Corrective Action Plan for Corrections Standards Authority Staff Safety Eval 2005
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· (MCSP) CORRECTIVE ACTION PLAN For CORRECTIONS STANDARDS AUTHORITY - STAFF SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT JULY 5 - 8. 2005 .,' Page: 1 of 17 Date: 2120/2007 PREPARED BY: Mule Creek State Prison Pro osed Action Plan Recommendations/Descri tion CommentslProof Of Practice Finding #1: There were no obvious trends identified relative to the issue of staff battery. 1. Thirty-nine incidents of battery and attempted battery on staff were reported during the time period of July 1, 2004 through June 30, 2005 at Mule Creek State Prison (MCSP). The institution reports that over 40 staff members were victims of battery or were injured during incidents: Twenty-eight victims were from the ranks of correctional officers (C/O's) and two were sergeants. The remaining ten victims included five Medical Technical Assistanfs (MTA's) and five health care workers. The average age of the victims was approximately 38 years with 9.5 years of service. Twenty-nine of the victims were male and ten were female. Twenty-Six of victims were white, six were black, six were Hispanic, and two were reported as "other". N/A No corrective action necessary as this is information prOVided for discussion only. NlA N/A N/A (MCSP) CORRECTIVE ACTION PLAN For CORRECTIONS STANDARDS AUTHORITY - STAFF SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT JULY 5 - 8, 2005 PREPARED BY: Mule Creek State Prison Recommendations/Descri tion Pro osed Action Plan CommentslProof Of Practice Finding #2: Additional training is needed for staff responding to emergencies. 2. 3. The Return to Work Coordinator provided statistics showing a category described as "Responding to Alarms" as being the third leading category of frequencies of staff injury, with 15 reported injuries during the last fiscal year. These statistics would support the need for training ways to safely respond to incidents. In-Service Training (1ST) Manager Emergency Alarm Response Training is in place for Continuous Off Post Training Sessions (OPTS). In addition, training. effective July 1, 2005 Mule Creek began monthly training on the facilities for alarm response. Alarm response identifies safety issues for responding to emergencies. Return To Work Coordinator In monthly safety meetings, MCSP will continue to review all reported injuries to determine trends and identify trainina needs as warranted. Finding # 3: Race and age do not appear to be 51 ;Jnificant assau t factors. No significant variances were noted when N/A No corrective action necessary as this is information comparing the race, age or county of provided for discussion only. commitment of the assaultive inmates to that of the overall facility inmate population. Hispanic and white inmates were responsible for 29 incidents with the remaining 10 being dispersed among the other races. The inmates had been committed from twelve counties with none being unusually represented. Training and Safety Meetings are Alann Response Memorandum being completed on a monthl~ (Attachment A), Cell Extraction .basis. Alann Response Overview (Attachment B) and 1ST Records. Ongoing. N/A August 9, 2005 Safety Meeting Minutes (Attachment C). NlA N/A N/A (MCSP) CORRECTIVE ACTION PLAN For CORRECTIONS STANDARDS AUTHORITY - STAFF SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT JULY 5 - 8,2005 Page: 3 of 17 Date: 2/20/2007 PREPARED BY: Mule Creek State Prison RecommendationslDescri tion Comments/Proof Of Practice Pro osed Action Plan Finding #4: Inmates with high security classifications or serious mental health issues are more likely to commit assaults on staff. 4. Enhanced Outpatient (EOP) inmates, while generally described as mental health patients because of their diagnosis, require a significantly higher level of clinical care. 1ST Manager 1ST provides awareness training concerning the potential of assaultive behavior of this population to all custody and non-custody staff during OPTS. Continuous training. Training is being completed on a monthly basis. 