provided verbal consent to search her
apartment. He denied telling the civilian that he could not show the warrant to her, but
acknowledged that he did not know if he was obligated to do so if she asked. The CCRB credited
the civilian’s testimony based on discrepancies among the officers’ accounts.
2.
Consent to search Form. Although officers alleged that civilians
provided consent in 42 substantiated complaints (24% of the 174 substantiated complaints of
premises entry and search), these officers did not attempt to use the Department’s consent to
search form. Of these 42 complaints, 20 incidents (11% of the 174 substantiated complaints of
premises entry and search) were ones in which officers were assigned to the Detective Bureau or
commands reporting to OCCB, and therefore required to use the form.30 As a first step, officers
The officers did not possess a search warrant that authorized entry into the resident’s home. The sergeant also
stated that he was unsure whether he was required to complete a consent to search form under these circumstances.
30
The CCRB has cited officers for “Other Misconduct” for the failure to obtain a signed consent to search form in
only two incidents. One case involved a sergeant assigned to the Intelligence Division’s Criminal Intelligence
29

29

required to use the form should be retrained to remind them of their obligations under the
Department’s Operations Order. As for other officers who are not required by the Operations
Order to use the form, the Department should expand its policy to require all officers to use the
consent to search form absent exigent or emergency circumstances. Had the consent to search
form been presented and signed by the civilian prior to the entry or search, it may have
exonerated officers from subsequent allegations of misconduct.
Apart from cases involving disputed consent, officers in two incidents attempted to use
the consent to search form. In both cases, officers sought an occupant’s signature on the form
after they had already entered a residence, suggesting that they intended the form to cure prior
improper conduct. Indeed, one narcotics officer stated that, in his experience, consent to search
forms are filled out after narcotics are found. In a 2014 incident, members of a Conditions Team
responded to a radio run of a burglary in progress at a two-family home. Surveillance video
from the first floor hallway shows the officers knocking on the first-floor tenant’s door, the
tenant exiting his apartment into the hallway, and officers frisking him. Officers then placed the
tenant in handcuffs and left him in the hallway while they entered his apartment and remained
inside for several minutes. In contrast to the video, the Special Operations lieutenant told the
CCRB that he entered the tenant’s apartment to arrest him inside it. While inside, he saw four
police radios in plain view, which he seized and used as the basis for a criminal charge of
criminal possession of stolen property. After these items were found, the lieutenant presented
the consent to search form to the tenant, who refused to sign it. The radios were never inspected,
and the related criminal charges were dropped. The CCRB found that the officers did not have a
basis to enter the apartment, given that surveillance video showed the tenant arrested and
handcuffed outside of the apartment by the time the lieutenant arrived on the scene.31
In another case, officers arrested a young man for a drug-related crime, took him to the
precinct, and allegedly obtained his consent to use his house keys to enter and search his home
for drugs. Officers used the keys to enter his home, but encountered the young man’s mother
inside, who unequivocally refused to sign a consent to search form allowing the officers to
search her apartment.32 The mother stated that officers pressed her repeatedly to sign the form
and said “Goddamn it, you f---ing Haitian, just do it.” Even after a Haitian-Creole-speaking
officer arrived at her apartment and spoke to her, the mother refused to sign the form.
Eventually the officers left without searching the apartment.
Only one of the 174 complaints of substantiated entry and search involved a signed
consent to search form. Officers from an Anti-Crime unit stopped a civilian for a traffic
Section, while the other involved a detective who obtained a handwritten note signed by a resident—but not signed
by any other officer—purporting to consent to search of a bedroom.
31
The CCRB referred the lieutenant, whose statement to the CCRB was clearly contradicted by video footage, to
IAB for further investigation of a “false official statement.”
32
The CCRB analyzed any consent given by this young man at the precinct and concluded it was involuntary
because he was in custody and being debriefed when officers procured the consent. Notably, the officers did not
document the consent on a consent to search form, even though they presented one to his mother at the apartment.

30

infraction, searched his car and frisked him, leading to substantiated allegations of an improper
vehicle search and frisk. The officers alleged that, during the encounter, the civilian told them
that he had a gun at his home.33 The officers procured a signed consent to search form from the
civilian at the precinct, which the CCRB found to be coerced since the individual signed it while
under arrest, in the presence of three officers in the precinct, with the implicit understanding that,
if he did not sign, he would not be released until after Christmas (two days away).
3.
Coerced Consent. In 19 of the 174 (11%) substantiated improper entry
and/or search complaints, the CCRB found that the NYPD used coercion to obtain a civilian’s
consent. That coercion rendered the consent involuntary and invalid. Police coercion took
several forms, including misrepresentations that the police possessed a valid warrant authorizing
entry, threats to arrest or to destroy property if an occupant did not consent to entry, and police
intimidation or force.
a. Misrepresentation: In three cases of coerced consent, the CCRB found
that officers used open warrants issued years before the incident and represented to residents of
apartments that those warrants authorized entry into the apartment, though officers performed no
investigation to form a reasonable belief that the subjects of the warrant resided in the apartment.
The CCRB found that, even accepting the officers’ representation that the residents provided
consent for entry, such consent would be invalid.
In a 2013 incident, a woman and her autistic son were home at 8 a.m. when officers
arrived and entered, telling her that they had a warrant. According to the woman, officers would
not show her the paper they held, but asked her whether two men were in her home. The woman
told the officers that one of the men had been incarcerated for several years, while the other man
was her daughter’s ex-boyfriend. At the conclusion of the officers’ search, the woman asked for
a business card, but one officer said, “don’t give her sh-t,” and left the apartment. The officers,
in contrast, claimed the woman had provided them consent to enter and search her apartment.
Officers possessed a bench warrant issued seven years prior to the incident for riding a bike on a
sidewalk, but admitted that they conducted no investigation about the warrant or the current
residence of the warrant subject prior to the incident. A quick search of the federal Bureau of
Prisons website would have confirmed that the subject had been incarcerated for several years.
The warrant did not provide a basis for the officers to enter the home because the officers did not
possess a reasonable belief that the subject of the warrant still resided in the home. Any consent
provided by the woman was therefore improper, as it was based on the officers’ improper
representation that they were authorized to enter.

33

The officers also alleged that the civilian tried to punch a female officer while he was standing at the rear of his
vehicle, but the civilian was never charged with that crime. The civilian was ultimately given a disorderly conduct
summons and released. One of the officers also claimed during his CCRB interview that he had never searched the
civilian’s home, in contrast to two fellow officer statements confirming that he did. The CCRB referred that
statement to IAB for further investigation as a “false official statement.”

31

b. Threats and Intimidation: Police officers have threatened civilians—
with arrest, eviction, damage, force, or to call ACS—in order to obtain their consent to enter and
search their homes. Such threats, made without probable cause and exigent circumstances to
support an arrest, entry, or search, are improper. In several cases, officers, including ESU teams,
have threatened to break an apartment door down if the occupants did not open it. In a 2014
case, a civilian owned a building with a barbershop and money transfer business on the ground
floor, and his apartment on the second floor. Officers assigned to Conditions entered the
barbershop and the closed-off area of the money transfer business to search for a gun, and also
frisked the occupants. The shop owner asked the sergeant, who had no badge, what was going
on and was told to “shut the f--- up.” Officers threatened to “trash the place” if they were not
taken up to the second floor apartment to view footage from surveillance cameras recording
activities on the ground floor. Eventually one individual took them to the upstairs apartment
because he felt that “things would only get worse” if he did not. The shop owner filed a CCRB
complaint because the officers had “no search warrant” and “violated his rights.” The CCRB
found that consent to search was coerced, in that police acted in an intimidating fashion by
cursing at and pressuring the civilians into allowing access.
A civilian in a 2013 case provided consent after officers improperly threatened to arrest
his sister without probable cause to do so. Two officers from a street narcotics enforcement unit
saw a man smoking what appeared to be marijuana outside of a fenced backyard. Upon seeing
the officers, the man ran into a backyard and then into a house. The officers pursued him, and
found themselves at a Fourth of July barbeque with numerous civilians. The occupant of the
house refused entry without a warrant. A lieutenant arrived on the scene and told the occupant,
“As far as I’m concerned, he ran in and you’re gonna get arrested if you don’t…” The resident
responded, “I’m not getting arrested.” The lieutenant repeated, “Yea, you are. You are. It’s either
him or you.” The resident again responded, “I can’t give you something that’s not here… I’m not
obstructing anything.” And again the lieutenant said, “You’re obstructing the officers from going
in the house.” At this point, the resident’s brother stepped in and provided permission for the
officers to enter, given their threats to arrest his sister. The CCRB found that this consent, given
in response to an improper threat to arrest the civilian, was coerced.34
Even where threats are not explicit and verbal, officers, by their very presence, can create
an intimidating and coercive atmosphere. For example, officers in one incident arrived at an
apartment building after 1 a.m. to search for the perpetrator of a kidnapping. By this point, the
kidnapping victim had been released and gave the officers equivocal descriptions of where and
34

At most, the officers in this situation possessed reasonable suspicion to stop the individual who they observed
smoking what appeared to be a marijuana cigarette. Reasonable suspicion may allow an officer to pursue an
individual in a public place, but does not provide probable cause to pursue an individual into a private home under
the hot pursuit doctrine. Further, given the lack of probable cause to make an arrest, the officers did not have
exigent circumstances to justify a warrantless entry. Therefore, the officers’ threat to arrest the homeowner for
refusing their entry was improper. See People v. Rodriquez, 19 Misc. 3d 302 (Crim. Ct. N.Y. County 2008)
(individuals have right to refuse unlawful entry by police).

32

by whom he was held. Officers tracked the crime victim’s phone signal to the building but not to
any particular apartment. They knocked on multiple doors in the building, seeking consent to
enter and search the apartments. One resident, encountering 12 to 15 officers, agreed to allow
officers inside his apartment because he was afraid he would look like the “bad guy” if he
refused.
In a similar case, officers investigating a burglary at a shelter knocked on several doors
and sought to enter and search the rooms of the shelter residents in order to find the stolen
property. When one resident stated that he did not want the officers to enter, the officers
persisted. The resident did not physically block the officers from entering the room because he
did not want the situation to escalate. Officers searched his closet, under his bed, and opened his
cabinets. The CCRB found that, under the circumstances, the civilian did not provide voluntary
consent.
Other instances of coerced consent involved custodial situations. In one, a civilian awoke
in his bedroom at 3:00 a.m. to find officers from an Anti-Crime unit surrounding him, cuffing
him, and then asking for consent to search his room for a gun. Officers apparently focused in on
this civilian because of a tip that he had a gun from another individual they arrested. The civilian
granted consent, believing he had no choice. The officers told the civilian that he had an open
warrant for drinking in public, but then left without arresting him. The CCRB found that consent
was involuntary since it was given while the civilian was handcuffed, in his bedroom, and with a
search seemingly already underway.
c. Police force: In a few cases, officers secured consent by using physical
and other displays of force. Police in one recent case arrived at a resident’s apartment seeking to
arrest her boyfriend. The resident alleged that, after she refused to allow the officers inside her
apartment, the officers banged on her door for forty minutes, kicked the door, and used
screwdriver to pry the door open. The officers, while denying that they forced opened the door,
admitted to knocking on the door for thirty minutes until the resident finally opened the door, left
it open, and walked to the couch, implicitly providing them consent to enter. The CCRB found
that, even if the officers’ account of events was accepted, any consent provided by the resident
was coerced as it was provided after the officers banged continuously on her door for thirty
minutes. In two very similar cases, the CCRB found consent invalid due to police intimidation
and force where officers admitted to knocking on door sufficiently hard and long enough so that
the peephole fell out of the door, after which, according to the officers, an occupant opened the
door and granted access to the apartment.35 In another case, the CCRB found that, even
accepting an officer’s claim that a resident had implicitly allowed him access into her home by

In describing why the officers were at her apartment, the occupant stated, “I have no idea. They took my son.
They didn’t even mention to me, have the decency to say, oh ma’am we’ll get in touch with you . . . when I got in
touch with Detective [x], he said he’d get back to me, but he never did. . . . Finally I got the district attorney number
. . . she looked into it, and they claimed that I opened the door to them, but the door was already busted.”
35

33

failing to verbally object to his presence, such consent was not truly voluntary since the officer
had encountered the resident after entering her home with his gun drawn.
4.
Third Party Consent. In three substantiated complaints, officers gained
consent to enter or search a private area from a person who was not authorized to provide that
consent. The cases involved officers entering and searching private rooms in single-residence
occupancy buildings (SROs), homeless shelters, and transitional or supporting housing
arrangements. Even though the residents of these buildings did not have traditional house or
apartment building arrangements, they still possessed a reasonable expectation of privacy in their
private rooms. The CCRB found that, under the circumstances, officers did not obtain valid
consent to enter the tenant’s apartment from a landlord or management company.
A 2014 case arose from a 911 call by a resident of a Brooklyn shelter who complained
that his television and video game system had been stolen from his room.36 The shelter consisted
of private single rooms for residents with shared bathrooms. The subject officers stated that they
responded to the 911 call and spoke to the shelter’s security guard, who told them that the
building policy was for officers to “check” every resident’s room when something goes missing,
and that the building manager wanted the officers to check the rooms. One subject officer
acknowledged that he did not request documentation of this policy, did not call the building
manager to confirm it, and had no previous experience at this particular shelter. He understood
the policy to require him to enter any occupant’s room, even if they objected to it. He
acknowledged that, though the complainant “probably said explicitly that he did not want the
officers to enter,” he did so anyway. During his CCRB interview, the security guard stated that
he did not know if the building had a policy allowing officers to enter residents’ rooms, and did
not recall telling the officers about such a policy. The CCRB was unable to determine whether
such a policy existed, noted that the officers had made no attempts to verify the existence of such
a policy, and cited People v. Ponto, 103 A.D.2d 573 (2d Dep’t 1984), to find that, even if such a
policy existed, lessors cannot consent to a search of their lessees’ premises.
In a 2011 case, officers tracked the signal of a stolen cell phone to a block where a
supportive housing building was located. With the assistance of the receptionist who worked at
the building, they reviewed video footage that showed the complainant exiting and entering the
building with her friend, and alleged that the complainant and her friend matched the description
of the suspects who stole the phone. When officers did not receive an answer at the
complainant’s room, they instructed the receptionist to open the door with the master key, then
instructed the complainant to remove the chain to the door, after which they entered and searched
the room. They did not find the cell phone, and thereafter pressured the receptionist into using
36

The other officer who conducted the entries and searches, perhaps aware that their conduct was improper, denied
entering or searching any of the residents’ rooms. Given clear statements to the contrary by his partner, the security
guard, and civilian witnesses, the CCRB noted “Other Misconduct” and referred the officer for further investigation
of a false official statement.

34

her master key to open the door of a different tenant, so that they could enter and search his
room. The receptionist stated that the sergeant told her his actions were authorized by a “24 hour
protocol.” The sergeant on the scene alleged that he spoke to the building administrator, who
said they controlled the tenants’ rooms and allowed him to wake up the tenants. The sergeant
could not remember if the administrator authorized him to actually enter the tenants’ rooms. He
denied entering and searching any of the rooms. The CCRB found that the officers entered the
tenants’ rooms without probable cause or consent to do so.
5.
Dwelling Entered/Searched Beyond Scope of Consent. In a small
number of substantiated complaints, the CCRB found that, while civilians may have consented to
an initial entry into their premises, the subject officers entered or searched areas beyond the
scope authorized by the civilian’s consent. In a 2014 case, three officers arrived at a home
looking for the subject of a domestic violence complaint. The officers stated that they spoke to
the homeowner in his driveway outside the home, asked whether the suspect lived in his home,
and were allowed to enter the home behind the owner as he went inside to retrieve a list of his
tenants in the home. The homeowner, also the complainant, contended that he never consented
to the officers’ initial entry, and the propriety of the initial entry could not be determined by the
CCRB. However, the CCRB determined that the officers’ decision to go up to the second floor
of the house, upon hearing a “movement,” and then to open the closed door to a front bedroom,
were unauthorized by an initial consent provided by the owner.
In a 2011 case, a mother of a teenage boy called the police after she got into an argument
with her son and he ran away. The responding officers asked to be taken to the son’s bedroom,
and searched the closet and dresser drawers. The officers then asked to be shown the mother’s
bedroom and then apartment bathroom, both of which they entered and searched even though the
mother objected to their actions. The officers admitted to searching the entire apartment,
including looking for drugs in a dresser drawer and searching closets. Their sergeant contended
that standard procedure when responding to report of a missing person is to search the person’s
residence, but only places that could fit a person. The CCRB found that, while the mother
consented to the officers’ entry, she did not consent to the scope of their actions within the
apartment, including the full-blown search of bedrooms and bathroom.

B. No Exigent or Emergency Circumstances Justify Warrantless Entry
CCRB complaints often involve situations where officers arrive at an individual’s home
to investigate previously-filed crime complaints, to respond to calls of crimes in progress, noise
complaints, tips of firearms or weapons inside premises, apprehension of individuals involved in
narcotics sales, and calls of emotionally-disturbed people or other public safety issues. In
addressing these issues, the emergency or exigent circumstances doctrine can justify an officer’s
immediate entry and search of a residence despite having no warrant to do so. The application of
this doctrine often turns on the reason why officers are present at a location, as well as the

35

reasons that officers articulate for entering a premises without a valid warrant. Based on its
review of the substantiated cases involving relevant situations, the CCRB offers the
following recommendations:
1) The NYPD should require, as part of its body-worn camera program, officers
to document the conditions that support a warrantless entry of premises due to
exigent or emergency circumstances.
2) The NYPD Patrol Guide should be revised to include the legal standards for
exigent or emergency circumstances in the context of entries at homes and
businesses.
3) The NYPD Police Student’s Guide and other training material should be
revised to explicitly state that entries to investigate crimes and complaints at
homes need a warrant, absent consent or exigent or emergency circumstances.
Training materials should provide examples of what constitutes an exigent or
emergency circumstance, and what does NOT constitute an exigent or
emergency circumstance. Routine investigations of crimes that have already
occurred and are not currently in progress at that time generally do not
provide exigent circumstances to enter residences.
4) Patrol officers, along with officers assigned to narcotics commands and street
narcotics units, should receive training on the situations that permit pursuit of
an individual into a home on less than probable cause.
5) Officers should receive a roll call announcement on the requirements of Patrol
Guide 214-23, and the standards for entry into a home to correct a noise
violation.
To examine in detail why the exigent circumstances doctrine did not excuse warrantless
entry, substantiated complaints were categorized according to the type of situation that brought
officers to a particular location (Figure 6). Next, the CCRB reviewed the facts of the particular
encounter to analyze why the exigent circumstances doctrine did not excuse an officers’ entry.
To analyze how officers understood and applied the emergency circumstances doctrine, the
CCRB reviewed complaints where officers responded to a location because of an emergency,
public safety issue, or crime-in-progress, or articulated during their CCRB interview that they
entered a location because they believed individuals inside were in distress.

36

Figure 6: Exigent or Emergency Circumstances Issues in Substantiated Entry and Search
Complaints
Reason for Officer Presence at Location in Cases
where Exigent or Emergency Circumstances
Were a Factor
Officers arrive at location to investigate crimes such as
harassment, domestic violence complaints, larceny or
burglary, or minor crimes and violations; to apprehend
subjects of Investigation Cards or warrants37; to enforce
custody orders; to assist with landlord-tenant disputes.
Officers arrive at location to investigate narcotics-related
crime, or to apprehend individual involved in narcotics
buy-and-bust operation or observation sale.
Officers arrive at location to investigate complaint of shots
fired or shooting, or to search for gun on premises.
Officers arrive at location to address emergency call or
articulate belief that individual inside premises is in
distress.
Officers arrive at location to address noise violation.

Number of
Substantiated
Complaints

Percentage of 174
Substantiated
Complaints of
Entry and Search

69

40%

33

19%

15

9%

13

7%

6

3%

In examining entries made in order to arrest an individual, CCRB investigators determine
whether officers possessed probable cause and exigent circumstances by an assessment of the
following factors:
(1) the gravity or violent nature of the offense; (2) whether there is reason to
believe the suspect is armed; (3) whether there is a reliable basis for believing the
suspect is in the premises at issue; (4) whether there is probable cause to believe
that the suspect committed the crime; (5) the likelihood that the suspect will
escape if not quickly apprehended; and (6) the time of day of the entry and
whether the entry was peaceful in nature.38
In the context of entries to search for and seize evidence, officers are permitted to make a
warrantless entry to prevent the imminent use of a dangerous weapon, such as a gun.39 Officers
are also permitted to enter to prevent the potential destruction or removal of fruits of a crime
37

Certain substantiated cases involved the presence of a warrant that, according to the CCRB, did not permit entry
or search of the premises. In these cases, the CCRB analyzed whether exigent circumstances would permit the entry
or search despite the lack of a valid warrant.
38
People v. McBride, 14 N.Y.3d 440, 446 (2010).
39
People v. Doerbecker, 39 N.Y.2d 448 (1976).

