CARCERAL STRATEGY AND THE SOCIAL
STRUCTURE IN MAOIST CHINA
Mao-hong Lin
Abstract
This Article explores the connection between the carceral strategy
utilized by the Chinese government and the social structure in the Mao
era. From Mao’s view, thought reform and profit-seeking were the two
primary goals of the Chinese socialist prison. Yet, by placing the system
of labor camps and post-release management into a broader context,
this Article demonstrates that the system was designed to make inmates
depend on the socialist settings through the measures of party-state
apparatus, prisoner cards and dossiers, classification of prisoners, hard
labor, and thought remolding. Those measures had their counterparts in
the general social structure in communist China, like work unit, household registration and political dossier. In addition, the unique feature of
punishment-profit nexus made the system of labor camps and post-release management crucial for the purposes of economic development
and political control in Mao’s time. In conclusion, the system of labor
camps and post-release management was an integral part of the greater
social control mechanism in Chinese society during Mao’s time. It was
designed and operated in a way to reform an ill population into qualified
workers so as to fit socialist requirements and maintain social stability.

About the Author
Mao-hong Lin is a practicing attorney in Taiwan. He received his
J.S.D. and LL.M. from the University of California, Berkeley School of
Law. He also holds the degrees of LL.M. and LL.B. from National Taiwan
University. This Article benefits from the insights and comments from
Prof. Jonathan Simon, Prof. Malcolm Feeley, and Prof. Thomas Gold, for
which the author wishes to express his immense gratitude. The assistance from the editors at PBLJ during the editing process is also highly
appreciated.

© 2021 Mao-hong Lin. All rights reserved.

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Table of Contents
Introduction................................................................................................ 34
I.
Social Structure in the Maoist era............................................... 36
A. Background................................................................................... 36
B. Work Unit...................................................................................... 38
C. Household Registration................................................................ 39
D. Party-State Apparatus................................................................... 41
II. Operation of Labor Camps............................................................... 42
A. Nature of the Camps..................................................................... 42
B. Party-State Mechanism Inside..................................................... 43
C. Financial Structure........................................................................ 44
D. Management and Production...................................................... 46
III. Remolding Prisoners inside the Camps......................................... 46
A. Prisoner Card and Dossier.......................................................... 46
B. Classification of Inmates.............................................................. 48
C. Improvement of Prisoners’ Health and Skills............................ 50
D. Reforming Inner Self.................................................................... 52
IV. Post-release Control....................................................................... 53
A. Forced Job Placement................................................................... 53
B. Parole and Labor Reeducation Camps...................................... 56
Conclusion................................................................................................... 57

Introduction
The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has been well-known for
its statewide use of labor camps to accommodate prisoners after it took
control of China in 1949. This institution was a historical legacy from
the Soviet Union. Mao Zedong, the first chairman of the CCP and the
founding father of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), transplanted
the prototype into Chinese society with some adaptations. The idea of
labor camps came from a quote of Karl Marx: “physical labor is the best
disinfectant for preventing social viruses.”1 For Mao, however, prisoners’
labor also indicated a strong economic power to rebuild a “new China”
out of the ashes of World War II and the civil war against the Chinese
Nationalist Party. The system of labor camps was therefore positioned by
the CCP as a “special state-owned enterprise” in 1952. Thought reform
and profit-seeking became the two primary goals of the Chinese socialist
prison through large-scale and intensive labor work.
There has been plenty of research on this unusual carceral-labor
system from the Western view. Mühlhahn’s work gives readers a general
picture of criminal justice in China from the beginning of the twentieth century to the late 1970s.2 Some literature traces the system of labor
camps and its measures to correct prisoners back to the years when the
1.
2.

Klaus Mühlhahn, Criminal Justice in China: A History 150 (2009).
Id.