1ST records, Mental Health Services Overview/Update (Attachment D), Recognizing the Signs and Symptoms of Mental Disorders Student Handbook (Attachment E) and Post Quiz (Attachment F). Health Care Manager During Mental Health staff meetings, safety and security topics are consistently discussed. These topics include personal alarm, emergency response, personal whistle, reporting unusual inmate behavior and inmate staff relations. Medication requirements are frequently reviewed by Mental Health staff and they do use the Keyhea Injunction for inmates who are not medication compliant and are determined to be a danger to himself and others. Violence risks or assault risk inmate/patients are addressed in each Inter-Disciplinary Treatment Team (IDTT) and an appropriate treatment plan is developed. When assaultive tendencies are identified, staff are made aware of those individuals and a review for appropriate housing is conducted. Medication management Quality Improvement Teams (OITS) are conducted in an effort to ensure inmates receive prescribed medications in a timely manner. Continuous training and IOTT. Ongoing. Keyhea Involuntary Medication List "Confidential" (Attachment G) EOP IDTT Schedule (Attachment H). (MCSP) CORRECTIVE ACTION PLAN For CORRECTIONS STANDARDS AUTHORITY - STAFF SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT JULY 5 -8.2005 Page: 4 of 17 PREPARED BY: Mule Creek State Prison ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~Date: Item Recommendations/Descri tion Current Status Pro osed Action Plan 2120/2007 Comments/Proof Of Practice Finding #4: Inmates with high security classifications or serious mental health issues are more likely to commit assaults on staff (continued). 4. 5. Facility "B", Building 6, has been housing approximately fifty Level IV EOP/SNY inmates. The institution has just activated an EOP Unit in a Level IV building in Facility "A", housing 6 inmates as of this review date. Facility "A" and "B" Captains Facility "B" will continue to refer the Level IV EOP inmates to the C&PR for endorsement to Facility "A", Level IV EOP. Findina #5: Inmate manufactured weapons were not a factor In assau ts on staff. Inmate manufactured weapons were not N/A No corrective action necessary as this information for involved in any of the incidents reviewed. discussion only. Institution will continue to conduct Inmates threw or attempted to throw an program yard and housing searches. unknown liquid substance on staff in 6 of the incidents. In the remainder of the cases reviewed, inmates battered or attempted to batter staff by head-butting, kicking or unlawful touching with their hands. In the incident resulting in the most serious injury to staff, the inmate was able to head butt the C/O, knock him off balance, kick him several times and finally bite him on the leg. Six incidents occurred during escorts and three during meal service When C/O' opened food ports. Continuous N/A As of August 19, 2005, sixteen Level IV EOP inmates have been transferred to Facility "A". Thirtythree Level IV EOP inmates are in Level III housing and are being evaluated for Level IV EOP housing. Inmate Housing Assignment Change (Attachment I). N/A N/A (MCSP) CORRECTIVE ACTION PLAN For CORRECTIONS STANDARDS AUTHORITY - STAFF SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT JULY 5 - 8, 2005 PREPARED BY: Mule Creek State Prison Recommendations/Descri tion Finding #6: 6. Comments/Proof Of Practice Pro osed Action Plan Custody staff appears to be receiving training in safety related issues. Non- custody staff; however, receive fewer hours of training and are less compliant in attending training (continued). MCSP tracks the supervisors' annual training based on the employee's birthday. Each employee's training year begins on their birthday, not a calendar or fiscal year; therefore, using the current 1ST tracking program, we were unable to confirm that all of the training mandates were being met. 1ST Manager Non-Custody staff receives Block Training, which is a required annual course of training at MCSP. It incorporates the requirements listed in DOM for all employees except those with OPTS responsibilities and is held once a month. Non-Custody supervisors receive an 1ST deficiency notice two (2) months prior to their annual performance evaluation which identifies needed training. August 10, 2005 Memorandum will be completec by August 10, 2005 and distributed to all Non-Custod" supervisors. Non-Custody Block Training memorandum dated August 10, 2005 (Attachment J) 1ST Deficiency Notice - Annual (Attachment K) and 1ST records. Non-custody personnel are scheduled to receive 8 hours of annual training, 6 of which are related to staff safety. The training manager reported that 80% of the non-custody personnel were compliant with the training mandates. The sample files reviewed and supported that percentage. Finding #7: 7. During interviews with supervisors, they indicated that staff would benefit from specified training (cell extraction, mental health intervention, etc.). In fact, the majority of staff interviewed identified the need for more meaningful training. Staff need hands-on training for cell extractions (the use of cell extraction equipment), and mental health techniques for dealing with EOP and Correctional Clinical Case Management System (CCCMS) inmates. 