Conditions of Confinement in DC, Washington Lawyers' Committee, 2015

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Conditions of Confinement in DC, Washington Lawyers' Committee, 2015

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D.C. Prisoners: Conditions of
Confinement in the District of Columbia
June 11, 2015
A report of the Washington Lawyers’ Committee
for Civil Rights & Urban Affairs
11 Dupont Circle NW, Suite 400
Washington, DC 20036
www.washlaw.org

D.C. PRISONERS: CONDITIONS OF CONFINEMENT
IN THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE(S)
Executive Summary ............................................................................................ 2
I.

District Department of Corrections Facilities and Populations ............. 4
A.
B.
C.

II.

Recurring Issues and Problems Involving the D.C. Jail and CTF......... 12
A.
B.
C.

III.

Crumbling physical infrastructure.............................................................. 13
Mental Health and Suicide Prevention Practices at the D.C. Jail ..............20
Issues Confronting Youth ........................................................................... 25

Costs of Confinement & Contracted Services ............................................ 33
A.
B.
C.

IV.

Facilities ........................................................................................................ 5
Policies Affecting Prisoner Population ......................................................... 7
Demographics and Budget ........................................................................... 11

The CTF & Corrections Corporation of America ........................................ 33
Unity Health Care ....................................................................................... 45
Halfway Houses .......................................................................................... 46

Looking Forward ............................................................................................... 47
A.
B.
C.
D.
E.
F.
G.

Recommendation 1: Close the D.C. Jail and the CTF and construct
a new, safer, more effective facility ............................................................. 48
Recommendation 2: Expand the Secure Residential Treatment
Program ....................................................................................................... 48
Recommendation 3: Correct deficiencies in suicide prevention and
youth confinement ...................................................................................... 48
Recommendation 4: Conduct a review of training ................................... 49
Recommendation 5: Revise current policies restricting “Good Time
Credits” ........................................................................................................ 49
Recommendation 6: Return management of the CTF to District
control ......................................................................................................... 49
Recommendation 7: Increase public access to records ............................. 51

Appendix A - Demographics & Budget
Appendix B - D.C. Department of Corrections Response

PREFACE
The appalling conditions of confinement in D.C. prison facilities, especially in
light of their disproportionate impact on African-Americans, are a key criminal justice
and civil rights issue in Washington DC. This is the third in a series of reports focusing
on criminal justice reform and civil rights issues by the Washington Lawyers’ Committee
for Civil Rights and Urban Affairs.
We want to express our appreciation for the invaluable assistance in researching
and writing this report provided by a team of lawyers from Covington & Burling LLP:
Kevin Glandon, Shelton Abramson, Brandon Myers, and Alan Pemberton, who were the
principal authors of this report, as well as paralegals Kimberly Bickham and Eric Barros.
All these reports are dedicated to Judge Louis F. Oberdorfer, the distinguished
jurist, who inspired the creation of the Washington Lawyers’ Committee in 1968 while a
partner at Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering. Judge Oberdorfer served on the Committee’s
Board of Trustees until his elevation to the bench in 1977. Throughout his long career,
Judge Oberdorfer, who died in February of 2013, spoke eloquently in support of civil
rights and criminal justice reform. In his memory, the Louis F. Oberdorfer Fund has
been established to support the Committee’s ongoing work on criminal justice reform
and civil rights advocacy. We are pleased to note that one of the significant contributors
to this report was Elliot Mincberg, who is serving as the Louis Oberdorfer Senior
Counsel on the Washington Lawyers’ Committee staff. A stipend to support his work is
provided by the Oberdorfer Memorial Fund.
The Washington Lawyers’ Committee would also like to acknowledge with
particular gratitude the service of the following retired and senior Federal and District of
Columbia Judges who composed the Advisory Committee assisting with this study:
John M. Ferren, Senior Judge, District of Columbia Court of Appeals
Rufus G. King III, Senior Judge, Superior Court of the District of Columbia
James Robertson, Retired Judge, United States District Court for the District of
Columbia
Ricardo M. Urbina, Retired Judge, United States District Court for the District of
Columbia
Patricia M. Wald, Retired Chief Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit
Roderic V.O. Boggs, Executive Director

June 11, 2015

Deborah M. Golden, Director, DC Prisoners’ Rights Project

D.C. PRISONERS: CONDITIONS OF CONFINEMENT

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
On average, the daily population of D.C. Department of Corrections (DCDOC)
facilities exceeds 2,000 prisoners. About three-quarters of these individuals are
detained at the Central Detention Facility, a nearly forty-year-old facility commonly
referred to as the “D.C. Jail.” Just under one quarter are detained at the privately-run
Correctional Treatment Facility (CTF). The rest are located at one of the District’s three
halfway houses.
This report examines the conditions of confinement at the D.C. Jail and the CTF
and discusses several recurring and serious problems that require the prompt attention
of the DCDOC and District policymakers.
•

The D.C. Jail’s physical condition is alarming. Inspection reports by the
D.C. Department of Health (DOH) have identified numerous violations of
established correctional and public health standards, as well as structural and
mechanical problems that are “serious to extremely serious.” Some of the
problems noted in recent inspections appear to be a matter of poor housekeeping
and sanitation practices — e.g., an “active infestation of vermin/pests throughout
the facility.” Others indicate more fundamental degradation of the D.C. Jail’s
physical infrastructure. Inspectors found “openings in the wall” of several cells,
“damaged concrete in several of the cell blocks,” “water penetration through the
walls,” mold growth, and a leaking roof. In addition, inspectors have noted that
“most of the plumbing fixtures were in different stages of disrepair.”

•

Suicide prevention practices in the D.C. Jail are “in need of
immediate corrective action.”
An expert report (the “Hayes Report”)
arrived at this conclusion in 2013 after being commissioned to examine the D.C.
Jail conditions and policies following a ten-month period during which four
prisoners in the D.C. Jail committed suicide. The Hayes Report found that the
D.C. Jail did not have enough suicide-resistant cells, and that prisoners under
observation were subject to “overly restrictive and seemingly punitive”
precautionary measures. The Hayes Report also criticized the infrequency of
monitoring, which demonstrated “complete unconcern for inmate safety.” In
response to the Hayes Report, the DCDOC formed a Suicide Prevention Task
Force, which took steps to correct some of the issues noted in the report.
However, the Task Force has not published anything in more than one year, so it
is difficult to assess whether all of the required remedial measures have been
implemented.

•

Facilities for youth are inadequate and programming is insufficient.
A report conducted by an outside correctional consulting group (the “Ridley
Report”) identified significant problems with the conditions of confinement for
youth housed at the CTF and found that boys at the CTF “have needs far greater
than the services currently provided.” The Ridley Report highlighted the

D.C. PRISONERS: CONDITIONS OF CONFINEMENT

inadequacies of the juvenile facilities at the CTF, the excessive imposition of
segregation and isolation, and the insufficient programming for boys held there.
The report also notes that many boys may only visit with family members
through video visitation, which can interfere with maintaining critical family
bonds. The DCDOC reports that it has “worked diligently to implement the
Ridley recommendations,” but we recommend further actions, including
reducing the use of isolation and segregation among youth prisoners, further
increasing and improving youth programing, and expanding access to in-person
visitation for all youths.
•

The District should not renew its contract with CCA, the for-profit
corporation running the CTF. Since 1997, the CTF has been operated under
contract by the Corrections Corporation of America (CCA). It appears that the
District’s compensation to CCA was 31% higher than CCA’s reported average, at
least as of 2014. During that year, CCA reported an operating margin of 29.7%.
CCA’s contract is set to expire in 2017 and issues related to CCA operation of
prisons around the country since the beginning of the contract indicate that it
would not be in the District’s interests to continue to contract out the operation of
the CTF.

•

The Secure Residential Treatment Program needs expansion. The
Secure Residential Treatment Program, operated out of the CTF by the Court
Services and Offender Supervision Agency and the U.S. Parole Commission,
offers a helpful alternative to incarceration for those suffering from addiction, but
is unavailable to women and to many men due to the location of the facility and
its limited size.

•

“Good time credit” policies deny early release based on arbitrary
distinctions. District policies regarding the availability of “good time credit”
for academic, vocational, and rehabilitation achievement contain arbitrary
restrictions with respect to certain offenses. Federal policy governs good time
credits for inmates who will be transferred to the custody of the Bureau of
Prisons.

•

Correctional officers may not have been provided sufficient training.
A theme running throughout prior reports is that some of the District’s
correctional officers have not been provided modern, effective training.

•

Public records regarding the D.C. Jail and the CTF are difficult to
obtain. The process for obtaining public records regarding the District’s
correctional system is complex, time-consuming, occasionally befuddling, and
sometimes fruitless.

We conclude by offering seven proposed recommendations to address recurring
issues outlined in the report. They would not solve all the issues facing the District’s
correctional system, but we believe they would be important and tangible
improvements.
D.C. PRISONERS: CONDITIONS OF CONFINEMENT

Although we detail multiple areas of concern, it should be said at the outset that
this report is not intended to find fault with any particular person, organization, or
institution. Corrections officers face dangerous, even life-threatening, conditions on a
regular basis. The job is stressful and can be thankless. Administrative staff who help
run the Department of Corrections and its facilities and programs are often faced with
competing safety, budgetary, time, practical, political, and legal pressures. None of this
is to say that the District cannot make improvements in every area of concern. We can.
But assigning blame is less productive than collaborating to advance practical, effective
solutions.

DISTRICT DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS
FACILITIES AND POPULATIONS

Individuals in the DCDOC system are generally subject to confinement at either
of two facilities within the District, the D.C. Jail and the CTF, 1 or at one of the District’s
three contracted halfway houses. Prisoners convicted of a felony are transferred to a
Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) facility and may become eligible for parole.
In FY14, the average daily population for all DCDOC facilities combined was
Approximately three quarters (1,474) of those individuals were detained at the
D.C. Jail. Twenty-four percent (489) of those in DCDOC custody were located at CTF,
and the rest were in one of the contract halfway houses in the District. 3 While most
youth charged with crimes in the District are held at Department of Youth
Rehabilitation Services (DYRS) facilities, an average of sixteen boys were located at CTF
(the only DCDOC facility that houses youth) in FY14. 4 Pursuant to the Revitalization
Act of 1997, individuals convicted of felonies in D.C. are transferred to the custody of the
BOP.

2,041. 2

D.C. Dep’t of Corr., FY 2013 Performance Accountability Report, 1.

See D.C. Dep’t of Corr., DC Department of Corrections Facts and Figures,
http://doc.dc.gov/sites/default/files/dc/sites/doc/publication/attachments/DC%20Departmen
t%20of%20Corrections%20Facts%20and%20Figures%20October%202014.pdf
2

See id.

This number represents juveniles that the District tried as adults. See id.

D.C. PRISONERS: CONDITIONS OF CONFINEMENT

Facilities
1.

D.C. Jail

The DCDOC operates the D.C. Jail. 5 The D.C. Jail’s population comprises solely
adult men who: (1) are awaiting trial or a parole revocation decision and are subject to
pre-trial detention, (2) have been convicted of a misdemeanor, or (3) have been
convicted of a felony and are awaiting a transfer to a BOP facility. 6 The D.C. Jail houses
all three categories (Low, Medium, and High) of the DCDOC’s Inmate Classification
System (ICS), which is used to categorize prisoners for housing purposes based on “a
number of factors that include the nature of their current criminal charges, prior
criminal history and prior incarceration history.” 7
We appreciate the willingness of the DCDOC to allow us to tour the D.C. Jail in
February 2015. The D.C. Jail cell blocks include eighteen housing units, one of which is
currently being used as an inmate receiving center. Each housing unit has eighty cells
which, pursuant to current practices, hold up to two individuals each. The facility has of
late been housing fewer District prisoners than the capacity of the D.C. Jail would allow.
The tour was brief, we did not tour the entire facility, and we did not bring experts or
otherwise attempt to audit the facility or assess shortcomings addressed in
environmental inspection reports discussed in section III(A). Nonetheless, the tour was
informative. The D.C. Jail is an aging facility and is visibly suffering from wear and tear.
2.

Correctional Treatment Facility

Unlike the D.C. Jail, the CTF is operated for the District by a contractor, the
Corrections Corporation of America (traded as CXW on the New York Stock Exchange),
pursuant to a 20-year contract that runs through January 30, 2017. 8 The CTF
population comprises primarily adult men and women who: (1) are awaiting trial or a
parole revocation hearing and are subject to pre-trial detention, (2) have been convicted
of a misdemeanor, or (3) have been convicted of a felony and are awaiting a transfer to a
BOP facility. 9 The CTF also houses youth of both sexes and some U.S. Marshals Service

Located at 1901 D Street, SE, Washington, DC 20003; see also D.C. Dep’t of Corr., FY 2013
Performance Accountability Report, 1.
5

D.C. Dep’t of Corr., DOC Frequently Asked Questions, http://doc.dc.gov/page/doc-frequentlyasked-questions.
6

D.C. Dep’t of Corr., DOC Frequently Asked Questions, http://doc.dc.gov/page/doc-frequentlyasked-questions.
7

Operations and Management Agreement by and between The District of Columbia and
Corrections Corporation of America (effective Jan. 30, 1997, as modified); D.C. Dep’t of Corr.,
DOC Frequently Asked Questions, http://doc.dc.gov/page/doc-frequently-asked-questions.
8

D.C. Dep’t of Corr., DOC Frequently Asked Questions, http://doc.dc.gov/page/doc-frequentlyasked-questions.
9

D.C. PRISONERS: CONDITIONS OF CONFINEMENT

prisoners, and is permitted to house up to 200 sentenced BOP prisoners. 10 Unlike the
D.C. Jail, the CTF only houses prisoners with a “Low” or “Medium” ICS category. 11 The
CTF’s operating capacity is between 1,400 and 1,500. 12
3.

Halfway Houses

Until recently, the DCDOC contracted with four separate, contractor-owned and
operated halfway houses in the District, which are “often used as alternatives to
incarceration”: 13 (1) Efforts From Ex-Convicts; (2) Extended House, Inc.; (3) Fairview;
and (4) Hope Village. 14 The District no longer contracts with Efforts From ExConvicts. 15 Data from the first week in February 2015 indicate that the Fairview housed
about ten women, Extended House held about twenty-six men, and Hope Village housed
about thirty men. 16 These figures are lower than the average daily populations for FY
2014, which were as follows: Efforts From Ex-Convicts (15 individuals), Fairview (24),
Extended House (40), and Hope Village (43). 17

Id.; D.C. Dep’t of Corr., DOC Official Population Counts by Facility (Feb. 6, 2015),
http://doc.dc.gov/node/307122; Operations and Management Agreement by and between The
District of Columbia and Corrections Corporation of America, Modification 10. As of January 1,
2003, the District permitted the CCA to fill empty beds at the CTF with prisoners from other
jurisdictions, with the District receiving a per diem for any such prisoners. Id. Modification 3.
As of November 4, 2008, the District’s contract with the CCA was expressly modified to permit
the CCA to house USMS prisoners at the CTF. Id. Modification 9.
10

D.C. Dep’t of Corr., DOC Frequently Asked Questions, http://doc.dc.gov/page/doc-frequentlyasked-questions.
11

The District reports that the operating capacity is 1,400; CCA filings cite a 1,500 figure.
Compare D.C. Dep’t of Corr., DOC Official Population Counts by Facility (Feb. 6, 2015),
http://doc.dc.gov/node/307122, with Corrections Corporation of America, Annual Report
(Form 10-K), 14,
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1070985/000119312514072723/d664216d10k.htm.
12

D.C. Dep’t of Corr., FY 2015 Performance Plan, 1,
http://oca.dc.gov/sites/default/files/dc/sites/oca/publication/attachments/DOC15.pdf.
13

D.C. Dep’t of Corr., FY 2013 Performance Accountability Report, 1,
http://oca.dc.gov/sites/default/files/dc/sites/oca/publication/attachments/DOC_FY13PAR.pdf
14

See D.C. Chief Financial Officer, Keeping the Promises: FY 2015 Proposed Budget and
Financial Plan, C-37,
http://cfo.dc.gov/sites/default/files/dc/sites/ocfo/publication/attachments/DCOCFO_Volume
_1_web.pdf; D.C. Dep’t of Corr., FY 2015 Performance Plan,
http://oca.dc.gov/sites/default/files/dc/sites/oca/publication/attachments/DOC15.pdf.
15

D.C. Dep’t of Corr., DOC Official Population Counts by Facility (Feb. 6, 2015),
http://doc.dc.gov/node/307122.

D.C. Dep’t of Corr., DC Department of Corrections Facts & Figures October 2014,
http://doc.dc.gov/node/344892.
17

D.C. PRISONERS: CONDITIONS OF CONFINEMENT

Policies Affecting Prisoner Population
1.

U.S. Bureau of Prisons

Unlike each of America’s fifty states, management of the District of Columbia is
vested in a Mayor and City Council, but subject to control and oversight by the United
States Congress. 18 One result of this control is that, pursuant to a federal law,19
sentenced felons in the District have been required to be transferred to the BOP. 20
Before the enactment of the National Capital and Self-Government Act of 1997 (the
“Revitalization Act”), many of those prisoners had been housed at the Lorton
Correctional Complex 21 in Virginia; by December 31, 2001, the District had ceased
operations at Lorton. 22
Almost sixty percent of the District’s prisoner population are accused or
convicted of felonies: Within that population, nearly fifty percent of all District
prisoners are standing trial on a felony charge and 10% have been convicted and are
awaiting transfer to the BOP. 23 As a result, the District’s prisoner population is highly
transitory: Those awaiting trial for felonies will generally be released after the trial if
acquitted or sent to the BOP if convicted, and misdemeanants will not be confined for
more than one year.
2.

Reason for Incarceration

The majority of individuals in DCDOC custody are either awaiting trial or
awaiting transfer to a BOP facility. Forty-eight percent have a felony legal matter
pending, and another 10% have been sentenced to felony time (presumably awaiting
transfer to a BOP facility). Seven percent have a misdemeanor legal matter pending and
are held pre-trial. Only 11% of DCDOC prisoners are sentenced misdemeanants—
individuals, not awaiting a transfer, who are serving imposed sentences in a DCDOC
The Constitution grants legislative authority over the District to Congress. U.S. Const. art. I,
§ 8, cl. 17.

National Capital Revitalization and Self-Government Improvement Act of 1997, Pub. L. No.
105-33, 111 Stat. 712.

D.C. Dep’t of Corr., Correctional Facilities, http://doc.dc.gov/page/correctional-facilities.

The conditions at Lorton were examined through a series of interviews with staff and
prisoners in a 1990 article authored by Professor Robert Blecker of New York Law School. See
Robert Blecker, Haven or Hell? Inside Lorton Central Prison: Experiences of Punishment
Justified, 42 Stan. L. Rev. 1149 (1990).
21

D.C. Dep’t of Corr., About DOC, http://doc.dc.gov/page/about-doc.

See infra D.C. Dep’t of Corr., D.C. Department of Corrections’ PREA, Safety and Security
Report 2014,
http://doc.dc.gov/sites/default/files/dc/sites/doc/publication/attachments/DOCPREASafetyan
dSecurityReport2014.pdf.
23

D.C. PRISONERS: CONDITIONS OF CONFINEMENT

facility. 24 The remaining 24% of the prisoners are incarcerated for violation of parole,
being held pursuant to a writ or hold, or for “other” reasons.
Of the male DCDOC prisoners, about 19% are classified as “Federal Inmates,” i.e.,
prisoners accused of violating federal law who are temporarily held in a DCDOC facility.
Sixteen percent of the men being held for a D.C. Code offense are incarcerated for
assault or domestic violence, 13.6% are in for a parole violation, and 9.4% are
incarcerated for a burglary/robbery/carjacking.
The remaining prisoners are
incarcerated for various offenses including property crimes (8.2%), drug offenses
(6.6%), weapons possession (6.4%), and homicide (4%). Approximately 32% of male
DCDOC prisoners are incarcerated for “violent” or “dangerous” crimes (“dangerous
crimes” includes possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance).
The top two reasons for incarceration of female DCDOC prisoners are (1)
assault/domestic violence and (2) parole violations, with each of the two categories
accounting for 20% of the DCDOC female population. Of female DCDOC prisoners,
13.7% are federal inmates. Other reasons for incarceration include property crimes
(7.9%), failure to appear in court 25 (6.5%), and white collar crimes 26 (5.8%). Twenty-six
percent of female prisoners are incarcerated for violent or dangerous offenses.
3.