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Social Structure in Maoist China

35

CCP was just established3 or even earlier to the Qing dynasty and the
Republican era.4 The system’s use of mandatory labor and political
thought reform practices have also drawn strong criticism for violating human rights.5 Dutton and Xu, from a view of traditional Chinese
philosophy, explains that the idea of thought reform actually worked in
the earlier decades, but gave way to more draconian legalist notions of
retaliation as the social changes eroded the socialist roots.6 Dutton also
capitalized on the ideas of disciplinary power and governmentality to
analyze the labor reform mechanism over the course of Chinese history.7
Some other studies pay attention to the economic function of Chinese labor camps. Mosher discusses the productive capability of camps
and its integral part of national economic development in the reform
era.8 Tanner refutes the official reports on the labor camps’ contribution
to the state economy during the 1980s and 1990s and points out its economic vulnerability.9 Seymour and Anderson’s work provides us with
insightful observations on the camps in Northwest China in the 1990s and
explains that the challenges from the market economy beginning in the
1980s have worsened the penal economy.10 It discloses that the output
from the labor camps was in a downward trend.11 By embedding China’s
carceral practice into a broader politico-economic context, Fu argues that
3. See Frank Dikötter, Crime and Punishment in Post-Liberation China: The
Prisoners of a Beijing Gaol in the 1950s, 149 China Q. 147, 147–59 (1997); Frank Dikötter, The Emergence of Labor Camps in Shandong Province, 1942–1950, 175 China
Q. 803, 803–17 (2003); John A. Fyfield, Re-Educating Chinese Anti-Communists
(1982); Aminda M. Smith, The Dilemma of Thought Reform: Beijing Reformatories
and the Origins of Reeducation Through Labor, 1949–1957, 39 Mod. China 203–34
(2013); Aminda M. Smith, Thought Reform and China’s Dangerous Classes: Reeducation, Resistance, and the People (2013).
4. See Jan Kiely, The Compelling Ideal: Thought Reform and the Prison in
China, 1901–1956 (2014).
5. Melissa P. Fruge, The Laogai and Violations of International Human Rights
Law: A Mandate for the Laogai Charter, 38 Santa Clara L. Rev. 473–520 (1998);
Ramin Pejan, Laogai: “Reform Through Labor” in China, 7 Hum. Rts. Brief 22, 22–23,
& 27 (2000); Michael Pareles, Hard Times, Hard Labor: Prison Labor Reform in China
from 1978 to Present, 6 Stan. J. E. Asian Aff. 33–41 (2006).
6. Michael R. Dutton & Zhangrun Xu, A Question of Difference: The Theory
and Practice of the Chinese Prison, in Crime, Punishment, and Policing in China 103,
103-140 (Børge Bakken ed., 2005).
7.
Michael R. Dutton, Disciplinary Projects and Carceral Spread: Foucauldian
Theory and Chinese Practice, 21 Econ. & Soc’y 276, 276–94 (1992); Michael R. Dutton, Policing and Punishment in China (1992).
8. Steven W. Mosher, Chinese Prison Labor, 1991 Soc’y 49, 49–59 (1991).
9. Harold Tanner, China’s Gulag Reconsidered: Labor Reform in the 1980s and
1990s, 9 China Info. 40, 56–63 (1994).
10. James D. Seymour & Richard Anderson, New Ghosts, Old Ghosts: Prisons and Labor Reform Camps in China (1998).
11. James D. Seymour, Sizing Up China’s Prisons, in Crime, Punishment, and
Policing in China 141, 141-170 (Børge Bakken ed, 2005); James D. Seymour (2006),
Profit and Loss in China’s Contemporary Prison System, in Remolding and Resistance Among Writers of the Chinese Prison Camp 157, 157-173 (Philip F. Williams &
Yenna Wu eds., 2006).

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the macroeconomic changes beginning in the early 1980s have impacted
not only on the ordinary citizens but also the people behind bars, which
was detrimental to their rehabilitation and prison security.12
Building on a solid foundation of prior studies on Chinese imprisonment, this Article aims to probe into the interplay between the
carceral-labor system and the social structure of Chinese society in the
Maoist era (1949–1976). This approach has deep theoretical roots,13 and
it has produced abundant scholarship on Western experiences, mostly
focusing on certain capitalist and democratic regimes.14 Supplementing
the existing literature on Western societies, this Article provides comparative analysis to fill the gaps in Western research.15 Thus, by unravelling
the connection between the labor camps and the social structure in an
authoritarian polity through an analysis of a series of laws and government rulings in Mao’s China, this Article aims to provide readers with
a more complete picture of the prison system and the penal strategies
embedded in socialist society during Mao’s time.
The Article first outlines the structure and development of the Chinese economy in Mao’s age and then depicts the three most important
means of social control utilized by the CCP: work unit, household registration system, and party-state mechanism. By explaining the functions
of the three social control methods, this Article paints the entire picture
of Chinese society in the pre-reform period. Then, it moves on to the
society in the shadows: labor camps. It further shows how the means of
social control were reflected in the carceral design and how the system
of labor camps was thus integrated into the plenary mechanism of social
stability as well as production.