1ST Manager Cell extraction and mental health training is given on a monthly basis during OPTS per departmental lesson plans. Based on departmental funding hands-on cell extraction training is not provided at MCSP. Mental Health training is also provided during OPTS along with on-site training in Buildings #5 and #6 (EOP) on how to interact with EOP inmates. Draft memorandum to all supervisors identifying the aforementioned training advising supervisors to attend training. August 2005 10, Monthly training during OPTS Memorandum dated August 10 2005 (Attachment L). 1ST records and OJT records for EOP Building #6. Cell Extraction Lesson Outline (Attachment M). (MCSP) CORRECTNE ACTION PLAN For CORRECTIONS STANDARDS AUTHORITY - STAFF SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT JULY 5 - 8, 2005 PREPARED BY: Mule Creek State Prison Recommendations/Deseri tion Pro osed Action Plan Comments/Proof Of Practice Finding #8: Correctional Officers in some positions are not provided sufficient communications equipment. 8. The C/O assigned to Body Cavity Surveillance cells was not equipped with a personal alarm. intercom capabilities or radio (although post orders reflect a personal alarm is to be worn). The camera did not monitor the hall where the staff person is stationed, but positioned to monitor the inmate. Correctional Captain Watch Commander Memorandum regarding equipment to be worn dated July 6, 2005. Post order instructing staff to wear personal alarm device will be revised. The camera is positioned to monitor the inmate only. August 2005 Only 1 radio is issued to 2 C/O's working inside the housing unit as floor officer's. Typically the position designated as "floor one" is assigned to maintain the radio. This position is also designated as the primary respondent. dUring Code I and Code II emergencies. This process results in the second C/O remaining in the unit without radio communication. A radio was assigned to the Facility "A" Gym. In an effort to maximize the use of a single radio, staff had secured the radio to the podium as a point of centralized use. The evaluation team agreed that the institution should consider providing all floor officers with a radio. Correctional Captain Facility Captain Armory Sgt. MCSP is currently utilizing all the radios we have been authorized. MCSP will prepare an Issue Memorandum to Operations Review Committee, via chain of command, regarding the feasibility of issuing radios to all housing unit officers. September 30. 2005 19. Post Order completed. Memorandum dated July 6, 2005 Body Cavity Surveillance (BCS) Cells/CTC Overflow (Attachment N). Post order (Attachment 0) and Operational Procedure MC 48-52050, Quarantine BCS (Attachment P). In process. N/A (MCSP) CORRECTIVE ACTION PLAN For CORRECTIONS STANDARDS AUTHORITY - STAFF SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT JULY 5 - 8, 2005 PREPARED BY: Mule Creek State Prison Ite Page: 7 of 17 Date: 2/20/2007 Recommendations/Descri tion Current Status Pro osed Action Plan Comments/Proof Of Practice Finding #9: There are 87 Correctional Officers and many Medical Technical Assistant's (MTA's) and Correctional Counselor's (CC's) that have not been Issued a stab-resistant vest. 9. The Armory Sgt. informed us that 651 CIO's have been designated to be issued a stab resistant vest. The records reflect that 54 C/O's within the ranks of CIO, sergeant, and lieutenant have been fitted for vests; however, the vests have yet to be issued. Thirty-three C/O's have not been fitted for or issued a vest at the time of the evaluation. Sufficient vests are available at the facility for those CIO's to check out for use during their shift until their personal vests are available. C/O's reported a reluctance to wear these vests, saying that the vests were not cleaned