Length of Stay and “Good Time” Credits

The average length of stay in a DCDOC facility is 179 days for male prisoners, and
94 days for female prisoners. Under District law, prisoners 27 may earn “Good Time
Credits” for completion of academic and vocational programs or rehabilitation
programs; for “exceptionally meritorious service”; or “performing duties of outstanding
importance in connection with institutional operations”; and for “demonstrat[ing]
successful participation in one or more rehabilitation programs, work details, or special
projects. 28
One credit is equal to one full day of reduction in a sentence. Prisoners earn one
credit for completing a “program, detail, or project” that lasts twenty days or less, two
credits for completing a program that lasts between twenty and twenty-six days; and
24

See id.

“Failure to appear” generally refers to an individual’s failure to appear before any court or
judicial officer when ordered to do so. See, e.g., D.C. Code §23-1327.
25

“White collar crime” generally refers to financially-motivated, nonviolent crime that is often
committed by government and business professionals. See, e.g., DC Code §22-3225.02
(Insurance fraud).
26

The District’s good time credit laws apply only to pretrial and subsequently sentenced
misdemeanants. Inmates charged with felonies and sentenced to more than one year of
incarceration will be transferred to BOP custody and can only earn good time credits in
accordance with federal law and BOP policies.

D.C. Code §§ 24-221.01 to 24-221.01c.

D.C. PRISONERS: CONDITIONS OF CONFINEMENT

three credits if a program lasts twenty-six days or more. 29 There are a few limitations on
the use of this policy. First, only prisoners serving sentences for misdemeanors are
eligible (however, credits can begin to accrue pre-sentencing while the individual is
incarcerated). 30 Second, credits may not reduce a prisoner’s sentence by more than 15%
if the conviction was for a crime of violence, and credits may not reduce the minimum
sentence at all for a specified list of crimes, including certain crimes under the
Controlled Substances Act. 31 There are limitations on how many credits a prisoner may
earn per month. 32
4.

Parole/Supervised Release

When a D.C. Code offender 33 has served his or her minimum felony sentence,
s/he may be eligible for parole. 34 In addition to the standard parole system, the District
also provides for medical parole for permanently incapacitated or terminally ill
prisoners, and for geriatric release for prisoners at least sixty-five years old who have a
chronic illness. 35
The U.S. Parole Commission is vested with the authority to grant or deny parole
to D.C. Code felony offenders and to revoke parole and supervised release for those
under its supervision. 36 Before August 5, 1998, the D.C. Board of Parole was responsible
for making parole decisions, but its authority was transferred by the Revitalization Act. 37
Even though D.C. Code felony offenders are transferred into the federal BOP
system, the Commission applies District (rather than federal) guidelines and procedures
to all D.C. Code offenders. 38 However, the Commission has the authority to amend the
29

D.C. Dep’t of Corr., Program Statement 4341.1, § 10(b) (Aug. 17, 2012) (Good Time Credits).

See id. § 10(a)-(b).

Id. § 13(a)-(b).

Id. § 13(d).

By “D.C. Code offender,” we refer to an individual who has violated a section of the D.C.
criminal code, as opposed to a District resident who violated a federal law.
33

D.C. Code § 24-404(a).

See id. §§ 24-464, 24-465.

See U.S. Dep’t of Justice, FAQs, http://www.justice.gov/uspc/frequently-askedquestions#q46.
36

See id. The D.C. Board of Parole retained the authority to revoke parole until August 5, 2000,
when that authority was also transferred to the Commission and the Board was abolished. Id.;
D.C. Code § 24-131(a)(1).

See Parole FAQs. Specifically, D.C. Code offenders are addressed in Subpart C of the
Commission’s manual, which is available at http://www.justice.gov/uspc/documents/uspcmanual111507.pdf.
38

D.C. PRISONERS: CONDITIONS OF CONFINEMENT

rules, and it did so in 2000, potentially requiring prisoners to serve time beyond when
they become eligible for parole until they are deemed “suitable” for parole. 39 The
Commission’s guidelines have been subject to challenge. For example, a class action
filed by D.C. Code offenders challenges the application of the Commission’s rules,
arguing that the Commission’s rules unconstitutionally apply retroactively to extend the
length of time before prisoners will receive parole. 40
While D.C. Code offenders are on parole, they are subject to supervision by an
independent federal agency, the Court Services and Offender Supervision Agency
(CSOSA). 41 CSOSA also supervises pre-trial defendants who have been released to the
community.
5.

Secure Residential Treatment Program

The Secure Residential Treatment Program (SRTP) is a residential substance
abuse treatment program for individuals who have violated the terms of their parole or
supervised release and who have addiction needs. 42 The benefit of the SRTP is that the
participants receive substance abuse counseling and earn street-time credit, meaning
that they are still considered to be on supervised release for purposes of calculating the
length of their supervised release. The SRTP started as “a joint collaboration of CSOSA,
the DC Government, the United States Parole Commission, and the Bureau of Prisons
(BOP)” to address the needs of “chronic substance abusing, and criminally-involved DC
Code offenders” and “increase their chances of successful community reintegration.” 43
According to the DCDOC, the SRTP is currently operated by CSOSA and the U.S. Parole
Commission, which control eligibility requirements and the content of the program. 44

Id.; Daniel v. Fulwood, 766 F.3d 57, 59 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 12, 2014).

See Daniel v. Fulwood, 766 F.3d 57; see also Spencer Hsu, U.S. appeals court revives parole
challenge by D.C. inmates imprisoned since 1985, The Washington Post, Sept. 12,
2014,http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/crime/us-appeals-court-revives-parole-challengeby-dc-inmates-imprisoned-since-1985/2014/09/12/5c4a78ce-3a97-11e4-bdfbde4104544a37_story.html.
40

Court Services and Offender Supervision Agency for the District of Columbia, Mission and
Goals, http://www.csosa.gov/about/mission.aspx.
41

See Court Services and Offender Supervision Agency for the District of Columbia, FAQs:
Supervision Programs and Initiatives (“Describe CSOSA’s planned participation in the
[SRTP]”), http://www.csosa.gov/about/faqs/programs.aspx#faq19.
42

Id.

D.C. Department of Corrections Response to Washington Lawyers’ Committee White Paper,
May 5, 2015 (hereinafter “DCDOC Response”). A draft of this report was shared with the
DCDOC and, on May 5, the DCDOC provided its comments. This draft incorporates DCDOC
comments, along with analysis of those comments. The DCDOC Response is included as
Appendix B to this report.
44

D.C. PRISONERS: CONDITIONS OF CONFINEMENT

Participants in the SRTP are housed for up to 180 days in a special thirty-two-bed unit
at the CTF. The SRTP is administered by Phoenix House, a third-party contractor. 45
The SRTP makes a significant difference in the lives of many of its participants
and can help reduce the rate of recidivism. 46 But currently, the number of individuals
who could benefit from the program far exceeds the SRTP’s capacity. The SRTP is
available only to men, and its limited capacity means that many individuals who might
benefit from the program are unable to participate.
Those who are unable to participate in the program are held in custody and can
wait months to begin participating in the program. During that time, the individuals
who are held for a violation of their supervised release but who are unable to participate
in the SRTP do not receive street time credit. Also, because the SRTP is operated out of
the CTF, it is not available to individuals with a “High” ICS rating. As a result,
individuals with a High ICS rating are put in custody at the D.C. Jail instead of being
able to participate in the SRTP and will likely have their parole or supervised release
revoked. They may apply for a waiver, but those waivers can take months, if they are
ever granted at all. 47
C.

Demographics and Budget

As District leadership and community stakeholders confront the challenges
presented by the conditions of confinement in the District, it is vital to consider two
additional aspects of the correctional system: The system’s disproportionate impact on
certain populations, and its cost. In addition to the discussion in this section,
See Phoenix House, Secure Residential Treatment Program,
http://www.phoenixhouse.org/locations/metro-dc/secure-residential-treatment-program/.
45

See generally Press Release, Norton Announces the Secure Residential Treatment Program
for Non-Violent Offenders Will Continue, Congresswoman Eleanor Holmes Norton,
http://norton.house.gov/media-center/press-releases/norton-announces-the-secureresidential-treatment-program-for-non.
46

The SRTP is distinct from the Residential Substance Abuse Treatment (RSAT) program, which
is available to male and female inmates in DCDOC custody. See D.C. Department of
Corrections, Substance Abuse Treatment at DOC, http://doc.dc.gov/page/substance-abusetreatment-doc. According to the DCDOC, inmates may volunteer to participate in the RSAT,
join via referral or self-report, or enroll if they “have violated the terms of their probation and
otherwise meet the requirements of the program.” See DCDOC Response. The RSAT is
generally a 30- to 120-day program that includes services on relapse prevention, as well as
“workshops on domestic violence, parenting, fatherhood, life skills, arts, behavior modification,
vocational education and health education.” Id.; D.C. Department of Corrections, Substance
Abuse Treatment at DOC, http://doc.dc.gov/page/substance-abuse-treatment-doc. This
curriculum has been “licensed by Addiction Prevention and Recovery Administration (APRA),
the regulating body for policy for substance abuse, prevention, treatment, and recovery
services.” DCDOC Response. Individuals who successfully complete the RSAT program are
reinstated to supervision and are generally placed in a 30- to 60-day aftercare program.
47

D.C. PRISONERS: CONDITIONS OF CONFINEMENT

demographics and cost issues are addressed in more detail in the appendix to this
report.
The
District’s
prisoner
population
is
disproportionately Black and male as compared to the
Slightly less than half
District’s total population. Slightly less than half
(49.5%) of the District’s
(49.5%) of the District’s total population, but 91% of
total population, but
the District’s prisoner population, is Black.
By
91% of the District’s
contrast, 43.4% of the District’s total population, but
prisoner population,
only a small fraction (3%) of the District’s prisoner
is Black.
population,
is
White.
And, while 92% of the DCDOC
And, while 92% of the DCDOC population is
population is male,
male, only 47% of the District’s total
only
47% of the District’s
population is male. 48 When it comes to
total population is male.
youth, the racial and gender disparities are
even starker.
Since 2007, the District’s prisoner population has declined significantly, and may
well decline further as a result of District policies relating to the decriminalization of
marijuana. A report studying the District’s high incarceration rate identified a lack of
affordable housing, high rates of homelessness, education deficiencies, lack of access to
mental health and substance abuse treatment, and high unemployment as relevant
factors. 49

II. RECURRING ISSUES AND PROBLEMS INVOLVING
THE D.C. JAIL AND CTF
Despite the tremendous investments that the D.C. government has made in its
prison system, discussed in more detail in the Appendix, the D.C. Jail and CTF continue
to face significant problems. As the following sections explain:
•

The D.C. Jail’s physical infrastructure appears to be crumbling and multiple
inspections have revealed unsanitary conditions and non-compliance with basic
standards established by national correctional authorities;

United States Census Bureau, State & County QuickFacts,
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/11000.html.

Justice Policy Institute, A Capitol Concern: The Disproportionate Impact of the Justice
System on Low-Income Communities in D.C.,
http://www.justicepolicy.org/images/upload/10-07_EXS_CapitolConcern_AC-PS-RD-DC.pdf.

D.C. PRISONERS: CONDITIONS OF CONFINEMENT

•

An independent expert found that the suicide prevention program employed at
the D.C. Jail has significant shortcomings despite the fact that four prisoners
recently committed suicide in the span of less than one year; and

•

The CTF is not adequately providing for the needs of juveniles who are
incarcerated there.

•

For nearly twenty years, the CTF has been operated under contract by CCA.
Continued problems at the CTF, the fact that the District’s compensation to CCA
appears to be 34% higher than CCA’s reported average, at least as of 2013, and
CCA’s operational track record around the country since the beginning of the
contract all strongly indicate that it would not be in the District’s interests to
continue to contract out CTF operations when the CCA contract expires in 2017.
A.

Crumbling physical infrastructure
1.

Recent reports

The District’s jail facilities are not new. The CTF was opened in 1992 and has
now been in operation for over twenty years. 50 The D.C. Jail was opened in 1976 and
has been in operation for nearly forty years. 51 Based on discussions with DCDOC staff,
as well as testimony provided to the D.C. Council by DCDOC officials, maintenance and
upkeep for the D.C. Jail will continue to consume resources and may require expensive
upgrades.
Inspection reports prepared by the D.C. Department of Health (DOH) paint a
troubling picture of the physical condition of the D.C. Jail. The two most recent
inspection reports that are available account for a September 2013 to October 2013
inspection period (the “Fall 2013 Inspection”) and a February 2014 to March 2014
inspection period (the “Spring 2014 Inspection”). 52 A cover letter from the DOH to the
Director of the DCDOC accompanies each of the inspection reports and explains that:
This inspection identified areas of non-compliance with
environmental requirements as defined by the American
Correctional Association Standards for Adult Local
Detention Facilities and the American Public Health
Association Standards for Health Services Correctional
Institutions.53
50

D.C. Dep’t of Corr., Correctional Facilities, http://doc.dc.gov/page/correctional-facilities.

Although additional inspections likely occurred since March 2015, prior requests to obtain
access to any associated reports through the FOIA process were unsuccessful.
52

Letter from Joxel Garcia, Director, D.C. Department of Health, to Thomas Faust, Director,
D.C. Department of Corrections (May 20, 2014); Letter from Joxel Garcia, Acting Director, D.C.

(continued…)
D.C. PRISONERS: CONDITIONS OF CONFINEMENT

The inspection reports themselves raise grave concerns. Although some of the
problems could conceivably be addressed through improvements in housekeeping and
sanitation or maintenance practices, others speak to larger problems with the physical
infrastructure of the D.C. Jail and indicate that the facility itself—which opened nearly
forty years ago—may require significant renovations or need to be replaced.
In both the Fall 2013 Inspection and the Spring 2014
Inspection, the inspector found that “the cell blocks and
several common areas were not maintained in a clean and
sanitary manner and in good repair.” 54 In the reports
accompanying each inspection, the inspector provided a list of
more than 100 problems to support this conclusion. 55
Problems that pertain to sanitation failures and a lack of
routine maintenance and that could possibly be corrected
through significant improvements in housekeeping practices
include, for example:

“There is an
active infestation
of vermin/pests
throughout the
facility”

•

“There is an active infestation of vermin/pests throughout the facility;” 56

•

There were numerous sanitation issues in the kitchen, such as unsanitary
equipment and improper temperature control for refrigerated foods; 57

•

“The showers throughout the housing units were not sanitarily maintained and in
good working order;” 58

Department of Health, to Thomas Faust, Director, D.C. Department of Corrections (Dec. 4,
2013).
See generally Ralph Spencer, Central Detention Facility Inspection Report, February 18 to
March 21, 2014 (Mar. 21, 2014) (hereinafter “Spring 2014 Inspection Report”); Ralph Spencer,
Central Detention Facility Re-Inspection Report, February 18 to March 21, 2014 (Mar. 21,
2014) (hereinafter “Spring 2014 Re-Inspection Report”); Ralph Spencer, Central Detention
Facility Inspection Report, September 17 to October 11, 2013 (Oct. 18, 2013) (hereinafter “Fall
2013 Inspection Report”); Ralph Spencer, Central Detention Facility Re-Inspection Report,
September 17 to October 11, 2013 (Oct. 18, 2013) (hereinafter “Fall 2013 Re-Inspection Report”).
54

See Spring 2014 Re-Inspection Report, 2 - 6; Spring 2014 Inspection Report, 2 - 6; Fall 2013
Inspection Report, 2 - 6; Fall 2013 Re-Inspection Report, 2 - 7.
55

Memorandum from Ralph Spencer, Safety and Environmental Health Specialist, to Senior
Deputy Director, Health Regulation and Licensing Administration, 6 (Feb. 18, 2014 to Mar. 21,
2014) (hereinafter “Spring 2014 Spencer Memorandum”); Memorandum from Ralph Spencer,
Safety and Environmental Health Specialist, to Feseha Woldu, Senior Deputy Director, Health
Regulation and Licensing Administration (Sept. 17, 2013 to Oct. 11, 2013) (hereinafter “Fall 2013
Spencer Memorandum”)
56

Spring 2014 Spencer Memorandum, 6; Fall 2013 Spencer Memorandum, 4 - 5.

D.C. PRISONERS: CONDITIONS OF CONFINEMENT

•

Numerous parts of the medical facility were deemed “dirty” or “damaged” and
there was “a sewer odor” in some of the rooms; 59 and

•

“[T]he lighting was not functioning properly” in many of the cell blocks. 60

By contrast, other problems cited in the
reports could be remedied only through
Department of Health:
significant renovations to the facility or by
replacing the D.C. Jail entirely. Indeed, the
“structural and mechanical
Department of Health noted in its Fall 2013
deficiencies were more
Inspection that “structural and mechanical
prominent than
deficiencies were more prominent than
environmental deficiencies”
environmental deficiencies,” 61 and many of those
issues remained uncorrected during the Spring
Structural or mechanical deficiencies observed during the
2014 Inspection. 62
inspections, included, for example:

•

“There were openings in the wall” of several cells 63 and “damaged concrete in
several of the cell blocks;” 64

•

“Most of the plumbing fixtures were in different stages of disrepair; 65

•

The roof was leaking; 66

•

There was “water penetration through the walls;” 67

Spring 2014 Spencer Memorandum, 7; Fall 2013 Spencer Memorandum, 6.

Fall 2013 Inspection Report, 4 - 5; Fall 2013 Re-Inspection Report, 4 - 5; see also Spring 2014
Inspection Report, 4 - 6; Spring 2014 Re-Inspection Report, 4 - 5.
59

Fall 2013 Re-Inspection Report, 11; see also Spring 2014 Inspection Report, 11 (“There were
several blown fluorescent tubes throughout the cell blocks and in the stairwells.”).

Fall 2013 Spencer Memorandum, 2.

Spring 2014 Spencer Memorandum, 2.

Fall 2013 Re-Inspection Report, 8; Fall 2013 Inspection Report, 2; see also Spring 2014
Spencer Memorandum, 9 (identifying “Openings in the wall” as a general maintenance
concern).
63

Spring 2014 Re-Inspection Report, 2; Spring 2014 Inspection Report, 2; Fall 2013 ReInspection Report, 8; Fall 2013 Inspection Report, 2.

Fall 2013 Re-Inspection Report, 4, 12.

Spring 2014 Spencer Memorandum, 2; Fall 2013 Spencer Memorandum, 2.

D.C. PRISONERS: CONDITIONS OF CONFINEMENT

•

Mold was growing on many of the walls; 68

•

There was “concrete separating at the corners in the gym;” 69

•

The floors, walls, and ceilings in many rooms were “damaged;” 70

•

Floor tiles in many of the rooms were missing or damaged; 71

•

There were rusted areas in the ceiling and the wall; 72

•

There were damaged and rusted windows and “damaged and missing caulk from
around the window in several of the cell blocks;” 73

•

There was “peeling paint on the walls throughout the facility;” 74 and

•

There was damage to the “concrete walkway around the exterior premises.” 75

The DOH emphasized the seriousness of the water leakage in particular, which it
blamed for mold growth and described as “a health and safety issue which can have
serious effects.” 76

Spring 2014 Spencer Memorandum, 2; Fall 2013 Spencer Memorandum, 2.

Spring 2014 Inspection Report, 2; Fall 2013 Re-Inspection Report, 2.

See generally Spring 2014 Inspection Report; Spring 2014 Re-Inspection Report; Fall 2013
Inspection Report; Fall 2013 Re-Inspection Report.

See generally Spring 2014 Inspection Report; Spring 2014 Re-Inspection Report; Fall 2013
Inspection Report; Fall 2013 Re-Inspection Report.
71

Spring 2014 Inspection Report, 12; Spring 2014 Re-Inspection Report, 12; Fall 2013
Inspection Report, 12; Fall 2013 Re-Inspection Report, 12.

Spring 2014 Inspection Report, 3; Fall 2013 Re-Inspection Report, 2.

Spring 2014 Spencer Memorandum, 8; Fall 2013 Spencer Memorandum, 7.

Spring 2014 Spencer Memorandum, 2; Fall 2013 Spencer Memorandum, 2.

Fall 2013 Spencer Memorandum, 3; see also 2014 Spencer Memorandum, 10.

D.C. PRISONERS: CONDITIONS OF CONFINEMENT

Persistent problems

A review of reports from ten recent inspections indicates that many issues have
not been adequately addressed after being noted in prior reports. 77 For example, in the
report accompanying the Spring 2014
Inspection, the inspector noted that “[s]everal of
the structural and mechanical deficiencies
The Department of Health
observed in previous inspections . . . remained
described
these problems as
outstanding.” 78 These issues include: “leaking
“serious to extremely
roof, water penetration through the walls, mold
serious”
growth on the walls,” and “leaking damaged and
or inoperable plumbing fixtures.” 79 In past
reports, the Department of Health described
these problems as “serious to extremely serious” and explained that some of these
problems “can have a negative impact on the health and safety of the inmates and staff if
they are not addressed in a timely manner.” 80
However, despite the seriousness of these and other concerns, many of the same
problems persisted—and in some cases deteriorated—between reports. 81 Thus, while it
is helpful that the DOH inspects the D.C. Jail on a regular basis, it is not clear that these
reports are being translated into actions that significantly improve the condition of the
facility.
It is standard for periodic inspections to consist of an initial inspection and a
follow-up inspection to determine compliance with corrective action plans submitted by
The ten inspections were conducted in February 2014 - March 2014; September 2013 October 2013; April 2013 - May 2013; November 2012; May 2012 - June 2012; January 2012 February 2012; May 2011; May 2010 - June 2010; June 2009; January 2009.
77

Spring 2014 Spencer Memorandum, p. 2.