37

where they do not have the time to obtain a warrant. In these cases, exigency is determined by
reviewing the following factors: (1) the nature and degree of urgency involved and the amount of
time needed to obtain a warrant; (2) a reasonable belief that the contraband is about to be
removed; (3) the possibility of danger to officers guarding the site of contraband while a warrant
is sought; (4) information indicating that the possessors of the contraband are aware that police
are on their trail; and (5) the ease with which the contraband can be destroyed.40 Information
that a gun is located inside an apartment, without more, may not serve as exigent
circumstances.41 In addition, the fact that contraband may be easily disposed of, in and of its
self, is not a predicate for exigency.42
Police officers can also make an entry without a valid warrant under the “emergencies
doctrine” to protect individuals in distress, to assist victims of crimes that have just occurred, or
to investigate signs of impending danger. Courts have focused on the following factors in
determining whether an emergency justifies warrantless entry: (1) there are reasonable grounds
to believe that there is an emergency at hand and an immediate need for police assistance to
protect life or property; (2) the search is not primarily motivated by an intent to arrest and seize
evidence; and (3) there is some reasonable basis to associate the emergency with the area or
property to be searched.43 Thus, police are permitted to enter residences without a warrant to
locate or aid possible victims of a reported crime, when they respond to a call involving a
domestic dispute, shots fired in the location, or other crime-in-progress inside the apartment,
when there has been a report regarding an emotionally disturbed person, and to investigate
strange odors or other hazardous conditions.44 Any search that results from such an entry should
be related to the emergency itself.
1.
Apprehension or Investigation Cases. When officers arrive at a location
to investigate a crime complaint or apprehend a suspect, the CCRB will examine whether exigent
circumstances justified the officers’ entry or search of the residence. The CCRB concludes that
exigent circumstances do not exist to justify warrantless entry if there is no urgent need to enter,
as determined by the McBride factors. For example, in one recent 2015 incident, a woman was
sleeping in her home at approximately 6 a.m. when a captain and officer knocked on her door.
When she opened it, officers entered her apartment and arrested her son for an open domestic
violence complaint. Not only did the officers fail to articulate any exigency for apprehending her
son without first obtaining an arrest warrant, one officer noted that they were carrying out a
weekly “domestic violence initiative” where they would go to the homes of individuals with
open domestic violence complaints early in the morning to try and apprehend them.
People v. Lewis, 94 A.D.2d 44, 49 (1st Dep’t 1983).
Matter of Kwok T., 43 N.Y.2d 213 (1977).
42
People v. Knapp, 52 N.Y.2d 689 (1981).
43
People v Mitchell, 39 N.Y.2d 173, 177-78 (1976).
44
See, e.g., People v. Salazar, 290 A.D.2d 256 (1st Dep’t 2002); People v. DePaula, 179 A.D.2d 424 (1st Dep’t
1992).
40
41

38

Key to the urgency for an officer’s immediate, warrantless entry is whether the suspect in
the apartment is armed or will flee. Officers in several cases lacked any indication that these
facts were present. In a 2014 case, officers responded to a call regarding a domestic dispute in
an apartment building. They encountered a woman outside the apartment, who stated that her
boyfriend hit her in the face and remained in the apartment. The man refused to open his door,
so officers broke the lock and entered the apartment with their guns drawn. The CCRB found
that, under the circumstances, exigent circumstances were not present since there was no
indication that the man would escape or was armed, and the officers entered the apartment using
physical force. Other cases involved domestic violence incidents or assaults where the crime
victims were not in the residence, and officers did not need to enter the apartment immediately
and without a warrant to apprehend suspects. In other cases, occupants consented to an officer’s
initial, warrantless entry, but did not provide consent for the officer’s subsequent search, and no
exigency required a warrantless search for contraband or evidence.
Finally, the criminal conduct at issue in several other cases was not serious enough to
justify a warrantless entry for an individual’s arrest. Situations where officers entered
apartments to arrest occupants included alleged crimes of vandalism, stolen phones, tablets, or
other electronic devices, and trespassing. In a 2014 incident, patrol officers responding to a call
spoke to a woman who alleged that her neighbor keyed her vehicle. The officers and the woman
went to the neighbor’s apartment together. After the neighbor’s mother opened the door, the
woman identified the neighbor inside the apartment as the one who had keyed her car. During
his CCRB interview, one patrol officer admitted telling the mother that “we could enter,” and
that “she could be arrested for obstructing government . . . for keeping us [from] getting to her
child to be arrested. That process would lead to making phone calls and since there were young
children, ACS would be involved.” The mother refused to allow the officers entry, but once a
sergeant arrived on the scene, the officer used the mother’s distraction to enter the apartment and
handcuff her daughter. The CCRB found that exigent circumstances did not exist to justify the
officer’s warrantless entry into the apartment to arrest for the minor crime of criminal mischief.
2.
Narcotics Cases. 33 substantiated complaints (19%) of the 174
substantiated premises entry and search complaints involved police officers engaged in narcotics
investigations. Officers frequently conduct investigations of the sale and use of controlled
substances in and around apartment buildings and homes. Many of the substantiated premise
entry and search complaints arise out of these investigations of drug sales, “kite” complaints, and
specialized narcotics operations. Narcotics cases are analyzed in light of applicable case law and
the officers’ belief that presence of drugs justifies their immediate and warrantless entry and
search of a private home. In substantiated cases involving drugs, the CCRB found no exigent
circumstances to justify warrantless entry given the lack of probable cause associated with the
location or the individual sought, the low likelihood that the suspect would flee, or the minor
nature of the crime.

39

a. Kite Locations.
16 substantiated complaints (9%) of the 174
substantiated complaints of premises entry and search related to incidents where officers stated
they arrived at a location because of multiple past complaints regarding drug-related activity at
the location—also known as a “kite” complaint or location. One detective from a Brooklyn
Narcotics Squad was the subject officer in two substantiated incidents involving “kite” locations.
In the first one, the detective told the CCRB that he had an arrangement with an elderly resident
of an apartment that was frequently “taken over” by other individuals who used it to sell drugs.
Every month, the detective would go to the apartment and check in on the resident; if the resident
provided him a code word, the detective would enter the apartment and arrest the individuals
engaged in drug sales. The detective went to the apartment one day, where he encountered a
new tenant. The tenant alleged that this detective, along with two other officers in plainclothes,
knocked on the door, gave a false name, and pushed past him when he opened the door. The
detective then allegedly punched the tenant in the chest twice, and demanded to know about
drugs and money in the apartment. After the tenant persuaded the officers that he legally resided
in the apartment, they left; the tenant immediately called 911.
In the second case, the same detective, along with other members of the narcotics team,
went to a kite location at night. One of the residents stated that, as he was leaving the two-story
house, he opened the front door to find several officers outside, who pushed and punched him in
the mouth. The officers searched the second floor of the house, finding marijuana on top of a
television and arresting the two occupants upstairs. In contrast, the officers from the narcotics
team stated that they had received information that narcotics were being sold out of the home, so
they went there to conduct an observation, knock on the front door, and obtain the name of the
person who lived inside. They did not obtain a search warrant because, according to the officers,
they did not intend to enter the building. When a detective knocked on the front door, he
claimed to see an individual holding a clear sandwich bag containing crack cocaine. The
detectives entered the hallway of the building and tackled the individual to the ground.
According to the officers, the two occupants upstairs walked downstairs on their own and were
arrested. Two officers denied searching the upstairs apartment. The CCRB rejected the
detectives’ claim that they observed a clear plastic bag containing cocaine because the house had
no electricity, and all officers described available light as poor or nonexistent (except when it
came to identifying narcotics). Further, the CCRB found that the officers searched the upstairs
apartment and there found the marijuana that served as the basis of the civilians’ arrests, because
one officer confirmed that the occupants upstairs were escorted downstairs by other officers.45

The CCRB referred the detective involved in both “kite location” incidents to IAB for further investigation of a
“false official statement” when he claimed that the two occupants upstairs walked downstairs by themselves. His
statement contradicted the consistent, plausible testimony of other officers and the upstairs occupants. Another
detective involved in this incident was also referred to IAB for investigation of a “false official statement,” because
she omitted crucial information from her memo book at the CCRB interview in order to minimize her presence
inside the home and her involvement in the improper entry and search.
45

40

b. Buy-and-bust operations. Another set of substantiated cases arises from
narcotics buy-and-bust operations. In these operations, narcotics officers work as a team. An
undercover officer purchases drugs, and is trailed by a ghosting officer, whose ensures the
undercover is safe. If the undercover buys drugs, the undercover may make a pre-planned
physical movement (positive buy sign) to indicate to the ghost officer that the purchase was
successful. The ghost or undercover will radio or relay a description of the seller to a back-up
team, which then converges on the seller’s location to arrest the seller. In 8 of 174 substantiated
complaints of premises entry and search (5%), officers entered apartments and homes in order to
search for and arrest the person they believed to be the seller in a narcotics buy-and-bust
operation. In these cases, exigent circumstances did not justify the officers’ entry because
officers lacked probable cause to tie the apartment entered to the drug sale, or that the individual
was armed or would flee.
Three substantiated CCRB complaints involved officers entering the wrong apartment in
search of the seller in a buy-and-bust operation. In one serious case, an undercover officer went
inside an apartment building with two individuals, and then exited and made a positive buy sign.
One of the individuals who accompanied the undercover was later arrested outside the building,
while the other individual remained inside. The ghost officer decided to enter the building with
the field team, using information provided by an officer in the prisoner van about the apartment
where the remaining individual was located. The ghost knocked on the apartment door, and
claimed “J” had been hit by a car. The ghost admitted during his CCRB interview that, at this
point, he did not have probable cause to arrest the individual. When a man opened the door, the
ghost was “95%” positive it was the same man because both wore a do-rag. The ghost officer
tried to pull the man out of the apartment, but was instead pulled inside the apartment when the
man retreated. Two pitbulls lunged towards officers, who shot and killed the dogs. The man and
a female resident were arrested, though neither were the ones sought by the officers.
In another case, officers conducted a “buy and walk” operation where an undercover
purchased drugs from a man and woman, but the officers did not immediately arrest the couple.
Instead, officers arrived at the couple’s apartment approximately one month later, and knocked
on the door. When the woman opened the door, the sergeant told the couple that he had a
warrant and entered the vestibule of the apartment to arrest them. The sergeant admitted during
his CCRB interview that he lied to the couple about possessing a warrant because he did not
want the couple to resist arrest. In addition, the sergeant stated that he did not need a warrant for
their arrest because they had been identified by the undercover officer on the team. This
statement indicates that the sergeant did not understand the need for a warrant to enter premises
in order to effect an arrest.
c. Observed drug sales. 6 substantiated complaints (3%) of the 174
substantiated complaints of premises entry and search arose from observed narcotics sales, where
officers witnessed a drug sale in public and then entered a residence in order to arrest the seller
or search for evidence. The CCRB found in these cases that the circumstances presented did not
41

justify a warrantless entry, since officers had time to obtain a warrant and did not need to enter
immediately to prevent the suspect’s flight or to prevent use of a weapon. In one case, officers
observed a man sell drugs to a woman in front of his house.46 Officers knocked on the door, and
when the man answered, the officers entered without consent and arrested him. Officers then
alleged that the man asked the officers to retrieve his shoes from his bedroom, and when they
went upstairs to do so, they saw marijuana in plain view. In one case, officers did not actually
observe a sale, but simply saw a man stepping on and off his stoop, which they thought
suspicious. Officers entered the vestibule of the home, a private area closed and locked to the
public, and searched the area for drugs. Similarly, in a case where officers arrested an individual
involved in a narcotics sale in the lobby of his apartment building, the CCRB found the officers’
subsequent entry into his apartment upstairs to search his bedroom was not justified by exigent
circumstances, in part because the individual was already in custody at that point.
In two related cases, officers sought to seize contraband after seeing it from a point
outside an apartment. No facts suggested that the contraband would be destroyed if the officers
did not enter the apartment immediately, or froze the location. In one, an Impact officer claimed
that he was on the roof of a building, looked down and saw through a bedroom window two
males packaging crack cocaine, which he recorded on his personal cell phone. The officer
further alleged that, after the men were stopped and detained outside of the apartment building,
he went up to the apartment, asked the men’s mother if he could enter, and she “did not appear
reluctant” to let them do so. After claiming to find “plenty of other narcotics,” including
marijuana, oxycodone and drug paraphernalia in the men’s bedroom, the officers ultimately
released the men without arrests or summons. The mother, on the other hand, claimed that she
repeatedly refused to allow the officers to enter her apartment and told them “you will only come
inside when you get the search warrant.” According to her, one officer said, “if you don’t let me
in and I obtain a search warrant, you and [your daughter] will be arrested, and ACS will be called
to take [your daughter’s] son away.” Officers walked in past her, despite her refusals. The CCRB
credited the mother’s account of the events given her contemporaneous video recording on the
officers’ search and her protests on her iPad.
3.
Firearms Cases. Reports regarding the presence of a firearm in a home
are among the most serious incidents requiring police response. As detailed in Section 6 below,
the CCRB exonerates numerous complaints where officers enter homes as part of their response
to a call about shots fired inside a particular location or a crime-in-progress involving a firearm.
The substantiated cases involving firearms are ones where officers received information
regarding the presence of a gun at a location, but the circumstances did justify their immediate
and warrantless entry and search for the gun. As the New York Court of Appeals has held, the

46

The CCRB noted Other Misconduct for a detective involved in this incident, who denied going upstairs, in light of
a fellow officer’s clear statement that the detective was upstairs when the bedroom was searched, along with the
civilian witness statement as well.

42

“mere fact that police have information that a weapon is located in a suspect’s apartment . . .
does not justify a warrantless entry.”47
In 4 substantiated complaints (2%) of the 174 substantiated complaints of premises entry
and search, officers received a tip from an identified person regarding the presence of a gun in or
outside a home. In one of these cases, officers from an Anti-Crime unit arrived at a home
without a warrant at approximately 12:30 a.m. based on a tip from a confidential informant that
two males inside a particular home had guns and drugs they were looking to “move.” The AntiCrime supervisor claimed that when he knocked on the door, both the husband and wife came to
the door and the wife gave the officers consent to “look around.” The 85-year-old husband, on
the other hand, said he came to the door, opened it, and several plainclothes officers “shoved me
back, I almost fell.” When he asked what was going on, he was told that someone had weapons
in the house. At this point, he returned to his bedroom to bring his “panicking” 81-year-old
wheelchair-bound wife to the front of the house, since she could not walk without assistance.
The husband asked the officers, “you got a search warrant or something like that for my house?”
The officers did not respond. The husband was particularly upset that the officers “got us up
outta bed at that time in the morning” even though they “weren’t chasing anyone.” The Board
panel found the homeowners’ account of the event more credible, and noted that the particular
circumstances—the late hour, the gun tip—required officers to possess a warrant.
In another case, an Anti-Crime unit alleged that the tenant of a house came to the precinct
and told officers that, at some point during the previous thirty-six hours, he fought with his
roommate and was told to leave the apartment. The tenant was afraid to return to the apartment
because his roommate possessed a gun. The lieutenant did not write down the name of the
tenant, but claimed he helped officers identify his roommate walking down the street. Two
officers stopped and frisked the roommate, but did not find a gun. The officers alleged that, even
though they told the roommate he could leave at any time, the roommate admitted to having a
firearm in his home, and took officers directly to a closet in his apartment where they recovered a
gun. The Board credited the roommate’s account that he had been stopped and arrested on the
street, and officers took his keys without consent to open his apartment door and search it.
In 3 substantiated complaints (2%) of the 174 substantiated complaints of premises entry
and search, officers responded to residential premises to apprehend the perpetrator of a crime
involving a gun, including a shooting, menacing, or robbery. In these cases, the CCRB will
examined the propriety of each action taken by the officers to address the exigency or
emergency. While initial steps to apprehend the perpetrator were exonerated, subsequent
searches for the gun inside a home without a warrant—after the perpetrator was in custody, and
the circumstances presented no ongoing or imminent danger—were substantiated as improper.
For example, in one case, the CCRB exonerated the officers’ initial entry into an apartment to
Matter of Kwok T., 43 N.Y.2d 213, 220-21 (1977); see also People v. Gibson, 117 A.D.3d 1317 (3d Dep’t 2014);
People v. Lott, 102 A.D.2d 506 (4th Dep’t 1984).
47

43

arrest the individual accused of menacing someone with a gun. However, the CCRB
substantiated as improper the officers’ subsequent, warrantless search of the apartment for the
gun after the perpetrator was in handcuffs. In a fourth case, the CCRB found that, once the
police had secured a residential location where they believed a gun to be present, they should
have waited for a search warrant before initiating the search for the gun.
In other cases, officers did not possess sufficient evidence linking a complaint of shots
fired or a gun to a particular individual or location. In one, officers responding to a call of shots
fired pursued a fleeing individual on foot, but lost sight of him. As the officers walked back to
where they initially began their pursuit, they chose an apartment to enter to look for the suspect
without any particular link to that apartment. Several cases involved tips from informants or 911
calls regarding the presence of a gun in a particular location. In two cases, the tip or 911 call was
anonymous and did not have sufficient indicia of reliability to support probable cause that the
gun was present at the location. In one of these cases, officers entered the wrong apartment with
guns drawn, even though the apartment number tied to the 911 call was relayed to the officers.
In another case, members of a narcotics team noted in their memo books that they
received a tip from a confidential informant that he attempted to purchase narcotics at a
particular apartment, but had a gun pointed at him. The team applied for an emergency search
warrant, which was denied. The next day, the team went to the building, stopped, frisked, and
cuffed a resident of the building, and then entered and searched his apartment because they
claimed to hear yelling from inside it. At their CCRB interviews, members of the narcotics team
denied any link between their unsuccessful attempt to obtain an emergency search warrant to
enter an apartment and the next day’s search of that apartment based on the pretext that they
heard someone yelling inside. Instead, the team claimed that their visit to the building on the day
of the incident was motivated by a kite complaint made a week earlier. The CCRB found no
evidence of this kite complaint. In contrast to the police accounts, the civilian complainant
alleged that, as he was taking the trash out of his apartment building, the officers “bum rushed”
him, cuffed and searched him. The police took him upstairs to his apartment, opened the closed
apartment door and entered the apartment without consent. After the officers exited his
apartment, they uncuffed him, “punched [him] in the face,” and laughed as they walked down the
stairs. He felt like he couldn’t “even protect my own daughter” who was inside the apartment.
He told the CCRB, “the law is supposed to be there to set the rules and protect us,” not “to be
breaking laws.” CCRB investigators found that the warrantless entry and search of the
apartment was motivated by the confidential informant’s tip and the officers’ inability to obtain a
warrant, rather than follow up of a kite complaint. During a subsequent unrelated investigation,
IAB uncovered evidence that members of this narcotics team fabricated statements from
confidential informants to obtain search warrants.
4.
Noise Violation Cases. In several substantiated complaints, officers
arrived at a residence to address a noise complaint or having heard loud noise themselves. The
residents of the premises alleged that they lowered the volume of a radio or television, while the
44

officers alleged that they entered the apartment because the residents failed to do so. In either
case, Patrol Guide section 214-23 authorizes officers to enter a resident to correct a noise
complaint only after a decision to do so has been “made by a precinct commander/duty captain
and ONLY as a last resort, after requests to stop the noise have been ignored.” In none of these
substantiated cases did officers on the scene obtain the required approval to enter premises from
a precinct commander or duty captain. In one instance, officers obtained keys to an apartment
from the landlord and surveillance video showed the officers entered the apartment after the
noise abated, while the occupants were sleeping.
More troubling is that some incidents escalated beyond the noise issue and led to civilians
being arrested and subjected to physical force, pepper spray, and the threat of a taser. Large
gatherings or parties especially present difficult circumstances. Officers in these cases were
dissatisfied by a civilian’s response to the officer and then either pushed their way into the
residence or pulled the civilian into a public area in order to arrest the civilian. Officers found
themselves at risk of serious physical harm, due to the presence of multiple angry civilians and
unknown circumstances inside a residence, over a minor noise violation.
In a 2011 incident, two patrol officers responded to a complaint of loud music in an
apartment building. One of the officers told the CCRB that he smelled marijuana as he walked
up the stairs to the apartment, and when the occupant of the apartment opened the door, he saw
marijuana residue and paraphernalia on a table in the living room but no lit marijuana. He
entered the “because we could,” and told CCRB he did not need consent.48 He did not ask the
occupants to lower the music before entering her apartment, nor did he call for a supervisor to
respond because “it wasn’t necessary.” As he told the CCRB, he did not need a search warrant
because he was not searching for or removing anything from the apartment. Video captures this
officer telling the four women inside the apartment, “We don’t need a warrant.” The women
demanded to know why the officers were inside their apartment. During the argument, a
physical struggle ensued leading to arrests of the three women for resisting arrest, disorderly
conduct, and obstructing governmental administration, but no marijuana-related charges. Video
captured an officer grabbing a woman around her torso and pushing her face down onto a bed to
cuff her. The officer also used pepper spray against the women.
5.
Emergency Circumstances Doctrine Inapplicable. In several cases, the
CCRB did not find “reasonable grounds” for the officer to have believed an emergency existed
requiring police assistance to protect life or property. For example, in one case, officers alleged
that they entered a store where they believed a burglary was in progress because the metal gate in
front of the door was halfway down and the entrance door was ajar. However, a SPRINT
recording confirmed that the officers called for backup for a “business inspection,” rather than a
48

At the time that the closing report for this incident was drafted, this officer had accumulated 18 substantiated
allegations in his thirteen years of service, including substantiated physical force allegations in three separate
incidents. One penalty received was the loss of 25 vacation days and a 5-day suspension, while another penalty was
the loss of ten vacation days.