appropriately. The records reflect that the remaining 564 CIO's have been fitted and have been issued a vest. MTA's and CC's, who were custody staff, are not included in the above numbers. The team was informed that many of these personnel have been fitted for vests but have not received vests. The team was further informed that the bargaining unit representing MTA's and CC's has filed a grievance (With the agency, not the institution) over this matter. Correctional Captain Armory Sgt. Pool vests are assigned to each facility and are to be used in the absence of personal vests. MCSP has continued to stay current with Departmental policies and procedures pertaining to this issue. Upon Emergency Operations Unit (EOU) approval to purchase vest. MCSP currently has 101 staff Memorandum dated August 18, members who do not have a 2005 (Attachment Q). vest. Twelve are out on extended Memorandums dated November sick or workers compensation to 20, 2003, January 14, 2005, bring the total to 87. Fifty eight February 10, 2005, email dated of the 87 have been fitted and March 28, 2005, and are waiting for their vests. The memorandum dated June 2, remaining staff will be fitted on 2005 (Attachments R, S, T, U & V). September 30, 2005. Cleaning procedures are being written for the cleaning of pool vests on all facilities. September N/A Warden's memorandum dated February 9, 2005 instructs all C/O's, sergeants and lieutenants issued vests, the requirement to mandatorily wear the Stab Resistant Vests. N/A A representative from Second Chance Vest has been contacted and is scheduling a new date to fit the remaining staff. MCSP is fol/owing the Departmental directive issued by Deputy Director, Institutions Division, identifying which custody classifications are reqUired to wear the Stab Resistant Vest. N/A 1, 2005 N/A Memorandum dated February 9, 2005 (Attachment W). 30,2005 Second Chance will be on site for fitting, approximately on September 30, 2005. N/A N/A September N/A Memorandum dated March 4, 2004 (Attachment X). (MCSP) CORRECTIVE ACTION PLAN For CORRECTIONS STANDARDS AUTHORITY - STAFF SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT JULY 5 - 8, 2005 PREPARED BY: Mule Creek State Prison Recommendations/Oescri tion Comments/Proof Of Practice Pro osed Action Plan Findina #10: Specific to Facilities "A". "B" & "C". 10. The gymnasium was observed by the staff Facility "A", "B" safety audit team to have towels, blankets and and "C" clothing draped from bunks. Such coverings Captains obscure visibility. Facility"C" Captain Post Orders for all facilities has special instructions regarding bed covering removal. Gymnasium rules are provided to inmates. N/A Gym staff will be provided training on expectations that inmates do not hang/drape any item that reduces visibility. August 2005 First, Second and Third line supervisors conduct daily/weekly/monthly inspections and provide training to staff. Ongoing. Facility "C" to submit work order for installation of drying racks. August 2005 29, 19, N/A Post Orders for Facility "A", "B", & "C· (Attachments Y, Z, & AA). On-going training being provided. N/A N/A Inspection sheets (Attachment BB). example. Facility "C" gymnasium has Work Order (Attachment CC). problems with clothing, towels, blankets, etc, being hung on the bunks as there is currently no drying rack. Facility "A" and "B" currently have drying racks. (MCSP) CORRECTIVE ACTION PLAN For CORRECTIONS STANDARDS AUTHORITY - STAFF SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT JULY 5 - 8, 2005 Page: 9 of 16 PREPARED BY: Mule Creek State Prison Date: 212012007 M.~m;~~lt~}l~n.h1~ji::<:~'~~~-='§.f;!~~r~ . ~~~~~j@m~'t:::p~~L~·"~~--~ta:;;::~~rn:n~·rr~!:~~;;:;:~;;::::"'~-·~::;::;l!~1mi~"-m=-~r~~t.iY~:7~i~~~ffiTS;:';"·~,-':':'.,~~i=:~~!l=·,,"·="·'-~._;'!';;i~~r~I!J~'L~~':r=:~=.n~··~~r~"."':""-··~""'!'""-Q~::m~~~':'!'!"'m-·~'~)':'"'!": ..iJ~··.S~Ifti~=~~~=r:::;":;(~NI~~~-=-~_~~r.-J.~Kta~~~.~·{t~·~:::;fifi~-~~~~;1fi~p~·n~,Q~·!L~<J~If~g~C~~'·C~·O~.~;::.::::';:~~~~t1r~:~tp.=:i=:f~;~f::r~,'/\:;~~L~~{7~;J.~;r,:···~f~~1~~~;;~~~L~iO;-:::~L~:~f~;~~;r{~I;·;:~?b~r~~'t.J:~~~::"';;(~>~;;:;;:;~ft~~fL~·~;i~·r;:="":2&.~~~~~·ft~:}~~'~·~~:¥r~>~~E.·~.~;~. =.:,~=~~:g~~··1iJf.j~/-·.i!""!!!ltfj)r.~'~?~r;f!~~'!#-=.J'~~~; Recommendations/Deseri tion ction ReqUired 8 Whom Finding #10: Specific to Facilities "A","B" & "e" (continued). 