I.

Social Structure in the Maoist era

A.

Background

The CCP intended to set up a centrally planned economy when
it took control over China in 1949 and conducted some drastic revolutions on the original skeleton during the first years, including land reform,
building up a state-owned economy, maintenance of price stability,
12. Hualing Fu, Punishing for Profit: Profitability and Rehabilitation in a Laojiao Institution, in Engaging the Law in China 213, 213-229 (Neil J. Diamant et al. eds.,
2005).
13. See Georg Rusche & Otto Kirscheimer, Punishment and Social Structure (2003); Georg Rusche, Labor Market and Penal Sanction: Thoughts on the Sociology of Criminal Justice, 10 Crime & Soc. Just. 2, 2-8 (1978); Michel Foucault,
Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison (1995); Dario Melossi & Massimo
Pavarini, The Prison and the Factory: Origins of the Penitentiary System (1981).
14. See, e.g., David Garland, Punishment and Welfare: A History of Penal
Strategies (1985); Alessandro De Giorgi, Re-thinking the Political Economy of
Punishment: Perspectives on Post-Fordism and Penal Politics (2006); Nicola Lacey, The Prisoners’ Dilemma: Political Economy and Punishment in Contemporary
Democracies (2008).
15. David Garland, Penality and the Penal State, 51 Criminology 475, 482 (2013).

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Social Structure in Maoist China

37

unification of state finance, and adjustments in the industry structure.16
After the years of settling down, particularly at the end of the Korean
War and after the conclusion of land reform, the preparation work for
socialist transformation was roughly completed.17 The goals for the following years were to accomplish the country’s industrialization and the
socialist transformation of agriculture, handicrafts, capitalist industry
and commerce. The CCP gave priority to heavy industry, in particular
defense industries, as the experience learned from the civil war and the
Korean War urged the CCP to establish a heavy industrial base for the
weaponry. Therefore, the CCP launched the first five-year plan in 1953
with an emphasis on heavy industry and it was successful.18 The CCP also
spent nearly five years on changing the system of ownership from private
to public, either in a collective form or state-owned.
The CCP further expressed its ambition to overtake or catch up
with the United Kingdom in industrial production in fifteen years and
the United States in twenty or thirty years, so it launched the Great Leap
Forward (dayuejin 大跃进) in 1958.19 This movement required industrial output to surpass agricultural output within five to ten years and the
mechanization of agricultural tools within five to seven years to improve
production efficiency.20 The movement also transferred most of the
labor force away from the production of consumer goods to iron, steel,
and other heavy industrial goods. The trends implied a possible famine
because China at that time was still a poor country.21
The CCP also began to build people’s communes (renmin ­gongshe
人民公社) in the rural areas in 1958, by combining small agricultural
cooperatives into bigger ones. The establishment of people’s communes,
in Mao’s view, was the signal for a complete communist country. The
duty of people’s communes was to advance developments in the rural
areas through large-scale production and greater accumulation, but in
reality the output usually fell short of expectations. The people’s commune was also an administrative entity. It replaced the original township
and became the basic administrative district in the rural areas. The sectors of polity, society, and economy were all integrated into a single
structure made up of people’s communes, so the commune became a
multifunctional organization. The attributes of its economic role, like
labor-intensive production and self-reliance, reflected the CCP’s political
strategy to maximize the involvement of the masses and the expectation
16. Xiao Guoliang (萧国亮) & Sui Fumin (隋福民), Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Jingjishi, 1949–2010 (中华人民共和国经济史, 1949–2010) [Economic history
of the People’s Republic of China, 1949–2010], 42–63 (2011).
17. Qizhi Zhang, An Introduction to Chinese History and Culture 443
(2015).
18. Chris Bramall, Chinese Economic Development 87–89 (2009).
19. Wei Li & Dennis Tao Yang, The Great Leap Forward: Anatomy of a Central
Planning Disaster, 113 J. Pol. Econ. 840, 841 (2005).
20. Xiao & Sui, supra note 16, at 119–20.
21. Bramall, supra note 18, at 125.