45

crime-in-progress. An independent witness confirmed that the entrance door was closed, and
officers picked the lock and used a crowbar to open it. The CCRB investigation revealed that
officers entered the basement of the business to investigate illegal social club activities, and used
the pretext of investigating a burglary to justify their entry.
In a 2014 incident, a detective and sergeant arrived at an apartment to apprehend the
subject of an investigation card; when they received no answer at the door, the detective climbed
the fire escape, and entered the apartment through a window. Though the detective and sergeant
claimed they entered because they thought a burglary was in progress, the police officer on the
scene contradicted that account and said there were no facts indicating a burglary in progress.
Similarly, in other cases, the CCRB did not credit the officer’s testimony of having heard yelling
or other noises indicating that someone was in distress, because fellow officers offered a
different justification for the entry and did not corroborate hearing sounds of distress.
In some cases, the CCRB rejected application of the emergency doctrine because a
preponderance of the evidence indicated that the officers’ primary motivation was to arrest and
seize evidence, rather than to respond to an emergency. For example, in a 2013 case, officers
responded to a dispute at a Father’s Day barbeque in the courtyard of an apartment building.
Upon the officers’ arrival, a woman reported that she had been punched in the face by a man
approximately fifteen minutes earlier and that the man had fled into a ground floor apartment.
The resident of the ground floor apartment opened her door, but refused to allow the officers
inside without a warrant. The sergeant on the scene confirmed that she refused consent, but that
he heard the assailant inside so he walked past her to arrest him. Since the sergeant and other
officers intended to arrest the assailant, and that the assailant had no way to escape, the CCRB
found there were no emergency circumstances to justify the warrantless entry.
Certain cases turned on whether an officer possessed a “reasonable basis” to associate the
emergency with the apartment or residence entered. In one case, a teenager alleged she had
been kidnapped and held along with another child in an apartment with a “red door,” where she
was forced into prostitution. After being rescued by her parents, the teen filed a police report.
Police officers drove her around the neighborhood until she pointed out a particular address with
a “red door.” Officers then forcibly entered the apartment without a warrant. The resident of the
apartment described the incident during her CCRB interview, “at 2 a.m., [I’m] by myself,
[officers] bum rushed into my apartment, looking for god knows what.” The woman said the
officers “ignored” her questions of whether they had a warrant, and told her to “shut up” when
she asked what was going on. The woman was “nervous and scared,” and eventually the officers
left. The CCRB found that the officers had taken no investigative steps to bolster or refute the
teen’s allegations, which were doubted even by the supervising officer.

46

C. Hot Pursuit Did Not Justify Warrantless Entry
In examining the 174 substantiated complaints of premises entered and/or searched, 39
complaints or 23% involved situations where officers alleged that they observed an individual
engaged in suspicious activity on the street or outside of a residence, approached the individual
to investigate the activity or arrest them for it, and then pursued the fleeing individual into a
residence. The CCRB found that the hot pursuit doctrine did not permit a warrantless entry into
the home for arrest or search purposes. In the majority of these complaints, the underlying
offense was minor and could not justify entry into a home. The pursuit of individuals for minor
offenses into apartments, backyards, and houses requires officers to confront unknown,
potentially dangerous situations inside residences. Officers may unnecessarily place themselves
and civilians in danger, especially when they draw guns, use tasers, or otherwise engage in force
to control a chaotic situation encountered in an unfamiliar location. Based on its review, the
CCRB recommends the following:
a. The NYPD training material should explicitly note, and officers should be
retrained, that officers engaging in a pursuit of an individual:
i. Officers can pursue a fleeing individual only if they have reasonable
suspicion that the individual has committed, is committing, or will
commit a crime. Reasonable suspicion, however, does not permit entry
into a private home.
ii. If officers enter a private residence in pursuit of an individual, they must
possess probable cause that the individual committed a crime.
iii. The hot pursuit doctrine only allows entry into a home if the officer
initiated the arrest outside of the home.
iv. Officers should not pursue individuals into a home for a violation.
When the police are in hot pursuit of a suspect they are attempting to arrest, courts have
held that the fleeing suspect cannot thwart an otherwise lawful arrest by hiding out in his or her
home or in the home of another person.49 The police can therefore forcibly enter the residence
into which the suspect has sought refuge in order to make the arrest. Police may not, however,
claim “hot pursuit” to justify warrantless entry into a home in a situation where a suspect simply
closes the door to the police and stays at all times within the interior of his home.50 The Supreme
Court has held that the “hot pursuit” exception does not permit warrantless entry into a home
where the underlying offense is “relatively minor.”51 With respect to misdemeanor crimes, the
Police Department instructs officers the hot pursuit doctrine permits warrantless entry for such
49

See United States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 42-43 (1976).
See People v. Gonzalez, 111 A.D.3d 147, 150 (2d Dep’t 2013).
51
See Welsh v Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740 (1984).
50

47

crimes, without regard to the nature of the offense or maximum term of imprisonment.52 With
respect to “violations” under New York law, such as alcohol consumption in public view, the hot
pursuit doctrine does not permit warrantless entry in order to arrest or issue a summons.
1.
Hot pursuit for minor offenses. Officers pursue individuals into homes
and apartments when they see low-level marijuana offenses. In a 2013 case, officers in a street
narcotics enforcement unit stated they saw a man smoking marijuana outside of a house, and
upon initiating a stop, the man fled indoors. The sergeant responding to the scene authorized
entry into the house along with three officers in order to arrest the man.53 Inside, officers
encountered approximately 15 occupants, angry and upset over the officers’ presence. A large
physical struggle erupted, resulting in officers being punched and thrown into furniture, injuries
to civilians, and damage to the homeowner’s property. The CCRB found that the warrantless
entry into the house was not justified by the minor nature of the crime.
In yet another 2013 case, Anti-Crime officers alleged that they observed a man smoking
what appeared to be a joint, and then ran after him as he ran into a house and away from the
officers. Officers encountered several angry civilians in the house, and admitted to punching the
suspect and drawing their guns inside the home. Similar situations—where officers pursued an
individual into an apartment or home after observing him allegedly smoking marijuana outside
of a building—arose in 2012, in 2011, and 2010.
Low-level alcohol violations also led to warrantless entries. In one 2013 case, a lieutenant
and police officer saw two men drinking from a bottle of vodka outside of a building. The police
stopped their car and approached the men, one of whom fled into the building and was pursued.
The lieutenant pursued the man into an apartment filled with several people, who became
agitated, yelling and cursing at the officers. On the way out of the apartment building, the
lieutenant encountered one man, who accused the lieutenant of punching and kicking him, and
backup officers used a Taser to subdue another man in the hallway. The CCRB found that the
underlying criminal activity—drinking in public—was too minor to justify warrantless entry
based on the hot pursuit doctrine.
2.
Not continuous flight. Other situations arise where officers begin
pursuing an individual, but lose sight of them prior to entering an individual’s residence. Yet the
hot pursuit doctrine can only be applied to justify a warrantless entry if officers engage in
52

On this issue, the CCRB has taken a different position than the Police Department in some cases. In applying the
Supreme Court’s holding that the hot pursuit doctrine does not permit entry for minor offenses, the penalty imposed
by the state is an important factor by which to determine whether the offense is minor. See People v. Cruz, 41
Misc.3d 1222(A) (Crim. Ct. Bx. Co. 2013). In certain cases, involving marijuana-related misdemeanors, the CCRB
has found that the hot pursuit doctrine did not authorize the officers’ warrantless entry. Certain marijuana-related
misdemeanors are punishable by a term of imprisonment of up to 3 months only.
53
This sergeant had previously been the subject of substantiated force, stop, search, entry, and threat of arrest
allegations arising out of his supervision of an entry into an apartment to search it for contraband after a buy-andbust operation. Charges were recommended by the CCRB, and in May 2012, an administrative trial resulted in a 27day suspension and the loss of 13 vacation days.

48

“immediate or continuous pursuit” of the individual from the scene of the crime into the home.54
In a 2014 case, two men were sitting outside of an apartment building when they noticed four
plainclothes officers running past them and out of sight. Approximately five minutes later, the
officers walked back towards the men and past them through the entrance of the apartment
building. The officers went to the second floor apartment, where they began banging loudly on
the door and announcing themselves as police. The officers asked the men whether any males
lived upstairs, and the men said no. One man went into the first floor apartment, where his
friends lived, to get the phone number of the second floor resident and alert her to the officers’
presence outside of her house. When he came back outside of the first floor apartment, the
officers demanded that he open the door to the first floor apartment, and upon gaining entry,
searched all bedrooms, under the beds, in the closets, and behind doors. The officers told the
residents they were looking for a young man named “Elijah” who had a gun. After satisfying
themselves that the suspect was not in the location, the officers left. The officers, in turn, stated
that they responded to a report of a firearm and detained a group of teenagers, one of whom fled.
They admitted chasing the fleeing teen, but denied entering or searching any apartment.
However, another officer contradicted those officers, and confirmed she and a sergeant had stood
guard outside the searched apartment. The CCRB found not only that the officers had
improperly entered and searched the apartment, but also noted other misconduct in the form of
false official statements by the officers who denied entering and searching the apartment.
In a 2012 incident, Impact officers and a sergeant heard a radio transmission regarding a
robbery, including two physical descriptions of suspects, a description of the stolen property (a
cell phone), and the direction of the suspects’ flight. Approximately twenty minutes after
hearing the radio transmission, the officers were approximately five blocks away from the
location of the robbery, when they observed a man fitting the description of one of the suspects.
When the officers and the man made eye contact, the officers opened the door of the van, the
individual threw a cell phone into a trash can, and began running. Officers observed the man
fleeing into a particular building, followed him inside, and heard a door shut on the third floor.
An officer alleged that he knocked on a third-floor apartment and heard someone say, “They
found me. It’s the police. I’m not coming out.” After knocking and telling the individual inside
the apartment to unlock the door, the door was finally unlocked. The officer alleged that he saw a
small girl and adult male in a dark apartment, and pointed his gun at the man because he would
not comply with orders to come out of the apartment. The man was eventually taken out of the
apartment, shown to the victims, and released when they did not identify him. The father inside
the apartment, however, told the CCRB that his front door was kicked open, and officer standing
outside the doorway pointed his gun at his daughter and tracked her as she ran past the doorway.
The father stated that officers cuffed him and punched him, which a neighbor corroborated.
Neighbors who listened to the entire incident contradicted the officers’ claim that someone inside
the apartment said he was “I’m caught,” and instead corroborated the father’s account.
54

See Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 753 (1984).

49

3.
No probable cause. An officer must possess probable cause to put an
arrest in motion when the suspect is outside the home, in order for the hot pursuit doctrine to
justify subsequent pursuit of that suspect into a residence. Officers in these cases may have
possessed reasonable suspicion to stop the individual outside the home, which would also allow
the officers to pursue the individual if he took flight. However, only probable cause—not
reasonable suspicion—permits officers to pursue the individual into a private residence under the
hot pursuit doctrine. Moreover, all of these cases involved situations where the CCRB did not
credit the officers’ accounts that the fleeing individual would pose a danger to the individuals
inside the homes.
In a number of cases, officers did not possess probable cause to arrest an individual when
they began pursuing him outside the home, rendering their subsequent entry into the home
improper. In a 2010 incident, Impact officers in a drug-prone neighborhood drove by a home at
night and saw two individuals facing each other in the front yard, with one next to a mailbox.
One officer suspected the individuals of engaging in a drug transaction, though he also
acknowledged he “did not know what was going on.” The officers stated that, when they exited
their vehicle to ask the men whether they lived at the residence, one man ran into the home while
the other remained in the front yard. One officer ran after the man, and grabbed him inside the
home. According to the residents of the home, the officers accused the man of putting something
in the mailbox. No contraband was ever recovered and the man was released without arrest or
summons. According to one resident, when he asked the officer, “do you have a warrant?,” the
officer responded that he “doesn’t have a warrant, doesn’t need one, he belongs here.”
The circumstances of some cases indicate that officers pursue civilians into their homes
after an interaction where the officers believe the civilian has disrespected them in some way,
though there was no probable cause to arrest or issue summons. In a particularly egregious case
from 2011, two Impact officers stated that they encountered and admonished two teenage boys
attempting to pry open the door of an apartment building. The boys’ older brother approached
the scene, upset that the officers were speaking to his teenage brothers. When the officers began
to leave, the older brother followed them to their vehicle, cursing and yelling. The officers then
turned, intending to issue the brother a summons for disorderly conduct for acting loud and
boisterous. The older brother, according to the officers, ran into the building, and into his
apartment, where a sergeant later arrived and authorized entry to arrest him. Video taken by the
older brother, however, shows that the Impact officers became extremely irritated when the older
brother interrupted to ask why they were harassing his teenage brothers and recorded their
interaction with his teenage brothers. Video captures the older brother walking away from the
officers, not running, towards the building entrance. The older brother stated in his CCRB
interview that, after he and his brothers returned to their apartment, the Impact officers showed
up outside the apartment door, demanded that he step out of the apartment, attempted to pull him
out, and punched him. Video shows one of the officers stepping into the apartment, telling the
older brother to exit so that he could receive a summons, and saying “In about two seconds,

50

twenty cops are going to come in here, so do you want to step outside so we can get this under
control?” Later, video documents the officer saying, “Three times I summoned you to come out
here and you didn’t,” and “Did you think we were just going to go away if we told you to come
here?” The Impact officers radioed for additional officers, who entered the apartment and
arrested two brothers.55 Both arrested brothers sustained bruising on their backs and alleged that
they had been punched by the officers, though all officers denied punching or using force to
affect the arrests.
In a 2014 case, two plainclothes Impact officers doing vertical patrol in an apartment
building stated that they saw a man walking down the hallway who put his hands in his pockets
as he made eye contact with the officers. Based only upon that motion of putting his hands in his
pockets, the officers stopped him, asked for ID, and asked whether he lived in the building. The
man refused to provide ID and then ran to an unlocked apartment door a few feet away. Officers
pursued the man into his home and arrested him. In the man’s interview with the CCRB, he
described seeing two guys in “black hoodies” emerging from the staircase doorway as he
returned from taking the garbage out. The men in hoodies asked, “What’s up?” The man
responded, “Who are you?” and backed up to his apartment door. When the men in hoodies
asked if he had ID, the civilian responded, “For what, who are you?” The police then identified
themselves, and demanded his ID again. The man said, “For what? I’m in my house,” went
inside his apartment and tried to close the door. The police pushed their way inside, where they
allegedly put the man in a chokehold. The hot pursuit doctrine did not apply since the officers
lacked probable cause to arrest the man, let alone reasonable suspicion to stop him.

D. Plain View Doctrine Misapplied to Entries and Seizures
Several substantiated cases involved officers who possessed an incorrect understanding
of the “plain view doctrine.” In these cases, officers believed that, once they saw narcotics
inside an apartment, they were allowed to cross the threshold of the apartment to seize those
items without a warrant. Officers are permitted to make a warrantless seizure of contraband or
evidence of a crime if: (1) the officers are lawfully in the position from which the object is
viewed; (2) the officers have lawful access to the object; and (3) the illicit nature of the items
seized must be immediately apparent.56 If officers observe contraband from a lawful vantage
point outside premises, they must establish lawful access to the premises by way of a warrant,
consent, or exigent circumstances.57 Patrol Guide 212-105, relating to execution of search
warrants, as well as Operations Order 29 of 2008, relating to the consent to search policy,
The District Attorney’s office declined to prosecute these arrests made after the warrantless entry. In the
documents declining prosecution, the office stated clearly that there was “insufficient grounds for [the arresting
officer] to issue a summons,” since the older brother was approximately 15 feet from the officers, he was “not
shouting,” there were only “2-3 spectators,” and ultimately “there were no grounds to conduct a hot pursuit into this
[defendant’s] residence.” While informative, decisions by the District Attorney to decline to prosecute a case do not
determine the CCRB’s decision to substantiate or exonerate allegations of misconduct.
56
See People v. Diaz, 81 N.Y.2d 106, 110 (1993).
57
See People v. Vega, 276 A.D.2d 414 (1st Dep’t 2000).
55

51

instructs officers that, if they are inside premises lawfully pursuant to a search warrant or
consent, they may seize contraband or evidence if the incriminating nature of the seized item is
immediately apparent, and the discovery of the item is inadvertent.58
Based on its review, the CCRB recommends the following:
a. The NYPD Police Student’s Guide and related training material should
explicitly describe the plain view doctrine, and provide examples of where the
plain view doctrine does not allow entry without a warrant, consent, or exigent
circumstances.
b. The NYPD should require, as part of its body-worn camera program, officers to
document the presence of contraband or narcotics in plain view.
In a 2014 incident, Brooklyn North Narcotics officers stationed outside of an apartment
building received confirmation from an undercover officer that he had made a positive buy of
marijuana from individuals on the fourth floor of the building. The officers went to the fourth
floor, saw two men in a doorway with their hands clenched, and then saw one man attempt to
place a bag of marijuana in his pants pockets. After detaining the men, frisking them, and finding
marijuana on one of them, the officers stated that they looked through the open doorway of the
apartment and saw a scale and marijuana placed on a table approximately three feet inside. One
of the officers reached into the apartment and grabbed the items. The officer who did so stated
during his CCRB interview, “we didn’t need [a warrant], we didn’t have one . . . it wasn’t
warranted.” The sergeant accompanying the officer stated during his CCRB interview that,
because the items were in open view in the doorway, the officers were conducting an operation
and making an arrest, and the table was in lungeable area from outside the door, it was standard
procedure to take the drugs and paraphernalia to voucher them.
In another case involving Brooklyn North Narcotics, officers stated that, while
conducting nighttime observation of a brownstone where parties and drug sales were taking
place, they entered the unlocked front door of the building to study the interior and collect
information that could assist an undercover’s future operations at the building. The captain on
the scene stated that he smelled marijuana inside the building, went up to the second floor, and
through the open front door to the second floor apartment, saw a few men smoking a joint. The
captain and his officers entered the apartment, requested everyone’s ID, and then left without
issuing any summons or arrests.

E. Investigation Cards Are Improperly Used To Gain Entry into Premises

Patrol Guide 212-105 also references the “Plain View Doctrine” discussed in Legal Bulletins Vol. 13, No. 5 and
Vol. 17, No. 6.
58

52

Investigation cards (commonly known as I-cards) are present in numerous substantiated
cases, suggesting that they are being improperly used by investigatory commands to gain entry
into homes to search and apprehend the subject of the investigation card. In addition, as
described in Section 6, unsubstantiated cases also involve investigation cards. Based on its
review, the CCRB recommends the following:
a. The NYPD Patrol Guide, Police Student’s Guide, and other training
material should explicitly state, and officers should be retrained, that
investigation cards are not warrants. Further, investigation cards carry
with them no authority to enter homes.
b. The NYPD should clarify the situations where it is permissible for officers
to create an investigation card for an individual instead of obtaining an
arrest warrant, with an emphasis on the need for warrants if officers want
to apprehend an individual inside a private residence.
c. The NYPD should require, as part of its body-worn camera program,
officers who arrive at a home with an I-card to record their interactions
with the occupants of the home, in order to capture the following
information: (a) whether the officer states he possesses a warrant; (b) how
the officer describes the authority provided by the investigation card; and
(c) the context in which an occupant provides consent, especially as it
relates to the presence of the investigation card.
“Investigation Cards” are described in Patrol Guide section 208-23. While the section
describes the various categories associated with an individual listed on an I-card—a perpetrator,
suspect, or witness—it does not clearly state that an investigation card is not a warrant. Nor does
it clearly state that that the investigation card provides no authority to enter premises to search
for or arrest an individual.
In 28 substantiated complaints (16%) of the 174 substantiated complaints of premises
entry and search, officers entered and/or searched premises improperly in the course of their
search for a subject of an I-card. Since I-cards are often used to record that an individual is
wanted for arrest or a suspect in a crime, members of the Warrant Squad were the subject
officers in all of these cases but two. In 13 cases, officers entered premises based on an I-card
alone, while in the remaining 15 cases officers used the I-card along with an invalid warrant as
the basis of their entry (Figure 7).