10. PadJocks are applied to each cell during the Plant Manager sleeping hours to prevent inmates from lifting the sliding door off the track. Pro osed Action Plan Over five years ago it was discovered inmates could open cell doors. As a result, the Warden ordered "boot locks" to be installed until the problem could be resolved. The Deputy State Fire Marshal for this district was advised and subsequently toured the site. The determination was made that the security of the institution took precedence. Faulty locking devices have been discovered at other institutions creating a state-wide funding issue. Date To Be Com leted Unknown pending funding. Current Status The practice of padlocking cell doors dUring sleeping hours will continue. Comments/Proof Of Practice February 2001 electromechanical door operator repairs and schedule (Attachment DD) and COBCP. A Capital Outlay Budget Change Proposal (COBCP) by the Security Operations was initiated Management Branch in August of 2000. A majority of institutions were affected. MCSP is in Phase It behind California Correctional Institution and Wasco State Prison. Convex security mirrors are being recommended at the end of the dayroom of each bUilding to enable CIO's at the control desk to see blind spots near inmate telephone areas. Associate Warden, Programs I Housing and Plant Manager Emergency Beds (E-Beds) on the dayroom floors are anticipated to deactivate in September-October 2005. With this action, blind spots in the bUildings wiIJ be reduced. CIO's, as part of their daily assign ments, rove the dayroom floors in the buildings, and work in conjunction with the control booth officers to ensure blind spots are covered and activities monitored. Because various buildings have different missions, vantage points and convex mirror needs will differ. All facility buildings have a minimum of 3 mirrors which can be adjusted to address blind spots. MCSP convex mirrors are sufficient for C/O coverage. We will continue to monitor the need for mirrors. N/A N/A N/A (MCSP) CORRECTIVE ACTION PLAN For CORRECTIONS STANDARDS AUTHORITY - STAFF SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT JULY 5 - 8, 2005 PREPARED BY: Mule Creek State Prison Recommendations/Descri tion Finding #11: Specific to Facility "Au. The inmate exercise yard is very large for level IV operations and only three CIO's assigned to yard coverage. Additionally, supervisory staff were not able to focate assigned yard staff. 11. Comments/Proof Of Practice Pro osed Action Plan Facility Lieutenant Due to the SNY designation of the facility, the size of the yard is mitigated by the nature of the inmates assigned to the facility. Yard staff have been given training regarding their obligation to remain within their assignment area unless authorized to leave by their supervisor. August 2005 19, Training is on-going. Yard CIO's 1ST Sign-In sheets and Post remain at their assigned post until Orders (Attachments EE, FF and relieved. GG) Responses from staff regarding incident response procedures were inconsistent. Facility Lieutenant All Facility staff will be provided specific training regarding their individual obligation during incident response. Contained within each Post Order is the specific Code Response designation. All staff are required to read and acknowledge their individual obligation during Code Response. Staff routinely participate in prison alarm response training drills scheduled by In-Service Training. August 2005 22, Training is on-goiog. Staff are reading and acknowledging their Code Response Obligations Building five has in the dayroom area, various office fumiture items to facilitate the EOP treatment program. This furniture and equipment may pose a staff safety issue, as it could be used as a weapon or used to make weapons. The team recommends that the office furniture to be replaced with detention grade furnishings. N/A This is a temporary program setting designed to deliver Mental Health Service to approximately 35 inmates. Currently a permanent treatment facility is being planned for construction within this year. Once completed, this temporary treatment facility will be dismantled and removed. At this time, the need for detention furnishings is not warranted. This rationale is based upon the short term projected use of this treatment area. In similar program settings throughout the Department. there have been no negative behavioral trends, which justify the use of this type of furniture. However, through