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that mass mobilization would become a strong weapon for the socialist
revolution and development.22
Because of the great political pressure from the central and local
governments, a trend of exaggeration spread through the country.23
Enterprises had no choice but to compete with each other by stacking
up the numbers of their targets in spite of their incapacity and shortage
of resources to meet those unreachable goals. China lost the technical
support from the Soviet Union due to their break in 1960, and the problem with industrial production was thus aggravated.24 Unfortunately, the
crisis was ensued by a historical famine during the three years from 1959
to 1961 and led to millions of deaths.25 Therefore, the CCP halted its policies, slowed down the revolutionary steps, and went through a period of
recovery, but the beginning of the Cultural Revolution in 1966 dragged
the country into a decade-long abyss.
B.

Work Unit

The process of economic transformation into a socialist structure in
the early years of communist China radically and thoroughly altered the
working class. Just as peasant households were integrated into the people’s commune in the rural regions, urban workers became fully reliant
on the enterprise and lost their independence. Almost every urban resident was required to assume a position in a workplace, such as a factory,
store, school, or government office, which was called a work unit (danwei
单位). Since the CCP transformed the private enterprises into state or
collective ownership during the first five-year plan, state or state-related
enterprises employed the vast majority of urban labor force and most
work units were administered by the state.26
Therefore, each work unit was regarded as an extension of the government organization; all work units were put under the bureaucratic
arrays of government. The benefits and privileges of work units either
solely or primarily came from the state, and the relationship between the
state and employees were administrative rather than contractual. The
assessment of a work unit was not only based on its economic achievements but also its performance of other government responsibilities such
as planned birth, environment protection, or crime control. In summary,
work units were the basic unit of social life in the urban areas and served
as a pivotal mechanism for social control and operations.27
22. Byung-Joon Ahn, The Political Economy of the People’s Commune in China:
Changes and Continuities, 34 J. Asian Stud. 631, 631–633 (1975).
23. Xiao & Sui, supra note 16, at 131.
24. Dwight H. Perkins, The Centrally Planned Command Economy (1949–84),
in Routledge Handbook of the Chinese Economy 41, 46 (Gregory C. Chow &
Dwight H Perkins eds., 2015).
25. Li & Yang, supra note 19, at 841; Bramall, supra note 18, at 126.
26. Xiaogang Wu, Work Units and Income Inequality: The Effect of Market Transition in Urban China, 80 Soc. Forces 1069, 1073 (2002).
27. Id. at 1073–74.

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39

Through the domination and allocation of resources, work units
and the corresponding government policies built a special social space
for urban residents. One’s style of living, working, thinking, or interpersonal relationships hinged upon one’s work unit affiliation. The positive
aspect was that one could enjoy all benefits and privileges provided by
the work unit when assuming the position. Work units in this sense can
be understood as having been small-scale welfare states. However, the
negative aspect was that one would lose everything required to fulfill
basic life requirements once leaving the work unit. In other words, urban
residents could not live without an affiliation to a work unit.
A work unit’s structural position in the government organization,
including its rank in the hierarchy and type of ownership, decided the
resources that it was able to acquire. If a work unit had a higher rank,
such as in the central administration instead of provincial or local, it also
had stronger bargaining power with the government supervisors. The
state preferred to grant more goods and services to state-owned work
units than the collective ones. The state-owned enterprises were mainly
the heavy industries while the collective enterprises were mostly light or
service industries; the former were thought of as the pillars of the socialist regime and were thus ranked higher than the latter.28 The distinctions
between hierarchical rankings and between state-owned vs. collective
work units formed the basis for inequality among urban residents.
C.