53

Figure 7: Investigation Cards and Warrants in Substantiated Entry and Search
Complaints
Type of Complaints

Number of
Substantiated
Complaints

Percentage of 174
Substantiated
Complaints of
Entry and Search

Substantiated Cases Involving Use of Investigation Cards
Alone to Gain Entry

13

7%

Substantiated Cases Involving Use of Investigation Cards
and Invalid Warrants to Gain Entry

15

9%

Two types of cases illustrate the problematic use of investigation cards by officers to gain
entry into a residence. First, officers possessing only an investigation card used force or
misrepresentation of the I-card as a warrant to gain access into a private home. In one case, a
detective from the Warrant Squad acknowledged that an I-card did not give officers permission
to enter an apartment, but once he saw the suspect listed in an I-card standing behind his mother
inside the apartment, he immediately had to take the suspect into custody.
In a 2013 case, a sergeant and three officers from the Warrant Squad arrived at an
apartment at 6:30 a.m. to look for the subject of an I-card for robbery of a cell phone. The
sergeant and officers banged on the door, identified themselves, and asked the occupants they
heard inside to come to the door. They denied using tools to remove the peephole, but alleged
that the vibration from knocking on the door caused the peephole to fall off. According to the
officers, the older brother of the I-card subject eventually opened the door after 20-25 minutes,
and in response to the sergeant’s question of whether the subject was present, nodded his head
backwards as if saying, “look in the back.” In contrast, the teenage subject of the I-card, along
with his twin brother, alleged that they were sleeping in their bedroom when they heard banging
on the front door and the NYPD identifying themselves. The twins further stated that, after a
few minutes, an officer appeared on the fire escape directly outside their bedroom window,
opened the window, pointed his gun at one twin and ordered him to unlock the fire-escape gate
blocking entry into the bedroom. The twin did so, and the officer entered the apartment, pointed
his gun at him, and ordered them to open the front door for the remaining officers. When the
twins went to the living room, they saw components of the peephole on the floor and a tube
inserted into the hole where the peephole had been. Officers told the twins and their brother that
they were looking for a gun. When one twin asked the officers if they had a warrant, the sergeant
on the scene pointed to a piece of paper with that twin’s photograph on it. The boys heard
officers in the bedroom making a commotion, as if searching it, and eventually one twin was

54

taken to the precinct. The CCRB found that, regardless of how the peephole fell off the door, the
sergeant’s act of looking through it to see what was going on in the apartment constituted an
improper search. In addition, the CCRB found that the physical entry into the apartment by the
officers was improper because any consent given was coerced, and there were no exigent
circumstances justifying entry.
In another 2013 case with similar facts, detectives from the Warrant Squad arrived at an
apartment just after 6:30 a.m. to apprehend the subject of an I-card wanted as perpetrator
(probable cause to arrest) for a robbery. Detectives stated that they knocked on the door for 10
to 15 minutes, and told a male occupant that they were looking for a particular individual. The
detectives continued to knock on the door, and the peephole fell out. One detective stated that he
could see the subject of the I-card through the peephole running back and forth. According to
the detectives, approximately one hour later, the mother of the suspect unlocked the door for the
detectives and then stepped back to allow them to come into her apartment and look for her son.
The detectives cuffed the suspect, and then asked the mother if she had a jacket for her son. One
detective walked to the back of the apartment with the mother to retrieve the jacket. The mother
stated, in her CCRB interview, that she awoke to loud banging on the door, and upon going to
her front door, saw the peephole knocked out and the lock broken. The detectives opened the
door themselves and entered without her permission; one detective took her son out of the
apartment, while another detective went to the bedroom in the back, looked in a shelf in the
bedroom closet and said he was looking for a gun. The CCRB found that, even if the mother
opened the door as the detectives alleged, it was not voluntary consent, given the prolonged and
forceful banging on the door. Further, no exigent circumstances existed since the detective told
the mother that he would have obtained a warrant if she had not opened the door.
In the second type of case, members of the Warrant Squad or other detectives arrive at a
residence to apprehend the subject of an investigation card, but also possess an open warrant for
someone else to facilitate their entry of the residence. For example, in an August 2014 incident,
members of the Bronx Warrant Squad arrived at an apartment looking for the young male subject
of an I-card. Since the I-card carried no authority to enter the apartment where the Warrant
Squad believed the individual to be present, the detectives took the name of the main resident of
the apartment, a white male in his 70s, and found a bench warrant issued in 1981 for a man with
the same name, but identified on the warrant as a 58-year-old black male at a completely
different address. The officers performed no additional investigation to determine whether
subject of the bench warrant lived at the apartment they sought to enter. When they arrived at
the apartment, the officers told the 70-year-old man, who they could immediately observe to be
white, that they had a warrant for him, so he allowed them to come in over the objections of his
daughter. The detectives claimed that they went inside to confirm that the black male subject of
the bench warrant was not the same person as the 70-year-old white man. The detectives then
claimed to hear noise coming from a bathroom, opened the door, and found the subject of the I-

55

card. CCRB found that the officers’ entry based on the 1981 bench warrant was invalid, since
they took no steps to establish a reasonable belief that the subject of the bench warrant lived at
the apartment they entered. Further, the officers’ search was found to be improper since, by the
time they opened the bathroom door, they knew that the subject of the bench warrant was not in
the apartment.

F. Improper Execution and Use of Warrants to Gain Entry into Premises
Members of the NYPD Warrant Squad and other investigative commands are the subject
of a variety of substantiated complaints regarding the improper use and execution of arrest and
search warrants on premises. Based on its review, the CCRB makes the following
recommendations:
a. The NYPD should ensure that officers executing arrest or bench warrants at
homes are trained regarding their obligation to take investigative steps to form a
reasonable belief that: (1) the subject of the warrant resides in home; and (2) the
subject of the warrant is present within the home at the time of the officers’ entry.
Fulfilling these obligations takes on a heightened importance when:
i.
Officers execute warrants issued several months or years previously;
ii. Officers conduct warrant sweeps of an apartment building or residential
area; and
iii. Officers are at an apartment to apprehend a person for whom they do not
have a warrant and use an open warrant associated with the location to
enter it.
Payton requires a warrant for officers to conduct a search and seizure at a home. An
arrest warrant may only issue from a neutral and detached judge or magistrate, not a police
officer or prosecutor, and is based upon an officer’s affidavit, which sets forth facts that establish
probable cause for the individual’s arrest.59 Bench warrants result when an individual, who was
previously arrested, fails to appear in court as required; the judge (who sits on the “bench”) then
issues a warrant for that individual’s arrest.60 A search warrant is a judicial order authorizing the
police to conduct a search at a specified location in order to seize designated property or to arrest
a specific person.61 The search warrant must contain a description of the property that is the
subject of the search, and a designation or description of the place to be searched using an
address, ownership, name or any other means that can identify the place with certainty.62 While
a search warrant must be executed within ten days of its issuance,63 arrest and bench warrants
have no deadline by which they must be executed.
59

Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 212 (1981); see also C.P.L. §§ 120.10, 120.20.
C.P.L. § 1.20(30).
61
C.P.L. § 690.05(2).
62
C.P.L. § 690.45.
63
C.P.L. § 690.30(1).
60

56

There are, however, important limitations on officers’ ability to execute arrest and bench
warrants at a residence. Both arrest and bench warrants permit officers to enter a dwelling to
look for the subject of the warrant only if: (1) they reasonably believe it to be his residence; and
(2) they reasonably believe he is present at the time they enter.64 When warrants are issued
months or years prior to the entry, officers must take investigative steps to confirm that the
premises entered is still the residence of the subject of the warrant, and to provide themselves
with “some modicum of concrete, believable information of recent vintage, pointing to the
suspect's presence at the time his home is searched.”65 As one court has held, “[a] ‘reasonable
belief’ that the suspect is present cannot be arrived at simply because that suspect may have lived
at those premises some 6 ½ months prior thereto.”66 Nor does “the fact that a suspect may have
lived at a particular premises at some point in time . . . legally transform those premises into his
residence for a period of indefinite duration.”67
Because an arrest or bench warrant permits police to enter a residence to search for and
arrest a person, the police must confine their search within the residence to areas in which a
person could be hiding, e.g., rooms and closets. With an arrest or bench warrant, the police will
generally not be permitted to search through cabinets and drawers for evidence, though the
officer can legally seize contraband in plain view.68
Of the 174 substantiated complaints of premises entered and/or searched, a warrant was
present in 29 complaints (17%). That warrant, however, could not authorize entry and/or search
of the premises for one or more of several reasons, including the lack of a reasonable belief that
the warrant subject resided in the premises, the officers entered a third-party residence without a
search warrant in addition to an arrest warrant, or the officers executed the warrant at the wrong
address (Figure 8).

64

See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980); People v. Rodriguez, 19 Misc. 3d 202 (Crim. Ct. N.Y. Cnty. 2008).
People v. Cabral, 560 N.Y.S.2d 71, 76 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1990); cf. People v. Brown, 56 A.D.2d 543 (1st Dep’t
1977); People v. Russell, 958 N.Y.S.2d 310 (City Ct. Troy 2010) (officers illegally entered and searched apartment
using only open warrant as part of warrant sweep, without any checks to confirm that subject of warrant remained at
apartment); People v. Smith, 806 N.Y.S.2d 447, 447 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2005) (officers executing four-year-old bench
warrant did not possess reasonable belief that subject of warrant still resided at address on warrant where officers
did not receive any information about suspect from NYPD databases and did not conduct further investigation with
NYCHA, DMV, or other city agencies); People v. Baez, 661 N.Y.S.2d 759 (Bx. Sup. Ct. 1997).
66
People v. Cabral, 560 N.Y.S.2d 71, 76 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1990); see also People v. Fernandez, N.Y.L.J. Aug. 31,
1990 (N.Y. Crim. Ct.) (suppressing evidence obtained after officers executed a bench warrant at the last known
address given by a suspect a year and a half earlier and without any attempts to verify that address through
interviews with neighbors, or checking phone books or mailboxes).
67
Id. at 74.
68
People v. Dalton, N.Y.L.J. May 3, 1991 (Sup. Ct. Queens Co.).
65

57

Figure 8: Substantiated Entry and Search Complaints In Which Warrants Did Not
Authorize Entry
Reason Why Warrant Did Not Authorize Entry

Officers did not possess a reasonable belief that premises
entered was the residence of the subject of the warrant.
Officers did not possess a reasonable belief that suspect
was present in the residence at the time they entered.
Officers entered a third-party’s residence for the subject
of an arrest warrant without obtaining a search warrant
for the third-party residence.
Officers executed a valid warrant at the wrong address.
Officers lacked a sufficient basis to apply for the warrant.
Officers conducted a search for evidence inside a
dwelling, though they possessed only an arrest warrant.

Number of
Substantiated
Complaints

Percentage of 174
Substantiated
Complaints of
Entry and Search

19

11%

4

2%

9

5%

2
2

1%
1%

1

1%

Four substantiated complaints (2%) where officers did not possess a reasonable belief
that the subject of an arrest warrant resided in a dwelling were “warrant sweep” situations. In
these cases, officers pulled all open warrants associated with apartments in a particular building,
and travel to each address to apprehend the subjects of the warrants. In three cases, the warrant
sweep was triggered by a serious crime that had occurred in the area just prior to the sweep, and
appeared to be an investigative strategy by which the police could take individuals living in the
area into custody and question them. However, officers executed the warrants without
conducting proper investigation to confirm that the subjects of the arrest or bench warrants still
resided in the apartments listed on the warrants. In one 2014 case, a man and his three friends
were in their bedrooms on the second floor of a house at approximately 7:30 a.m. when they
heard a commotion downstairs, and encountered plainclothes officers, allegedly with their guns
drawn. When the man asked to see a warrant, one officer responded, “We don’t have to show
you sh-t,” and the officers searched the house, saying, “We have a right to be here.” The officers
had executed an arrest warrant issued approximately four months earlier, without running any
checks to confirm that the subject of the warrant lived at the address on the warrant. They
entered the home through an open window. One lieutenant from the Warrant Squad oversaw two
separate substantiated cases where warrant sweeps were conducted at NYCHA buildings before
7 a.m., and used open warrants issued between 5 to 7 months prior to the incident to enter
apartments without first conducting any investigative steps to confirm the warrants’ validity or
the current residence of the warrant subject. In one case, the lieutenant arrived and insisted on
entry into the complainant’s apartment based on his review of the resident directory in the
building’s lobby. He noted that the very common last name of the subject of the bench warrant,

58

on which no apartment number was listed, was referenced on the directory as the last name
associated with the complainant’s apartment.
Another common theme among substantiated cases with warrants is that officers from a
Warrant Squad, when trying to apprehend the subject of a bench or arrest warrant, will go to
homes upon receiving information that the subject of the warrant can be found there. However,
officers needed, but did not possess, a search warrant authorizing their entry into the third-party
residence. For example, in a 2014 incident, officers arrived at a particular address to look for the
female subject of an open bench warrant. When they did not find the woman, they proceeded to
the apartment of the woman’s ex-boyfriend, which was listed on a domestic incident report filed
three months earlier. Officers did not possess a reasonable belief that woman lived at this
apartment, nor did they have a search warrant to search the third-party residence for the subject
of the bench warrant. Nonetheless, officers entered the apartment at approximately 5:30 a.m.,
where a middle-aged woman lived with her daughter and granddaughter.

b. Officers Fail to Show Warrants to Occupants
The CCRB substantiated 7 complaints (5%) of all 150 complaints that an officer failed to
show a warrant to the occupant of the premises when executing the warrant. These 7 complaints
correspond to 9 substantiated allegations. Patrol Guide section 212-105 requires officers
“executing the search warrant shall, when able to do so safely, show a copy of the search warrant
to any of the occupants of the premises.”69 Patrol Guide 208-42 requires officers executing an
arrest warrant, to show the warrant as soon as possible upon request.
In these cases, the CCRB credited the accounts of occupants, who credibly and
consistently testified that they had asked multiple officers to show them a search or arrest
warrant but were never shown one, or that officers flatly refused to do so. In one case, a civilian
recounted hearing a vibration noise at the front door, seeing the front door knob fall out, and
hearing, “Police, police, get down!” As she sat in her bedroom while officers searched her
apartment, she asked the officers multiple times, “Where’s your warrant?,” but was never shown
one. Another civilian alleged, “I kept asking [the officers] for a search warrant. They told me
they didn’t have to show me sh-t. Point blank. I thought those were my rights.” In another, a
detective acknowledged hearing a civilian’s request to see the search warrant, but claimed that he
could not show it to her because it contained sensitive information regarding an undercover
officer conducting buys at the apartment that was searched. The CCRB reviewed the warrant,
however, and it did not contain any of the sensitive information the detective claimed.

69

This Patrol Guide section imposes a greater obligation than the Criminal Procedure Law by requiring officers
executing a search warrant to show occupants a search warrant without any requirement that the occupants request
to see it. In contrast, CPL § 690.50(3) requires officers to show civilians a search warrant “upon request.”

59

Some officers claimed they never heard a request from a civilian to be shown the search
warrant. However, under the Patrol Guide, officers have an obligation to show an occupant a
search warrant if they can do so safely, and this obligation is not contingent upon receiving a
request from the occupant. The CCRB noted that, in all but one of the search warrant cases,
every officer interviewed by the CCRB stated that he or she had not shown a search warrant.
These statements support a finding that no officer on the scene showed the occupants the
warrant. In all of the search warrant cases, the CCRB found that the officers had secured the
premises and could have shown the occupants a search warrant safely.
The number of substantiated complaints of failure to show a warrant is limited because
CCRB investigators have interpreted the obligation to show a search warrant as triggered by a
civilian’s request. Officers also appear to understand the Patrol Guide requirements as requiring
a search warrant to be shown upon request. Therefore, if officers stated during their CCRB
interview that they did not hear the civilian’s request to see a search warrant, and the CCRB
could not resolve the dispute, the allegation was “unsubstantiated.” As described in detail in
Section 6, approximately 116 allegations (66%) of the 175 allegations failure to show a search
warrant were unsubstantiated, and only 4 or 2% of allegations were exonerated.
Going forward, CCRB investigators will substantiate a failure to show a search warrant if
a preponderance of evidence supports that: (1) the occupants of the premises were not shown a
search warrant; and (2) the officers executing the search warrant were able to show that warrant
to the occupants safely. As to the officer who should be the subject of such an allegation, Patrol
Guide 212-105 states only that “[t]he member of the service executing the search warrant shall,
when able to do so safely, show a copy of the search warrant to any of the occupants of the
premises.” Since the Patrol Guide does not assign a specific officer the responsibility of
possessing the search warrant, or showing it to the occupants, the CCRB will plead this
allegation against the officer assigned to have possession of the warrant on the scene, or the
officer in command of the entry.
The CCRB recommends that officers be reminded and trained on Patrol Guide 212-105
and its affirmative obligation to show residents a valid search warrant that is being executed,
without waiting for a request from the residents to see the warrant.

60

SECTION FOUR: RELEVANT CHARACTERISTICS OF
SUBSTANTIATED COMPLAINTS
The CCRB isolated and quantified certain characteristics of substantiated complaints,
such as location, demographics of victims and subject officers, and a variety of other indicators
related to subject officers, to further analyze how and where improper entries and searches occur.

Location of Improper Entries and Searches. The CCRB tracks the location where a
complained-of incident occurred, both at the borough and precinct level. Among the boroughs,
the distribution of complaints with a substantiated allegation of premises entry, premises search,
or failure to show a warrant generally mirrors the distribution of all types of CCRB complaints
among the boroughs. For all types of complaints of FADO misconduct decided between January
1, 2010 and October 1, 2015, 34% of complaints (occurred in Brooklyn; 23% in Bronx; 22% in
Manhattan; 16% in Queens; 4% in Staten Island. Yet, when comparing the distribution of all
CCRB complaints to the distribution of substantiated premises entry, search, and warrant
complaints, one notable point emerges. Forty-nine percent of relevant complaints substantiated
between January 1, 2010 and October 1, 2015 occurred in Brooklyn (Figure 9). Yet, during that
same time period, only 34% of all complaints decided by the CCRB occurred in Brooklyn.
Similarly, many of the police precincts generating the most premises entry, search, and
warrant complaints are located in Brooklyn. The distribution of 1,761 fully investigated
complaints among the various precincts is shown in the complaint activity map on the next page
(Figure 10).
The overrepresentation of substantiated complaints in Brooklyn is notable. Brooklyn has
traditionally generated the greatest proportion of overall CCRB complaints, but within premises
entry, search, and warrant allegations, generates an even higher percentage.