routine security checks, the ability to use or make weapons will be minimized. N/A 1ST Records Response (Attachment A). Office furnishings continued in use N/A for this program. and Alarm Memorandum (MCSP) CORRECTIVE ACTION PLAN For CORRECTIONS STANDARDS AUTHORITY - STAFF SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT JULY 5 - 8, 2005 Page: II of 16 Date: 2120/2007 PREPARED BY: Mule Creek State Prison I I ItemJ Recommendations/Description IAction Required By Whom I I Date To Be Completed Proposed Action Plan I Current Status I Comments/Proof Of Practice Finding #12: Specific to Facility "Bn • 12. Only two officers were assigned to this exercise yard. The team agreed this was an insufficient number of yard officers. The evaluation team Facifity "B" Captain suggests that the institution consider assigning an additional CIO to this yard. Facility B has two yard officers. two Search and N/A N/A N/A Ongoing. N/A Inspection sheet example and Post Order (Attachments BBand Z) and Operational Procedure Me 72 Daily Housing Escort officers and one ya rd observation post officer for the exercise yard. Add itionally, there are two sergeants and one lieutenant. MCSP is within established budgetary authority at 1900k overcrowding, 160 gym beds and 144 emergency dayroom beds. Based on the very low violence level. this current staffing appears adequate to maintain staff and inmate safety. E-beds contained in Building 7, 8. 9 and 10 present a staff safety risk. Poor visibility due to inmates draping items between the bunks and inability to secure these inmates contribute to this concern. Facility liB" Captain CIO's are expected to remove any draping items in bed areas as indicated in their Post Orders. Supervisors and Managers conduct inspections. (Sergeants daily, Lieutenants weekly, Captains monthly, AW's quarterly). Additionally, C/O's, as part of their daily assignments. are expected to rove the day room floors in the buildings and work in conjunction with the control booth officers to ensure blind spots are covered and activities monitored. Inspections of the Housing Units for Supervisors and Managers (Attachment HH). (MCSP) CORRECTIVE ACTION PLAN For CORRECTIONS STANDARDS AUTHORITY - STAFF SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT JULY 5 - 8, 2005 PREPARED BY: Mule Creek State Prison Recommendations/Descri tion Finding #13: Specific to Facility lie". 13. C/O's in Building 14 stated the inmates have the ability to control the TV volume and the volume becomes loud enough to hinder verbal communication between C/O's. Comments/Proof Of Practice C/O's will monitor and correct any TV volume issues impacting their ability to communicate. The parts are on order. 1ST sheet on TV Volume (Attachment II) Memorandum to staff dated August 19, 2005 on TV Volume (Attachment JJ). N/A Work orders dated August 19, 2005. (Attachments KK and LL). With the addition of E-beds in the housing units, the institution agreed to install receivers on the TV that broadcasts on FM reception thus eliminating the sound from the TV speakers. These receivers have been ordered. Pending the installation, C/O's have been instructed to order inmates to turn the volume down or off if warranted. C/O's have always had the ability and discretion to monitor TV volume. August 19, 2005 Ongoing. Current process allows for approval of each work order by the Facility Captain. If urgent, the Facility Secretary faxes the work order to Plant Operations, then submits original. Submit work orders for lights and door repairs. August 2005 Plant Manager MCSP will initiate a Work Order Report for all pending work orders to the respective areas. October 2005 N/A N/A Facility"C: Captain A total of twelve custody staff are at the Facility Dining Hall to monitor inmates as they enter and exit the Dining Hall. This is adequate coverage for a 270 design Level III Facility. MCSP is within established bUdgetary authority. N/A N/A N/A Facility "C' Captain C/O's in Building 11, 14 & 15 reported that work orders are not addressed consistently. 'Team members observed lights that were burned out and doors located near the showers with locks that were sticking. Staff in Building 11,14 & 15 reporting concerns about not having adequate coverage dUring the a.m. feeding release and recall. Current Status Pro osed Action Plan 19, (MCSP) CORRECTIVE ACTION PLAN For CORRECTIONS STANDARDS AUTHORITY - STAFF SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT JULY 5 -8, 2005 PREPARED BY: Mule Creek State Prison Page: 13 of 16 Date: 2120/2007 Recommendations/Descn tion Comments/Proof Of Practice Pro osed Action Plan Finding #14: Specific to Central Services, Correctional Treatment Center (eTC). 