Id.

See, e.g., Memorandum from Milton Anderson and Ralph Spencer to Feseha Woldu, Senior
Deputy Director, Health Regulation and Licensing Administration, 6 (May 18, 2010 to June 2,
2010); Memorandum from Milton Anderson and Ralph Spencer to Feseha Woldu, Senior
Deputy Director, Health Regulation and Licensing Administration, 18 (June 8, 2009 to June 19,
2009); Memorandum from Milton Anderson and Ralph Spencer to Feseha Woldu, Senior
Deputy Director, Health Regulation and Licensing Administration, 17 (Jan. 12, 2009 to Jan. 30,
2009).
80

D.C. PRISONERS: CONDITIONS OF CONFINEMENT

the facility based on the initial inspection. The DCDOC states that it is “committed to
performing preventative and day to day maintenance of the CDF and CTF facilities in
order to provide a clean and safe environment,” and, typically, the DCDOC will have
addressed or fixed at least some of the problems identified in the initial inspection by
the time the follow-up inspection occurs. The DCDOC did not dispute the findings from
these past reports, but noted that DOH had recently cited “noticeable improvements in
the facility,” and observed that “areas that were in need of repair and in poor condition
during the initial inspection have improved significantly.” 82 Further, the DCDOC
maintained that 87% of the items identified in a March 2015 inspection have already
been “abated.” 83 Nonetheless, as DCDOC acknowledged, some of the issues noted in
DOH inspection reports are, “due to the age and deterioration of the physical structure,”
“outside of DOC’s control.” 84
During our tour of the D.C. Jail, we did not attempt to re-evaluate the facility or
verify the findings of the environmental inspection reports. Nonetheless, we did observe
that, although many parts of the facility were painted and appeared to be maintained, in
other areas of the facility, paint was peeling or scratched, metal frames and hinges were
rusted, the ceiling was stained and missing ceiling tiles, and piping insulation was frayed
or damaged. We observed flies in the culinary area, though not to such an extent that
we would term it an “infestation.” We also learned that mice posed an occasional
problem in dry storage. We did not observe any mice during the tour.
The DCDOC acknowledged that it has
not been able to fix certain shortcomings
“due to the age and deterioration
of the physical structure.”

Addressing these structural deficiencies

These DOH reports underscore the urgent need for improvements to the D.C.
Jail. Many of these issues may not be easily remedied. Indeed, the DCDOC
acknowledged that it has not been able to fix certain shortcomings “due to the age and
deterioration of the physical structure.” 85 But if District prisoners are to be housed in a
facility that is clean, sanitary, and up to the minimum standards that have been
established by national correctional authorities, then they must be addressed. A full
examination of the potential remedies—including physical plant issues such as the
replacement of aging facilities with one or more new, modern facilities—is necessary.
The status quo is unacceptable.
82

DCDOC Response.

Id.

DCDOC Response.

D.C. PRISONERS: CONDITIONS OF CONFINEMENT

Additional Concerns

In a recent hearing before the Committee on the Judiciary and Public Safety,
Director Thomas Faust suggested that the D.C. Jail’s lack of program space makes it
difficult to provide significant programming. 86 Director Faust also stated that the
facility is well-worn and that it will continue to need significant repairs.
During our tour, we discussed a number of structural issues at the facility that
appear to pose current risks and may require costly improvements.
First, the D.C. Jail has four electrical generators, three of which are as old as the
D.C. Jail itself, and a fourth that was transferred from the Lorton facility and was likely
not new when that facility closed in 2001. Although the generators are reportedly all
functioning and able to provide emergency back-up power, the current generator system
is unable to provide enough power to meet all of the facility’s electricity needs. In
particular, the system would not be able to support full operation of the air chillers on a
hot day. There is no indication of a security risk, but the result could be an inability to
maintain reasonable temperatures in the facility. Additionally, due to the age of the
generators, parts are increasingly unavailable on the market, driving up the cost of
maintenance and repair.
Second, the air handlers that control air flow and help balance temperatures in
the cells were moved nearly two decades ago in an effort to increase efficiency.
Unfortunately, it appears that there were fairly severe problems in the implementation
of the system redesign and the current system has not been able to maintain consistent
temperatures in the cellblocks. Moreover, the air handlers are reportedly nearing the
end of their useful life and replacement and attendant redesign of the structure may cost
millions.
Third, the D.C. Jail relies on the D.C. General steam plant for steam, which is
used for heating. When the steam plant goes offline, as it has in the past, the D.C. Jail
does not have an alternate source of steam for heat and has no control over the repair of
that facility. This lack of a contingency is concerning, particularly if a failure results in
an inability to adequately heat the facility in winter.
Fourth, the D.C. Jail contains a number of structural flaws that limit its utility
and cost-effectiveness. For example, during the tour, DCDOC staff noted that one of the
elevators was designed to skip a floor in the facility. Staff were uncertain as to the
original intent behind the design, but the feature is apparently no longer necessary.
Nevertheless, staff must contend with an elevator that does not stop at all floors.
Additionally, the 1970s facility was not designed with energy efficiency in mind, a
concept that would be expected to save costs in a modern facility.
D.C. City Council, Public Hearing, Committee on the Judiciary (Feb. 19, 2015),
http://208.58.1.36:8080/DCC/February2015/02_19_15_Judici.mp4 (video) (testimony of
Director Faust).
86

D.C. PRISONERS: CONDITIONS OF CONFINEMENT

Fifth, although the cell blocks we toured contained common areas, the D.C. Jail
appeared to have limited space available for programming.
B.

Mental Health and Suicide Prevention Practices at the D.C. Jail

Prisoners at the D.C. Jail receive on-site
mental health services from the D.C. Department
of Mental Health, 87 and clinicians from Unity
Health Care, an outside vendor that provides a
range of health care services to prisoners in
DCDOC facilities. 88 In recent years, prisoner
suicides at the D.C. Jail have highlighted potential
shortcomings in this mental health system. 89
Between November 2012 and August 2013, four
prisoners at the D.C. Jail committed suicide, bringing the suicide rate to three times the
national average. 90 At the time, the DCDOC’s contract with Unity Health Care provided
for certain suicide-prevention measures, including safe cells, a suicide intake protocol,
and periodic suicide screening. 91
Between November 2012
and August 2013, four
prisoners at the D.C. Jail
committed suicide,
bringing the suicide
rate to three times the
national average.

In the midst of the dramatic increase in suicides at the D.C. Jail, the DCDOC
engaged an outside consultant in mid-2013 to draft a report on suicide prevention
practices within the D.C. Jail. 92 The DCDOC also formed a Suicide Prevention Task
Force (the “Task Force”), whose membership includes representatives of the
Department of Corrections, Unity Health Care, the Department of Mental Health, and
the Corrections Corporation of America. 93 The Task Force took steps to correct some of

D.C. Dep’t of Corr., Mental Health Services at DOC, http://doc.dc.gov/page/mental-healthservices-doc. Mental health services may also be provided by “community service agencies.”
See id.
87

See Lindsay M. Hayes, Report on Suicide Prevention Practices within the District of
Columbia, Department of Corrections’ Central Detention Facility (Sept. 13, 2013) (hereinafter
“Hayes Report”).
88

Aaron C. Davis, Report: Rash of suicides at D.C. Jail points to deep problem with inmates’
mental health care, The Washington Post, Nov. 7, 2013,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/dc-politics/report-rash-of-suicides-at-dc-jail-points-todeep-problem-with-inmates-mental-health-care/2013/11/07/caecf39c-47e5-11e3-b6f83782ff6cb769_story.html.
89

Id.

D.C. Contract, DCFL-2006-D-6001 & Modifications (Unity Health Care, Inc.), Contract
§§ C.3.2.3, C.3.12; id. at Modification 8, §§ C.3.2.4, C.3.12.7.

See generally Hayes Report.

D.C. Dep’t of Corr., Office of Health Administrations, Suicide Prevention Task Force Report
(Oct. 14, 2013) (hereinafter “Task Force Report”).

D.C. PRISONERS: CONDITIONS OF CONFINEMENT

the issues noted in the Hayes Report, but,94 after an initial report in October 2013, the
Task Force has not published anything further in more than a year. Nevertheless,
Director Faust characterized the Task Force as “very active” in a recent hearing before
the Committee on the Judiciary and Public Safety. 95
1.

Hayes Report

The DCDOC engaged Lindsey Hayes, an expert in the area of suicide prevention
in correctional facilities, to assess the policies and practices at the D.C. Jail and to issue
a report summarizing his findings (the “Hayes Report”). 96 The Hayes Report found
that, while the DCDOC and Unity Health Care had policies that “more than adequately
cover the required components of a suicide prevention program . . . the suicide
prevention practices for many of these required components [were] lacking in varying
degrees and in need of immediate corrective action.” 97 The D.C. Jail was particularly
lacking in the following areas:
•

Lack of Suicide-Resistant Cells. Hayes found that the D.C. Jail included an
inadequate number of suicide-resistant cells. 98 Such cells do not include
protrusions that could serve as an anchoring device for a prisoner trying to
commit suicide by hanging. At the time of the assessment, the D.C. Jail included
only nine suicide-resistant cells, but “there were more than nine (9) inmates on
observation status each day.” 99 As a result, several prisoners who were under
observation for potentially suicidal behavior were housed in non-suicide resistant
cells that contained “dangerous anchoring devices.” 100 In response, the Hayes
Report “strongly recommended that DOC officials embark upon an inspection
program to ensure that prisoners on suicide precautions are housed in ‘suicideresistant’ cells.” 101

•

Punitive Conditions. Hayes found that the “precautions” taken with respect to
prisoners who were possibly suicidal were “overly restrictive and seemingly
punitive.” 102 When prisoners were designated for “behavioral observation,” they

See id.

D.C. City Council, Public Hearing, Committee on the Judiciary (Feb. 19, 2015),
http://208.58.1.36:8080/DCC/February2015/02_19_15_Judici.mp4 (video) (testimony of
Director Faust).
95

See generally Hayes Report.

Id. at 6.

See id. at 23.

Id.

100

Id.

101

Id. at 26.

102

Id. at 24.

D.C. PRISONERS: CONDITIONS OF CONFINEMENT

were isolated and “stripped of all clothing and possessions, and given only a
paper gown without undergarments.” 103 While under behavioral observation,
prisoners were permitted to leave their cells only for showers and legal visits, and
were prohibited from using the telephone or having family visits. 104 Hayes noted
that many of these measures were counterproductive: “Confining a suicidal
inmate to their cell for 24 hours a day only enhances isolation and is antitherapeutic.” 105 The “seemingly punitive” conditions also decreased the chances
that prisoners would honestly report suicidal ideations. 106 According to Hayes, it
was “obvious” that the punitive measures were premised on “a misguided belief
that most inmates who threaten suicide and/or engage in self-injurious behavior
are simply manipulative” and that the overly “restrictive and punitive aspects of
Behavioral Observation [are meant] to deter such behavior.” 107
•

Insufficient Supervision of Potentially Suicidal Prisoners. Hayes was most
critical of the DCDOC’s use of a monitoring protocol called “behavioral
observation” for suicidal prisoners instead of “Suicide Watch” or “Suicide
Prevention.” Hayes found it “incredibl[e]” that, “there were not any inmates on
either Suicide Watch or Suicide Prevention status” during the three-day on-site
assessment. 108 This is significant because while prisoners who are on Suicide
Watch or Suicide Prevention would be monitored continuously or once every
fifteen minutes, respectively, prisoners placed on “behavioral observation” were
monitored only once every 30 to 60 minutes. 109 Hayes even suggested that this
irregular monitoring of suicidal prisoners showed “complete unconcern for
inmate safety,” 110 and that it was “obvious” that behavioral observation was being
used to by-pass more regular monitoring. 111 The Hayes Report cites one case of a
prisoner who had attempted suicide on several occasions in the previous two
months but was nevertheless placed on behavioral observation where he might be
monitored only once every sixty minutes. 112

•

Inadequate Training. Hayes found that “correctional officers that are assigned to
the mental health unit do not receive any specialized mental health and/or

103

Id. at 23.

104

Id. at 24.

105

Id.

106

Id.

107

Id. at 33.

108

Id. at 31.

109

Id. at 30, 32.

110

Id. at 33.

111

Id.

112

Id. at 34 - 35.

D.C. PRISONERS: CONDITIONS OF CONFINEMENT

suicide prevention training.” 113 The suicide prevention training program for all
employees was “a 39-slide PowerPoint presentation . . . encompassing only one
hour of instruction.” 114 Overall, the report concluded that “the number of hours
devoted to both pre-service and annual suicide prevention training for
correctional, medical, and mental health staff is inadequate, and the content of
the training curricula is in need of improvement.” 115
2.

Suicide Prevention Task Force

In response to the increase in prisoner suicides, the DCDOC formed the Suicide
Prevention Task Force to review “custodial practices related to medical and mental
health issues in DOC facilities.” 116 On October 14, 2013, the Task Force published a
report summarizing a recent meeting and other steps taken by the Task Force to date. 117
In the report, the Task Force noted that, as of the date of the report, the suicide rate for
the DCDOC as a whole, when accounting for the average daily population of its facilities,
was “more than 3 times the average” of local jails nationwide. 118
The report also described positive steps that the Task Force had taken to address
some of the concerns outlined in the Hayes Report. For example, the following Task
Force recommendations were implemented:
•

Increase the frequency of “Segregation and Intake unit checks” to at least once
every fifteen minutes. 119

•

Ensure that “NO ONE is placed in a single cell unless there’s an overwhelmingly
compelling reason to do so.” 120

•

Include a dedicated booking supervisor at intake to “monitor all high-risk
inmates . . . to determine if an expedited referral to a mental health clinician is
warranted.” 121

•

Implement a new “Razor plan” that prohibits prisoners from accessing razors. 122

113

Id. at 9.

114

Id.

115

Id. at 10.

116

See Task Force Report, 2.

117

See generally id.

118

Id. at 4.

119

Id. at 6.

120

Id.

121

Id. at 5.

122

Id. at 6.

D.C. PRISONERS: CONDITIONS OF CONFINEMENT

•

Institute a more robust four-hour suicide prevention training curriculum. 123

In its report, the Task Force also described a set of “long-term suicide prevention
strategies undergoing consideration.” 124 For example, in order to improve suicideresistance in prisoner cells, the “DOC’s Facilities team” worked on and had “nearly
completed a ‘suicide-resistant’ cell prototype.” 125
Although the Task Force report signaled some improvements in the DCDOC’s
suicide prevention program, more work needed to be done beyond what was described
in the October 2013 report. The DCDOC has reported that, as of May 2015, it has taken
the following additional steps to improve its suicide prevention practices.
•

The DCDOC reports that, as of October 2014, “all 40 designated cells have been
completed and retrofitted as follows: to decrease ligature points, handles have
been removed from toilets and desks, vents are covered with anti-ligature grade
mesh, pick-proof, penal-grade caulking has been used in the cells, and doors have
been replaced to allow for 2 clear panels that provide enhanced vision into and
out of the cells.” 126

•

As of May 2015, the DCDOC “provides suicide-resistant smocks and blankets.” 127
In addition, “more time out of cells and the provision of more family visits and
telephone access is under review.” 128

•

The DCDOC reports that it “immediately discontinued “Behavior Management”
status…upon receipt of the Hayes Report.” As of May 2015, the DCDOC reports
that there are “two categories of observation: Suicide Watch for inmates thought
to be actively suicidal and Suicide Precaution for inmates who are at risk of
suicide, but less acutely compared to inmates on Suicide Watch.” 129 The DCDOC
states that “Inmates on Suicide Watch are placed in a safe cell on 3rd floor
medical and are provided one-to-one constant monitoring by a healthcare
professional,” whereas “Inmates on Suicide Precaution are monitored by officers
every fifteen (15) minutes in staggered intervals.” 130

123

Id.

124

Id. at 7.

125

Id. at 8.

126

DCDOC Response.

127

Id.

128

Id.

129

Id.

130

Id.

D.C. PRISONERS: CONDITIONS OF CONFINEMENT

•

The DCDOC also reports that “Suicide Prevention training has been significantly
enhanced.” 131 As of May 2015, “[a[ll correctional officers, other DOC staff and
healthcare vendor staff must undergo four (4) hours annually of Suicide
Prevention training.” 132 The DCDOC also stated that it “brought in national
expert Dr. Dean Aufderheide to conduct a full day of training on self-injurious
behavior issues which involved inmates with mental health issues as well as those
exhibiting ‘bad behavior.’” 133 That training was attended by “[c]orrectional
officers on the mental health and segregation units, as well as mental health
staff.” 134

The DCDOC reports that the recommendations of the Hayes Report “have been
implemented.” However, the WLC was unable to verify that this is the case. Based on
the information provided, none of these improvements make clear how prisoners who
were isolated for exhibiting suicidal behavior would be treated in a manner that is less
restrictive or punitive than before. Hayes had noted that these seemingly punitive
conditions were based on false assumptions and that they were actually
counterproductive. Moreover, it is not clear that the 40 designated safe cells are being
made available to inmates in all cases where there may be a need. For example,
although a new inmate processing center currently under construction at the D.C. Jail
contains a suicide-resistant cell, or safe cell, the existing inmate processing center (a
converted housing unit) does not. It also is not clear whether a best-practices standard
has been applied to confirm that safe cells are in fact adequately suicide-resistant. On
our tour, a cell at the D.C. Jail deemed to be a safe cell appeared to be little different
from a regular cell and included potentially dangerous fixtures, such as bunk beds.
Even though the D.C. Jail’s recent District inmate population is well below
operating capacity, the DCDOC has a practice of double-celling, or holding two people in
a single cell, for the general population. This practice was described as a suicide
prevention measure. Individuals in the mental health unit, however, are generally
housed one to a cell.
C.

Issues Confronting Youth

Significant problems with the conditions of
confinement for youth who are housed at the CTF
were identified in a 2013 report prepared by a
criminal justice consulting firm (the “Ridley

131

Id.

132

Id.

133

Id.

134

Id.

D.C. PRISONERS: CONDITIONS OF CONFINEMENT

“Juveniles at CTF have
needs far greater
than the services
currently provided.”

Report”). 135 The DCDOC operates the Incarcerated Juvenile Program at CTF, which
includes youth who “have been charged in the court system as adults and are awaiting
trial or currently serving their sentence.” 136
According to the Ridley Report,
approximately one girl and seventy boys are processed through CTF each year, and
approximately 26% of these youth have mental health issues. 137 At the time of the onsite
assessments by the Ridley Group, the CTF was housing twenty-five youth, all but one of
whom were boys.
The Ridley Report found that “juveniles at CTF have needs far greater than the
services currently provided.” 138 The report highlights the inadequacies of the facilities at
the CTF, the excessive imposition of segregation and isolation, and the insufficient
programming for juveniles. The report also notes that boys may only visit with family
members through video visitation, which can interfere with maintaining critical family
bonds. As the following analysis suggests, many of these problems are exacerbated by
the fact that the DCDOC is housing an average of twenty-five youth at a facility that also
houses hundreds of adults.139
1.

Inadequate Facility

The Ridley Report concluded that the youth’s “Unit Space is inadequate for the
population served.” 140 Units for youth should include “sufficient space for adequate
physical exercise; provision of regular, special, and vocational education; and
therapeutic programming.” 141 However, the Ridley Report found that at the CTF, the
on-site “school is cramped and the unit does not have dedicated programming or
recreation space.” 142 Some of
The on-site “school is cramped and the
the issues appear to arise from
unit does not have dedicated
the fact that the small number
programming or recreation space.”
of youth must be separated
from
the
adult
prisoner
Walter B. Ridley, Francis Mendez, and Ghia Ridley Pearson, The District of Columbia
Department of Corrections Correctional Treatment Facility Juvenile Unit Assessment (2013).
Mr. Ridley is a former Director of the DCDOC.
135

136

Id. at 6.

137

Id.

138

Id. at 47.

D.C. Dep’t of Corr., DOC Official Population Counts by Facility,
http://doc.dc.gov/node/307122; D.C. Dep’t of Corr., Quarterly Population Statistics October
2014, http://doc.dc.gov/node/344902.