Household Registration

To solidify the rural-urban distinction, the CCP redesigned the
traditional Chinese household (hukou 户口) institution into a new registration system in the mid-1950s, by which people were separated into
“rural households” or “urban households” depending on where they
resided. The household registration system requires every citizen to be
registered with the authority at birth, and the registration works as the
legal basis for personal identification. Research shows the system has
two chief rationales.29 The first came from the tenets of Marxism-Leninism, which treats the urban-rural inequality in their developments
and the population mobility as the consequence of capitalism and thus
demands to minimize the migration of people and to set up a centrally
planned economy by eliminating the labor market. Secondly, the CCP
learned from the Soviet experience that the shortage of food and goods
in the urban areas resulted from their overpopulation.
Free migration between rural and urban areas was allowed in the
early 1950s, yet the influx of farmers into cities caused serious burdens
and the central government hence started to control the “blind flows”
of rural labor. Following a directive laid down by State Council,30 farm28. Id. at 1074.
29. Dorothy J. Solinger, Contesting Citizenship in Urban China: Peasant
Migrants, the State, and the Logic of the Market 33–36 (1999).
30. Guanyu Jianli Jingchang Hukou Dengji Zhidu de Zhishi (关于建立经常户

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ers in the cities were required to be sent back to their hometowns in the
rural regions in June 1955. Two months later, the State Council issued
an interim measure31 by which the urban population was entitled to a
state-subsidized yet rationed supply of grain.32 This experiment dividing
the urban and rural population lasted for three years, and the urban-rural separation and the distinction between non-farmers and farmers was
legalized when the Household Registration Ordinance of PRC33 was officially passed in 1958. Under the Household Registration Ordinance, an
individual needs to register with the authorities his long-term residence,
temporary residence, birth, death, and change of address.
The household registration system had two interesting features that
prevented peasants from entering the urban areas. First, it granted the
authority to work units in the urban areas and to the people’s commune
in the rural areas to control and manage the affiliated labor. In other
words, the labor force belonged solely to work units or people’s communes and was not allowed to be freely exchanged or traded. Second,
the public security agencies, namely the police in China, managed the
household registration system, so they controlled the registration process,
identification certificate issuance, and so forth. Together with the policies
that all agricultural production was only allowed to be purchased by the
state, the household registration system was designed to support the state
to form the urban-rural binary and thereby to confine farmers in the rural
areas. Consequently, the state was able to exploit the agricultural surplus
to support the development of heavy industries in the non-rural areas.
The system established a rigid distinction between agricultural
households and nonagricultural households and maintained the differentiated treatment for generations. Farmers were not entitled to the
same benefits as urban residents, such as wages, coupons for buying rice,
meat, food oil, or flour at low state-set prices, or medical care. They were
excluded from the food ration system and had to be self-supporting.34
Household registration thus grew into a carrier of benefits. Urban residents enjoyed more preferential treatments in social security, education,
medical care, or public service than rural ones. Moreover, household
status was “birth-subscribed”, which meant people’s household status
came from their mother at the time they were born and couldn’t be easily
口登记制度的指示) [Directive on the Establishment of Regular Household Registration System] (promulgated by the State Council, Jun. 9, 1955, effective Jun. 22, 1955)
(China).
31. Shizhen Liangshi Dingliang Gongying Zhanxing Banfa (市镇粮食定量供应
暂行办法) [Interim Measures for Rationed Supply of Grain in Cities and Towns] (promulgated by the State Council, Aug. 25, 1955, effective Aug. 25, 1955) (China).
32. Kam Wing Chan & Li Zhang, The Hukou System and Rural-Urban Migration in China: Processes and Changes, 160 China Q. 818, 820–22 (1999).
33. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Hukou Dengji Tiaoli (中华人民共和国户口
登记条例) [People’s Republic of China Household Registration System Regulation]
(promulgated by the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress, Jan. 1,
1958, effective Jan. 1, 1958) (China).
34. Jean C. Oi, State and Peasant in Contemporary China 30 (1989).

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Social Structure in Maoist China

41

changed unless through higher education, joining the CCP or the People’s Liberation Army, or inheriting the urban registration and job from
one’s urban father after his retirement.35
D.