61

Figure 9: Complaints by Borough of Premises Entry, Premises Search, and Failure
to Show a Warrant Substantiated Between 1/1/2010 and 10/1/2015

62

Figure 10: Fully-Investigated Complaints by Precinct of Premises Entry, Premises Search,
and Failure to Show a Warrant Between 1/1/2010 and 10/1/2015

63

Types of Premises Searched. The vast majority—175 complaints or 97%—of the 180
substantiated complaints involved residential premises: houses, apartments, rooms in shelters,
transitional living facilities and single room occupancies. Only 5 of the 180 substantiated
complaints, or 3%, involved commercial or business premises, and in these cases, the CCRB
found that officers had improperly entered an area in the commercial premises that was not open
to the public and where the complainant had a reasonable expectation of privacy.
The CCRB also analyzed the types of residential premises where substantiated
allegations occurred (Figure 11). Only a quarter of substantiated allegations occurred at singlefamily or dual-family homes, such as stand-alone houses, townhomes, or brownstones. The
entries and searches of almost all of the remaining substantiated complaints occurred in multifamily apartment buildings, some of which were purely residential, and some of which consisted
of residential units above street businesses.
Significantly, 18% (33 unique residential locations of the 183 locations) of substantiated
complaints occurred in apartment buildings owned and operated by the NYC Housing Authority
(NYCHA). According to NYCHA, its apartments house only 403,917 authorized residents or
5% of the New York City population.70 Measured by housing units, NYCHA buildings contain
177,666 apartments or 5% of total housing units in New York City.71 These figures may be
explained by greater presence of NYPD assignments and operations in public housing buildings.
Figure 11: Type of Residential Premises in Substantiated Complaints
Number of
Complaints

Percentage
of Locations

One or Two Family Buildings

44

24%

Multi-Family Walk-up Buildings

50

27%

Multi-Family Elevator Buildings

48

27%

Mixed Residential and Commercial Use Buildings

35

19%

Single-Residence Occupancy, Shelter, or Other Housing Facility

6

3%

183

100%

Type of Residence72

Number of Unique Residential Locations in 180 Substantiated
Complaints

70

See New York City Housing Authority, Facts About NYCHA at 1 (Mar. 26, 2105), available at
http://www1.nyc.gov/assets/nycha/downloads/pdf/factsheet.pdf (last accessed Nov. 1, 2015).
71
Compare id. with New York City Dep’t of Housing Preservation and Development, Selected Initial Findings of
the 2014 New York City Housing and Vacancy Survey at 1 (Feb. 9, 2015), available at
http://www1.nyc.gov/assets/hpd/downloads/pdf/2014-HVS-initial-Findings.pdf (last accessed Nov. 1, 2015).
72
The first four categories correspond to “Land Use” categories assigned to each address and tax lot by the New
York City Department of City Planning.

64

Time of Day of Improper Entries and Searches. The CCRB analyzed the time of
day when improper entries, searches, or failure to show a warrant occurred. The greatest number
of substantiated incidents occurred in the early morning hours between 5:00 a.m. and 8:00 a.m.,
with another concentration of substantiated incidents occurring during traditional after-work
hours between 6:30 p.m. and 9:00 p.m. (Figure 12). When examining the Warrant Squad’s
activities, the concentration of improper entries, searches, and failures to show a warrant
increased in the morning hours. All substantiated complaints involving the Warrant Squad
occurred between 5:00 a.m. and 10:00 a.m., with the exception of a single incident that occurred
at 2:30 p.m. (Figure 13). While officers may intend to arrive at a home at hours when they are
least expected, and residents are most likely to be home, these early-morning encounters are also
what civilians describe as frightening and problematic.
Figure 12: Substantiated Complaints by Time of Incident (All Commands) (#)

Figure 13: Substantiated Complaints by Time of Incident (Warrant Squad Only) (#)

Victims Demographics. The 2,640 fully investigated allegations of premises entry,
premises search, and failure to show a warrant decided between January 1, 2010 and October 1,
2015 involved 4,046 victims and victim/complainants. 487 victims and victim/complainants
were involved in the 180 complaints with at least one substantiated allegation of premises entry
or search, or failure to show a warrant decided between January 1, 2010 and October 1, 2015.

65

The racial and sex makeup of these victims and victim/complainants, along with a
comparison to the demographics of New York City as a whole in 2014, are detailed below
(Figures 14 and 15). The CCRB compares the demographic profile of the alleged victims to the
demographics of the City as a whole, without controlling for any other factors such as proportion
of encounters with the police, the percentage and number of criminal suspects, or the
demographics of individuals for whom arrest or bench warrants are issued.
African-Americans comprise 55% of the victims in improper entry, search, and failure to
show a warrant incidents, twice their proportion of the population of New York City. Whites
comprise only 4% of victims in substantiated incidents, an eighth of their proportion in the
population of New York City.
This data is consistent with the racial makeup of CCRB victims in all types of
complaints. Between 2010 and 2014, 56% of all alleged CCRB victims were African-American,
while 26% were Hispanic, 12% were white, 2% were Asian, and 3% were classified as “other.”
Figure 14: Race of Alleged Victims and Victim/Complainants in Substantiated Complaints
Compared to New York City Demographics
Race of Alleged
Victims and
Victim/Complainants

Race of Victims
in Substantiated
Complaints73

Race of Victims
in All Relevant
Complaints74

Demographics of New
York City (U.S. Census
Bureau, 2010)

African-American

55% (269)

52% (2087)

23%

Hispanic

23% (112)

23% (918)

29%

White

4% (20)

6% (247)

34%

Asian

2% (9)

1% (39)

12%

15% (72)

17% (678)

--

1% (5)

2% (77)

2%

Unknown
Other

73

Victims in Substantiated Complaints consists of the 487 victims and victim/complainants in cases with at least one
substantiated allegation of premises entered and/or searched and/or failure to show a warrant.
74
Victims in All Relevant Complaints consist of the 4,046 victims and victim/complainants in the 2,640 fully
investigated allegations.

66

Figure 15: Sex of Alleged Victims and Victim/Complainants in Substantiated Complaints
Compared to New York City Demographics
Sex of Alleged
Victims and
Victim/Complainants
Male
Female
Unknown
Total

Sex of Victims in
Substantiated
Complaints

Sex of Victims
in All Relevant
Complaints

Demographics of
New York City
(U.S. Census Bureau, 2010)

54% (265)
43% (212)
2% (10)
100% (487)

51% (2074)
45% (1837)
3% (135)
100% (4,046)

48%
52%
-100%

Subject Officer Demographics. From January 1, 2010 to October 1, 2015, there were
1,584 subject officers associated with the 2,640 premises entry, search, and failure to show a
warrant allegations. There were 263 subject officers associated with the 297 substantiated
allegations of premises entered/searched or failure to show a warrant.75 In addition, many more
officers may have been involved in the improper entry and/or search than the 263 identified
subject officers. The CCRB’s pleading practice is—in instances where officers are acting
pursuant to orders from a higher-ranking member of service—to plead an improper entry and/or
search allegation against only the highest officer on the scene.
During the period under review, the racial makeup of subject officers in fully investigated
complaints alleging premises entered, premises searched, or failure to show a warrant mirrored
the demographics of the NYPD as a whole. These proportions are consistent with the CCRB
data for all types of complaints—subject officers have historically reflected the racial makeup of
the Police Department (Figure 16).
In addition, male officers are overrepresented in substantiated improper entry, search, and
warrant allegations, comprising 97% of subject officers in substantiated allegations. In 2014,
male officers made up 83% of the Department.
Figure 16: Race of Subject Officers in Substantiated Allegations Compared to NYPD
Demographics
Race of Subject
Officers

African-American

Race of Subject
Officers in
Substantiated
Allegations

Race of Subject
Officers in All
Relevant Allegations

Demographics of
NYPD in 2015

14% (38)

15% (232)

15%

75

The total count of subject officers is greater than the number of distinct subject officers because some officers
were involved in more than one complaint (26 subject officers appeared more than once).

67

Hispanic

25% (67)

25% (392)

27%

White

58% (152)

57% (897)

51%

Asian

2% (6)

4% (60)

6%

American Indian

0%

0. (2)

< 0.01%

Command and Assignment of Subject Officers. The CCRB analyzed the commands
of the 263 subject officers involved in the 297 substantiated allegations of premises entry,
premises search, or failure to show a warrant. The 263 subject officers were responsible for 285
instances of improper entry, improper search, or failure to show a warrant.76 The CCRB further
analyzed the specific assignment of those officers within Patrol Bureau and Housing Bureau
commands, to determine whether improper entries and searches were more prevalent among
certain assignments than others (Figure 17).77
58 subject officers (20%) are members of the Warrant Squad, and another 16 officers
(6%) are members of Detective Bureaus. Members of these commands engage in apprehension
and investigation, including the problematic use of investigation cards and warrants issued years
earlier described in Section Three. Members of the Warrant Squad receive specialized training
regarding warrant execution, suggesting that the training they receive is either inadequate or not
followed consistently. At least one member of the Warrant Squad told CCRB that common
practice is to unscrew peepholes in front doors in order to look inside—which, under the law, is
considered a search.
Other specialized commands and assignments that include a significant percentage of
subject officers include the 45 subject officers (16%) assigned to Narcotics Borough Commands,
and the 25 subject officers with Anti-Crime assignments (9%) (Figures 17 and 18). Officers who
engage in specialized operations and investigations of narcotics and firearms should be
especially aware and trained regarding the difference between exigent circumstances permitting
immediate, warrantless entry, and those in which they will be expected to obtain a search or
arrest warrant. Each borough in New York City has an assistant district attorney on-call 24
hours per day to assist officers in obtaining emergency search warrants, along with a duty judge
available to issue warrants.

76

Sometimes CCRB investigators pled a single allegation of improper entry and search by an officer in a particular
incident. At other times, investigators pled one allegation of improper entry by an officer and a separate allegation
of improper search by the same officer in the same incident. Therefore, the 297 allegations actually correspond to
285 unique instances of improper entry, search, or failure to show a warrant by different officers. In assessing
command and tenure, we use a denominator of 285 instances of improper entry, search, or failure to show a warrant
to avoid double-counting an officer’s command, assignment, and rank where two allegations against the officer
arose out of the same underlying entry and search.
77
Appendix A contains specific commands and the count of subject officers assigned to each command.

68

Also notable is that 63 subject officers (22%) were assigned to patrol duties (Figure 18).
Patrol officers are often the first line of response to calls regarding crimes-in-progress,
emotionally disturbed persons, and other public safety issues occurring at homes and businesses.
Their entry and searches of premises are inevitable. Their constant contact with civilians, and
presence at homes and businesses, necessitates continuous training regarding the legal standards
of consent, exigent circumstances, and emergency circumstances.
Figure 17: Command of Subject Officers in Substantiated Allegations
Command at Time of Incident

Number of
Subject Officers

Percentage of
Total Incidents

Patrol Bureaus, including precincts

140

49%

Warrant Section

58

20%

Narcotics Borough Commands

45

16%

Detective Bureaus, including precinct detective squads

16

6%

Housing Bureau Commands, including Police Service
Areas (PSA)

10

4%

Auto Crime Division and Gang Squad

4

1%

Emergency Services Units

4

1%

Intelligence Division

4

1%

Major Case Squad

1

<0%

Uniformed Promotions Training Unit

1

<0%

Technical Assistance and Response Unit

1

<0%

Vice Enforcement Squad

1

<0%

285

100%

Number of Entries and/or Searches, or Failures to
Show a Warrant by Subject Officers

69

Figure 18: Assignment of Patrol and Housing Bureau Subject Officers in Substantiated
Allegations
Assignment at Time of Incident
Number of
Percentage of
Subject Officers Total Incidents
Patrol

63

22%

Anti-Crime

25

9%

Impact

17

6%

Conditions

8

3%

Platoon Commander

7

2%

Special Operations

6

2%

SNEU

4

1%

Domestic Violence

3

1%

Precinct Commanding Officer

2

1%

Auto Larceny Patrol

2

1%

Burglary

2

1%

Field Intelligence

2

1%

Cabaret Sergeant

1

<0%

Field Training Unit Supervisor

1

<0%

Housing Bureau – Warrant Enforcement

1

<0%

Noise Sergeant

1

<0%

Robbery Reduction Overtime

1

<0%

Search Warrant Supervisor

1

<0%

Shooting Reduction Overtime

1

<0%

Violence Reduction

1

<0%

Administrative Duty

1

<0%

150

53%

Total Number of Unique Incidents

70

Ranks of Subject Officers. The CCRB analyzed the ranks of 263 subject officers
involved in the 297 substantiated allegations of premises entry, search, and failures to show a
warrant (Figure 19). The largest group of subject officers were 111 police officers (39%).
However, a significant number of subject officers were sergeants (70 officers or 25%) and
lieutenants (25 officers or 9%) possessing supervisory authority over lower-ranking officers, and
often ordering their officers to enter and search premises. In addition, 26% of subject officers
possessed detective ranks and were supervisors in detective squads (74 officers).
Figure 19: Rank of Subject Officers in Substantiated Allegations
Rank at Time of Incident

Number of Subject
Officers
111
70
49
25
9
7
5
3
3
3
285

Police Officer
Sergeant
Detective 3rd Grade
Lieutenant
Detective 2nd Grade
Supervisor – Detective Squad
Captain
Detective 1st Grade
Detective Specialist
Lieutenant Commander Detective Squad
Total Number of Unique Incidents

Percentage of Total
Incidents
39%
25%
17%
9%
3%
2%
2%
1%
1%
1%
100%

Tenure and Complaint History of Subject Officers. The CCRB analyzed the tenure
of 263 subject officers at the time of the substantiated incident of improper entry, search, or
failure to show a warrant (Figure 20). Notably, only a very small number of officers had less
than two years on the job. Significant numbers of subject officers possessed between five and
ten years on the job at the time of improper entry or search. Large numbers of subject officers
had over fifteen years on the job at the time of the improper entry or search. It is unclear why
officers with long tenures engage in improper entries and searches, having received multiple
trainings and legal bulletins regarding the law of entries and warrant execution procedures.
The CCRB also reviewed the complaint history of the subject officers at the time of the
substantiated incident of improper entry, search, or failure to show a warrant (Figure 21). 50
subject officers (19%) had received twenty or more CCRB complaints at the time of
substantiated incident of improper entry, search, or failure to show a warrant. Another 89 subject
officers (34%) received between ten and nineteen CCRB complaints prior to the complained-of
substantiated incident.

71

Figure 20: Tenure of Subject Officers at Time of Substantiated Incident (Years)

Figure 21: Number of Complaints before Substantiated Incident by Number of Subject
Officers (#)

72

Subject Officers in Plainclothes. The CCRB analyzed how often plainclothes officers
were involved in substantiated complaints. Of the 180 substantiated complaints, 101 complaints
or 56% involved subject officers who were in plainclothes at the time. The designation
“plainclothes” refers to subject officers who were not wearing uniforms at the time of the
incident. These “plainclothes” officers do not include officers on an undercover assignment.
Officers engaged in apprehension possess compelling reasons to wear plainclothes when they
arrive at homes. Yet civilians often complain that strangers without uniforms banging on their
doors at early morning hours and demanding entry leave them confused and frightened.
Several victims have told the CCRB that the appearance of plainclothes officers inside
and at their homes did not provide them with the sense that lawful and appropriate procedures
were being followed. One victim described the way in which narcotics officers tried to enter his
apartment: “Three people were pushing in the [front] door. I didn’t see no badges, no nothing,
they didn’t state they were police officers. . . I said, well this is a break-in robbery . . . these guys
are breaking in and gonna rob me.” A victim in another incident said that when she looked at her
intercom one evening to see who had rung her bell, “They looked like teenagers, they had
hoodies on, I didn’t see any faces so I ignored it because I didn’t know who it was.” The officers
later came up to the woman’s apartment, and as she told the CCRB later, “They said to open the
door, I said, Sir, I’m not going to open the door because they didn’t look like police officers.
They didn’t have any uniforms on. They just looked like hoodlums to me.”
Additional data would assist the CCRB in assessing whether the number of complaints it
receives regarding conduct of plainclothes officers is consistent with the number of officers in
the NYPD who have plainclothes assignments. With this data, one could examine whether an
officer’s plainclothes dress is a relevant factor in triggering a CCRB complaint.

Manner of Entry. The CCRB analyzed the manner in which officers entered the
premises in the 164 complaints that were substantiated for improper entry (Figure 22). As
Section Three details, civilians alleged that officers enter their apartments in a variety of ways,
including using physical force to break or kick down doors, pushing past occupants to enter
apartments, opening locked and unlocked doors, entering through open windows, and by placing
their foot in the doorway. Many officers also used no physical force to enter residences. In
some circumstances, the CCRB cannot make a finding regarding exactly how an officer enters a
residence, even though it can establish improper entry. In cases where the CCRB could establish
the manner of entry, the majority involved officers using some amount of physical contact,
including force, to gain entry into an apartment.

73

Figure 22: Manner of Entry in Substantiated Entry Complaints
Manner of Entry

Number of
Complaints

Percentage of
Complaints

The CCRB found that the subject officers did not use physical
force.

49

30%

The CCRB found that the subject officers used physical force
against a person to enter the premises (including pushing past
an occupant and pulling an occupant out of the premises).

37

23%

The CCRB found that the subject officers used physical force
against the entryway door in order to enter the premises
(including breaking and kicking the door).

25

15%

The CCRB did not make a finding about the manner of entry.

22

13%

The CCRB found that the subject officers used keys to open
locked doors or opened unlocked doors to gain entry.

16

10%

The CCRB found that subject officers put their foot in the
doorway, preventing closure of the door.

13

8%

The CCRB found that subject officers went through a window
to gain entry.

2

1%

164

100%

Substantiated Complaints of Entry

Damage to Property Allegations. In the 180 complaints containing a substantiated
allegation of improper entry and/or search or failure to show a warrant, 25 complaints or 14%
also included an allegation that the officers damaged complainants’ or victims’ property.
Damaged property ranged from broken doors, locks, and peepholes, to destruction of tables and
other items inside an apartment during the course of a physical confrontation between the officer
and civilian.
In a 2013 case, detectives from the Warrant Squad arrived at an apartment to apprehend
the subject of an I-card who was wanted as a perpetrator. The I-card stated that there was
probable cause to arrest him for assault in the second degree. The detectives stopped a child
leaving the apartment, who confirmed that the subject of the I-card was his stepbrother and
offered to get his brother from the apartment. The detectives followed the child to the apartment,
but remained in the hallway, with one detective’s foot placed on the surface of the door to keep it
slightly ajar. An individual inside the apartment slammed the door, and refused to open it again.

74

The main detective admitted that he banged on the door and used his asp, but denied breaking
down the door. Three of the occupants stated, in contrast, that officers broke down the door,
using a black metal crowbar-like tool at the bottom of the door, causing it to bend into the
apartment, and knocked out the peephole and the door until it hung off the hinges. The CCRB
credited the occupants’ narrative since the building management office documented the damage
on an incident report from the same day, provided a receipt confirming that the entire door and
associated parts were replaced, and filed a claim with the New York City Comptroller’s Office.

Arrests after Improper Entry. The CCRB reviewed the 174 substantiated complaints
of improper premises entry or search and found that, in 94 complaints or 54%, officers detained,
arrested, or issued summons to individuals after illegally entering or searching private premises.
Criminal charges associated with these arrests and summonses included disorderly conduct,
obstructing governmental administration, trespassing, harassment, resisting arrest, assault, petit
larceny, grand larceny, unreasonable noise, criminal possession of stolen property, unlawful
possession of marijuana, an open alcohol container in public view, criminal sale and possession
of a controlled substance, robbery, and assault.
In several instances, officers appear to have made the arrest because the occupants of the
home resisted the officers’ illegal entry. New York courts have found that individuals do not
commit the crime of obstructing governmental administration when they refuse a warrantless,
improper entry by police. See People v. Rodriquez, 19 Misc. 3d 302 (Crim. Ct. N.Y. County
2008). In one 2013 case, a sergeant assigned as a field training supervisor was driving down the
street with other officers in a van when he saw a young man look into the front passenger
window of a vehicle, but then run across the street in front of the police van after he noticed the
officers. Believing a grand larceny auto crime possibly in progress, the sergeant had the officer
driving the van to stop. The sergeant claimed that he saw the man grab the front of his waistband
with both hands, even though the sergeant sat in the front passenger seat, the man was standing 8
feet away from the driver’s side window, and the driver herself did not see the man grab his
waistband. When the driver asked the man to come to the van, he said “no” and ran into a house.
The sergeant followed, breaking through the front door with his gun drawn and knocking over a
man in a wheelchair. The officers arrested the man for disorderly conduct, alleging that he began
screaming profanities as he was led out of the house, and flailed his arms to resist arrest. No
criminal charges were related to the underlying activity that the officers claimed to see.

Use of Force Allegations and Alleged Injuries to Victims. In the 180 complaints
containing a substantiated allegation of improper entry and/or search or failure to show a
warrant, 84 complaints (46%) also included a force allegation. These 84 complaints contained
212 force allegations that were fully investigated. Of the 212 fully investigated force allegations,
22 allegations (10%) were substantiated, 98 allegations (46%) were unsubstantiated, 43
allegations (20%) were exonerated, and 13 force allegations (6%) were unfounded. These force
allegations comprised allegations of physical force (127 allegations or 60%), allegations of a gun

75

pointed, used as a club, or fired (39 allegations or 18%), allegations of pepper spray being used
(12 allegations or 6%), allegations of a chokehold (9 allegations or 4%), allegations of a
nightstick, asp, or baton or other blunt instrument being used (10 allegations or 5%), allegations
of being hit against an inanimate object (5 allegations or 2%), allegations of a nonlethal
restraining device, handcuffs being too tight, or other force (10 allegations or 5%).
In the 174 complaints containing a substantiated allegation of improper entry and/or
search, victims in 41 complaints (24%) reported suffering an injury arising out of the officers’
improper entry or search of their premises. These injuries ranged from pain, swelling, and
bruising, to contusions and lacerations. In some cases, the CCRB obtained medical records
corroborating these injuries. Some victims alleged that these injuries occurred when officers
pushed them as part of the entry or search, while others alleged that the injuries occurred as
officers arrested them inside their residences.