14. The institutional fire identification system alarm Plant Manager In September 2005 MCSP will again submit a is not working properly. Staff reported that the system has historically not functioned correctly and that during the rainy season, the problem with the system is exacerbated. Special Repair Project (SRP) to the Facilities Management Section. Unknownpending funding Fire identification alarm system still not working properly. SRP request originally submitted in April 1999 was denied. SRP resubmitted in August 2001 was denied. EqUipment Budget Request submitted September 2004 was not approved. Headquarters Operational (HOAn Assessment Team funding requested January 2005, no response from Office of Financial Management Section 6.00 submitted February 2005, no response yet by Facilities Management Section. MCSP will resubmit again in September 2005. CTC Officer did not have a personal alarm. In the eTC, an electrical room has been converted into a staff break room/inmate clerk office. The room contained cleaning supplies and a staff refrigerator. The inmate clerk was not being directly supervised and had access to C/O food. Correctional Captain Associate Warden, Medical Department Draft memorandum advising staff that wearing their personal alarm device (PAD) is mandatory. August 8, 2005 Memorandum has been drafted Memorandum dated August 8, and issued to Managers and 2005, and Post order Supervisors. (Attachments MM and NN). Watch Commander will provide training to CTC C/O's. August 25, 2005 N/A N/A The electrical room is no longer being used by inmate clerks and the staff refrigerator is no longer inside the room. The inmate workers are only allowed in the room under direct supervision of the Building Maintenance Worker. August 4, 2005 Completed. N/A (MCSP) CORRECTIVE ACTION PLAN For CORRECTIONS STANDARDS AUTHORITY - STAFF SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT JULY 5-8, 2005 Page: 14 of 16 Date: 2120/2007 PREPARED BY: Mule Creek State Prison Recommendations/Descri tion Findina #15: Level IV inmates with mental health 15. Staff shared with us that MCSP is considered the "hub" for EOP/SNY inmates, designating it as the only institution that houses EOP and SNY inmates. Compounding the situation, many of the SNY inmates have level IV classification points requiring 180 design housing; however, this institution was designed as level III with 270 design housing. As a result, staff safety becomes a concern when SNY inmates, with assaultive histories, are housed in these facilities. The team was informed that the Department has no 180 design facilities to house these level IV SNY inmates. issues and sensitive needs are being housed in inappropriate facilities (270 vs.180 deshml. Associate The Level IV EOP MCSP inmates have been September NlA Wardenevaluated through the current classification process 30, 2005 and endorsed Level IV 270 design. MCSP will initiate Housing 1 Programs an Issue Memorandum to the Operations Review Committee to determine feasibility of activation of a 180 design unit. Finding #16: Crowding leads to a potentiallv unsafe environment. A second concern is the overcrowding in the Associate facilities, which result in Emergency beds (E- Warden, beds), or triple bunk beds placed in housing unit Programs 1 dayrooms, and double and triple bunking of the Housing gymnasiums. Designated housing units have up to 40 inmates sleeping in E-beds. While an additional floor officer is assigned to supervise these inmates, it is difficult for the officer to supervise these inmates due to obstructed sightJines. Gymnasium "A" uses triple bunks, and Gymnasium "B" and "c" use double bunks to house up to 160 inmates. Gymnasium "A" has two floor officers and one gunner, and Gymnasium "B" and "C" have two floor officers but no gunner, because the inmates are classified as level I-II. These gymnasiums are perceived as staff safety issues, as it is difficult to supervise the inmates due to the large number of beds and diminished siahtlines. 