139

Walter B. Ridley, Francis Mendez, and Ghia Ridley Pearson, The District of Columbia
Department of Corrections Correctional Treatment Facility Juvenile Unit Assessment (2013),
9.
140

141

Id. at 13.

142

Id. at 9.

D.C. PRISONERS: CONDITIONS OF CONFINEMENT

population by both sight and sound. For example, the juveniles are permitted to use the
gym and outdoor recreation facilities only when the adults are not using those facilities.
The Ridley Report recommended that the DCDOC “explore whether there are unused
spaces in the complex that can be used for recreation activities and or to move the unit
to a larger space.” 143
2.

Use of Segregation

The Ridley Report, which was released in 2013, suggests that the use of isolation
and segregation for youth at CTF is excessive. Generally, youth in D.C. are not supposed
to be subject to isolation for more than five days, and a hearing of the housing board is
required to extend the isolation of a juvenile beyond five days. 144 However, the Ridley
Group found that in some cases “segregation had been extended multiple times,”
causing the “juveniles to remain in segregation for longer periods of time.” 145 Indeed, “a
few juveniles reported being placed in segregation for 2 months with 1 hour of
recreation daily.” 146 In response, the Ridley Report recommended that DOC adopt a
[W]ritten policy which reflects clearly the process and
procedure which ensures (a) juveniles are returned to the
general population within the mandated five days of
segregation/the duration of the segregation is as short as
possible to address the risk to the other juveniles or (b) clear
guidelines are defined and followed for segregation
extensions. 147
In addition, the report recommended that “segregation should be revoked as soon as it
is considered no longer reasonable and necessary for the purpose for which it was
implemented.” 148 In March 2014, Daniel Okonkwo, the Executive Director of D.C.
Lawyers for Youth testified before the D.C. City Council Committee on Public Safety and
the Judiciary, asserting that, as of that time, the DCDOC had “still not established and
published” a written policy “that defines the procedure and requirements for imposing
solitary confinement.” 149 As a result, it appeared “that there [still] is no upper limit to
how long a youth can be held in solitary.” 150
143

Id. at 13.

144

Id. at 36.

145

Id. at 37.

146

Id. at 15

147

Id. at 37.

148

Id.

Testimony of R. Daniel Okonkwo, Executive Director, Committee on Public Safety & the
Judiciary, Performance Oversight Hearing on the Department of Corrections (Mar. 19,
2014),http://www.dcly.org/cpsj_doc_2014#_ftn2.

149

150

Id.

D.C. PRISONERS: CONDITIONS OF CONFINEMENT

Excessive use of solitary confinement is troubling because of the effect that it can
have on juveniles’ development. A joint report by the American Civil Liberties Union
and Human Rights Watch found that “solitary confinement of young people often
seriously harms their mental and
physical health, as well as their
“Solitary confinement of young
development,” and called for the practice
151
people often seriously harms
to be abolished.
Clinical studies of the
their mental and physical health,
use of solitary confinement have “shown
as well as their development”
that adult prisoners generally exhibit a
variety of negative physiological and
psychological reactions to conditions of
solitary confinement,” 152 and the “American Academy of Child and Adolescent
Psychiatry has concluded that, due to their ‘developmental vulnerability,’ adolescents
are in particular danger of adverse reactions to prolonged isolation and solitary
confinement.” 153
While the inadequate facilities and excessive use of isolation are significant
problems in their own right, the Ridley Report suggested that they may be linked.
Inadequate space might require corrections staff to use isolation and segregation on
youth more frequently than they would if they were housed in a more appropriate
facility: “Based on the fact that all juveniles are housed on one unit, at CTF, it is difficult
to separate them without the use of segregation.” 154
The DCDOC has provided information on the use of administrative segregation
subsequent to the release of the Ridley Report. The following chart provided by DCDOC
shows the number of juveniles who were segregated over the past year (either because
they were “awaiting a disciplinary hearing or placed in administrative segregation”):

Human Rights Watch and American Civil Liberties Union, Growing Up Locked Down: Youth
in Solitary Confinement in Jails and Prisons Across the United States,
https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/us1012webwcover.pdf.
151

American Civil Liberties Union, Alone and Afraid,
https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/Alone%20and%20Afraid%20COMPLETE%20FINAL.pdf.
152

153

Id. (internal citations omitted).

154

Ridley Report, 37.

D.C. PRISONERS: CONDITIONS OF CONFINEMENT

Further, the DCDOC provided the following information about how, as of May
2015, it uses isolation and segregation with juveniles.
•

Juveniles in administrative segregation are “housed in a separate cell on the
lower tier within the juvenile unit.” 155

•

According to the DCDOC, those juveniles are able to “attend school through
DCPS and have access to legal services, programming, counseling services, and
meaningful contact with the other juvenile inmates.” 156

•

In addition, “[i]f a juvenile is placed in administrative segregation . . . officers are
required to do a visual security check of the juvenile every fifteen (15) minutes,”
and the “juvenile receives individual recreation for two (2) hours per day.” 157

As of May 2015, the DCDOC reports that, over the past year, “the average stay in
segregation” is “approximately two (2) days.” 158 The DCDOC states that “[j]uveniles will
not be placed in segregation for longer than five (5) days unless extenuating
circumstances exist.” 159 It is unclear what these extenuating circumstances are or how
frequently they are deemed to exist.
3.

Insufficient Programming and Staffing

Insufficient programming for youth is a significant problem. According to the
Ridley Report, “programming at the Juvenile Unit is insufficient and needs to be
155

Id.

156

Id.

157

Id.

158

Id.

159

Id.

D.C. PRISONERS: CONDITIONS OF CONFINEMENT

expanded.” 160 The lack of programming left youth “without structured activity for the
majority of the weekend.” Feedback from youth cited in the Ridley Report indicated
that there “is too much down time with nothing structured to do.” 161 In addition, youth
who completed their GED or high school diploma did not have any academic
programming provided and were instead “assigned to detail duty for extended periods
of time.” 162 With regard to re-entry programming, the Ridley Report recommended that
CTF “incorporate evidence-based reentry planning as early as possibly for all juveniles
from the moment they are admitted.” 163 Such programming can be critical for helping
to ensure that problems do not carry over into adulthood and that the youth are best
equipped to succeed when they re-enter their communities. While the Ridley Group
acknowledged that the DCDOC had “significantly expanded programming” in recent
months, it stated that “there is still an opportunity to increase programming even
further.” 164 According to the DCDOC, it has further expanded the juvenile program
since the Ridley Report. 165 For example, the DCDOC expanded an after-school program
so that it now operates Monday through Friday. 166
The Ridley Report also raised concerns with the staffing of the juvenile unit for
youth prisoners, finding that many of the corrections officers lacked proper training. In
response, the Ridley Group recommended that “Personnel on all shifts should be trained
to work with juveniles.” 167 As a recent report by D.C. Lawyers for Youth and Youth
Justice acknowledged, staffing issues were at least partially attributable to the fact that a
small number of boys and girls are housed at an otherwise adult facility: “Given that
youth are such a small fraction of CTF’s population, it is perhaps unsurprising that CTF
does not have a separate position description for hiring corrections officers to the
Juvenile Unit and that the Unit sometimes utilizes relief staff who normally work with
adults.” 168 The DCDOC reports that, “[a]s of September 2014, all correctional officer
recruits are trained in Positive Youth Development (PYD), as well as the operational and
disciplinary procedures of the Juvenile Unit.” 169 The DCDOC states that its PYD
training “emphasizes building skills and assets in youth in addition to preventing
160

Ridley Report, 11.

161

Id.

162

Id. at 12.

163

Id. at 21.

164

Id. at 11.

165

DCDOC Response.

166

Id.

167

Ridley Report, 14.

Campaign for Youth Justice and D.C. Lawyers for Youth, Capital City Correction: Reforming
D.C.’s Use of Adult Incarceration Against Youth, 18,
http://www.campaignforyouthjustice.org/images/pdf/Capital_City_Correction.pdf.
168

169

DCDOC Response.

D.C. PRISONERS: CONDITIONS OF CONFINEMENT

negative outcomes.” 170 For existing correctional staff, this PYD training will be “phased
into” annual training. 171
4.

Shortcomings of Video Visitation

Contrary to the American Bar
Association’s Standards for Treatment of
Not surprisingly, boys said that
Prisoners, youth housed at the CTF are
the video visitations “make it
generally restricted to video visitation in
hard for [them] to communicate
lieu of in-person visitation. Although
with their family members.”
there may be benefits to the selective
implementation of video visitation, the
ABA has taken the position that video
visitation should not be used as a replacement for in-person visitation. 172 However, it
appears that, for youth at the CTF, video visitation has replaced in-person visitation,
even though CTF offers in-person visits to adults. The use of video visitation is
particularly problematic for youth because “[a] key part of working with juveniles is
being able to engage the families and help to strengthen the relationship between the
juveniles and their parent/guardian.” 173 Moreover, according to a report by the
Campaign for Youth Justice and D.C. Lawyers for Youth, the “visitation monitors are
located in a common space, so youth have no privacy while speaking with their family
members.” 174 Not surprisingly, boys said that the video visitations “make it hard for
[them] to communicate with their family members.” 175
In its Standards for Treatment of Prisoners, the American Bar Association states
that video visitation should not be used as a replacement for in-person visitation.176
And while video visitation is sometimes cited as a means to reduce the introduction of
contraband into a prison, a recent study in Texas found that, after a county replaced in-

170

Id.

171

Id.

ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, Treatment of Prisoners,
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/criminal_justice_standards/Trea
tment_of_Prisoners.authcheckdam.pdf.
172

173

Ridley Report, 45.

175

Ridley Report, 15.

ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, Treatment of Prisoners,
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/criminal_justice_standards/Trea
tment_of_Prisoners.authcheckdam.pdf.
176

D.C. PRISONERS: CONDITIONS OF CONFINEMENT

person visitation with video visitation, there was an increase in contraband and
disciplinary infractions. 177
The DCDOC began providing some limited in-person visitation for minors in
March 2014, but it appears that this has been made available to fewer than 50% of
youths. 178 While applauding this development, the Committee on the Judiciary and
Public Safety has requested “that the Department consider providing in-person visits to
all juveniles, given the unique nature of their confinement.” 179 The DCDOC reports that,
as of May 2015, “juveniles who have reached the Gold Tier in the Juvenile Unit are given
contact visitation with their parent or guardian once per month.” 180 Whether a youth is
eligible for Gold Tier is “based on several factors such as behavior, program
The DCDOC reports that, as of May 2015,
“juveniles who have reached the Gold Tier in the
Juvenile Unit are given contact visitation with
their parent or guardian once per month.”
participation, and educational factors.” 181 As of May 5, 2015, the DCDOC reported that
eight juveniles had attained “Gold Tier” status, and that two more were expected by May
7, 2015. 182 In addition, youth inmates “are given contact visits during the holiday season
in December.” 183
The use of video visitation is not confined to youth at the CTF. Since 2012, inperson visitation for prisoners at the D.C. jail has been limited to visits with lawyers or
with clergy, or with others in exceptional circumstances. By all indications, the
availability of video visitation is not, in itself, a concern. Indeed, it appears to provide
additional opportunities for adult prisoners at the D.C. Jail to communicate with family
and friends. However, video visitation should not come at the cost of heavy restrictions
on in-person visitation.
Texas Criminal Justice Coalition & Grassroots Leadership, Video Visitation: How Private
Companies Push for Visits by Video and Families Pay the Price,
http://grassrootsleadership.org/sites/default/files/uploads/Video%20Visitation%20%28web%
29.pdf.
177

Report and Recommendations of the Committee on the Judiciary and Public Safety on the
Fiscal Year 2015 Budget for Agencies Under Its Purview, May 14, 2014,
http://dccouncil.us/files/performance_oversight/Committee_on_the_Judiciary_and_Public_
Safety.pdf.
178

179

Id.

180

DCDOC Response.

181

Id.

182

Id.

183

Id.

D.C. PRISONERS: CONDITIONS OF CONFINEMENT

III. COSTS OF CONFINEMENT & CONTRACTED
SERVICES
Over the past decade, the DCDOC’s budget has averaged $141.7 million. As
discussed in more detail in the Appendix, a significant percentage of the Department of
Corrections budget is devoted to payment for contractual services, including the
DCDOC’s contracts with CCA, with the private halfway houses, and for prisoner health
care.
A.

The CTF & Corrections Corporation of America

Since January 30, 1997, the District has been paying CCA both a management fee
to operate the CTF and a lease payment for the CTF facility. The management fee has
varied over time pursuant to a twenty-year contract, which is set to expire in 2017, but
appears to have been $14.4 million for 2014. 184 When the District entered into the
operations contract with CCA, the District and CCA also entered into an agreement to
sell the CTF facility to CCA for $52 million. 185 The CCA was required to make initial
improvements to the facility and, over the duration of the operations contract, the
District agreed to pay $2.8 million each year (and a lesser amount in the final year of the
contract, 2017) in lease payments in addition to paying any real estate taxes imposed on
CCA as a result of ownership of the CTF. 186 At the end of the operations contract,
ownership of the CTF will revert to the District. 187

Operations and Management Agreement by and between The District of Columbia and
Corrections Corporation of America (effective Jan. 30, 1997, as modified). We were able to
review a copy of the operations contract and fourteen modifications, as well as the lease
agreement. We were initially unable to obtain other contract documents such as the lease
agreement or any modifications after modification number nine. The DCDOC referred our
request for contract documents to the Office of Contracting and Procurement (OCP), which
initially failed to provide any documents. Under the District’s freedom of information law, we
appealed that non-response to the Mayor’s office. After over nine weeks and a series of followup communications with the Mayor’s General Counsel Office, and the Mayor’s Office of Legal
Counsel, OCP ultimately provided documents. It should not be so difficult to obtain public
documents.
184

Lease Agreement by and between Corrections Corporation of America as Lessor and The
District of Columbia as Lessee; Stephanie Mencimer, Let’s Make a Deal, Wash. City Paper (May
9, 1997), http://www.washingtoncitypaper.com/articles/12631/lets-make-a-deal.

185

186

See id.

187

See id.; Corrections Corporation of America, 2009 Letter to Shareholders.

D.C. PRISONERS: CONDITIONS OF CONFINEMENT

The Contract

The term of CCA’s contract with the District is significantly longer than what CCA
describes as its typical contract duration, which is typically for a term of “up to five
years,” with additional renewals at the option of the government. 188
The District pays CCA in a number of ways. As drafted, CCA’s contract provided
that the District’s primary expense associated with CCA operation of the CTF is based on
a per-prisoner daily rate that is increased by 3% annually. In 1997, the first year of the
contract, the District was required to pay CCA $70.40 per prisoner per day. 189 Due to
contract modifications, the base rate (before annual increases are figured in) has been
adjusted several times. For example, during a period in 2003, the per diem rate was
dropped as low as $51.40 as part of a settlement of claims the District “may have had
against [CCA] related to the Management Contract and [CCA’s] alleged non-compliance,
known and documented by the Department of Corrections (DOC) as of January 1,
2003.” 190 Assuming standard annual increases since the last contractual modification of
the per diem, the per diem rate the District is obligated to pay in 2015 is $85.95 per
prisoner per day. 191 Based on a calculated 2014 per diem rate of $83.45, and an average
adult prisoner population at the CTF during 2014 of 473, the 2014 management fee
would have been roughly $14.4 million.
By way of comparison, CCA reported that, nationally, its revenue per
“compensated man-day” in calendar year 2014 was $63.54, an increase over the 2013
figure of $60.57. 192 Assuming that CCA’s SEC filings reported an average rate, a degree
of variation between the per diem rates of various jurisdictions due to different
economic conditions and different regulatory regimes is to be expected.
Whether such variation fully explains the rates in the District’s contract, which
were approximately 31% higher in 2014 than the average, is unclear. 193 However, labor
costs may play a role in explaining the variation. CCA often markets its services as
Corrections Corporation of America, Annual Report (Form 10-K), 28,
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1070985/000119312514072723/d664216d10k.htm.
188

Operations and Management Agreement by and between The District of Columbia and
Corrections Corporation of America, ¶ 7.1.
189

Operations and Management Agreement by and between The District of Columbia and
Corrections Corporation of America, Modification 4.
190

Operations and Management Agreement by and between The District of Columbia and
Corrections Corporation of America, ¶ 7.1.2; Modification 6 (setting a per diem rate of $62.09 as
of February 1, 2004, to be adjusted annually thereafter).

191

Corrections Corporation of America, Annual Report (Form 10-K), 56 (Feb. 25, 2015)
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1070985/000119312515061839/d853180d10k.htm.

192

This assumes a 2014 per diem rate of $83.45, which was calculated based on annual increases
since Modification 6 in 2004.

193

D.C. PRISONERS: CONDITIONS OF CONFINEMENT

leading to cost-savings, in part based on savings in expenses for labor. In states where it
can operate without unions, its employee pay floor may be set by the minimum wage.
By contrast, the District’s contract with CCA provides that CCA must recognize the right
of employees to unionize 194 and District contracts are subject to the federal Service
Contract Act, which sets wage floors for various occupation codes (e.g., “Accounting
Clerk II,” “Pharmacy Technician,” etc.) that, depending on the type of service, may be
significantly higher than the federal minimum wage. 195 According to the most recent
U.S. Department of Labor wage determination, the hourly wage for the occupation of
“Corrections Officer” is $22.80, not including fringe benefits. 196 By way of comparison,
the District’s minimum wage as of the date of this report was $9.50 per hour, and the
“Living Wage” for 2015 that the District requires its major contractors to pay is $13.80
per hour. 197
Nonetheless, one of the DCDOC’s plans for FY13 was to seek to re-negotiate the
CTF per-diem rates, though this initiative was “discontinued due to a change in
priorities” and has not been proposed in the department’s FY14 or FY15 plans. 198
In addition to regular payments based on the per diem rate, the District has paid
CCA lump sum amounts on multiple occasions over the years. For example, a
September 2005 contract modification included an additional payment of $960,000 in
connection with a dispute between the District and CCA over a Department of Labor
wage determination applicable to correctional officers, and $26 million in FY06 for
prisoner bed space and a lease payment. 199

Operations and Management Agreement by and between The District of Columbia and
Corrections Corporation of America, ¶5.2.4

194

195

See 41 U.S.C. §§ 6702-6703.

U.S. Dep’t of Labor, WD 05-2103 (Rev. -14), http://www.wdol.gov/wdol/scafiles/std/052103.txt.
196

See D.C. Dep’t of Employment Servs., Wage and Hour Compliance,
http://does.dc.gov/service/wage-and-hour-compliance; D.C. Dep’t of Employment Servs.,
Living Wage Act of 2006 Fact Sheet,
http://does.dc.gov/sites/default/files/dc/sites/does/page_content/attachments/Living%20Wa
ge%20Act%20Fact%20Sheet%202015.pdf.
197

See D.C. Dep’t of Corr., FY 2013 Performance Accountability Report,
http://oca.dc.gov/sites/default/files/dc/sites/oca/publication/attachments/DOC_FY13PAR.pdf
; D.C. Dep’t of Corr., FY 2014 Performance Plan,
http://oca.dc.gov/sites/default/files/dc/sites/oca/publication/attachments/DOC14.pdf; D.C.
Dep’t of Corr., FY 2015 Performance Plan,
http://oca.dc.gov/sites/default/files/dc/sites/oca/publication/attachments/DOC15.pdf.
198

Operations and Management Agreement by and between The District of Columbia and
Corrections Corporation of America, Modifications 7-8.

199

D.C. PRISONERS: CONDITIONS OF CONFINEMENT

For calendar year 2014, CCA reported that its operating margin was 29.7%,
slightly up from the 29.4% margin it achieved in 2013. 200
One cost to the District is for a building and equipment lease between the District
and CCA for the CTF. CCA reports that it expects to receive a minimum of $2.8 million
each year in rental income for 2014-2016 and an additional $694,000 in 2017, the last
year of its current contract. 201
CCA has been involved in lawsuits and investigations over the years, including an
agreement to pay the State of Idaho $1 million as a result of “contractual disputes
related to staffing at the Idaho Correction Center.” 202 CCA is also being investigated by
the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in connection with its actions at the Idaho
facility, which has reportedly been referred to by prisoners as “Gladiator School.” 203 The
FBI is investigating whether CCA violated federal law prohibiting fraud following CCA’s
apparent acknowledgment that it violated its contract with the state by understaffing the
facility “by thousands of hours” and that CCA’s employees “falsified reports to cover up
the vacancies.” 204
CCA has acknowledged that, “[t]he operation of correctional and detention
facilities by private entities has not achieved complete acceptance by either governments
or the public,” that “[t]he movement toward privatization of correctional and detention
facilities has also encountered resistance from certain groups,” and that “negative
publicity about an escape, riot or other disturbance or perceived poor operational
performance, contract compliance, or other conditions at a privately managed facility
may result in adverse publicity to [CCA] and the private corrections industry in general,”
any of which may “make it more difficult for [CCA] to renew or maintain existing
contracts or to obtain new contracts.” 205

Corrections Corporation of America, Annual Report (Form 10-K), 56,
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1070985/000119312515061839/d853180d10k.htm.