Discourtesy and Offensive Language Allegations. The majority of the substantiated
complaints of improper entries, searches, and failures to show a warrant also contained an
allegation of discourtesy by an officer on the scene. Of the 180 substantiated complaints, 157
complaints (87%) also included a discourtesy allegation, corresponding to 125 discourtesy
allegations that were fully investigated. Of the 125 fully investigated discourtesy allegations, 20
allegations (16%) were substantiated, 89 allegations (71%) were unsubstantiated, 8 allegations
(6%) were exonerated, and 8 allegations (6%) were unfounded. The 16% substantiation rate of
discourtesy allegations within substantiated premises entry, search, and failure to show a warrant
allegations is higher than the CCRB’s overall substantiation rate of discourtesy allegations.
Between 2010 and 2014, the substantiation rate of all fully investigated discourtesy allegations
ranged from 3% to 6%, and in the first six months of 2015, the substantiation rate reached 9%.
Offensive language allegations were much less frequently raised within the substantiated
complaints of improper entries, searches, and failures to show a warrant. Of the 180
substantiated complaints, 26 complaints (15%) also included an offensive language allegation,
corresponding to 23 offensive language allegations that were fully investigated. Of the 23 fully
investigated offensive language allegations, 3 allegations (13%) were substantiated, 19
allegations (83%) were unsubstantiated, and 1 allegation (4%) was unfounded. In the first half
of 2015, 3% of all fully investigated offensive language allegations were substantiated, and the
substantiation rate between 2010 and 2014 increased from 2% to 6%.

Presence of Notice of Claim or Civil Lawsuit. In the 180 complaints containing a
substantiated allegation of improper entry, search, or failure to show a warrant, 7 complaints
(4%) had a statement from the complainant or victim that a Notice of Claim with the
Comptroller’s Office related to the incident, or a civil lawsuit arising out of the incident, had
been filed.

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For example, in a 2013 case, officers noticed a man standing in an apartment building
stairwell holding a red cup full of liquor. When officers approached the man to investigate the
open container violation, he dropped the cup and ran into an apartment, pursued by officers. At
the door of the apartment, a crowd of five people grabbed the man and an officer, pulling the
man into the apartment, and pushing the officers out of the apartment. In arresting the man, the
civilians alleged that officers punched a man and pushed a pregnant woman to the floor, leading
to three people going to the hospital and two filing a notice of claim with the City for false arrest
and excessive force.78

False Official Statements. In the 180 complaints containing a substantiated allegation
of improper entry and/or search or failure to show a warrant, 14 officers were referred by the
Board to IAB for further investigation of a potential false official statement. In addition, there
were 2 instances where the Board noted Other Misconduct in the form of a false official
statement, but exonerated or unsubstantiated the allegation of improper entry or search of
premises. In all 16 instances, the false official statement noted by the Board was material to
CCRB’s investigation of the premises entry and search allegations. As described in Section
Three, officers in these cases minimized or denied entering or searching premises as a way to
avoid involvement in the misconduct. Other evidence—in the form of video footage,
contradictory statements by other officers on the scene, and contradictory statements by
civilians—provided the CCRB with a sufficient basis to note a potential false official statement
by the officer.
In a November 2013 incident, officers activated I-cards for a pair of brothers, sought as
perpetrators in a robbery. The robbery victim identified the first suspect by seeing a wanted
poster for that person in the precinct and identifying him as one of the men who robbed him; the
victim identified the second suspect by picking him out of mug shots. Officers arrived at the
brothers’ home, where their mother answered the door. The mother alleged that the officers
pushed past her, immediately arrested one of her sons who was the subject of the I-card, and also
arrested another one of her sons, who was not the subject of the other I-card. Entries made in the
command log of the precinct showed that, initially, the names of the arresting officer and a
supervisor who verified the arrests were written in the log. Yet both the officer and sergeant’s
names were crossed out and replaced with another officer’s name; the latter officer denied
crossing out the original names listed. The officer and sergeant whose names were originally
written in the command log both denied being present at the apartment, denied arresting the two
men, and denied writing their names in the command log. The Board substantiated the improper

CCRB exonerated one officer’s use of physical force against the pregnant woman because it was the minimum
amount needed in light of the woman’s interference in the arrest. Another force allegation was closed as officers
unidentified. The final force allegation was closed as unsubstantiated because the victim pursued a claim with the
Comptroller’s Office and did not provide a CCRB statement. All officers denied punching or kicking any civilians;
however, the victim’s arrest photograph depicts a swollen upper lip and the command log at the precinct confirms
that he was transported to the hospital from the precinct.
78

77

entry by these officers into the apartment, and also cited the officer and sergeant for other
misconduct for making a false official statement to obscure their involvement in the incident.

Failure to Complete a Memo Book Entry. In the 180 complaints containing a
substantiated allegation of improper entry and/or search or failure to show a warrant, 58
complaints (32%) had Other Misconduct Noted in the form of officers failing to complete an
entry in their memo book about key aspects regarding their encounter with the victims. Memo
book entries are key to CCRB investigations, because they assist the CCRB in identifying
subject and witness officers, and documenting their movements and assignments each day.

Presence of Video, Audio or Relevant Photographs.

Of the 180 complaints
containing a substantiated allegation of improper entry, search, or failure to show a warrant, 30
substantiated complaints (17%) included video, audio, or photographs that depicted some aspect
of the improper entry or search.
For example, in a 2014 incident, a borough narcotics team was engaged in a buy-and-bust
operation, in which undercover officers observed two men making a hand-to-hand sale of
marijuana at a particular intersection. The narcotics team apprehended the purchaser, but lost
sight of the seller, who was on a bicycle at the time of the sale. After an hour canvassing for the
seller, the undercovers notified the team that the complainant, who was riding his bike, was the
seller. The team pursued the complainant and alleged that he ran into a basement apartment and
locked the door. Surveillance video, however, depicted the complainant walking without hurry
to the side door of the basement apartment, propping his bicycle against a table, looking for his
keys in his pocket, unlocking and opening the side door, and then entering and closing the door
behind him. The sergeant reached the door two seconds after the complainant closed it. Video
then showed the officers forcing the door open with a Kelly Tool, a detective and sergeant
entering the door, and then walking out with the complainant. The sergeant admitted pointing
his gun at the complainant and his wife when he entered the apartment. The complainant alleged
that the sergeant said, “Get the f--- on the floor,” pushed him to the ground, and placed his foot
on the side of his neck. A detective claimed that he entered a bedroom and saw an open shoebox
with a bag of marijuana in plain view. The complainant was arrested and charged with criminal
sale of marijuana in the fourth degree, and criminal possession of marijuana in the fifth degree,
though the charges were eventually dismissed. The CCRB found that the officers lacked exigent
circumstances to make forcible entry into the complainant’s apartment, given the non-violent
nature of the crime, no indication that the complainant was armed, and his casual entry into the
apartment indicated that he was not fleeing. Moreover, the CCRB discredited the detective’s
claim that he saw marijuana in plain view upon entering a bedroom, since surveillance video
showed him remaining in the apartment for over 13 minutes after the complainant was taken
outside.

78

SECTION FIVE: DISCIPLINE AND PENALTIES IN
SUBSTANTIATED CASES
The CCRB analyzed the type of discipline it recommended in substantiated cases of
premises entry, premises search, and failure to show a warrant, along with final discipline and
penalty imposed by the NYPD. Over the last five years, the CCRB has increased the number of
cases where it recommends command discipline or formalized training as the appropriate
discipline. While the CCRB has reduced the number and percentage of substantiated complaints
in which it recommends charges and specification, its Administrative Prosecution Unit (APU)
prosecutes many more of these cases than in prior years. In several cases, the Department’s
Deputy Commissioner – Trials has issued written decisions that align with the analysis of home
entries reflected in CCRB closing reports. Ultimately, the penalties imposed by the Department
after a successful prosecution reflects the Department’s emphasis on progressive discipline.
After the CCRB substantiates a complaint, it sends its finding to the Department, along
with a recommendation of the type of disciplinary penalty that should be imposed on the subject
officer in the substantiated allegation. The CCRB’s disciplinary recommendations to the
Department are advisory in nature. The Board has three basic options when making disciplinary
recommendations. The first form of discipline is to compel an officer to receive formalized
training, instructions from a commanding officer or other mild forms of discipline. The second
form of discipline is a command discipline schedule “A” or “B.” These cases are forwarded to
the subject officer’s commanding officer for adjudication, and can result in the loss of up to five
vacation days for a schedule A and up to ten vacation days for a schedule B. The third and most
severe disciplinary option is the filing and service of formal administrative charges and
specifications. This will launch a disciplinary administrative proceeding, and may lead to a loss
of vacation days, probation, suspension, or dismissal. Officers may plead guilty prior to trial, or
may be found guilty or not guilty after trial before an Assistant Deputy Commissioner – Trials.
In all cases, the Police Commissioner possesses the final authority to approve or disapprove
discipline, and decide the penalty to be imposed in cases of substantiated misconduct.
In 2012, the CCRB and the NYPD signed a Memorandum of Understanding allowing
CCRB to prosecute cases in which it recommended charges and specifications. The CCRB’s
Administrative Prosecution Unit (“APU”) began operating in April 2013 to carry out these
prosecutions. Under the MOU, the Police Commissioner has the discretion to retain a case
where charges have been recommended, though he must notify the CCRB and allow the CCRB
an opportunity to contest this decision.
Between January 1, 2010 and October 1, 2015, the CCRB substantiated 180 complaints
corresponding to 297 substantiated allegations of (1) premises entered and/or searched; and/or

79

(2) failure or refusal to show a warrant.
substantiated allegations.

There were 263 unique subject officers with

Over this period, the CCRB recommended Charges and Specifications in 174
substantiated allegations (59%) (Figure 23). Examining the year-to-year breakdown of
disciplinary recommendations, charges and specifications were recommended as discipline for
approximately 75% of allegations substantiated in the years between 2010 and 2014 (Figure 24).
In the first nine months of 2015, however, the CCRB recommended charges and specifications in
only 33% of substantiated allegations.
In 75 allegations (24%) substantiated between January 1, 2010 and October 1, 2015, the
CCRB recommended some form of command discipline (Figure 23). Between 2010 and 2014,
command discipline recommendations fluctuated between 13% and 24% of substantiated
allegations (Figure 24). In 2015, however, command discipline recommendations jumped to
40% of disciplinary recommendations made by the CCRB.
The CCRB began recommending formalized training as a form of discipline in 2014.
The CCRB has recommended formalized training in 27 allegations (26%) of those substantiated
in the first nine months of 2015 (Figure 24). The CCRB decreased its recommendation of
instructions to 1% of substantiated allegations in the first nine months of 2015.
In the 9 substantiated allegations of failure to show a warrant, the CCRB recommended
Instructions in 2 allegations (22%); Formalized Training in 2 allegations (22%); and Command
Discipline “A” for 4 allegations (44%). In the remaining substantiated allegation of failure to
show a warrant, the subject officer was also found to have committed an improper entry into a
home—the CCRB recommended charges for both substantiated allegations.
Figure 23: CCRB Disciplinary Recommendations in Substantiated Premises Entry,
Search, and Warrant Allegations
CCRB Disciplinary
Recommendation
Charges
Command Discipline79
Command Discipline A
Command Discipline B
Formalized Training
Instructions
No Recommendation
Total Substantiated Allegations

Number of Substantiated
Allegations
174
33
24
19
28
15
5
297

Percentage of Substantiated
Allegations
59%
11%
8%
6%
9%
5%
2%
100%

This category refers to cases where the Board recommended “Command Discipline,” but did not make a further
recommendation for either Schedule A or Schedule B Command Discipline.
79

80

Figure 24: CCRB Disciplinary Recommendations By Year in Substantiated Premises
Entry, Search, and Warrant Allegations
CCRB
Disciplinary
Recommendation

Number of
Allegations
Sub. In 2010

Number of
Allegations
Sub. In 2011

Number of
Allegations
Sub. In 2012

Number of
Allegations
Sub. In 2013

Number of
Allegations
Sub. In 2014

Charges
Command
Discipline
Instructions
Formalized
Training
No
Recommendation

26

5

14

40

55

Number of
Allegations
Sub. 1/1/2015
and
10/1/2015
34

6

1

5

12

10

41

1

1

2

0

10

1

0

0

0

0

1

27

2

0

0

3

0

0

35

7

21

55

76

103

74%

72%

67%

73%

72%

33%

17%

14%

24%

22%

13%

40%

3%

14%

9%

0%

13%

1%

0%

0%

0%

0%

2%

26%

6%

0%

0%

5%

0%

0%

Total Sub.
Allegations
% of allegations
with Charges
% of allegations
with Command
Discipline
% of allegations
with Instructions
% of allegations
with Formalized
Training
% of allegations
with No
Recommendation

81

Examining the NYPD’s final disciplinary decisions in substantiated entry, search, and
warrant cases indicates that the Department’s disciplinary action rate is in line with its overall
disciplinary action rate for all substantiated CCRB complaints. As of January 20, 2016, of the
297 substantiated allegations, the Department has informed the CCRB of its final disciplinary
decision in 185 allegations (62%) (Figure 25). Of these 185 allegations, the Department imposed
a penalty in 64% (or 118) allegations, and imposed no penalty in 36% (or 67) allegations. The
Department’s disciplinary action rate for substantiated complaints of all types in 2014 was 73%.
Figure 25: Police Department Discipline in All Substantiated Premises Entry, Search, and
Warrant Allegations80
Discipline Imposed

Number of
Substantiated
Allegations
112
Pending Final Discipline Decision
Penalty Imposed (118 allegations – 40%)
44
Instructions
19
Formalized Training
13
Guilty After Trial – Forfeit Vacation
16
Command Discipline B
13
Command Discipline A
7
Resolved by Plea – Forfeit Vacation
3
Reprimand
2
Suspension
1
Warned and admonished
No penalty (67 allegations – 23%)
28
No penalty – Department Unable to Prosecute
16
No penalty – Not Guilty Decision after Trial
81
13
No penalty – Statute of Limitations Expired
5
Retired
3
Charges Dismissed by APU
2
Retained, without discipline
297
Total Substantiated Allegations

80

Percentage of
Substantiated
Allegations
38%
15%
6%
4%
5%
4%
2%
1%
1%
0.3%
9%
5%
4%
2%
1%
1%
100%

Data about the final penalties imposed by the NYPD are provided by allegation. This means that, even if an
officer is not given a penalty for one substantiated allegation within a case, he or she may receive a penalty for
another substantiated allegation within the same complaint.
81
In twelve cases, the CCRB did not forward its findings and disciplinary recommendations to the Department until
after the statute of limitations had expired. In the thirteenth case, CCRB forwarded its findings and disciplinary
recommendations to the Department four days before expiration of the limitations period. All of these cases were
substantiated in or before August 2014.

82

Analysis of Disciplinary Decisions in Administrative Proceedings.
The CCRB recommended charges and specifications as discipline for 174 substantiated
allegations. The Department’s decline to prosecute rate, disciplinary rate, and final dispositions
should be assessed before and after April 2013, when APU began prosecuting cases in which
Board panels recommended charges and specifications.
Prior to April 2013, the Department declined to prosecute 12 of the 52 allegations in
which the CCRB recommended charges. The Department also imposed lesser penalties such as
command discipline B in 7 allegations or instructions in 17 allegations. The Department’s
decline to prosecute rate in pre-APU charges cases was 23%, while its rate of imposing lesser
discipline was 46%. The DAO prosecuted seven allegations (or 13%), culminating in a decision
after trial (4 allegations) or plea agreement with subject officers (3 allegations). The DAO
secured guilty verdicts for officers in three allegations and a not guilty verdict in the remaining
allegation, for a conviction rate of 75%.
After April 2013, the Department no longer declines prosecution, but instead has the
option to retain a case where charges have been recommended. The Department has chosen to
retain two allegations without discipline, and six allegations with discipline (formalized
training)—all of which arose out of incidents that occurred in 2013 and prior years (Figure 26).
In addition, in November 2014 and again in September 2015, the Department set aside two pleas
reached by APU with the subject officers. The incidents underlying both of these plea
agreements occurred in 2012. APU initiated prosecutions against all subject officers, with the
exception of one who retired, in charges cases arising out of incidents that occurred in 2014 and
2015.
The creation of APU, along with increased communication between the CCRB and the
NYPD, has resulted in the prosecution of an increased percentage of subject officers. In
addition, even though the CCRB has reduced the percentage of substantiated complaints in
which it recommends charges, more of those cases are going to trial as compared to the years
prior to the creation of APU. For example, this year alone four of the 34 allegations in which the
CCRB recommended charges have been scheduled for or commenced trial, as compared to seven
allegations prosecuted by the Department across the years of 2010 to April 2013. The APU has
obtained guilty verdicts after trial for officers in 12 allegations, while not guilty verdicts were
issued after trial for officers in 15 allegations, resulting in a 44% conviction rate.
In cases where officers forfeited vacation days as part of a plea agreement, the number of
days forfeited ranged from two days to 30 days (Figure 26). Where officers were found guilty
after trial, the Police Commissioner has imposed penalties ranging from a reprimand to forfeiture

83

of 10 vacation days. Administrative case law cited by Assistant Deputy Commissioners – Trials
supports recommendations that officers with no prior disciplinary records receive a forfeiture of
five vacation days as a penalty for improper entry and/or search. In a very recent case, however,
an ADCT recommended only three vacation days as the penalty for an improper entry, noting
another very recent Police Commissioner decision to impose that penalty upon a sergeant with
no prior disciplinary record.
Figure 26: Police Department Discipline in Allegations with Charges Recommendation
Discipline Imposed by NYPD

Number of
Allegations

Charges Served, in pre-trial stage
Charges Served, in trial stage
Plea agreed to or filed, awaiting NYPD approval
Charges Filed, Awaiting Service
Guilty Decision After Trial – Warned and Admonished
Guilty Decision After Trial – Reprimand
Guilty Decision After Trial – Forfeit Vacation
Resolved by Plea – Suspension
Resolved by Plea – Instructions
Resolved by Plea – Forfeit Vacation
Resolved by Plea – Command Discipline A
Plea Set Aside – Formalized Training
Plea Set Aside – Instructions Issued
Retained, With Discipline (Formalized Training)
Suspension
Command Discipline B
Instructions
No penalty – Not Guilty Decision after Trial
No penalty – Department Unable to Prosecute
No penalty – Statute of Limitations Expired
No penalty – Charges Dismissed
No penalty – Retired
Retained, Without Discipline
Total Allegations Where CCRB Recommended Charges
and Specifications

16
35
10
4
1
3
11
1
1
7
2
1
1
6
1
9
19
16
12
8
3
5
2
174

Number of
Allegations
65 Allegations
Pending
(38%)

63 Penalty
Imposed
(36%)

46 No Penalty
Imposed
(26%)

174

An examination of Deputy Commissioner guilty decisions at the conclusion of
administrative trials demonstrates that the Department, at times, concurs with the reasoning by
which the CCRB substantiated improper entries and searches. For example, the Department
assesses whether valid was consent was given, and in cases where it has been, whether officers
84

remained within the scope of that consent. In one case, the Assistant Deputy Commissioner Trials (“ADCT”) found that an officer who entered a civilian’s apartment using a key, despite
her many refusals to open the door, did not possess valid consent to enter. In another case, an
ADCT found a subject officer guilty of an improper search where the officer continued searching
a civilian’s apartment even after she repeatedly asked the officer to leave her apartment, thereby
revoking her initial consent to enter.
Assistant Deputy Commissioners have also found that no exigent or emergency
circumstances existed to support warrantless entry into private homes. In one case, the ADCT
reviewed a situation involving entry to arrest the perpetrator of a domestic violence assault. The
ADCT reviewed the factors set forth in People v. McBride, as well as two Department legal
bulletins regarding warrantless entries of homes, and noted that the ultimate issue was whether
an “urgent need” for the warrantless intrusion exists. The ADCT found no urgent need for
immediate entry because there was no indication that the perpetrator was armed or that evidence
related to the assault would be destroyed. In addition, the ADCT did not find any likelihood that
the perpetrator would escape, especially because eight officers were on the scene. The ADCT
noted that the scene could have been safeguarded until officers obtained proper authorization to
enter the apartment. In another case, an ADCT rejected an officer’s claim that he entered an
apartment to look for a small child inside since, as the officer testified at trial, he did not hear
anything signaling distress before he opened the civilian’s unlocked front door.
In one important case, an ADCT addressed the complexity of the hot pursuit doctrine, as
it arises from encounters based on reasonable suspicion or less than probable cause. The civilian
victim in this case testified that, as she was leaving an apartment for dinner, she saw two men
dressed all in black standing in the hallway. She asked the men if she could help them, but
neither responded. She then stepped back into her apartment to avoid passing the men, who she
found large and intimidating. As she tried to close the door, the men pushed it open, she fell to
the ground, and an officer straddled her and searched her coat pockets. The officers testified that
they had received a kite complaint about this apartment previously, and on the day of the
incident, received a noise complaint regarding the occupants. One subject officer testified that,
as the officers approached the apartment door, the civilian exited the apartment and asked them
“what do you need,” while holding what he believed to be an eight ball of crack cocaine. The
officer concluded that the civilian was offering to sell him drugs, and so he pursued her into the
apartment when she turned and went inside. The civilian was discovered to be holding a blue
and white lollipop. The ADCT noted that the hot pursuit doctrine allows entry only where
officers have probable cause to arrest an individual for a crime. The subject officers, however,
did not possess probable cause to believe that the civilian was engaged in narcotics sale—since
they only had a prior anonymous kite complaint, a noise complaint on the day of the incident,
asked the civilian no questions about what she held in her hand, and saw nothing indicative of a
drug sale at the apartment—and therefore had “no legal right to pursue” her into the apartment.