16. Comments/Proof Of Practice Pro osed Action Plan On occasion, inmates released from Psychiatric Security Unit to SNY/EOP's have very assaUltive past behavior. After received and reviewed at MCSP, they have subsequently been re-endorsed for an Indeterminate Security Housing Unit (SHU) term due to their inability to program within a 270 design building program. General Population inmates are required to go to a 180 design after serving a SHU, though EOP's nor SNY's have that same reauirement. E-beds and dormitories in the facilities meet departmental security requirements as it pertains to custody. NlA N/A N/A August 8, 2005 memorandum authored by Mike Knowles, Deputy Director (A), Division of Adult Institutions, advised institution's that the conversion of 950 level IV beds to 950 Level III (SNY) beds at Salinas Valley State Prison (SVSP) is tentatively scheduled to begin in September 2005. Based on this information MCSP would deactivate 228 E-beds by the week of October 24. 2005. October 24, 2005 N/A August 8, 2005 memorandum (Attachment 00) (MCSP) CORRECTIVE ACTION PLAN For CORRECTIONS STANDARDS AUTHORITY - STAFF SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT JULY 5 - 8.2005 PREPARED BY: Mule Creek State Prison Page: 15 of 16 Date: 2120/2007 RecommendationsJOescri tion . . F'In d"Ing #17 P ost an d S'd I preven ts managers rom fill"109 posts WI'th th e b est-qua t I I S taff rfied 17. Additionally, the captains believe that Post and Associate MeSp follows Departmental policy as it pertains to Bid (a process in Which lieutenant's, sergeants and C/O's request to work a specific post based on their seniority) restricts their ability to ensure a high level of institutional and staff safety. The best qualified individual is not always placed in a position, based solely on seniority. Comments/Proof Of Practice Pro osed Action Plan Warden, Central Services N1A N/A Post and Bid for supervisors and the Memorandum of Understanding for C/O's. Training and corrective action will occur for these personnel who fail to perform. on Personnel Action (Confidential) . . th e ~0 trowrng: F'In d'Ing #1 8: Supervlsor concerns m rrore d t hose 0 f t h e managers In 18. Crowding with E-beds and using gymnasiums Associate See comments for Findings #16 and #17. as dormitories. Warden, Programs I Post and Bid - supervisors were restricted from Housing diverting an C/O from one position to another based on operational needs. N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A Finding #19: During interviews with supervisors, they indicated that staff would benefit from specified training. 19. Supervisors said that correctional staff needed hands-on training for cell extractions (the use of cell extraction equipment), and mental health techniques for dealing with EOP and CCCMS inmates. 1ST Manager See comments for Finding # 7 file (MCSP) CORRECTIVE ACTION PLAN For CORRECTIONS STANDARDS AUTHORITY· STAFF SAFETY EVALUATION REPORT JULY 5 - 8, 2005 PREPARED BY: Mule Creek State Prison Recommendations/Descri tion Pro osed Action Plan Comments/Proof Of Practice Findina #20: Staff reported that safety equipment Is adequate for lJerforming their duties and rated the equipment as "good" to "oka~". Line staff said the type of safety equipment N/A No corrective action necessary as this is information N/A N/A issued to them includes personal alarms, radios proVided for discussion only. in designated positions, handcuffs, side~handle batons, and Oleoresin Capsicum (OC) spray. They indicated that equipment could be obtained at the sergeant's office, control booths, or from the person being relieved at shift chanae. 20. N/A Finding #21: Not all custody staff have been issued stab resistant vests and are reluctant to wear ves~ from the "vest pool". 21. Of staff interviewed, all had been fitted for stab resistant vests, but not all had been issued vests. The evaluation team reviewed the body armor report, and noted that 567 custody staff had been issued vests and 87 custody staff had not. Staff indicated that if they were assigned to a position which required a vest, they would not wear a vest from the avest pool" as they believed that these vests are not maintained in a sanitary condition, and they were concerned with the integrity of the material to withstand an attack by an inmate. Staff were familiar with department policy which requires that a vest be worn by staff in specified positions, but did not alwavs comoly. APPROVED/DISAPPROVED: ROSANNE CAMPBELL Warden (A) Armory Sergeant See comments from Finding # 9 N/A N/A N/A