Party-State Apparatus

The CCP strengthened its influence in Chinese society by establishing party extensions within every enterprise. For example, research
shows that the CCP built party-state connections within factories via setting up two organizations for forging political relationships as well as
ensuring coverage of the lowest rungs of the hierarchy: primary party
organization and the security department.36
A primary party organization is composed of all the party members
in that factory with three levels: members, committee, and the secretary
of the committee, who is the highest political official in the enterprise.
According to the Constitution of the CCP of 1956, a party organization
shall be formed in enterprises, rural areas, government organs, schools,
research institutes, communities, social organizations, companies of the
army and other basic units if there are three or more full-time party
members. This organization is parallel with and unaffiliated to the
administrative structure of the factory. Only members can attend the
committee meetings and the information within the meetings are not
allowed to be revealed to nonmembers. A security department is the
extension of the Chinese public security agency and under the lead of the
factory party committee. The Ministry of Public Security (MPS) has the
authority of investigating criminal offenses and potential political resistance and revolts. It was also empowered to exert certain administrative
sanctions without trials, including sending workers to labor reform camps
during Mao’s time.
The CCP also utilized some other methods to keep and check
workers’ loyalty to the party.37 First, every worker was required to take
part in regular group meetings of political study where group study leaders had to compose study notes and give oral reports to the party branch.
In addition, workers were also encouraged to report on others about
their political dispositions and thought problems. Another method was
the system of political dossiers. A political dossier records each employee’s political origin, attitude, and relevant political information from
schooling to death. Reports, evaluations, criticisms, warnings, and other
punishments are all included. These dossiers were kept by the party
cadres and were circulated to the next work unit if there was a job change.
Employees have no access to their own dossiers. The dossier stays with
the worker permanently and has substantial influence on the chances to
35. Xiaogang Wu & Donald J. Treiman, The Household Registration System and
Social Stratification in China: 1955–1996, 41 Demography 363, 365–67 (2004).
36. Andrew G. Walder, Communist Neo-Traditionalism: Work and Authority in Chinese Industry 88–95 (1988).
37. Id. at 90–92.

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change household registration status, enter a work unit or get promoted,
join the party, or even apply for a passport.38
The scheme of political dossiers was a type of techno-scientific
administration, through which the governing of the people was converted
into the governing of things.39 It was also a manner of semiotic control.
The documentation of personal political dossier worked in a visible form
belonging to the bureaucratic system while it also kept a mysterious and
unpredictable nature that governed and regulated one’s existence in a
coded way. By wedding the coded personal details with the bureaucratic
system, the CCP employed the visible and formless power of dossiers to
control the welfare, social ranking, social and political identities, as well
as the mobility of population in rural and urban areas.40

II.

Operation of Labor Camps

A.

Nature of the Camps

There were two chief types of labor camps in Communist China:
labor reform (laogai 劳改) camps and labor reeducation (laojiao 劳教)
camps. The former was a form of criminal punishment imposed on
offenders through a formal judicial process, and the latter a form of
administrative detention rendered by public security agencies for petty
offenses and deviant behaviors such as begging on the street or prostitution without trial.41 Both camps featured mandatory labor of inmates
during their custody. Based on a resolution by the Central Committee
of the CCP in 195142 and the subsequent legislation of Regulations on
Reform through Labor of the PRC in 1954,43 labor reform camps became
the de facto prison system. According to the State Council’s decision in
1957,44 labor reeducation camps were defined as mandatory reeducation
units equipped with the requirement of forced labor.
38. Raymond W. K. Lau, Socio-Political Control in Urban China: Changes and
Crisis, 52 Brit. J. Soc. 605, 609 (2001).
39. Gary Sigley, Suzhi, the Body, and the Fortunes of Technoscientific Reasoning
in Contemporary China, 17 Positions 537, 548–50 (2009).
40. Jie Yang, The Politics of the Dang’an: Specialization, Spatialization, and Neoliberal Governmentality in China, 84 Anthropological Q. 507, 510–12 (2011).
41. Hualing Fu, Dissolving Laojiao, 1 China Rts. F. 54, 54 (2009).
42. Guanyu Zuzhi Quanguo Fanren Laodong Gaizao Wenti de Jueyi (关于组
织全国犯人劳动改造问题的决议) [Resolution on the Question about Organizing All
Criminals to Reform through Labor] (promulgated by the Central Committee of the
Communist Party of China, May 15, 1951, effective May 22, 1951) The 3rd National
Public Security Conference, May 15, 1951 (China).
43. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Laodong Gaizao Tiaoli (中华人民共和国劳
动改造条例) [PRC Regulations on Labor Reform] (promulgated by Central People’s
Government Administration Council, Aug. 26, 1954, effective Sept. 7, 1954) CLI.2.72
(China).
44. Guanyu Laodong Jiaoyang Wenti de Jueding (关于劳动教养问题的决定)
[Decision on the Question about Reeducation through Labor] (promulgated by PRC
State Council, Aug. 1, 1957, effective Aug. 3, 1957) 78th Meeting of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress, Aug. 1, 1951 (China).