200

Corrections Corporation of America, Annual Report (Form 10-K), F-20,
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1070985/000119312514072723/d664216d10k.htm

201

Corrections Corporation of America, Annual Report (Form 10-Q), 18,
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1070985/000119312514300102/d755063d10q.htm,
202

See id.; Rebecca Boone, APNewsBreak: FBI investigates prison company, Associated Press,
March 7, 2014, http://bigstory.ap.org/article/apnewsbreak-fbi-investigates-prison-companycca.
203

Rebecca Boone, APNewsBreak: FBI investigates prison company, Associated Press, March
7, 2014, http://bigstory.ap.org/article/apnewsbreak-fbi-investigates-prison-company-cca.
204

Corrections Corporation of America, Annual Report (Form 10-K), 27-28,
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1070985/000119312514072723/d664216d10k.htm.

205

D.C. PRISONERS: CONDITIONS OF CONFINEMENT

Profile of CCA and its relationship with the District

CCA, founded in 1983, is a publicly traded real estate investment trust, and is the
oldest and largest private prison company in America. 206 Because CCA’s contract is set
to expire in 2017, it is appropriate to consider events involving CCA that have occurred
since 1997, when the contract was signed. The DCDOC itself apparently planned to
conduct a cost/benefit analysis of continuing a privatized model for the CTF or
returning management to the District in FY12 and FY13, but this initiative was at first
delayed due to “an incredible backlog of critical DOC procurements at [the Office of
Contracting and Procurement],” and ultimately “discontinued due to a change in
priorities.” 207
CCA “owns or controls 52 correctional and detention facilities and manages 13
additional facilities owned by [its] government partners, with a total design capacity of
approximately 86,500 beds in 20 states and the District of Columbia.” 208 In 2013, CCA
reported revenue of approximately $1.69 billion. 209

Source: “See CCA’s Nationwide System of Correctional Centers,”
CCA.com, http://www.cca.com/locations.

See Matt Stroud, The Private Prison Racket, POLITICO Magazine, Feb. 24, 2014,
http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2014/02/private-prison-racket103893.html#.VCXP12ddV8E.
206

See D.C. Dep’t of Corr., FY 2013 Performance Accountability Report,
http://oca.dc.gov/sites/default/files/dc/sites/oca/publication/attachments/DOC_FY13PAR.pdf
; D.C. Dep’t of Corr., FY 2012 Performance Accountability Report,
http://oca.dc.gov/sites/default/files/dc/sites/oca/publication/attachments/DOC_FY12PAR.pdf
; D.C. Dep’t of Corr. FY 2012 Performance Plan,
http://oca.dc.gov/sites/default/files/dc/sites/oca/publication/attachments/DOC12.pdf.
207

Corrections Corporation of America, CCA Announces 2014 First Quarter Financial Results,
News Release, May 7, 2014, http://ir.correctionscorp.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=117983&p=irolnewsArticle&ID=1928425&highlight=.
208

Corrections Corporation of America Revenue & Earnings Per Share (EPS), NASDAQ,
http://www.nasdaq.com/symbol/cxw/revenue-eps.
209

D.C. PRISONERS: CONDITIONS OF CONFINEMENT

In 1997, CCA contracted with the District to “operate, maintain and manage the
CTF” for a term of 20 years. 210 In the event that CCA fails to comply with the provisions
in its contract, federal or state and local requirements and laws, the District may
terminate its contract with CCA after allowing a 30 day cure period. 211 However, “if any
action, or failure to act, by [CCA] results in any risk
In 1997, CCA contracted
to the safety or welfare of the prisoners assigned to
with the District to
the CTF, the staff of the CTF or the general public,
“operate, maintain and
the District may immediately initiate the action it
manage the CTF” for a
deems appropriate to eliminate or reduce such risk,
term of 20 years.
including assumption of the operation of the
CTF.” 212
CCA, along with other private prison companies, has been the subject of much
criticism. Joshua Miller, a labor economist with the American Federation of State,
County and Municipal Employees, asserted that the private corrections model was
“structurally flawed” because “[t]he profit motive drastically changes the mission of
corrections from public safety and rehabilitation to making a quick buck.”213 Public
criticisms of CCA generally fall into two categories: (1) Allegations that CCA provides
substandard services resulting in harm to both prisoners and prisoners, and (2)
Allegations that CCA supports policy measures that have the effect of keeping more
people in prison and for longer periods of time.
a)

Allegations of substandard services

The first criticism stems, in part, from a number of instances where CCA
employees reportedly exhibited misconduct. For example, in 2006, a former CCA
corrections officer admitted to “putting human waste in an inmate’s drinking jug” after
the company was sued by four prisoners alleging that they were forced to eat food
contaminated with urine and feces. 214 Reportedly, “[o]ne of many instances of prisoner
sexual abuse” occurred in a Texas
CCA facility where a CCA employee
In Idaho, the state’s largest prison was
“was found guilty of sexually
given the nickname “Gladiator School”
abusing at least eight female
because of its violent reputation.
immigrant
detainees
while
Operations and Management Agreement by and between The District of Columbia and
Corrections Corporation of America (1997).
210

211

Id. at 9.1-9.3.

212

Id. at 9.3

Grassroots Leadership, The Dirty Thirty: Nothing to Celebrate About 30 Years of
Corrections Corporation of America, 4,
http://grassrootsleadership.org/sites/default/files/uploads/GRL_Dirty_Thirty_formatted_for
_web.pdf.
213

Kelli Kennedy, Human Waste Put in Food, Ex-inmates Claim, Associated Press, Mar. 12,
2006, http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1P1-119683145.html/.

214

D.C. PRISONERS: CONDITIONS OF CONFINEMENT

transporting them in a van alone.” 215 In 2007, a Justice Department survey of local jails
showed that a CCA facility in New Mexico had “the highest rate of sexual victimization
(13.4 percent), more than four times the national average,” and “the highest rate of staffon-inmate sexual victimization – 7 percent, as compared with a national average of
around 2 percent.” 216 Additionally, CCA facilities have seen numerous escapes,
mistaken releases, and riots. 217 In Idaho, the state’s largest prison was given the
nickname “Gladiator School” because of its violent reputation, allegedly caused by
understaffing. 218 After multiple lawsuits and an Associated Press investigation revealing
that records had been falsified in order to meet minimum staffing requirements, the
Federal Bureau of Investigation announced that it was investigating CCA “and looking at
whether various federal fraud statutes were violated and possibly other federal statutes
connected with the fraud.” 219
At the District’s CTF, there have been a series of instances where CCA corrections
officers and guards allegedly accepted bribes to smuggle contraband (including cash,
electronic items, cigarettes, and drugs) to prisoners. In 2002, four guards were indicted
on charges that they smuggled drugs, pagers and cash to prisoners in exchange for
bribes. 220 In 2010, another CCA correctional officer pled guilty to bribery for accepting

Grassroots Leadership, The Dirty Thirty: Nothing to Celebrate About 30 Years of
Corrections Corporation of America, 5,
http://grassrootsleadership.org/sites/default/files/uploads/GRL_Dirty_Thirty_formatted_for
_web.pdf.
215

James Ridgeway, Ex-Con Shareholder Goes After World’s Biggest Prison Corporation,
Mother Jones, May 10, 2012, http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2012/05/ex-con-alexfriedmann-cca-private-prison-rape.
216

Grassroots Leadership, The Dirty Thirty: Nothing to Celebrate About 30 Years of
Corrections Corporation of America, 5-9,
http://grassrootsleadership.org/sites/default/files/uploads/GRL_Dirty_Thirty_formatted_for
_web.pdf.
217

Rebecca Boone, FBI investigates prison company, Associated Press, Mar. 7, 2014,
http://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/fbi-takes-investigation-idaho-gladiator-schoolarticle-1.1714357.
218

219

Id.

D.C. PRISONERS: CONDITIONS OF CONFINEMENT

money to smuggle an iPod and cigarettes to prisoners. 221 More recently, in April 2014,
two CCA corrections officers were arrested and charged on similar bribery charges. 222
Also, in 2010, two former CTF prisoners sued the District of Columbia and CCA
for civil rights violations alleging that CCA employees “preyed on them sexually and
banished them to solitary lockdown when they complained.” 223 One of the female
prisoners alleged that a CCA officer paid her “sugar daddy,” who was on the outside, and
then demanded sex from the prisoner.
b)

CCA lobbying efforts and political contributions

In its Annual Report filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission, CCA
includes the following which it classifies as a “forward-looking statement”:
Our ability to secure new contracts to develop and manage correctional
and detention facilities depends on many factors outside our control. Our
growth is generally dependent upon our ability to obtain new contracts to
develop and manage new correctional and detention facilities. This
possible growth depends on a number of factors we cannot control,
including crime rates and sentencing patterns in various jurisdictions,
governmental budgetary constraints, and governmental and public
acceptance of privatization. The demand for our facilities and services
could be adversely affected by the relaxation of enforcement efforts,
leniency in conviction or parole standards and sentencing practices or
through the decriminalization of certain activities that are currently
proscribed by criminal laws. For instance, any changes with respect to
drugs and controlled substances or illegal immigration could affect the
number of persons arrested, convicted, and sentenced, thereby potentially
reducing demand for correctional facilities to house them. Immigration
reform laws are currently a focus for legislators and politicians at the
federal, state, and local level. Legislation has also been proposed in
numerous jurisdictions that could lower minimum sentences for some
non-violent crimes and make more inmates eligible for early release based
on good behavior. Also, sentencing alternatives under consideration could
Dep’t of Justice, U.S. Attorney’s Office District of Columbia, Former Correctional Officer
Sentenced in Bribery Case, News Release, http://www.justice.gov/usao/dc/news/2010/jul/10171.pdf.
221

Federal Bureau of Investigation, Corrections Officer Arrested on Federal Bribery Charge,
Press Release, http://www.fbi.gov/washingtondc/press-releases/2014/corrections-officerarrested-on-federal-bribery-charge; Keith L. Alexander, Second guard at D.C. jail charged with
bribery in smuggling contraband, The Washington Post, Apr. 30, 2014,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/crime/second-guard-at-dc-jail-charged-with-briberyin-smuggling-contraband/2014/04/30/260e88e4-d0ad-11e3-9e25-188ebe1fa93b_story.html.
222

Tim Hull, Women Call Private Prison Guards Predators, Courthouse News Service, Feb. 23,
2010, http://www.courthousenews.com/2010/02/23/24939.htm.
223

D.C. PRISONERS: CONDITIONS OF CONFINEMENT

put some offenders on probation with electronic monitoring who would
otherwise be incarcerated. Similarly, reductions in crime rates or
resources dedicated to prevent and enforce crime could lead to reductions
in arrests, convictions and sentences requiring incarceration at
correctional facilities. Our policy prohibits us from engaging in lobbying or
advocacy efforts that would influence enforcement efforts, parole
standards, criminal laws, and sentencing policies. 224
Except for the last sentence, the above statement, or one substantially similar to
it, appears on every CCA annual SEC filing for the last ten years. However, not until
FY11 does the final sentence, setting forth CCA’s position as to lobbying with regard to
criminal justice policy, appear.
Consistent with this timing (perhaps coincidentally), in 2011 CCA ended its
membership with the American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC), of which CCA had
been a corporate member for over twenty years. 225 ALEC, by its own description, is a
nonprofit organization that “works to advance limited government, free markets and
federalism at the state level” through the partnership of private entities, the general
public, and state legislators. 226 While CCA was a member of ALEC, it served on ALEC’s
Criminal Justice task force (later called the Public Safety & Elections task force) that
developed model legislation 227 for what has been called “some of the toughest
sentencing laws on the books today[:] . . . mandatory minimums for non-violent drug
offenders, ‘three strikes’ laws, and ‘truth in sentencing’ laws.” 228
The so-called “truth in sentencing” (TIS) laws refer to practices “designed to
reduce the apparent disparity between court-imposed sentences and the time offenders
actually serve in prison.” 229 Such policies are particularly relevant to D.C., where
Corrections Corporation of America, Annual Report (Form 10-K), 29,
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1070985/000119312514072723/d664216d10k.htm#t
x664216_1a.
224

Bog Ortega, Arizona prison businesses are big political contributors, Sept. 4, 2011,
http://www.azcentral.com/news/articles/2011/09/04/20110904arizona-prison-businesspolitics.html.
225

226

American Legislative Exchange Council, “About ALEC,” http://www.alec.org/about-alec/.

Additionally, through ALEC, the CCA was reportedly able to review and give its approval for
draft legislation that would later become Arizona’s controversial SB 1070. The CCA’s interest in
such legislation would likely be heightened given that CCA “is the nation’s largest detainer of
immigrants.” See Harvey Silverglate and Kyle Smeallie, Freedom watch: Jailhouse bloc, The
Phoenix, Dec. 9, 2008, http://thephoenix.com/Boston/News/73092-Freedom-watch-Jailhousebloc/?page=3.
227

Mike Elk and Bob Sloan, The Hidden History of ALEC and Prison Labor, The Nation, Aug. 1,
2011, http://www.thenation.com/article/162478/hidden-history-alec-and-prison-labor#.

228

Katherine J. Rosich and Kamala Mallik Kane, Truth in Sentencing and State Sentencing
Practices, NIJ Journal No. 252, http://nij.gov/journals/252/Pages/sentencing.aspx.

229

D.C. PRISONERS: CONDITIONS OF CONFINEMENT

statutes limit prisoners’ use of good time credits and eligibility for parole. ALEC’s
Criminal Justice Task Force reportedly drafted a model TIS bill—CCA was a member of
the task force at the time. 230 In 1994, Congress passed the Violent Crime Control and
Law Enforcement Act which, among other things, offered federal grant money for states
and the District of Columbia to “expand their prison capacity if they imposed TIS
requirements on violent offenders.” In order to qualify for this grant funding, states and
the District of Columbia were required to “have or pass laws requiring serious violent
offenders to serve at least 85 percent of their imposed sentences in prison.” 231 That same
year, the District of Columbia enacted the Omnibus Criminal Justice Reform
Amendment Act of 1994, D.C. Law 10-151 which, among other things, prevented good
time credits from reducing the minimum sentence of someone convicted of a crime of
violence by more than 15%, and prevented persons convicted of violent offenses from
being paroled prior to serving 85% of the minimum sentence imposed. 232
Additionally, numerous reports have indicated that CCA has lobbied for policies
affecting criminal statutes and sentencing. In 2008, The Phoenix reported that CCA
“spent more than $2.7 million from 2006 through September 2008 on lobbying for
stricter laws.” 233 The Associated Press reported that in CCA spent about half a million
dollars in the first half of
2010 “lobbying federal
In its self-published Political Activity Report,
officials.”
Targets of
CCA reported that it and its consultant
CCA’s lobbying efforts
lobbyists spent approximately
included Congress, the
$2.7 million “in fees and other expenditures
Department of Homeland
related to lobbying on behalf of
Security,
the
U.S.
CCA at the Federal, state and local levels.”
Marshals Service and U.S.
Immigration & Customs
Enforcement. 234 The chart below details the amount of money CCA has spent on federal
lobbying efforts each year from 1998 until 2014.

Karen Olsson, Ghostwriting the Law, Mother Jones, September/October 2002 Issue,
http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2002/09/ghostwriting-law.
230

Katherine J. Rosich and Kamala Mallik Kane, Truth in Sentencing and State Sentencing
Practices, NIJ Journal No. 252, http://nij.gov/journals/252/Pages/sentencing.aspx.
231

U.S. Dep’t of Justice, National Institute of Corrections Information Center, State Legislative
Actions on Truth in Sentencing: A Review of Law and Legislation in the Context of the Violent
Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, 34,
http://static.nicic.gov/Library/012259.pdf.

232

Harvey Silverglate and Kyle Smeallie, Freedom watch: Jailhouse bloc, The Phoenix, Dec. 9,
2008, http://thephoenix.com/Boston/News/73092-Freedom-watch-Jailhouse-bloc/?page=3.
233

Corrections Corp. spent $240,000 on 2Q lobbying, Associated Press, Sept. 1, 2010,
http://www.businessweek.com/ap/financialnews/D9HVBLM80.htm.

234

D.C. PRISONERS: CONDITIONS OF CONFINEMENT

Source: “Client Profile: Summary, 2013,” OpenSecrets.org,
https://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/clientsum.php?id=D000021940&year=2013.

However, as the above chart only involves expenditures on the federal level, it
does not tell the whole story. Most of CCA’s lobbying expenditures occur on the state
and local level. In its self-published Political Activity Report, CCA reported that it and
its consultant lobbyists spent approximately $2.7 million “in fees and other
expenditures related to lobbying on behalf of CCA at the Federal, state and local levels.”
Of that sum, $1.1 million was attributable to lobbying on the federal level, and $1.6
million was attributable to state and local activities. 235
CCA has invested significant
resources in lobbying against several
CCA has spent over $7 million in its
incarnations of the Private Prison
lobbying efforts to prevent private
Information Act (PPIA)—an act that
prisons from being subjected to the
has been introduced in Congress
same public disclosure
multiple times over the course of
requirements as public prisons.
several years and which would
essentially subject private prisons to
the requirements of the Freedom of
Information Act. CCA spent $1.84 million lobbying against the PPIA of 2007, $1.48
million lobbying against the PPIA of 2009, and $3.85 million lobbying against the PPIA
of 2011. 236 Thus, since 2007, CCA has spent over $7 million in its lobbying efforts to
prevent private prisons from being subjected to the same public disclosure requirements
See Corrections Corporation of America, CCA Political Activity and Lobbying Report 2013,
6, http://ir.correctionscorp.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=117983&p=irol-politicalcontributions_pf.
235

OpenSecrets, Corrections Corporation of America, Bills Lobbied, 2007,
https://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/clientbills.php?id=D000021940&year=2007.
236

D.C. PRISONERS: CONDITIONS OF CONFINEMENT

as public prisons. We note, however, that in recent years, CCA’s lobbying disclosures
have consistently included the following disclaimer:
CCA DOES NOT LOBBY FOR OR AGAINST ANY POLICIES OR
LEGISLATION THAT WOULD DETERMINE THE BASIS FOR AN
INDIVIDUAL’S INCARCERATION OR DETENTION. 237
It is not clear whether this statement is intended to cover lobbying efforts by any
other organization to which CCA may provide financial support. For example, due to
disclosure rules for certain entities, such as 501(c)(4) social welfare organizations,
whether CCA supports other organizations that in turn have expressed views regarding
legislation may not be publicly available information.
Over the years, CCA has also made substantial political contributions on both the
federal and state levels. In 2013, CCA and its political action committee CCA PAC,
contributed a total of $875,350—including contributions to (i) federal candidates,
parties and committees; (ii) state/local candidates, parties, and committees; and (iii)
527 organizations (“political organizations” under 26 U.S.C. § 527). 238 With regard to
District political elections, CCA has made contributions to the campaigns of several
candidates running for City Council and Mayor, with such contributions occurring in
2002, 2006, 2008, and 2009, and totaling $4,500. 239 A CCA subsidiary, CCA of
Tennessee, LLC, actually exceeded the CCA’s contribution rate by contributing over
$7,000 in District races in the last five years, 240 and another $5,000 to a mayoral
inaugural committee. 241 None of these figures include direct contributions to candidates
by the officers or employees of the CCA or a CCA subsidiary.
See, e.g., Corrections Corporation of America Lobbying Report 2013, Q2 (4/1-6/30),
http://soprweb.senate.gov/index.cfm?event=getFilingDetails&filingID=1699C3FE-3358-4854A8D5-BAE4143E294A&filingTypeID=60.
237

238

See Corrections Corporation of America, CCA Political Activity and Lobbying Report 2013.