85

Finally, in a recent case, an ADCT examined a detective’s conduct in light of the law
requiring that entries into apartments pursuant to arrest warrants be based upon an officer’s
reasonable belief that the subject of the arrest warrant resides there. The lead detective entered
the apartment of a civilian looking for her father, who was wanted on a bench warrant and open
investigation card. The detective testified that he believed the father could be found in his
daughter’s apartment based on a number of factors, including statements made by the daughter
and her mother, the presence of the father’s car close to her apartment, and the use of an
electronic benefits card nearby. The ADCT noted that the detective had not recorded many of
these statements in complaint follow-up forms (known as DD-5s), and that checks of the car’s
location and use of the EBT card in the weeks leading up to the entry did not confirm the father’s
presence near his daughter’s apartment. Given the lack of evidence indicating that the father
lived in his daughter’s apartment, the ADCT found the detective’s entry and search into the
apartment unlawful. In addition, the ADCT discredited the detective’s testimony that the
apartment door “swung open,” and found forcible entry.
Not guilty decisions also turned on the crucial issues of consent, exigent or emergency
circumstances, and the use of arrest or bench warrants to gain entry. Consent excused officers’
initial entries into apartments or driveways surrounding a home in a few cases. In another case,
the CCRB failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the officers entered without
consent. ADCTs have found emergency circumstances to allow entry where officers responded
to a home alarm to investigate a potential burglary, or to resolve a potential domestic violence
situation. Exigent circumstances were found to exist in a case where the ADCT credited the
officer’s testimony that the occupant of the apartment was engaged in narcotics sale, was likely
to be tipped off about her accomplice’s arrest, and sounds inside the apartment indicated that the
occupant was trying to destroy contraband. In two cases, ADCTs found that the officers’
actions—looking for medication and a knife used by an EDP, or retrieving a child from behind a
closed bedroom door—did not constitute an improper search.
In two cases resulting in not guilty decisions, ADCTs assessed an officer’s use of a bench
or parole warrant to enter a home and found that the officers possessed a reasonable belief that
the subject of the warrant resided in the premises and was present at the time of the entry. In one
case, the ADCT credited testimony that a particular man lived with the mother of his sons based
on the mother’s domestic violence complaint filed a week prior to the entry stating that he “came
home” and assaulted her. In another case, the ADCT found that officers possessed a reasonable
belief that the subject of a parole warrant resided and was present within his mother’s home
based on his use of that address with the DMV and since members of his family resided there. In
this case, and others, ADCTs have resolved doubts about the propriety of an officer’s conduct by
finding that the officer acted in good faith, and did not commit misconduct since he did not act
intentionally or negligently.

86

Analysis of Disciplinary Decisions in Non-Charges Cases
In cases where the CCRB recommended command discipline, instructions, or formalized
training, the Department accepted the CCRB’s recommendation of command discipline in 15
(32%) of the 47 allegations decided by the Department. The Department accepted the CCRB’s
recommendation of formalized training or imposed a more severe form of discipline in 9 (90%)
of the 10 allegations decided by the Department (Figures 27 and 28). The Department accepted
the CCRB’s recommendation of instructions or imposed more serious discipline in 7 (50%) of
the 14 allegations decided by the Department (Figure 29). The Department’s rate of agreement
with CCRB’s disciplinary recommendations this year cannot yet be determined, since a large
number and percentage of substantiated allegations are pending final decision.
There were also five substantiated allegations where the CCRB made no disciplinary
recommendations. In three allegations, the Department declined to pursue discipline. In one
allegation, the Department issued instructions to the subject officer. In the remaining allegation,
the Department served Charges and Specifications on the subject officers, obtained a guilty
decision at trial and imposed a penalty of forfeiture of 30 vacation days.
The Department has made final disciplinary decisions in 3 of the 9 substantiated
allegations of failures to show a warrant. The Department issued instructions in these 3
allegations.
Figure 27: Police Department Discipline in Allegations with Command Discipline
Recommendation
Discipline Imposed by NYPD
Pending Final Discipline Decision
Instructions
No penalty – Department Unable to Prosecute
Command Discipline A
Command Discipline B
Formalized Training
No penalty – Statute of Limitations Expired
Forfeit vacation
Total allegations Where CCRB Recommended Command
Discipline

87

Number of Cases
28
16
8
10
5
4
3
1
75

Figure 28: Police Department Discipline in Allegations with Formalized Training
Recommendation
Final Penalty Imposed by NYPD
Pending Final Discipline Decision
Command Discipline A
Formalized Training
Instructions
Total allegations Where CCRB Recommended Formalized
Training

Number of Cases
18
1
8
1
28

Figure 29: Police Department Discipline in Allegations with Instructions Recommendation
Final Penalty Imposed by NYPD
Pending Final Discipline Decision
No penalty – Department Unable to Prosecute
No penalty – Statute of Limitations Expired
Instructions
Command Discipline B
Total allegations Where CCRB Recommended Instructions

88

Number of Cases
1
5
2
5
2
15

SECTION SIX: A REVIEW OF EXONERATED,
UNSUBSTANTIATED, AND OFFICER UNIDENTIFIED
ALLEGATIONS
The CCRB reviewed exonerated and unsubstantiated allegations of premises entry,
search, and warrant allegations in order to contextualize its findings in substantiated allegations.
The CCRB can resolve most improper search and entry allegations on the merits as substantiated
or exonerated. The presence of a valid warrant, or contemporaneous radio runs or 911 calls of
crimes-in-progress, leads to the exoneration of most premises entry and search allegations. In
contrast, failure to show a warrant allegations often involved conflicting statements between
civilians and officers, where a preponderance of evidence does not exist to support either version
of events. Accordingly, the majority of failure to show a warrant allegations remain
unsubstantiated.

Exonerated Entry and Search Allegations
Between January 1, 2010 and October 1, 2015, the CCRB exonerated 1,527 allegations of
premises entry and/or search, comprising 62% of all 2,465 such allegations. The CCRB
reviewed these allegations by first isolating those that were exonerated because officers
possessed a valid search warrant, valid arrest or bench warrant, or other valid court order
authorizing entry into the premises. The CCRB then selected a random sample of the remaining
823 entry and search allegations—172 allegations—and determined the basis for the exoneration.
Almost 30% of all improper search and entry allegations were exonerated due to the
presence of a valid warrant.82 The existence of a valid search warrant or other legal
authorization permitting a search on premises led to the exoneration of 591 (24%) of the 2,465
allegations of improper entry and search (Figure 30). Another 113 (or 5%) of all improper
search and entry allegations were exonerated due to the existence of a valid arrest, bench, or
parole warrant, or other legal order authorizing entry into premises (Figure 30). These 704
allegations corresponded to 663 complaints.
One reason why civilians file complaints regarding incidents where officers execute valid
warrants may be a failure by the officers to show the warrant to the civilian. Of the 663
complaints in which officers possessed a valid warrant, 138 complaints (21%) included
allegations that officers failed to show that warrant to the occupant.
The CCRB exonerated 823 (33%) of the 2,465 allegations of improper entry and search
in situations where officers did not have a warrant (Figure 30). After reviewing a random
82

Data on the total number of warrant executions during the period under review would allow one to determine
whether a large or small proportion of warrant executions lead to civilian complaints.

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sample consisting of 172 (21%) of these 823 allegations, the CCRB identified several bases for
the exoneration. Sufficient exigent or emergency circumstances existed in 57% of the sampled
allegations to justify the warrantless entry and/or search (Figure 31). Valid consent was given to
authorize the warrantless entry and/or search in 26% of the sampled allegations. Officers were in
hot pursuit of a suspect in 11% of the sampled allegations. In a small number and percentage of
allegations, officers either conducted a valid protective sweep of the premises or entered to
correct a noise violation. In another few cases, officers entered or searched an area, such as a
common hallway, in which the complainant did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy.
Figure 30: Bases for All Exonerated Entry and Search Allegations
Basis of Exoneration

Number of Exonerated Entry
and Search Allegations

Entry and Search Conducted Pursuant to Valid Search
Warrant, Probation Search, or Liquor Inspection

591

Entry Conducted Pursuant to Valid Arrest Warrant, Bench
Warrant, Parole Warrant, or Court Order

113

Entry and Search Permissible Pursuant to Warrant Exception
or Other Reason

823

Total Exonerated Allegations

1,527

Figure 31: Bases for Exoneration in Sample of Exonerated Allegations
Applicable Warrant Exception

Number of
Allegations

Percentage
of Sample

Exigent or Emergency Circumstances Present

98

57%

Valid Consent to Entry and Search Provided by Occupant

44

26%

Hot Pursuit Doctrine Applicable

19

11%

Officers Entered or Searched Area where Occupant Had No
Reasonable Expectation of Privacy

6

3%

Officers Conducted Appropriate Protective Sweep of Premises

3

2%

Entry to Correct Noise Violation

2

1%

172

100%

Total Allegations Sampled

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The CCRB found that the occupant had provided consent to enter and/or search premises
in a numerous cases. Some of these cases involved implied consent, such as an individual
opening the door and walking away, allowing the officers to enter the home. Other cases
involved a signed consent to search form. Officers obtained a signed and valid consent to search
form in 16 of the 44 allegations of improper entry and/or search (corresponding to 11 cases)
exonerated because of valid consent.
Exigent and emergency circumstances are generally found by the CCRB when officers
enter an apartment during the course of their response to a call of a crime-in-progress, or to
address a situation involving an emotionally disturbed person. For example, in a 2014 case,
officers responded to an apartment from which an occupant had called 911 to report that a man
was holding them at knifepoint. When officers arrived at the home, the occupants refused to
open the door despite numerous commands to do so over several hours. Officers called for an
Emergency Services Unit team and a Hostage Negotiation Team, and eventually broke down the
door to arrest the perpetrator and ensure the safety of two young children inside. In a 2015 case,
a man who had just been stabbed inside an apartment called 911 as he left it. Officers responded
to the apartment, and arrested the perpetrator outside in the hallway. Seeing blood on the floor,
officers also entered the apartment and checked all the rooms to confirm there were no other
injured victims inside.
Officers also are called upon to investigate whether an EDP should be taken to the
hospital. In a 2015 case, officers responded to a 911 call stating that a woman with a history of
mental illness was acting violent inside an apartment. In another case, officers pushed their way
into an apartment after the occupant called 311 and said she would either kill herself or someone
else. Other emergency situations where warrantless entry was permissible included investigation
of a medical alert, a drug overdose, children crying or in distress inside an apartment, a water
leak, and a broken boiler in winter.
In a few instances, officers responded to a call of shots fired. In a 2012 case, officers
received a radio run generated by a 911 call that shots had been fired on the second floor of a
particular address. Officers responded within four minutes to that address, went inside the
building and to the second floor, and entered an apartment with their guns drawn. The CCRB
found that the existence of a potential violent crime, the likelihood that the suspect was armed,
and the likelihood that the suspect was still at the apartment when the officers arrived, all gave
officers exigent circumstances to enter the apartment.
The CCRB has found in a few cases that officers’ immediate entry into an apartment to
seize narcotics and apprehend those involved in drug sales was justified by exigent
circumstances. In a 2015 case, a borough narcotics team engaged in a buy-and-bust operation.

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The undercover officer reported to the team that she had been taken to a house, where she
obtained heroin and saw marijuana being packaged on the ground floor. The undercover argued
back and forth with the occupants of the house about her identity and whether she was a police
officer. After she left, officers entered the house, seized narcotics, and arrested the sellers. The
CCRB found exigent circumstances primarily because the occupants suspected that the
undercover was an officer, leading to a likelihood that they would destroy the contraband and
escape.
Hot pursuit is applied to exonerate an allegation when the investigation reveals that
officers initiate an arrest based upon probable cause in public and then pursue an individual
continuously into a residence. In a 2014 case, officers witnessed two men in a physical fight.
When the officers approached, one man fled, ran to his house, scaled a metal gate and entered the
house through the back entrance. Officers chased him to the house, knocked on the front door,
and entered it past the man’s aunt in order to apprehend the man.

Unsubstantiated Entry and Search Allegations
Between January 1, 2010 and October 1, 2015, the CCRB unsubstantiated 493 or 20% of
all 2,465 allegations of improper entry and/or search. The CCRB reviewed a sample consisting
of 145 allegations (29%) of these 493 unsubstantiated allegations. The 145 sampled allegations
corresponded to 91 complaints. As with all unsubstantiated complaints, the CCRB did not have a
preponderance of the evidence to come to a conclusion about a material issue in the incident.
For example, in some cases, the dispute was over the entry itself—the civilians alleged that
officers entered their residences or stuck a foot in the doorway, while officers denied it. In other
cases, the dispute centered over the occurrence or scope of search. Civilians alleged that they
saw officers opening cabinets, looking in closets, going under mattresses and conducting other
types of searches, or that they found their items in disarray, suggesting that officers did so. In
contrast, officers denied conducting a search and, in cases where guns or drugs were recovered
from a residence, claimed to find the contraband in plain view.
Thirty-three (33) of the 91 complaints arose from incidents involving disputed consent—
the civilians denied providing consent, while the officers claimed that they had consent to enter
and/or search. Among these thirty-three complaints involving disputed consent, officers
obtained a signed consent to search form in only three complaints. In the remaining thirty
complaints, officers did not obtain a signed consent to search form. In sixteen complaints,
subject officers were assigned to commands that, pursuant to the Department’s Operations Order,
were required to obtain a signed consent to search form.
Among all 493 unsubstantiated allegations, officers obtained a signed consent to search
form in only seven complaints. The existence of a signed consent to search form did not
exonerate the officers involved in these incidents for a few reasons. In one case, officers

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presented and obtained a signed form after they had already conducted a search. In two other
cases, officers and civilians had different accounts of whether the officers entered before or after
they obtained the signed form. In three cases, the civilians admitted signing a consent to search
form, but said they did so only because officers threatened to arrest them or contact ACS if they
did not. In the final case, the civilian alleged both that she was presented with the form after a
search of her apartment had already occurred, and signed it only because the officer on the scene
told her she would lose her apartment if she did not—which the officer denied doing.

Failure to Show a Warrant Allegations
The CCRB unsubstantiated 116 (66%) of the 175 failure to show a warrant allegations
decided between January 1, 2010 and October 1, 2015. The CCRB reviewed a sample consisting
of 37 (32%) of these 116 unsubstantiated allegations. Civilians alleged, in these cases, that they
requested to see a search warrant, but that the officers at their residence either did not show it to
them or affirmatively refused to do so. Officers, in contrast, allege that they either did not hear a
civilian make a request to see a warrant, that they actually did show the civilian the warrant, or
that they could not recall whether or not they showed the civilian the warrant. Without
additional evidence to resolve the dispute between the civilians’ and officers’ accounts, the
CCRB could not substantiate the allegation.
The CCRB exonerated 4 (2%) of the 175 failure to show a warrant allegations. In one, a
civilian alleged that a particular officer on the scene did not show her a search warrant when she
asked to see one. The CCRB determined that this officer did not possess the warrant, and
therefore exonerated the allegation against him. In another case, the CCRB concluded that,
given the dangerous nature of the warrant execution, officers were not required to show the
warrant to the civilian immediately when she asked for it, but did offer to show it to her later.

“Officer Unidentified” Complaints
Of the 1,762 complaints containing allegations of premises entered and/or searched, or
failure to show a warrant, 125 complaints (7%) had 128 allegations disposed of as “Officer
Unidentified.” The CCRB reviewed 26 complaints that had allegations of premises entry,
search, or failure to show a warrant that were closed as “Officer Unidentified” in 2014. There
were three main reasons why the CCRB was unable to identify the officers involved in these
allegations. First, discrepancies among NYPD documents prevented identification. Second, the
civilian complainant did not actually witness the officers who entered or searched the premises,
and only saw the aftermath of the entry or search. Therefore, the complainant was unable to
provide a description of the subject officers. Third, the civilian was unable to recall or provide
enough information or pedigree descriptions about the officers, and the CCRB was unable to
identify them either.

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SECTION SEVEN: CCRB RECOMMENDATIONS
Recommendations to the NYPD on the issue of entries and searches on premises are
guided by the nature of law enforcement activity at homes and businesses, and the specific
failings noted in substantiated complaints. The initial, and often dispositive, issues are why an
officer decides to enter a home, and how he or she chooses to do so. The lack of exigent and
emergency circumstances, the improper use of investigation cards and warrants issued years
earlier, the misunderstanding of the hot pursuit doctrine—all lead to unlawful entries into
constitutionally-protected spaces. In addition, consent obtained through physical force, coercion,
threats, or other improper means, or not even obtained at all, violates basic legal principles. The
illegality of such intrusions is compounded where an officer kicks, breaks, or bangs down the
front door to a home. Yet what an officer does inside a home often matters just as much as how
he or she entered the home. Where officers use physical force against residents, arrest them,
search beyond the scope of consent, seize or damage property, point guns at occupants, and
otherwise act discourteously, they leave themselves open to complaints of misconduct even if
their initial entry was justified.
Recommendation 1: The Department should record, as part of its body-worn
camera program, all non-exigent home entries (and, when possible, all home entries)
to document their propriety. The Department should craft rules to protect privacy
if entry videos are released.
Video recording inside civilian homes pose serious implications for an invasion of a
civilian’s privacy. Where a civilian’s Fourth Amendment rights are violated through an
improper search and entry, additional intrusion through the use of surveillance technology
compounds the injury. In addition, the storage of and access to footage of a civilian’s home—
even weeks and months later, for unrelated law enforcement purposes—is a crucial factor in
whether the advantages of body-worn cameras inside the home are outweighed by the risks of
misuse. Yet CCRB would be remiss if it did not note the value that video recording has to its
investigative work, and the crucial role it can play in resolving allegations of officer misconduct.
In December 2014, the Department launched a pilot program equipping certain patrol
officers with body-worn cameras. These cameras possess the capability to record both audio and
video of civilian encounters with police. Under Operations Order 48, governing the use of bodyworn cameras, officers are required to record certain categories of encounters, and have
discretion to record encounters that do not fall within the mandatory categories.83 Some of the
mandatory categories are ones that implicate officers entering, searching, and being present
inside homes. For example, officers are required to record stops of civilians based upon

83

See NYPD, Operations Order No. 48, “Pilot Program – Use of Body-Worn Cameras” at 2 (Dec. 2, 2014).