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Social Structure in Maoist China

43

The 1951 resolution disclosed the purposes of labor reform camps.
It read that “now we have more than one million of anti-revolutionaries
and criminals in detention across the country. They represent a huge
amount of labor force. For reforming those inmates, solving the problems
of prison capacity, and preventing prisoners from living as parasites, we
have to embark on a plenary project right away, based on the principle of
the combination of penalty and reform and on the needs for developing
the country, to organize them into reform through labor. Every inmate
who is suitable for labor shall join the regime.”
On the practical side, during the early years of the communist age
the CCP amassed a vast number of counterrevolutionaries, criminals,
petty offenders, and violators, and thus confronted the problems of incarceration capacity and budget shortage. At the same time, this new-born
country was in serious need of a labor force for economic development. Ideologically, inmates were treated as viruses and as bad elements
within society, and physical labor was thought to be the most efficacious
cure for the inmates. Besides, from the CCP’s view, ordinary citizens in
such a socialist state had to support their lives by working hard, and it is
complete nonsense to allow those social parasites to count on ordinary
citizens’ supply. Consequently, for making the state, the society, and the
inmates themselves better, mandatory labor would therefore be the best
means to punish as well as reform or reeducate inmates. The labor camps
were eventually positioned as a special state-owned enterprise.
The names also reflected the labor camps’ mixed nature of criminal
sanctions, economic production, and political control. Starting in 1951,
these labor camps were officially referred to as labor reform efforts in
order to differentiate them from prior styles of imprisonment. In order
to take credit for the products from labor reform camps, however, the
MPS announced in 1954 that there would be two names for labor reform
camps: the original name with the term of labor reform would be for
internal use only; the name for external use was required to use the term
“state-owned” instead of “labor reform” as well as include the local government’s title to differentiate from other manufacturers. Later in 1958,
the MPS also applied the same policy of naming on labor reeducation
enterprises.
B.

Party-State Mechanism Inside

When communist China was established in 1949, the Ministry of
Justice (MOJ) was in charge of the management of prisoners at that time.
But later, in November 1950, the CCP decided to transfer the authority
to the MPS, and the MOJ would provide assistance and guidance if needed.45 This transfer was brought about by an earlier directive of the central
45. Guanyu Jianyu Kanshosuo Laodong Gaizaodui Yizhaun Gui Gongan Bumen Lingdao de Zhishi (关于监狱、看守所、劳动改造队移转归公安部门领导的指
示) [Directive on Transferring the Authority of Prison, Detention Center, and Labor
Reform Battalion to the Ministry of Public Security] (promulgated by the Ministry

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government,46 which emphasized that the first and foremost goal of justice work was to suppress rebellions and protect the masses, so it would
be better to consign the responsibility as well as power of controlling
labor camps to the MPS rather than the MOJ. Article 6 of Regulations
on Reform through Labor also confirmed the leadership of public security agencies in labor reform work.
Political work is the essential part of the CCP tenets. As early as
1932, when the CCP was still a parochial party, it established the General
Political Department within its army because Mao criticized on the “pure
military viewpoint” that permeated through the party. By arguing that
the party shall always wield the gun, which means the military shall be
under control of the party, Mao required the military to be politicized.47
In 1952, the Fifth National Conference of Public Security set the tone
that every organ of the public security sector had to install agency or personnel in charge of the political propaganda as well as political control.
Since labor camps were also under the management of public security
agencies, in November 1954 the MPS required every labor camp to establish a unit responsible for the political work.48
The basic mission of political work in labor camps was to ensure the
party was the sole and absolute leader in ideological education and politics, and every policy from the party would be correctly enforced during
the reform or reeducation process. Just as every work unit in the urban
areas had it, the units of political work in labor camps were under the
guidance of the secretary of the party committee in corporation with the
political work leaders in the public security agencies. Every team within
the labor camps was equipped with a political office and political work
officials in charge of ideological education and thought reform tasks.
C.