District of Columbia Office of Campaign Finance, Contribution & Expenditure Search,
http://www.ocf.dc.gov/dsearch/searchresultcon.asp?mf1=&ml1=&ms1=&mc1=corrections%20c
orp&mo1=N&xa=&sa=&ea=&ca=N&sc=&mf3=&ml3=&ms3=&mc3=&mf4=&ml4=&ms4=&mo
4=N&d1=0&m1=0&y1=0&d2=0&m2=0&y2=0&d3=0&m3=0&y3=0&mo5=N&sc5=&sr=6&ob1
=agyname&ob2=&ob3=&type=pcc&searchtype=org.
239

District of Columbia Office of Campaign Finance, Contribution & Expenditure Search,
http://www.ocf.dc.gov/dsearch/searchresultcon.asp?mf1=&ml1=&ms1=&mc1=cca%20of%20te
nnessee&mo1=N&xa=&sa=&ea=&ca=N&sc=&mf3=&ml3=&ms3=&mc3=&mf4=&ml4=&ms4=
&mo4=N&d1=0&m1=0&y1=0&d2=0&m2=0&y2=0&d3=0&m3=0&y3=0&mo5=N&sc5=&sr=6
&ob1=agyname&ob2=&ob3=&type=pcc&searchtype=org.
240

D.C. PRISONERS: CONDITIONS OF CONFINEMENT

Unity Health Care

Between July 19, 2006, and September 30, 2013, the District paid approximately
$185 million for health care services for District prisoners, or about $26 million per
year. 242 The contract with Unity is based on a fixed-price model, in which the cost is not
dependent upon the prisoner population or number of individuals treated. 243
The prisoner population at the D.C. Jail and the CTF “is highly transient and
exhibits a wide array of serious health problems, including tuberculosis, HIV/AIDS,
sexually transmitted diseases, and mental illness.” 244 Prisoners are provided with
medical care through a contract with Unity Health Care, Inc. (Unity). 245
Unity has been providing medical care services to District prisoners since
This arrangement represented a change for CTF prisoners. Originally, the
contract between the District and CCA contemplated that CCA would provide medical
services to prisoners, and that CCA would be responsible for a range of both outpatient
and inpatient costs. 247 Six years into the contractual arrangement, in January 2003, the
District and CCA modified their contract to begin transferring responsibility for the
provision of medical care back to the District. During the transition, the District initially
agreed to pay CCA for the subcontracted services of the Center for Correctional Health
and Policy Studies, Inc. while it negotiated its own contract with a medical provider
without CCA as an intermediary. 248 That same contract modification included a
reduction in CCA’s compensation “as full and final settlement of any and all claims the
District may have against the Operator related to the Management Contract and
Operator’s alleged non-compliance.” 249
In April 2003, the District took over

2006. 246

D.C. Contract, DCFL-2006-D-6001 & Modifications (Unity Health Care, Inc.). Based on the
contract documents, the annual cost did not consistently increase each year over the life of the
contract; the contract cost for FY13 (Oct. 1, 2012, through Sept. 30, 2013) was $23.6 million.

242

See D.C.-Unity Health Care, Inc. Contract, ¶ B.2 (2006); Letter from Mayor Vincent Gray to
The Honorable Phil Mendelson, Chairman, Council of the District of Columbia (Sept. 24, 2013),
http://dcclims1.dccouncil.us/images/00001/20130925162240.pdf.

243

244

D.C.-Unity Health Care, Inc. Contract, ¶ C.2 (2006).

245

DOC, FAQs, http://doc.dc.gov/page/doc-frequently-asked-questions

Unity Health Care, Inc., About Unity Health Care / Our History,
http://www.unityhealthcare.org/AboutHistory.html.

246

Operations and Management Agreement by and between The District of Columbia and
Corrections Corporation of America, ¶ 5.4.5.
247

Operations and Management Agreement by and between The District of Columbia and
Corrections Corporation of America, Modification 3, at 3.
248

Operations and Management Agreement by and between The District of Columbia and
Corrections Corporation of America, Modification 3, at 4.

249

D.C. PRISONERS: CONDITIONS OF CONFINEMENT

responsibility for providing both medical services and all food services to CTF
prisoners. 250
The District has been developing a new contract model for health care services
that moves away from a fixed price model to a mixed compensation model that would
account for volume of services rendered. 251 Initially, then Mayor Gray transmitted a
proposed contract for services with Corizon Health, Inc. 252 However, concerns were
raised about the firm, 253 and Mayor Gray withdrew the contract from consideration by
the Council. 254 Mayor Bowser asked the Council to revisit the proposal and, on April 14,
2015, the D.C. Council voted against awarding the contract to Corizon. 255 While the
District continues procurement of a new long-term contract, it appears that Unity
continues to provide health care pursuant to short-term extensions of its contract.
C.

Halfway Houses

As noted, until recently, the DCDOC contracted with four separate, privatelyowned and operated halfway houses in the District: Efforts From Ex-Convicts;
Extended House, Inc.; Fairview; and Hope Village. 256 The District no longer contracts

Operations and Management Agreement by and between The District of Columbia and
Corrections Corporation of America, Modification 4.

250

See Letter of Mayor Vincent Gray to The Honorable Phil Mendelson, Chairman, Council of
the District of Columbia (Dec. 8, 2014), http://lims.dccouncil.us/Download/33020/CA200548-Introduction.pdf.
251

See id. D.C. Office of Contracting and Procurement, Determination and Findings for a Sole
Source Extension of Contract (Contract CW2669, Unity Health Care, Inc.) (unsigned),
http://app.ocp.dc.gov/intent_award/D_F/DF_SS_UnityHealth_DOC_022515.pdf (proposing
a payment of $5.9 million for services rendered during a three-month period between April 1,
2015, and June 30, 2015).
252

See, e.g., Human Rights Defense Center, Letter, Contract with Corizon for Medical Care at
D.C. Jail (Dec. 13, 2014),
https://www.prisonlegalnews.org/media/publications/Letter%20to%20DC%20councilmember
s%202014%20Chairman.pdf.
253

See Mike DeBonis, Gray halts D.C. Council vote on controversial pick for jail contract,
Wash. Post (Dec. 16, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/dc-politics/gray-halts-dccouncil-vote-on-controversial-pick-for-jail-contract/2014/12/16/93e9057e-855c-11e4-9534f79a23c40e6c_story.html.
254

Abigail Hauslohner, D.C. Council rejects Corizon Health contract after lobbying battle,
Wash. Post (Apr. 14, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/dc-politics/dc-councilrejects-corizon-health-contract-after-lobbying-battle/2015/04/14/b784c8e2-e222-11e4-81ea0649268f729e_story.html.
255

256

D.C. Dep’t of Corr., FY 2013 Performance Accountability Report, at 1 (Jan. 2014).

D.C. PRISONERS: CONDITIONS OF CONFINEMENT

with Efforts From Ex-Convicts. 257 Each of the other three halfway houses received a
contract with a maximum value of $990,000 for a one-year period ending on August 13,
2015. 258 The halfway houses serve as an alternative to incarceration for individuals
awaiting trial and for sentenced misdemeanants. The goal of halfway houses is to
provide a number of important services designed to help residents with educational,
professional, and interpersonal skills, as well as providing support for residents’ mental
and physical health and wellbeing. 259
Unfortunately, reports of inadequate services and safety concerns point to a need
for a review of the capabilities and performance of the District’s contract facilities. For
example, an op ed by a Washington Post editor reported in 2013 that, of the
approximately 2,000 offenders “return[ed] to the District each year after their release
from incarceration, . . . half are re-arrested within three years,” a statistic that casts
doubt on whether the halfway houses are indeed “helping ex-offenders adjust” to life
outside. 260

IV. LOOKING FORWARD
Based on our review of the conditions of confinement for District prisoners, we
believe a number of steps are urgently needed to address deficiencies ranging from
physical infrastructure to training, availability of programming, and oversight. Due to
the nature of the problems and the measures needed to resolve them, it is apparent that
efforts to move forward should be carried forward by the Mayor and City Council. We
believe these proposed steps are consistent with the DCDOC’s expressed “commit[ment]
to improving operations and achieving the status of a benchmark correctional
agency.” 261 For each of these following recommendations, we strongly encourage active,
good-faith collaboration by all stakeholders. Effective solutions will require input from
advocates, lawyers, corrections and law enforcement personnel, and politicians. The
goal of this report is not to dictate specific solutions, but to continue the Washington
Lawyers’ Committee’s efforts to address criminal justice issues writ large, and to begin a
series of much needed conversations about the District’s approaches to confinement.
See D.C. Chief Financial Officer, Keeping the Promises: FY 2015 Proposed Budget and
Financial Plan, C-37,
http://cfo.dc.gov/sites/default/files/dc/sites/ocfo/publication/attachments/DCOCFO_Volume
_1_web.pdf.
257

See D.C. Contracts CW 30866 (Extended House), CW 30868 (Hope Village), and CW30870
(Fairview - Reynolds & Associates); see also D.C. Office of Contracting & Procurement, Contract
Awards Notification Report, http://app.ocp.dc.gov/RUI/information/award/search.asp.
258

259

D.C. Dep’t of Corr., Correctional Facilities, http://doc.dc.gov/page/correctional-facilities.

Justin Moyer, To some, D.C. halfway house is more like ‘Hopeless Village’, The Washington
Post, Aug. 29, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2013/08/29/cd282a86-f4c111e2-9434-60440856fadf_story.html.
260

261

DCDOC Response.

D.C. PRISONERS: CONDITIONS OF CONFINEMENT

Recommendation 1: Close the D.C. Jail and the CTF and
construct a new, safer, more effective facility

This report identifies serious recurring and structural problems at the D.C. Jail
and the CTF. The D.C. Jail is suffering from degraded infrastructure, as evidenced by
recurring plumbing problems and holes in the walls, and insufficient protections for
those under observation due to suicide risk. Although we have less information about
the condition of the CTF’s physical infrastructure, problems associated with the juvenile
unit, including space and difficulty providing in-person visitation, and with the Secure
Residential Treatment Program, indicate that the CTF is not well-designed for the
specialized populations it contains.
Rather than invest considerable resources in a significant overhaul of both the
D.C. Jail and the CTF, the District should be proactive and design a new facility or
facilities designed to meet modern correctional facility standards, with the flexibility to
handle the District’s prisoner populations, and which will be easier to maintain.
Additionally, the trends in the District’s prisoner population, as well as changes
to the District’s drug policy, necessitate a reevaluation of the District’s true correctional
needs. A new facility could be designed to address the prisoner population the District
expects to have, and provide for the different prisoner populations, including men and
women, those awaiting trial, those post-conviction awaiting transfer to the BOP, parole
violators, juveniles of both sexes, individuals within each population who have special
physical or mental health needs (including suicide monitoring), and individuals of all
ages and gender who could benefit from substance abuse programming such as the
SRTP.
B.

Recommendation 2: Expand the Secure Residential Treatment
Program

The SRTP should be expanded. First, women should be able to participate. In
addition, CSOSA and the U.S. Parole Commission should ensure that more than thirtytwo beds are dedicated to the SRTP and make the program available for individuals with
a “high” ICS rating.
C.

Recommendation 3: Correct deficiencies in suicide prevention
and youth confinement

Significant work has already been undertaken by the DCDOC to assess the
conditions of, and identify problems in the DCDOC’s juvenile unit and mental health
and suicide programs through the Hayes Report and Ridley Report. Although the
DCDOC takes the position that it has addressed the issues outlined in the Hayes Report,
more work should still be done. The DCDOC should invite independent third party
assessment, such as a review by Hayes, as to whether the issues identified in the Hayes
Report have been fully addressed, culminating in a published report. The DCDOC also
notes that it has “worked diligently to implement the Ridley recommendations,”

D.C. PRISONERS: CONDITIONS OF CONFINEMENT

including by creating a “Juvenile Administrative Housing and Hearing policy,” that has
been in place since June 2013. 262 In order to address issues raised by the Ridley Report,
the DCDOC should consider, among other things, reducing the use of isolation and
segregation among youth prisoners, further increasing and improving youth
programing, and expanding access to in-person visitation for all youths.
D.

Recommendation 4: Conduct a review of training

In both the Hayes Report and the Ridley Report, one of the common themes was
inadequacy of training of correctional officers tasked with specialized functions related
to mental health or the juvenile unit. The DCDOC maintains that the “review of training
for correctional officers tasked with specialized functions such as juvenile custody and
suicide prevention . . . has been addressed . . . and is ongoing.” 263
We recommend continuing to ensure that adequate training is provided, as
described in both reports, but we also believe it would be useful to take a step back and
evaluate training across the correctional system in a comprehensive fashion. We
propose that the District retain an independent consultant with extensive experience in
the corrections field to conduct a review of all training programs needed for correctional
officers (and any others, including contract staff) who work at the D.C. Jail, the CTF,
and the halfway houses, to ensure that the right people are receiving the right training,
and that the training they receive is sufficiently thorough and reflects modern
correctional practices.
E.

Recommendation 5: Revise current policies restricting “Good
Time Credits”

As discussed above, DCDOC prisoners are eligible to earn “good time credits” and
reduce their sentences for successfully completing academic, vocational, and
rehabilitation programs and for performing duties of “outstanding importance” or
reflecting “exceptionally meritorious service.” Other DCDOC policies, however,
arbitrarily restrict the earning of such credits with respect to drug or violent offenses.
These restrictive policies should be carefully reviewed and revised so that the important
penological tool of good time credits is available for the benefit of prisoners and the
system alike to the maximum extent possible.
F.

Recommendation 6: Return management of the CTF to District
control

When the District’s contract with CCA expires, the District should return
management of the CTF to District control. The benefits of continuing to contract with a
private corrections corporation are doubtful, and there are a number of disadvantages.

262

DCDOC Response.

263

Id.

D.C. PRISONERS: CONDITIONS OF CONFINEMENT

Private corrections companies such as CCA tout a number of purported benefits
as rationales for contracting out correctional services, including taxpayer savings,
rehabilitation and reentry services, quality of operations, flexibility, security, and
economic benefits to the local community. 264
However, prisoners’ rights advocates have argued that these benefits are
questionable and that the companies themselves have had numerous safety and quality
issues. For example, a paper issued by The Sentencing Project pointed out the “promise
of meaningful savings is . . . specious at best,” citing reviews by the then General
Accounting Office (GAO) and the Bureau of Justice Assistance. 265 Others have argued
that the CCA has used cost-cutting measures such as “operating on routinely low and
dangerous staff-to-prisoner ratios.” 266 This concern was also raised by a ten-year
veteran CCA employee who provided testimony at a City Council oversight hearing that
“corners are being cut,” and “the facility is being operated understaffed to avoid paying
overtime to . . . employees.” 267 The witness also testified that “the company has been
grossly negligent in their management of time.” 268 The witness recalled that, on
Mother’s Day (May 13, 2012), ten units were being manned by five officers, there was no
emergency response team on site, the radios and telephones were faulty, and, as a result,
they were “in a death trap.” 269 The witness also listed various examples of
understaffing. 270 Additionally, the witness noted that the prisoners had been notified by
memo of a facility-wide shakedown, potentially allowing prisoners to dispose of

Corrections Corporation of America, Value and Benefits of Partnership Corrections,
http://www.cca.com/partner-with-cca/value-benefits; Corrections Corporation of America,
Value of Partnering with CCA, http://www.cca.com/partner-with-cca/valuebenefits/partnership-value; Corrections Corporation of America, Answers for Our
Communities, http://www.cca.com/partner-with-cca/value-benefits/community-benefits.
264

The Sentencing Project, Prison Privatization and the Use of Incarceration,
http://www.sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/inc_prisonprivatization.pdf.
265

Grassroots Leadership, The Dirty Thirty: Nothing to Celebrate About 30 Years of
Corrections Corporation of America, 3,
http://grassrootsleadership.org/sites/default/files/uploads/GRL_Dirty_Thirty_formatted_for
_web.pdf.
266

D.C. City Council, Public Hearing, Committee on the Judiciary (Sept. 20, 2012),
http://dccarchive.oct.dc.gov/services/on_demand_video/on_demand_September_2012_week
_3.shtm (video) (testimony of Ms. Dana Bushrod); see also D.C. City Council, Cmte. on the
Judiciary, Public Oversight Hearing on Corrections Corporation of America’s Management of
the District’s Correctional Treatment Facility: Witness List,
http://dccouncil.us/files/user_uploads/event_testimony/sept20_judiciary_corrections_witnes
slist.pdf.
267

268

Id.

269

Id.

270

Id.

D.C. PRISONERS: CONDITIONS OF CONFINEMENT

contraband and, according to the witness, potentially avoiding reporting of negative
incidents. 271
Additionally, in a recent hearing, witness testimony indicated that CCA may not
be adequately informing prisoners at the CTF of the availability of good time credits. 272
If this is accurate, it is concerning in part because CCA would be paid more if an
prisoner resided in the facility for a longer period of time.
There are also downsides to utilizing a private contractor, especially with respect
to accountability. Unlike government agencies (including the D.C. Department of
Corrections), private corporations are generally not subject to Freedom of Information
Act (FOIA) laws. Consequently, it is difficult to obtain internal documentation that
would allow for effective oversight of the District’s corrections system without engaging
in expensive civil litigation. The District-CCA contract provides that a limited set of
reports and audits of CCA’s operations ought to be in the possession of at least one of
the District’s departments and therefore subject to FOIA. But these documents can be
difficult to obtain, particularly when department FOIA officials fail to comprehensively
respond to requests and point the finger at other agencies, as the authors of this report
experienced.
Anecdotally, and notwithstanding difficulties in obtaining certain
information from the Department of Corrections, the authors of this report found it
easier to identify facts and data regarding the D.C. Jail than the CTF.
G.

Recommendation 7: Increase public access to records

One of the most challenging aspects of public oversight is unearthing the facts.
Former Supreme Court Justice William O. Douglas once said, “sunlight is the best
disinfectant,” meaning that government and freedom of information laws service the
public good because more information available to more people will lead to less waste,
more justice, and better government. To that aim, under the District of Columbia
Freedom of Information Act, public bodies of the D.C. government must disclose public
records to any person upon request (unless the record is covered by a statutory
exemption). 273 The “basic purpose” of this Act was “to open agency action to the light of
public scrutiny.” 274
Unfortunately, in our efforts to gather information for this report, we
encountered barriers that impede public access to corrections information. First,
although the District has in place the Freedom of Information Act, its implementation is
far from perfect. We submitted FOIA requests to four District agencies. All but one
271

Id.

See D.C. City Council, Cmte. on the Judiciary, Agency Performance Oversight Hearings on
Fiscal Year 2014-2015 (Feb. 19, 2015), http://dccouncil.us/events/committee-on-the-judiciarypoh1.
272

273

See D.C. Code § 2-534.

274

District of Columbia v. Fraternal Order of Police, 75 A.3d 259, 265 (D.C. 2013).

D.C. PRISONERS: CONDITIONS OF CONFINEMENT

exceeded the fifteen-day statutorily mandated time limit on responding to requests. On
one occasion, an agency seemed to wholly ignore our request, prompting us to appeal
the request to the Mayor’s Office. As a result of the appeal, and following further
dialogue, the requested documents were released—more than four months after the
statutory deadline. On another occasion, a public information officer asserted that we
had contacted the wrong agency in our effort to obtain a report, despite the fact that
D.C. law required that agency to conduct such reports. Many other requests did not
result in any substantive response at all.
Although some of the individuals we spoke with during this process tried to be
helpful, it is our impression that all public information officers could benefit from
significant improvements in their ability to identify records within their agencies.
Specifically, (i) public information officers should be made aware of the scope of work
the agency performs as well as documents created by other agencies or persons that the
agency is likely to possess; (ii) standard operating procedures for agencies responding to
a FOIA request should require the agency to make reasonable efforts to identify records
responsive to requests before asserting they do not exist (on more than one occasion,
public information officers responding to our request denied possession or knowledge of
reports we requested, even though a cursory internet search could have revealed that
such reports were produced by the agency in the past); (iii) if an agency makes
documents available on its website, it should identify where those documents are
located with specificity; (iv) agencies should implement measures to increase agency
accountability in their responses to FOIA requests and to ensure that public information
officers have an accurate understanding of the scope of disclosure requirements and of
the limitations on FOIA exemptions, 275 and (v) agency FOIA performance should be
assessed for the purpose of determining whether individual agency FOIA units require
additional staffing, training, or oversight. Public information officers should not be
permitted to ignore requests, flout deadlines without explanation.
Second, notwithstanding our difficulties obtaining certain information from
District agencies, it was even harder to identify anyone who would admit to possessing
information regarding CCA’s operation of the CTF. All of our efforts to obtain the
reports and audits authorized by the DC-CCA Contract were unsuccessful. And, while
the D.C. Department of Health provided us with its inspection reports of the D.C. Jail
Agencies currently submit annual reports providing basic information regarding the number
of requests received, the amount of time spent processing FOIA requests, and similar
information. See, e.g., D.C. Office of the Sec’y, Annual Reports, http://os.dc.gov/page/annualreports. In general, it appears that FOIA oversight currently focuses on quantification of FOIA
data; it is less clear that oversight adequately assesses whether FOIA requests are accurately
processed. For example, an analysis of the 2012 FOIA reports found that one-third of FOIA
requests were subject to delays and, when requesters chose to appeal agency determinations,
agency actions were found incorrect “nearly half the time.” See D.C. Open Government
Coalition, DC FOIA delays, denials, attorney fee awards jump in 2012,
http://www.dcogc.org/content/dc-foia-delays-denials-attorney-fee-awards-jump-2012 (last
visited Feb. 10, 2015).
275

D.C. PRISONERS: CONDITIONS OF CONFINEMENT

upon request, the agency specifically indicated that it was not authorized to inspect the
CTF. 276 This points to a larger issue associated with private operation of a large prison
facility. CCA itself has resisted efforts to be subjected to sunshine laws, spending
millions of dollars over several years to opposed federal legislation alone.
In light of the problems facing those who seek public access to corrections
information, we recommend a review of the District’s freedom of information laws and
practices, to ensure that the laws are functioning as they should, and that staff have the
information and resources to respond accurately, helpfully, and promptly to all requests.
The need for improvement is especially compelling where it involves the District’s
oversight of a private prison.