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reasonable suspicion—if a civilian flees, officers have pursued those individuals into homes.
Next, officers are required to record encounters where individuals commit a summons-able
offense. Several instances of improper home entries arose from officers encountering
individuals engaged in drinking in public view, or other minor offenses. Officers are also
required to record “all interior vertical patrols of non-Housing Authority buildings and Housing
Authority buildings.” Again, several CCRB complaints of improper entries and searches arose
during the course of an officers’ vertical patrol of a NYCHA building. Finally, officers are
required to record all use of force incidents, which arise not infrequently during the course of a
home entry.
While Operations Order 48 instructs officers not to activate their body-worn cameras in
“[p]laces where a reasonable expectation of privacy” exists, the CCRB recommends that the
Department use body-worn cameras to address three distinct issues that arise in the context of
home entries. The Board passed a resolution in October 2015 calling on the NYPD to equip
members of service that conduct home entries with body-worn cameras.
First, the video recording may illuminate the circumstances that lead to officer entry into
premises. This includes recording of any exigent or emergency circumstances that may exist—
such as noises or visual observations—that justify a warrantless entry. In addition, video can be
used to document verbal consent provided by an occupant, or the occupant’s actions that
provided the officer with implied consent. Video can also capture the verbal exchange between
officers and civilians that lead to consent. Officer threats, representations regarding a warrant,
and discussion of an investigation card are all crucial factors in determining whether consent was
voluntary. Finally, video may capture the facts and circumstances that provide an officer with
probable cause to initiate a hot pursuit of a suspect into a residence.
Second, body-worn cameras can shed light on how officers gain entry into homes and
businesses—through physical force, such as pushing a civilian or kicking down a door, or going
through an open window. How an officer gains entry is often an important element in
determining whether consent is valid, or exigent circumstances are present.
Third, video recording of an officers’ actions inside a home may be useful, though it also
raises the most privacy concerns for citizens. Recording what occurs during the course of an
entry and search of premises assists in resolving the scope of an officers’ search, as well as
whether the officer used force, discourtesy, or offensive language—allegations that frequently
accompany those of improper entry and search. Body-worn cameras can also document that
officers show civilians a search warrant affirmatively, or an arrest warrant upon request.
Officers who find contraband inside a home in plain view can document that discovery with
body-worn cameras, and avoid challenges to their conduct in both criminal proceedings and
CCRB complaints. Also crucial is the civilian’s conduct inside the home. Civilians were
arrested, detained, or issued a summons after an officer’s improper entry or search in more than

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half of the substantiated complaints. Video would assist civilians and officers in proving the
existence, or lack, of probable cause.
Recommendation 2: The Department should expand its current policy regarding the
consent to search form and require all officers in the Department to use the form
absent exigent or emergency circumstances.
Currently the Department requires only officers assigned to investigatory commands or
units, including the Detective Bureau and OCCB, to use a consent to search form whenever they
want to enter a “particular location” to seize property or a person. The Department should
expand this policy to require all officers to document consent to enter or search a location, absent
exigent or emergency circumstances.84
Expanding the policy to include all officers not only safeguards the rights of civilians, but
also may result in the exoneration of misconduct allegations. 42 (24%) of the 174 of
substantiated complaints of improper entry or search involved situations where consent was the
dispositive—and disputed—issue. Although the CCRB found a preponderance of evidence in
these cases that no consent was given, if a signed and valid consent to search form had been
present, those cases may have been exonerated. In addition, a signed consent to search form
provides evidence for officers and districts attorney in court where arrests and seizures of
evidence are challenged on the basis of an officers’ unlawful entry and search in a home.
The consent to search form also removes ambiguity from situations where a civilian’s
actions—such as stepping away or walking away from a door—constitute implied consent.
Officers no longer have to guess, nor are civilians forced to explicitly protest, in order to
establish consent. Indeed, over a third of the sampled unsubstantiated complaints were ones
where consent was disputed, and a signed consent to search form may have allowed a finding on
the merits.
Apart from expanding this policy, the Department should reinforce the current Operations
Order it has in place by reminding officers that the consent to search form should be signed prior
to entry and search of a location, not simply instances where the search yields something of
value. Where the consent to search form is signed after the entry and search takes place it has
less probative value in documenting that the civilian provided consent prior to the entry and
search. In addition, officers should be reminded that threats cannot be used to gain a civilian’s
signature. Indeed, officers should be reminded in their training materials and other written
directives that threats unsupported by probable cause, or exigent or emergency circumstances,
are improper. Moreover, consent is rendered invalid by misrepresentations that an officer

84

The New York City Council is considering a bill that would require officers conducting consent searches in any
context, including home entries, to inform the person being searched that the search is consensual and that he or she
has the right to deny or withdraw consent. The bill would also require that officers document consent through an
audio or signed record, and provide proof of consent to the person searched. See Int 0541-2014.

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possesses a warrant when they do not—including situations where officers have only an
investigation card.
In addition, the Department’s current Operations Order and consent to search policy
should be incorporated into the Patrol Guide. Not only would this remind officers of the
existence of the policy and the procedures to be followed, it would allow the Department to
cross-reference other key Patrol Guide sections. For example, the Patrol Guide currently
requires that language assistance be provided to limited English proficiency (“LEP”) individuals
in a number of instances. One such instance should be where an individual is presented with a
consent to search form to sign.
While the CCRB has noted “Other Misconduct” in only two instances for an officer’s
failure to obtain a signed consent to search form, many other subject officers in improper entry
and search complaints failed to do so. Going forward, CCRB investigators will be reminded to
determine whether the Department’s current Order requires a subject officer to have obtained a
signed consent to search form. Where officers were required to do so, but did not, the CCRB
will refer this as “Other Misconduct” to the Department for further investigation.
Recommendation 3: The Patrol Guide should be revised to contain a stand-alone
section on the law of search and seizures at homes and businesses.
The NYPD Patrol Guide contains separate sections on the law of arrests and the law of
searches for evidence, with some indication of how these two bodies of procedure intersect with
homes and businesses. A stand-alone section in the Patrol Guide setting forth the basic law of
search and seizure at homes and businesses is necessary to consolidate applicable legal doctrines,
the exceptions to the warrant requirement, and related police procedures.
As an initial matter, the Patrol Guide should contain a new section that begins with the
Payton rule: absent consent or exigent circumstances, arrests and searches in homes must be
conducted pursuant to probable cause and a warrant. The section should distinguish between
homes and businesses, and provide the factors under which searches and entries of the latter are
improper. Further, this section should set forth the legal standards for voluntary consent, the
Department’s consent to search form, and the factors used to assess whether exigent or
emergency circumstances are present. This section should discuss the hot pursuit doctrine, and
that officers may pursue an individual into a home only if they have probable cause to support
the arrest in public. Reasonable suspicion can justify an officer’s pursuit of a fleeing individual
in a public place, but not entry into a private place. As it stands, no section of the Patrol Guide
contains this guidance for officers. In addition, this section should incorporate the standards
contained in Patrol Guide 208-42 that officers must obtain a search warrant in order to execute
an arrest warrant at a third-party residence. This section should also incorporate the plain view
doctrine contained in Patrol Guide 212-75, and expand upon it to describe the circumstances
allowing entry when officers outside the home observe contraband in plain view inside the home.

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Other revisions to the Patrol Guide are warranted. Patrol Guide 208-23 on Investigation
Cards should be revised to state the circumstances under which officers should go to homes in
order to look for the suspect of an investigation card. This section should also clearly state that
investigation cards are not warrants, and carry no authority in themselves for an officer to enter a
home.
At least two other police departments with model polices contain sections in their
departmental policy and procedure manual that contain, in one place, the legal rules applicable to
searches and seizures generally, not simply the procedures of how search or arrest warrants can
be obtained and should be executed. These policies clearly state the warrant requirement for
searches and seizures, including those on premises, and then outline clearly the exceptions to the
warrant requirement. These policies incorporate both the law and the procedure, so that officers
can proceed from the law regarding searches and seizures on premises to the appropriate
procedures for obtaining a warrant, and how it must be executed at a home or private area of a
business. At least one jurisdiction requires officers to document consent to a search on a
department consent to search form.
The Seattle Police Department Manual clearly states “searches and seizures generally
must be made pursuant to a warrant.”85 Officers “bear the burden” of documenting that an
exception to the warrant requirement applies. The Manual outlines the legal standards for the
various exceptions to the search warrant requirement, including consent, exigent and emergency
circumstances, and the plain view doctrines. Officers who use the “consent” exception to the
warrant requirement are required to document the consent using a “consent to search form,” or, if
the form is unavailable, a department authorized recording device.
The Minneapolis Police Department’s Policy and Procedure Manual contains a section
regarding “Search and Seizure.”86 This section outlines the relevant legal rules and department
procedures applicable to searches of persons, searches of vehicles, and searches of dwellings and
buildings. In the last category, the Manual clearly states:
“A search warrant is always required to search dwellings and non-public areas of
buildings, absent consent or exigent circumstances. Without a search warrant, officers
may legally search a dwelling or building in the following circumstances:
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.

85
86

Hot Pursuit;
Protect and Preserve Life;
To Prevent the Destruction of Evidence;
Serving an Arrest Warrant;
Consent Search.”

Seattle Police Department Manual POL-6.180 (eff. Date 1/1/2015).
Minneapolis Police Department, Policy and Procedure Manual 9-200, Search and Seizure.

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Recommendation 4: The Police Student’s Guide should be revised to contain a
stand-alone section that addresses the Payton rule as it applies to searches and
seizures generally.
The Department’s training material should be revised to explicitly note that entries to
investigate crimes and complaints at homes need a warrant, absent exigent or emergency
circumstances or consent. Warrants should not be listed as the last option available for officers if
they cannot first gain consent or establish exigent circumstances to gain entry into premises.
Troublingly, the Police Student’s Guide leaves officers with the impression that they should try
to establish exigent circumstances to gain entry, as opposed to noting that the warrant
requirement is primary, with exigent circumstances permitting entry only in certain, limited
circumstances. Training materials should provide examples of what constitutes an exigent or
emergency circumstance, and what does not. Routine investigations of crimes that have already
occurred and are not currently in progress at the time the officers arrive at the residence generally
do not provide exigent circumstances to enter residences.
Regarding consent, officers should be instructed on the use of threats to gain consent to
enter and search a home or business. Training material should explicitly describe the plain view
doctrine, and provide examples of where the plain view doctrine does not allow entry without a
warrant, consent, or exigent circumstances. Concurrent with revisions to the Patrol Guide,
officers should be explicitly told that:
o Officers can pursue a fleeing individual only if they have reasonable
suspicion that the individual has committed, is committing, or will commit
a crime. Reasonable suspicion, however, does not permit entry into a
private home.
o If officers enter a private residence in pursuit of an individual, they must
possess probable cause that the individual committed a crime.
o The hot pursuit doctrine only allows entry into a home if the officer
initiated the arrest outside of the home.
o Officers should not pursue individuals into a home for a violation.
For borough narcotics commands and officers assigned to street narcotics enforcement
units, training on the standards for probable cause versus reasonable suspicion is crucial. As is
training on the presence of drugs and contraband providing exigent circumstances for entry and
searches into homes. Generally, the mere existence of a drug-related crime or the presence of
narcotics is insufficient to justify a warrantless entry or search of a home.
For members of the Warrant Squad and Detective Bureau, officers should be reminded of
that an arrest or bench warrant can only be executed at a home if they possess a reasonable belief
that the subject of the warrant resides and can be found inside. In the case of warrants issued
several months or years earlier, certain investigative steps must be taken in order to form a

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reasonable belief that the subject of those warrants still lives at a particular dwelling. This is
especially important when warrants issued several months or years earlier are used to enter
homes looking for a different person for whom only an investigation card has been issued. The
Department should consider, if it does not have it already, establishing a protocol for such
investigative procedures before warrants issued several months or years before are executed at
homes. Introducing such guidelines is especially important in light of the over 1 million open
warrants in New York City, some of which were issued in the 1970s.87
In all arrest warrant investigations and apprehensions, officers should take reasonable
steps to confirm that the subject of a warrant resides in and is present in the home to be entered.
In warrant sweep situations, officers should confirm the validity of open warrants to avoid the
appearance of using invalid warrants as a pretext to investigate other criminal conduct.
In addition, the Department should examine how officers use its investigation card
system in order to apprehend suspects at homes, in light of the numerous CCRB complaints
involving investigation cards. An analysis of the complaints involving I-cards reveals that, in
many instances, subject officers had time to obtain an arrest warrant prior to arriving at an
individual’s residence. It is unclear why officers do not obtain arrest warrants when they have
sufficient time to do so. Relying only upon investigation cards invites illegal conduct—civilians
are confused about what an I-card is and may consent to entry based on a misrepresentation or
misunderstanding that it is a warrant. Officers who arrive with only an I-card and see the suspect
inside an apartment may feel compelled to arrest the person even knowing they need, but do not
have, an arrest warrant. The Department should outline situations where officers can arrive at a
home with only an I-card, and where officers should first obtain an arrest warrant.
Recommendation 5: The Department should make a series of roll-call
announcements reminding officers of the requirements of Patrol Guide 214-23
regarding noise violations.
A number of complaints arise from situations where officers respond to noise complaints
or hear excessive noise from a home. These situations often require officers to address groups of
civilians, who may be angry at the officers’ presence, and refuse entry. Officers who enter
homes to address noise violations often become involved in chaotic, violent encounters, resulting
in physical injury to both the officers and the civilians. Patrol officers should be reminded that
Patrol Guide 214-23 requires them to request that civilians cure the loud noise, and that entry to
correct a noise violation should be done only as a last resort. In addition, entry must be approved
by a precinct commander or duty captain.

Al Baker, “Brooklyn Program Erasing Warrants for Low-Level Offenses,” N.Y. Times, Oct. 7, 2015 at A24,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/08/nyregion/in-brooklyn-an-effort-to-erase-warrants-for-low-leveloffenses.html?_r=0 (last visited Nov. 6, 2015).
87

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Recommendation 6: The Department should analyze CCRB data on complaints
arising from executions of valid search warrants. The Department should clarify
the Patrol Guide and assign the obligation to show a search warrant to a particular
officer.
As detailed in the body of the report, 704 (29%) of the 2,465 allegations of improper
entry and search were exonerated because a valid warrant or court order authorized the officers’
conduct. Despite the presence of valid court authorization, and the officers’ compliance with the
law, civilians believed something about the officers’ behavior was troublesome. Such a high
proportion of complaints related to valid warrant executions may be explained simply because
civilians will be upset whenever a government official intrudes in their home. Or, civilians may
be upset by particular warrant executions—either because the officer failed to show them the
warrant authorizing entry and search, or because the officer engaged in some other concerning
behavior (e.g., pointing a gun, using force, discourtesy). The Department could test these
theories by comparing the total number of search and arrest warrant executions it conducts every
year with the number of CCRB complaints that arise from these incidents. If only a limited
percentage of search and warrant executions lead to CCRB complaints, the Department should
analyze the circumstances in the executions that triggered the complaints.
The data analyzed in this report points to a correlation between allegations of failure to
show a warrant and the allegations improper entry and search exonerated due to the presence of a
valid warrant. Historically, the CCRB has substantiated allegations of a failure to show an arrest
or search warrant if a civilian makes a request to see a warrant, an officer hears that request, and
no officer shows the civilian a warrant. However, the Patrol Guide section relating to search
warrants makes no mention that an occupant must request to see it, and instead states that
officers “shall” show occupants a search warrant if they can do so safely. This provision
contrasts with the Patrol Guide section on arrest warrants, which requires officers to show an
arrest warrant only upon a request from a civilian.
The Department should revise the Patrol Guide to assign to a particular officer the
affirmative responsibility of showing a search warrant to a civilian, or the responsibility of
showing an arrest warrant upon request. The Patrol Guide already contains Section 212-106 on
Search Warrant Post-Execution Critique, which requires a captain or higher-ranking officer to
prepare a written critique of a search warrant execution.88 Among the issues to be included in
the assessment are whether any problems were encountered during the execution, any persons
arrested, damage incurred, evidence seized, and “any other pertinent information.” This Section
could be amended to require the captain to confirm that the occupants were shown the search
warrant, or explain why the officers were unable to do so safely.

88

NYPD Patrol Guide 212-106, Search Warrant Post-Execution Critique (eff. 8/1/2013).

101

Going forward, the CCRB will plead and analyze the allegation of failure to show a
search warrant against the officer assigned to have possession of the warrant on the scene, or the
officer in command of the entry. In addition, the CCRB will analyze failure to show a search
warrant allegations irrespective of whether a civilian made a request to see the warrant.
Recommendation 7: The penalties imposed by the Department on officers who
improperly enter and search homes should deter future misconduct and reflect the
serious harms suffered by civilians.
The Department should impose penalties upon subject officers who improperly enter and
search homes and businesses by determining what level of penalty will deter those officers from
engaging in similar conduct in the future. At a basic level, formalized training in a classroom
setting is essential for officers to understand the correct legal standards regarding searches and
seizures on premises. To reflect the Department’s preference, however, the CCRB can only
recommend a single penalty for subject officers, rather than dual penalties—for example, a
recommendation of command discipline and formalized training. In cases where CCRB panels
recommend charges or command discipline, this means that subject officers may not receive any
of the training necessary to guide an officer encountering similar situations in the future. And in
cases where officers are found not guilty after trial, they will not receive training. Yet, even
though an officer’s conduct did constitute misconduct, the need to instruct the officer of the
correct legal standards for search and seizure on premises may remain. The CCRB calls upon
the Department to allow dual penalty recommendations so that officers may receive training
necessary for the daily practice regardless of whatever other discipline they may, or may not,
receive.
Similarly, the Department should accept recommendations from the CCRB that certain
officers undergo retraining, even when they are not found to have committed misconduct. For
example, in some incidents, subordinate officers act at the direction of their superior officers to
enter and search homes and businesses improperly. Generally, the superior officers will be the
ones held responsible for the improper conduct, and receive disciplinary recommendations for
formalized training, command discipline, or charges and specifications. The subordinate officers
will not have a substantiated allegation against them since they acted at the direction and
command of their superior officers. While this practice accommodates the clear obligations that
subordinate officers have to follow their superior’s orders, it prevents CCRB from
recommending that subordinate officers undergo retraining to address misunderstandings about
the law or police practice. Subordinate officers who participate in the improper search and
seizure may never clearly be told that their conduct was improper, and may engage in it again
when confronted with similar circumstances. Referring officers for retraining in a nondisciplinary context will allow mistaken beliefs of the law to be corrected, while avoiding
holding subordinate officers liable for carrying out superior’s orders.

102

The Department should also recognize that, where they impose a forfeiture of vacation
days, the number of days chosen should reflect both the seriousness of the misconduct and the
likelihood that the chosen penalty will deter future misconduct. For example, the Department
recently imposed a forfeiture of only 3 vacation days on an officer with several years’ tenure and
no disciplinary record. While this penalty may align with the Department’s progressive
approach to discipline, it may not have a deterrent effect on an officer who has numerous years
on the job—as do many of the subject officers in the substantiated complaints of improper entry
and search. In addition, police intrusion of homes is among the most serious violations of an
individual’s constitutional rights. Criminal law recognizes the significance of this violation
through the use of the exclusionary rule. A penalty of three days does not adequately capture the
harmful consequences—to civilians, to the criminal justice system, and to police-community
relationships—of unlawful searches and seizures.

103

APPENDIX A: COMMANDS OF SUBJECT OFFICERS
Command at Incident

Number of Officers
60
26
13
13
10
9
9
8
5
5
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
3
2
2
2

WARRSEC
NARCBBN
081 PCT
075 PCT
047 PCT
067 PCT
NARCBBX
049 PCT
INT CIS
NARCBQN
PBBN
NARCBMN
120 PCT
DB BX
052 PCT
044 PCT
023 PCT
076 PCT
103 PCT
105 DET
106 PCT
062 PCT
073 PCT
007 PCT
041 PCT
046 PCT
121 PCT
079 PCT
114 PCT
ESS 03
GANG BS
PSA 2
PSA 8
PBBN AC
PBBX

104

Command at Incident

Number of Officers
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

NARCBBS
083 PCT
060 PCT
061 PCT
042 DET
028 PCT
009 PCT
024 PCT
066 PCT
068 PCT
069 PCT
070 PCT
PSA 1
071 PCT
073 DET
063 PCT
109 PCT
113 PCT
077 DET
077 PCT
025 PCT
033 PCT
040 PCT
042 PCT
052 DET
001 DET
046 DET
AUTO CD
DBBN OP
ESU
NARCBMS
GANG Q
MC/SQD
MNROBSQ
PBBX AC
PBMN
PBMS
PBMS TF
PBQNT/F
PBBS

105

Command at Incident

Number of Officers
1
1
1
1
1
1
297

PBBS SU
PSA 9
T.A.R.U
VE BSSI
PSA 3
PA UPTU
Total

106

“It is in the interest of the people of the City of New York and the New York City
Police Department that the investigation of complaints concerning misconduct
by officers of the department towards members of the public be complete,
thorough and impartial. These inquiries must be conducted fairly and independently,
and in a manner in which the public and the police department have confidence.
An independent civilian complaint review board is hereby established...”
(NYC Charter, Chapter 18-A, effective July 4, 1993)

CIVILIAN COMPLAINT REVIEW BOARD

100 Church St., 10th Floor, New York, NY 10007

Complaints: 1-800-341-2272 or 311 | Outside NYC: 212-New-York
General Information: 212-912-7235
www.nyc.gov/ccrb

Rosa Lee, Cover Designer

CCRB_HomeEntry.indd 7

2/8/2016 1:53:20 AM