We remain uncertain about the accuracy of this assertion. A 2004 Report by the Government
Accountability Office mentions “health and safety inspection reports for the Jail and the CTF
that were prepared from January 2002 through April 2004 by the District’s Department of
Health.” See District of Columbia Jail: Management Challenges Exist in Improving Facility
Conditions.” GAO-04-742, http://www.gao.gov/assets/250/243835.html.
276

D.C. PRISONERS: CONDITIONS OF CONFINEMENT

Appendix A
Demographics & Budget
Deficiencies in the conditions of confinement in the District disproportionately
impact the District’s Black men. We cannot fully understand and correct deficiencies in
the correctional system without understanding these realities.
Likewise, an
understanding of the District’s budget for corrections is important, because the high
cost 1 of confinement should be a call to action for those unhappy with the status quo.

DEMOGRAPHICS
A.

Racial Disparities

The District’s prisoner population is disproportionately Black and male as
compared to the District’s total population. Slightly less than half (49.5%) of the
District’s total population, but 91% of the District’s prisoner population, is Black. By
contrast, 43.4% of the District’s total population, but only a small fraction (3%) of the
District’s prisoner population, is White. And, while 92% of DCDOC prisoners are male,
only 47% of District residents are male. 2

Black
91%

Prisoners

Population

(in the District)

(of the District)

(by Ethnicity)

Black
49.50%

Black

Other
2%

Hispanic
White 4.60%
2.40%

(by Ethnicity)
White
43.40%

Black

Hispanic

White

Asian

Other

Hispanic
Hispanic
10.10%

Asian
3.90%

Although this Appendix primarily focuses on the monetary costs to the District (and taxpayers)
of confining and providing health care to District prisoners, there are numerous other costs
associated with confinement, such as the economic cost to individuals and to society of lost
productivity both due to confinement and due to difficulty obtaining employment following
release, and the economic and non-economic costs to the families of prisoners, to name a few.
1

United States Census Bureau, State & County QuickFacts,
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/11000.html.
2

A-1

The significance of this disparity is highlighted when considering the history of
vast racial disparities in arrest rates for marijuana possession in D.C. In 2010, the
District had the highest overall marijuana possession arrest rate in the nation with 846
marijuana possession arrests per 100,000 residents. 3 Ninety-one percent of individuals
arrested were Black, causing D.C. to also have one of the largest racial disparities in its
arrest rates for marijuana possession. 4 Thus, District law enforcement officers arrested
one White person for marijuana possession for every eight Black people they arrested
for marijuana possession. 5 Between 2009 and 2011, more than eight out of ten adult
residents arrested for marijuana possession were Black. 6 Marijuana use, however, is
roughly equal among Blacks and Whites. 7 Although the District’s legalization of
possession of small amounts of marijuana for at-home use (discussed elsewhere in this
Report) is sure to affect the arrest rates, racial disparities in arrest and conviction rates
are certainly not unique to marijuana-related offenses. 8 We remain concerned that the
existence of such a marked disparity in marijuana arrest rates, like the
overrepresentation of Blacks in DCDOC custody, is a symptom of a larger problem with
regard to the impact of the criminal justice system on minorities, and particularly Black
men.
B.

Gender Disparities

DCDOC’s prisoner population is also predominantly male; in FY14, men
represented approximately 92% of those in DCDOC custody. All of the prisoners in the
D.C. Jail are male (it only houses male prisoners), and 70% of CTF prisoners are male,
as are 80% of those in halfway houses in the District. 9 This percentage is somewhat

See American Civil Liberties Union, The War on Marijuana in Black and White: Billions of
Dollars Wasted on Racially Biased Arrests, 18, https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/1114413-mjreport-rfs-rel1.pdf.
3

See id. at 18.

See id. at 18–19.

See Washington Lawyers’ Committee For Civil Rights and Urban Affairs, Racial Disparities in
Arrests in the District of Columbia, 2009-2011,
http://www.washlaw.org/pdf/wlc_report_racial_disparities.pdf.
6

See id. at 21.

See Washington Lawyers’ Committee For Civil Rights and Urban Affairs, Racial Disparities in
Arrests in the District of Columbia, 2009-2011, at 8, 20, 23,
http://www.washlaw.org/pdf/wlc_report_racial_disparities.pdf (reporting that in 2011, black
arrestees in D.C. accounted for nearly 70 percent of the Metropolitan Police Department’s traffic
arrests, 76 percent of the disorderly conduct arrests, and 87.5 percent of the simple assault
arrests).
8

See D.C. Dep’t of Corr., “DC Department of Corrections Facts and Figures,”
http://doc.dc.gov/sites/default/files/dc/sites/doc/publication/attachments/DC%20Departmen
t%20of%20Corrections%20Facts%20and%20Figures%20October%202014.pdf.
9

A-2

higher than the percentage of the national average daily prison population that is male
(86%).10
This gender disparity is even more drastic when it comes to youth. While youth
incarcerated in the juvenile system are generally held in a DYRS or contract facility,
youth tried as adults may be placed at the CTF. An assessment from 2013 reports that
only one girl per year is processed through CTF, compared to seventy boys per year. 11
The prosecution of girls as adults is not only infrequent, but it also appears to be a fairly
recent phenomenon. 12 When in 2006, a sixteen-year-old girl was accused of stabbing a
man to death, the Washington Post reported that this was “the first time in recent
memory in the District that a girl was charged as an adult with murder.” 13 In contrast,
in FY12, girls represented 12% of youth committed to DYRS. 14
C.

Trends
1.

History of Disputes Regarding D.C. Jail Population Size.

Over the course of multiple decades, the District had been the subject of lawsuits
alleging that the number of prisoners in the D.C. Jail was unsafe and that overcrowding

U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Jail Inmates at Midyear 2013 - Statistical
Tables, http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/jim13st.pdf.

The Ridley Group & Associates, LLC, The District of Columbia Department of Corrections
Correctional Treatment Facility Juvenile Unit Assessment,
http://doc.dc.gov/sites/default/files/dc/sites/doc/release_content/attachments/DOC%20CTF
%20JUV%20ASSESSMENT%20REPORT.pdf. The Campaign for Youth Justice (CFYJ) cited
different, but similarly dramatic figures: CFYJ reported that, between 2007 and 2012, 528 boys
and 13 girls were processed through the CTF. Campaign for Youth Justice, Capital City
Correction: Reforming DC’s Use of Adult Incarceration Against Youth, 12 (May 2014),
http://www.campaignforyouthjustice.org/images/pdf/Capital_City_Correction.pdf.
11

It is unclear how much of this disparity is due to prosecutorial discretion as opposed to fewer
female juveniles being arrested for higher level violent crimes. A juvenile who is charged with
certain D.C. Code violations, like murder or burglary, will be eligible for “direct filing,” meaning
the prosecutor may try the juvenile as an adult from the start without having to seek permission
from a court. See D.C. Code § 16-203(3). Nevertheless, prosecutors retain sole discretion in
deciding whether to direct file an eligible juvenile. Prosecutors may also petition the court to
“transfer” a juvenile’s case from the D.C. Superior Court Family Division (i.e. juvenile court) to
the criminal division (to be tried as an adult).
12

Henri E. Cauvin, Jail Options Few for Young Female Suspects, The Washington Post, Sept.
14, 2006, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2006/09/13/AR2006091301937.html.
13

Dep’t of Youth Rehab. Servs., “Youth Population Snapshot,” http://dyrs.dc.gov/page/youthsnapshot.
14

A-3

and other conditions there amounted to cruel and unusual punishment. 15 In 1985, the
United States District Court for the District of Columbia capped the population at 1,674.
The District never fully complied with this order, nor with a consent decree issued after
another prisoner suit, and the District successfully moved to lift this cap in March of
2002 after the enactment of the Prison Litigation Reform Act. Soon thereafter, the D.C.
Jail population reportedly skyrocketed and two prisoners were stabbed to death, while
another prisoner was stabbed but survived, in unrelated incidents within the facility. 16
City Council member Kathy Patterson said she believed these incidents were related to
jail overcrowding—at the time, the D.C. Jail population exceeded 2,400. 17
The Jail Improvement Act of 2003 required the Mayor to establish a maximum
number of prisoners at the D.C. Jail based on recommendations from an independent
consultant. A study commissioned by the Mayor determined that the D.C. Jail
population should remain between 1,958 and 2,164 at any given time. Nevertheless, the
D.C. Jail’s population often exceeded 2,164 18 and the District was sued again in June
2005. In response, the District initially asserted that it should not be bound by these
recommendations. In 2007, D.C. Superior Court Judge Melvin Wright, who presided
over the suit, disagreed, stating that the District “does not have the right to choose
which laws it will obey” and considered a contempt finding against the Mayor. 19 A week
later, the District agreed to cap the number of D.C. Jail prisoners at 2,164 except in
“exigent circumstances.” 20

See, e.g., Beale v. District of Columbia, No. 1:04-CV-0959 (D.D.C.); Anderson v. Fenty, No.
2005 CA 005030 B (D.C. Super. Ct.); Morgan v. District of Columbia, 824 F.2d 1049 (D.C. Cir.
1987).

Michael Rigby, Officials Agree To Cap Population at D.C. Jail, Prison Legal News, Feb. 15,
2009, https://www.prisonlegalnews.org/news/2009/feb/15/officials-agree-to-cap-populationat-dc-jail/.
16

See Second D.C. inmate stabbed to death in jail, The Washington Times, Dec. 17, 2002,
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2002/dec/17/20021217-110323-2832r/.
17

Serge F. Kovaleski, D.C. Jail Conditions Unchanged Despite Law, The Washington Post, Apr.
24, 2005, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A122592005Apr23.html?nav=rss_topnews.
18

Robert E. Pierre, D.C. Judge Pressures City on Jail Population, The Washington Post, Oct. 6,
2007, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2007/10/05/AR2007100502268.html.
19

David Nakamura, D.C. Agrees to Abide by 2004 Limit On Inmates, The Washington Post,
Oct. 11, 2007, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2007/10/10/AR2007101001743.html; D.C. Dep’t of Corr., Correctional
Facilities, http://doc.dc.gov/page/correctional-facilities.
20

A-4

From Highest in the Nation to Downward Trend

The District had a higher incarceration rate in 2007 than any state in the
country. 21 The District saw a 48% growth of its prisoner population from 1982 to
2007. 22 In 2007, across the nation as a whole about 1 in every 100 adults was confined
behind bars; in the District, the figure was 1 in 50. 23 The Justice Policy Institute
asserted that these high numbers were largely due to problems particularly affecting low
income communities in the District: A report studying the District’s high incarceration
rate identified a lack of affordable housing, high rates of homelessness, education
deficiencies, lack of access to mental health and substance abuse treatment, and high
unemployment as relevant factors. 24
Whether or not these factors cause higher incarceration rates in the District, 25
there is no doubt that one or more of these factors impact many District prisoners. Only
about 30% of male DCDOC prisoners reported having a high school diploma, and 3.5%
report having a college degree. Additionally, census data show a disproportionate
number of prisoners reside in the Southeast quadrant of the city. As the Justice Policy
Institute reports, the Southeast quadrant of the city primarily consists of Black residents
who also “have the lowest median income of the city as well as the highest
unemployment rates.” Meanwhile, as shown below, very few members of DCDOC’s
prisoner population come from the Northwest quadrant of the city. By contrast, the
Northwest quadrant is home to the two wards with “the highest median household
income and lowest percentage of people of color in the entire District.” 26

The PEW Center On the States, One In 31: The Long Reach of American Corrections, at 43,
http://www.pewtrusts.org/~/media/Assets/2009/03/02/PSPP_1in31_report_FINAL_WEB_3
2609.pdf.
21

Id.

25
26

This question is beyond the scope of this report.
Id.

A-5

Source: D.C. Dep’t of Corrs., “DC Department of Corrections Facts and Figures” (Oct. 8, 2014),
http://doc.dc.gov/sites/default/files/dc/sites/doc/publication/attachments/DC%20Department%20of%
20Corrections%20Facts%20and%20Figures%20October%202014.pdf.

There has recently been a downward trend in the District’s overall prisoner
population—the average daily population for DCDOC facilities in 2009 was 3,089; in
2013, it was 2,289; it was 2,041 in 2014; and there has been a drop of over 700 prisoners
from January 2011 through June 2014. 27 This trend is also reflected in decreasing
intake numbers over the last five years: Intake was 17,903 in 2009, 17,047 in 2011, and
12,334 in 2013. And, whereas the number of intakes exceeded number of releases by
seventy-six in 2009, releases exceeded intakes by 642 in 2013. 28 In contrast, however,
the overall population of D.C. residents has increased from 572,059 residents in 2000 to

See D.C. Dep’t of Corr., Demographics and Statistics,
http://doc.dc.gov/sites/default/files/dc/sites/doc/publication/attachments/Demographics%20
and%20Statistics%20June%202014.pdf.
27

A-6

601,723 residents in 2010 to 646,449 residents in 2013 to an estimated 658,893
residents in 2014. 29
Drug policy, such as the recent legislation legalization of use and possession of
small amounts of marijuana, is also likely to impact prisoner population size.
Legislation related to this initiative began in July 2014, when the District enacted the
Marijuana Possession Decriminalization Amendment Act which decriminalized the
possession of up to one ounce of marijuana. Thus, under D.C. law, possession or
transfer without exchange of money of a small amount of marijuana became a civil
violation (with a $25 fine) instead of an arrestable offense 30 and violators were not
subject to jail time. 31 The effects of this change may already be apparent: The percent of
men being held in the DCDOC system for drug offenses dropped from 2013, 8.4% in
FY13 to 6.6% in FY14.
On February 26, the District passed a ballot initiative legalizing the possession of
up to two ounces of marijuana, and permitting individuals to grow up to three
marijuana plants in the home. 32 The ballot initiative garnered 70% of the vote. 33
Efforts toward marijuana legalization in the District have not gone unchallenged.
As noted, the District is subject to congressional control and, in late 2014, the U.S.
Congress passed an omnibus spending bill that included a provision prohibiting the use
of federal or local funds in the Act to “enact any law, rule, or regulation to legalize or
otherwise reduce penalties associated with the possession, use, or distribution” of

See United States Census Bureau, “State & County QuickFacts, District of Columbia,”
http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/11000.html.
29

See D.C. Metropolitan Police, Marijuana Possession Decriminalization Amendment Act of
2014, Special Order Number SO-14-04, July 17, 2014,
https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/1219510-metropolitan-police-department-specialorder-on.html.
30

See Mike DeBonis and Peter Hermann, Decriminalization arrives, and D.C. police prepare
for sea change in marijuana laws, The Washington Post, July 17,
2014,http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/dc-politics/decriminalization-arrives-and-dcpolice-prepare-for-sea-change-in-marijuana-laws/2014/07/16/0f21a2b8-0c82-11e4-b8e5d0de80767fc2_story.html.
31

Mike Coneen, Recreational marijuana use, possession now legal in D.C., WJLA, Feb. 26,
2015, http://www.wjla.com/articles/2015/02/recreational-marijuana-now-legal-in-d-c-111817.html.
32

Aaron Davis, D.C. voters overwhelmingly support legalizing marijuana, joining Colo.,
Wash., Washington Post, Nov. 4, 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/dc-politics/dcvoters-titling-heavily-toward-legalizing-marijuana-likely-joining-colowash/2014/11/04/116e83f8-60fe-11e4-9f3a-7e28799e0549_story.html.
33

A-7

certain substances, including marijuana. 34 Additionally, the day before the initiative
went into effect, two Members of Congress wrote a letter to the Mayor of the District
stating, in relevant part, that if the Mayor were to “decide to move forward . . . with the
legalization of marijuana . . . [the Mayor would] be doing so in knowing and willful
violation of the law.” 35 In an interview, one Congressman suggested that officials who
continued with the legalization efforts would face prison time. 36 Although District
officials were not deterred from moving forward with legalization, it appears that they
have (at least for the time being) refrained from pressing forward with efforts to legalize
the sale of marijuana, notwithstanding prior discussions of passing legislation to create
a “legitimate cannabis industry” in the District. 37 However, the City Council has
advanced a bill that, if enacted, would limit employers’ ability to require job applicants
to undergo drug testing as part of the hiring process. 38

Alex Rogers, Congress Approves Trillion-Dollar Spending Bill, Time, Dec. 14, 2014,
http://time.com/3632125/congress-spending-bill/; Consolidated and Further Continuing
Appropriations Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 113-235, 113th Cong. § 809 (2014).
34

Jonathan Topaz, Muriel Bowser: D.C. won’t back down in Chaffetz pot showdown,
POLITICO, http://www.politico.com/story/2015/02/jason-chaffetz-and-dc-in-pot-showdown115495.html; http://www.scribd.com/doc/256910143/Letter-to-d-c-Mayor-Muriel-BowserRegarding.
35

Mike DeBonis, Bowser: Legal pot possession to take effect at midnight in the District,
Washington Post, http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/dc-politics/house-republicans-warndc-mayor-not-to-legalize-pot/2015/02/25/2f784a10-bcb0-11e4-bdfa-b8e8f594e6ee_story.html.
36

See Aaron Davis, D.C. Council backs down on marijuana hearing after attorney general
warning, Washington Post, http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/dc-politics/dc-councilwarned-not-to-move-forward-on-marijuana-legalization/2015/02/09/2c1593aa-b067-11e4827f-93f454140e2b_story.html; Mike DeBonis, Legal marijuana could be $130 million a year
business in D.C., study finds, The Washington Post, Oct. 30, 2014,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/dc-politics/legal-marijuana-could-be-a-130-million-ayear-business-in-dc-officials-find/2014/10/30/d6f80a52-603d-11e4-9f3a7e28799e0549_story.html?wprss=rss_local.
37

Aaron Davis, Bill to limit marijuana screening by D.C. employers advances in council, The
Washington Post, Mar. 4, 2015, http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/dc-politics/bill-to-limitmarijuana-screening-by-dc-employers-advancing-in-council/2015/03/04/72569e0c-c28e-11e49ec2-b418f57a4a99_story.html.
38

A-8

II. THE DISTRICT’S BUDGET: COSTS OF
CONFINEMENT
A.

D.C. Department of Corrections Budget

Over the past decade, the DCDOC’s budget has averaged $141.7 million, with
peak funding 39 in FY08. The Department’s FY15 request for $151.6 million would bring
the Department’s budget within $2 million of the FY08 level.
When considering the District’s budgeting and priorities, one should note that
the District has less control over its budget than do states over their budgets. The
District of Columbia Self-Government and Governmental Reorganization Act of 1973
(also known as the “Home Rule” Act) is a federal law that devolves certain decision
making responsibilities to the District, including a degree of authority to help determine
the District’s budget. 40 To simplify, once the City Council adopts the Mayor’s budget,
which is effectively a request to Congress for approval of local budget priorities as well
as any federal funding, the Mayor sends the budget to the President, who transmits it to
the House and the Senate for review. 41 Congress is not required to follow the District’s
budget when it approves the District’s use of its own revenue or when it appropriates
funding in the bill it sends to the President for signature. As a consequence, District
funding remains subject to the oversight of a political body that is not accountable to
residents of the District, an arrangement that can and has led to disputes over funding
and puts the District at risk when Congress cannot pass legislation, such as those
discussed previously relating to legislation regarding possession of marijuana. 42
The District’s annual budget figures are divided into “actual,” “approved,” and
“requested” figures. Actual figures are dollars actually spent, as determined by an audit;
“approved” figures are amounts approved to be spent; and requested amounts denote
spending that the District has proposed, but which has not yet been approved. 43

This report considers budgets for FY05 through the FY15 request.

See District of Columbia Self-Government and Governmental Reorganization Act of 1973,
Pub. L. 93-198, 87 Stat. 777 (Dec. 24, 1973); see also D.C. Code §§ 1-201.1, et seq.
40

See D.C. Chief Financial Officer, Keeping the Promises: FY 2015 Proposed Budget and
Financial Plan, 1-16 - 1-17,
http://cfo.dc.gov/sites/default/files/dc/sites/ocfo/publication/attachments/DCOCFO_Volume
_1_web.pdf.
41

See, e.g., Erik Wasson, DC cannot declare budget freedom from Congress, GAO says, The
Hill, Jan. 30, 2014, http://thehill.com/policy/finance/197019-dc-cannot-declare-budgetfreedom-from-congress-gao-says.
42

See DC Fiscal Policy Institute, A Citizen’s Guide to the DC Budget, 8-9,
http://www.dcfpi.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/3-26-13-Citizens-Budget-Guide.pdf.
43

A-9

The DCDOC’s approved budget for FY14 was $140.3 million. 44 The FY14
approved budget represented an increase of 7% over the FY13 actual budget ($131.1
million). 45 For FY15, the Department has proposed a budget of $151.6 million, which
represents an increase of approximately 8% over FY14 approved levels. 46
Figure 1 47 indicates the Department’s budget for fiscal years 2005 through
2015. 48 As the data indicate, during the covered period (FY05-FY15), the Department
D.C. Chief Financial Officer, Keeping the Promises: FY 2015 Proposed Budget and Financial
Plan, C-37,
http://cfo.dc.gov/sites/default/files/dc/sites/ocfo/publication/attachments/DCOCFO_Volume
_2_web.pdf.
44

D.C. Chief Financial Officer, Keeping the Promises: FY 2015 Proposed Budget and Financial
Plan, C-37,
http://cfo.dc.gov/sites/default/files/dc/sites/ocfo/publication/attachments/DCOCFO_Volume
_2_web.pdf.
45

Figure 1 was calculated using information made available by the Office of the Chief Financial
Officer. See D.C. Chief Financial Officer, Keeping the Promises: FY 2015 Proposed Budget and
Financial Plan,
http://cfo.dc.gov/sites/default/files/dc/sites/ocfo/publication/attachments/DCOCFO_Volume
_2_web.pdf; D.C. Chief Financial Officer, FY 2014 Proposed Budget and Financial Plan,
http://cfo.dc.gov/sites/default/files/dc/sites/ocfo/publication/attachments/DCOCFO_Volume
_2_Final.pdf; D.C. Chief Financial Officer, Seizing Our Future: FY 2013 Proposed Budget and
Financial Plan,
http://cfo.dc.gov/sites/default/files/dc/sites/ocfo/publication/attachments/ocfo_fy2013_volu
me_2_chapters_part_1.pdf; D.C. Chief Financial Officer, One City Rising to the Challenge: FY
2012 Proposed Budget and Financial Plan,
http://cfo.dc.gov/sites/default/files/dc/sites/ocfo/publication/attachments/ocfo_volume_2_a
gency_chapters_part_i_web.pdf; D.C. Chief Financial Officer, Maximizing Efficiency: FY 2011
Proposed Budget and Financial Plan,
http://cfo.dc.gov/sites/default/files/dc/sites/ocfo/publication/attachments/2011_Volume_1Executive_Summary_Web.pdf; D.C. Chief Financial Officer, Meeting the Challenge: FY 2010
Proposed Budget and Financial Plan,
http://cfo.dc.gov/sites/default/files/dc/sites/ocfo/publication/attachments/ocfo_volume_2_a
gency_chapters_part_i_web_1.pdf; D.C. Chief Financial Officer, FY 2009 Proposed Budget and
Financial Plan,
http://cfo.dc.gov/sites/default/files/dc/sites/ocfo/publication/attachments/ocfo_agency_budg
et_chapters_part_1_of_2.pdf; D.C. Chief Financial Officer, Moving Forward: FY 2008
Proposed Budget and Financial Plan,
http://cfo.dc.gov/sites/default/files/dc/sites/ocfo/publication/attachments/ocfo_volume_2a_
web2.pdf; D.C. Chief Financial Officer, FY 2007 Proposed Budget and Financial Plan: Public
Safety and Justice 2007 Operational Appendices,
http://cfo.dc.gov/sites/default/files/dc/sites/ocfo/publication/attachments/ocfo_dc_budget_v
47

(continued…)
A-10

received peak funding in FY08 ($153.4 million). The FY12 budget was the lowest the
Department had seen since FY05.
Figure 1

D.C. Department of Corrections Budget
(in thousands of dollars)

$160,000
$150,000
$140,000
$130,000
$120,000
$110,000
$100,000
FY05

FY06

FY07

FY08

FY09

FY10

FY11

FY12

FY13

FY14 (A) FY15 (R)

olume_3d.pdf; D.C. Chief Financial Officer, FY 2008 Proposed Budget and Financial Plan:
Public Safety and Justice 2008 Operational Appendices,
http://cfo.dc.gov/sites/default/files/dc/sites/ocfo/publication/attachments/ocfo_volume_3_w
eb.pdf; D.C. Chief Financial Officer, FY 2009 Proposed Budget and Financial Plan: Public
Safety and Justice 2009 Operational Appendices,
http://cfo.dc.gov/sites/default/files/dc/sites/ocfo/publication/attachments/ocfo_operating_ap
pendices_part_2_of_4.pdf; D.C. Chief Financial Officer, FY 2010 Proposed Budget and
Financial Plan: Public Safety and Justice 2010 Operational Appendices,
http://cfo.dc.gov/sites/default/files/dc/sites/ocfo/publication/attachments/volume_4__operating_appendices_-_part_i_web.pdf; D.C. Chief Financial Officer, FY 2011 Proposed
Budget and Financial Plan: Public Safety and Justice 2011 Operational Appendices,
http://cfo.dc.gov/sites/default/files/dc/sites/ocfo/publication/attachments/2011_Volume_4Operating_Appendices-Part_I_Web.pdf; D.C. Chief Financial Officer, FY 2012 Proposed
Budget and Financial Plan: Public Safety and Justice 2012 Operational Appendices,
http://cfo.dc.gov/sites/default/files/dc/sites/ocfo/publication/attachments/ocfo_volume_4_o
perating_appendices_part_i_web_r.pdf; D.C. Chief Financial Officer, FY 2013 Proposed
Budget and Financial Plan: Public Safety and Justice 2013 Operational Appendices,
http://cfo.dc.gov/sites/default/files/dc/sites/ocfo/publication/attachments/ocfo_fy2013_volu
me_4_appendices_part_1_0.pdf; D.C. Chief Financial Officer, FY 2014 Proposed Budget and
Financial Plan: Public Safety and Justice 2014 Operational Appendices,
http://cfo.dc.gov/sites/default/files/dc/sites/ocfo/publication/attachments/DCOCFO_Volume
_4_Final.pdf; D.C. Chief Financial Officer, FY 2015 Proposed Budget and Financial Plan:
Public Safety and Justice 2015 Operational Appendices,
http://cfo.dc.gov/sites/default/files/dc/sites/ocfo/publication/attachments/DCOCFO_Volume
_5_web.pdf.
Figures for FY05 through FY13 are actual budget figures, while FY14 is the approved budget
and FY15 is the Department’s request.

A-11

The DCDOC’s budget can be further divided to into “Personal Services,” (PS)
(Figure 2 49) which is essentially labor expenses, and “Nonpersonal Services,” (NPS)
(Figure 3 50) which is a catch-all category for other expenses, generally including
operational costs including supplies, equipment, and contractual services.
Figure 2

Figure 3

Personal Services (PS)

Nonpersonal Services
(NPS) (in thousands of dollars)

(in thousands of dollars)

90,000
85,000
80,000
75,000
70,000
65,000
60,000
55,000
50,000
45,000
40,000
FY05
FY06
FY07
FY08
FY09
FY10
FY11
FY12
FY13
FY14 (A)
FY15 (R)

FY05
FY06
FY07
FY08
FY09
FY10
FY11
FY12
FY13
FY14 (A)
FY15 (R)

90,000
85,000
80,000
75,000
70,000
65,000
60,000
55,000
50,000
45,000
40,000

A review of notices of intent to award sole source contracts issued by the Office of
Contracting and Procurement 51 provide some insight into the cost of various contractual
services: 52
•

Inmate Telephone, Inc. provides prisoner telephone services for the DCDOC,
including labor, equipment, and materials. A proposed extension of a contract
for services provided through September 30, 2015, indicates that services would
be provided at no cost to the District. Presumably, the company pays for these
costs through revenue generated by system use. 53

See supra n.47.

See D.C. Office of Contracting and Procurement, Notice of Intent to Award Sole Source
Contracts, http://app.ocp.dc.gov/intent_award/intent_award_opic.asp.
51

It is not clear precisely which budget category encompasses these expenditures, though it is
not unreasonable to expect that they would be categorized as contractual services.
52

D.C. Office of Contracting and Procurement, Determinations and Findings for Sole Source
Extension of Contract (Contract CW12929, Inmate Telephone Inc.) (unsigned),
http://app.ocp.dc.gov/intent_award/D_F/DF_Sole_Source_Inmate_Telephone.pdf.
53

A-12

•

Centric GRP LLC/Keefe Supply Company provides commissary services. A
proposed extension of a contract for services would pay the company about
$631,000 for the seven-month period from January 1, 2015, through July 31,
2015. 54

•

Virginia Correctional Enterprises provides off-site laundry services for the D.C.
Jail. A proposed extension of a contract for services would pay the company
$200,000 for the nine-month period from January 1, 2015, through September
30, 2015. 55

•

Johnson Control provides maintenance services for the D.C. Jail air, heat, power,
and ventilation systems. A proposed extension of a contract for services would
pay the company about $70,000 from the date of the award through September
30, 2015. 56

•

URS Federal Technical Services, Inc./EG&G Technical Services, Inc. provide
warehouse management and logistics services, including management of supply
operations at the D.C. Jail. A proposed contract for services would pay URS
about $694,000 for services between October 1, 2014, and September 30, 2015. 57
B.

Private Contracts: CCA, Unity Health Care, Halfway Houses

One NPS component, “Contractual Services - Other” (Figure 4 58) accounted for
between 75% and 86% of all NPS expenses for FY05 through FY15, and for between 36%
and 48% of the entire budget. The contractual services component appears to include
the Department’s contracts with CCA, with the private halfway houses, and for prisoner
medical services.
Because the “Contractual Services - Other” category accounts for such a
significant percentage of the total NPS budget, it is useful to examine the NPS budget

D.C. Office of Contracting and Procurement, Determination and Findings for Sole Source
Extension of Contract (Contract CW18182, Centric GRP/Keefe Supply Company) (unsigned),
http://app.ocp.dc.gov/intent_award/D_F/DF_CW18182_R1.pdf.
54

D.C. Office of Contracting and Procurement, Determination and Findings for Sole Source
Extension of Contract (Contract CW17235, Virginia Correctional Enterprises) (unsigned),
http://app.ocp.dc.gov/intent_award/D_F/DF_CW17235_R1.pdf.
55

D.C. Office of Contracting and Procurement, Determination and Findings for Sole Source
Extension of Contract (Johnsons Control) (unsigned),
http://app.ocp.dc.gov/intent_award/D_F/DF_Johnson_Control_R1.pdf.
56

D.C. Office of Contracting and Procurement, Determination and Findings for Sole Source
Extension of Contract (Contract CW12688, URS) (unsigned),
http://app.ocp.dc.gov/intent_award/D_F/DF_CW12688%208_26_14R.pdf.

See supra n.47.

A-13

without the contractual services category (Figure 5 59). As Figure 5 demonstrates, the
NPS budget sans the “Contractual Services - Other” category has been subject to a fair
degree of year-to-year fluctuation. The figures also reveal comparatively higher
expenses in FY10 and FY11. In both fiscal years—and only those fiscal years—the second
largest expense category after contractual services was “Expense Not Budgeted Others,”
which accounted for $10.6 million in expenses in FY10 and $8.6 million in FY11. It is
not clear precisely what accounts for the variations in this budget category. For FY15,
this budget category includes $6.5 million for supplies and materials, such as books,
writing materials, and other goods purchased for prisoner use and consumption; $2.7
million for equipment; $60,000 for telecommunications. 60 For FY15, this budget
category also includes $2.8 million for land and building rental, which may represent
the District’s lease payment to CCA for the CTF facility, as discussed below. 61
Figure 4

Figure 5

NPS: Contractual Services
- Other

NPS Minus Contractual
Services - Other

(in thousands of dollars)

90,000

22,000

80,000

20,000
18,000

70,000

16,000

60,000

14,000

40,000

10,000
FY05
FY06
FY07
FY08
FY09
FY10
FY11
FY12
FY13
FY14 (A)
FY15 (R)

12,000
FY05
FY06
FY07
FY08
FY09
FY10
FY11
FY12
FY13
FY14 (A)
FY15 (R)

50,000

A significant percentage of the Department of Corrections’ budget is devoted to
paying for contracts with private entities, including CCA and private halfway houses.

See supra n.47.

See D.C. Chief Financial Officer, Keeping the Promises: FY 2015 Proposed Budget and
Financial Plan, C-37 to C-39,
http://cfo.dc.gov/sites/default/files/dc/sites/ocfo/publication/attachments/DCOCFO_Volume
_2_web.pdf.
60

See id.

A-14

Appendix B
GOVERNMENT OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS

D.C. Department of Corrections Response
to
Washington Lawyers’ Committee White Paper
The Washington Lawyers’ Committee commissioned Covington and Burling to prepare a white
paper regarding conditions of confinement at the D.C. Jail and CTF to include physical
infrastructure, mental health, suicide prevention, drug treatment practices, juvenile unit,
demographics, budget/costs and contracting. The Department of Corrections provides the
following comments in response to this report.
CDF and CTF Facilities




DOC is committed to performing preventative and day to day maintenance of the CDF
and CTF facilities in order to provide a clean and safe environment for staff and inmates.
DOH noted in its exit interview with DOC staff on March 16, 2015 that there had been
noticeable improvements in the facility, and areas that were in need of repair and in poor
condition during the initial inspection have improved significantly.
In the most recent March 2015 DOH inspection, 87% of the identified items have already
been abated to date; the remaining items are either currently being corrected or, due to the
age and deterioration of the physical structure, are outside of DOC’s control.

Juvenile Programs





Since the issuance of the Ridley Report, DCDOC has significantly expanded the juvenile
program.
o The after school program has been expanded and now runs from Monday-Friday.
This program focuses on reinforcing the day’s lessons, teaching good citizenship
and pro-social development.
o There is a daily barbering program for the male juveniles.
o There is a comprehensive Victim Impact Training program that combines intensive
recovery support, mentoring and anger management services, and workforce
development skills.
o Other weekly programs include: Life Skills workshops, Free Minds Book Club,
Adjusting Our Attitudes and substance abuse education.
The Juvenile Unit program manager is currently in the process of negotiating a career and
technical training for weekend programming.
As of September 2014, all correctional officer recruits are trained in Positive Youth
Development (PYD), as well as the operational and disciplinary procedures of the
2000 14th Street, NW, 7th Floor, Washington, DC 20009

Phone (202) 671-2042



Juvenile Unit. This training is being phased into the annual in-service training for all
correctional staff.
PYD emphasizes building skills and assets in youth in addition to preventing negative
outcomes.

Juvenile Administrative Segregation
.
The DOC does not use excessive isolation and segregation with the juvenile population. The
number of juveniles segregated (either awaiting a disciplinary hearing or placed in administrative
segregation) over the past year are as follows with the average stay in segregation being
approximately two (2) days:
Month
May 2014
June 2014
July 2014
August 2014
September 2014
October 2014
November 2014
December 2014
January 2015
February 2015
March 2015
April 2015
May 2015






Number of juveniles
Six (6)
Zero (0)
Three (3)
Three (3)
Two (2)
Six (6)
Two (2)
Zero (0)
Zero (0)
Zero (0)
Five (5)
Two (2)
Zero (0)

The DOC has had Juvenile Administrative Housing and Hearing Procedures in place
since June 2013.
Any juvenile placed in administrative segregation is housed in a separate cell on the
lower tier within the juvenile unit.
o These juveniles attend school through DCPS and have access to legal services,
programming, counseling services, and meaningful contact with the other juvenile
inmates.
If a juvenile is placed in administrative segregation, the following occurs:
o Officers are required to do a visual security check of the juvenile every fifteen (15)
minutes.
o The juvenile receives individual recreation for two (2) hours per day.
o Juveniles will not be placed in segregation for longer than five (5) days unless
extenuating circumstances exist.

Visitation for Juveniles





In addition to video visitation, juveniles who have reached the Gold Tier in the Juvenile
Unit are given contact visitation with their parent or guardian once per month. Eligibility
for the Gold Tier is based on several factors such as behavior, program participation and
educational factors.
There are currently eight (8) juveniles on the Gold Tier with two (2) more expected by
May 7.
Juvenile inmates are given contact visits during the holiday season in December.
2

Suicide Prevention
The DOC, through a proactive initiative, requested that consultant Lindsay Hayes independently
assess current practices and provide any appropriate recommendations relating to suicide
prevention policies and procedures within DOC. His recommendations have been implemented.







As of October 2014, all 40 designated cells have been completed and retrofitted as
follows: to decrease ligature points, handles have been removed from toilets and desks,
vents are covered with anti-ligature grade mesh, pick-proof, penal-grade caulking has
been used in the cells, and doors have been replaced to allow for 2 clear panels that
provide enhanced vision into and out of the cells.
In response to the Hayes Report recommendations relating to suicide precautions, the
DOC provides suicide-resistant smocks and blankets; more time out of cells and the
provision of more family visits and telephone access is under review.
“Behavior Management” status was immediately discontinued upon receipt of the Hayes
Report. There are now two categories of observation: Suicide Watch for inmates thought
to be actively suicidal and Suicide Precaution for inmates who are at risk of suicide, but
less acutely compared to inmates on Suicide Watch. Inmates on Suicide Watch are placed
in a safe cell on 3rd floor medical and are provided one-to-one constant monitoring by a
healthcare professional. Inmates on Suicide Precaution are monitored by officers every
fifteen (15) minutes in staggered intervals.
Suicide Prevention training has been significantly enhanced. All correctional officers,
other DOC staff and healthcare vendor staff must undergo four (4) hours annually of
Suicide Prevention training. Additionally, DOC brought in national expert Dr. Dean
Aufderheide to conduct a full day of training on self-injurious behavior issues which
involved inmates with mental health issues as well as those exhibiting “bad behavior.”
Correctional officers on the mental health and segregation units, as well as mental health
staff participated in this training.
DOC is in the process of developing a Mental Health Step Down Unit, which seeks to
transition stabilized inmates on the Crisis Intervention Unit to a different wing of the
same area which would involve enhanced programming, as well as double-bunking as a
way to help them fully transition to general population as their functionality improves.

Substance Abuse Treatment Programs



The Secure Residential Treatment Program (SRTP) is a joint program of CSOSA and the
US Parole Commission that is located in the CTF. Eligibility requirements and the
content of the program are controlled by those agencies.
The DOC offers a Residential Substance Abuse Treatment (RSAT) program to both male
and female inmates. The RSAT curriculum is licensed by Addiction Prevention and
Recovery Administration (APRA), the regulating body for policy for substance abuse
prevention, treatment, and recovery services.
o RSAT is a 30-120 day program that includes services such as: relapse prevention,
parenting classes, and life skills.
o The program is open to volunteers and also accepts referrals and self-reports.
o Inmates who have violated the terms of their probation and otherwise meet the
requirements of the program may also enroll.
3

Good Time Credits




The DOC amended the good time credits law in 2010 in order to expand the application
of good time credits to allow pretrial detainees, in addition to sentenced misdemeanants,
to earn credits for good behavior and for successful participation in an expanded list of
programs including rehabilitative programs, work details, and special projects, with or
without completion of the program.
The District’s good time credit laws only apply to pretrial and subsequently sentenced
misdemeanants. In accordance with the National Capital Revitalization and SelfGovernment Improvement Act of 1997 (Pub. L. No. 15-33, 11 Stat.712) and D.C. Code §
24-101, inmates charged with felonies and sentenced to more than one (1) year of
incarceration are Federal Bureau of Prisons inmates and can only earn good time credits
in accordance with federal law and FBOP policies.

WLC Recommendations
As explained above, the DOC has already taken action on several of the Recommendations
contained in the WLC Report. In regard to suicide prevention practices mentioned in
Recommendation #3, the DOC brought in on its own initiative an independent consultant,
Lindsay Hayes, made the report public, and has implemented the recommendations from his
report. Inasmuch as Recommendation #3 relates to juvenile confinement, the DOC similarly
commissioned the Ridley report and publicized it, and has worked diligently to implement the
Ridley recommendations, including a comprehensive Juvenile Administrative Housing and
Hearing policy that is currently in place. The review of training for correctional officers tasked
with specialized functions such as juvenile custody and suicide prevention contained in
Recommendation #4 has been addressed as explained above, and is ongoing. While much
progress has been made, the DOC remains committed to improving operations and achieving the
status of a benchmark correctional agency.

Disciplinary Self-Help Litigation Manual - Side