Financial Structure

Labor reform camps, on account of the nature of state-owned
enterprise, were required to become self-sufficient and only in some
exceptional situations the state would provide funds to the camps, such
as funds for infrastructure construction. Like other state-owned enterprises, labor reform camps were required to adopt a fiscal system of
unified state control over income and expenditure. During the Fourth
National Conference of Public Security in 1951, Mao ordered the labor
of Justice, Nov. 3, 1950, effective Nov. 30, 1950) Ministry of Justice Directive No. 41
(China).
46. Guanyu Jiaqiang Renmin Sifa Gongzuo de Zhishi (关于加强人民司法工
作的指示) [Directive on Strengthening People’s Justice Work] (promulgated by the
Central People’s Government Administration Council, Nov. 3, 1950) Government Administration Council Directive (China).
47. David Shambaugh, The Soldier and the State in China: The Political Work
System in the People’s Liberation Army, 127 The China Q. 527, 531 (1991).
48. Guanyu Laodong Gaizao Gongzuo Bumen Zhengzhi Gongzuo de Ruogan
Wenti de Guiding (关于劳动改造工作部门政治工作的若干问题的规定) [Regulations
on the Questions of Political Work in Labor Reform Units] (China).

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Social Structure in Maoist China

45

reform camps to advance from being partly self-sufficient to being completely self-sufficient within two years. Hence, the MPS laid down the
policy of “setting off receipts against expenditures,” by which the camps
were allowed to use the income to pay their own expenses first and the
rest of income would then be handed to the central government. Labor
reform camps had to pay sales tax as well if they had income from the
sale of their products or from doing other kinds of businesses.49
Nonetheless, due to the serious problems caused by corruption,
the central government determined to exert strict accounting measures
on labor reform enterprises in 1956.50 The policy of setting off receipts
against expenditures was thus discarded and instead all the income had
to be turned into the central government first and the central government
would distribute needed funds to the camps based on their annual budget
plans. The usage of funds would also be under the supervision of the People’s Construction Bank of China as part of the central government.51
In addition, for correctly estimating the cost of production, every
labor reform enterprise was allowed to withdraw “assumed wage” of
every inmate from the budget. The wage was only assumed and would
not be given to inmate; instead, assumed wages could be used on inmates’
daily expenditure and as subsidies for the skilled inmates.52 Assumed
wage could be calculated by referring to the wage rate in a similar stateowned industry and to the directions issued by the MPS. By contrast,
labor reeducation camps followed the same fiscal policy, yet their workers would receive wages for their tasks. The minimum wage for labor
reeducation inmates in 1956 was 20 RMB per month. The rate of pay for
labor reeducation inmates was determined on the principle of “more pay
for more work done; less pay for less work done.” The rate for workers in
the local state-owned enterprises or the rate for local peasants could be
referenced as well, but the wage for labor reeducation workers could not
be higher than that of local workers or peasants.53
49. Guanyu Laogai Shengchan Danwei Nashui de Guiding (关于劳改生产单位
纳税的规定) [Regulations on the Tax Payment of Labor Reform Production Units]
(China).
50. Guanyu Laogai Caiwu Guanli Wenti de Zhishi (关于劳改财务管理问题的指
示) [Directive on the Problem of the Financial Management of Labor Reform] (promulgated by the State Council, Dec. 31, 1955, effective Jan. 1, 1956) (China).
51. Guanyu Laogai Qiye Caiwu Shouzhi Naru Yusuan Guanli de Tongzhi (关
于劳改企业财务收支纳入预算管理的通知) [Notification on the Incorporation of Income and Expenditure of Labor Reform Enterprise into Budget Management] (China).
52. Guanyu Laogai Qiye Caiwu Guanli Wenti de Jixiang Juti Guiding (关于
劳改企业财务管理问题的几项具体规定) [Regulations on the Problem of Financial
Management of Labor Reform Enterprise] (promulgated by the Ministry of Public
Security and Ministry of Finance, Dec. 31, 1955, effective Jan. 1, 1956) (China).
53. Guanyu Bei Laodong Jiaoyang Renyuan Gongzi Wenti de Pifu (关于被劳动
教养人员工资问题的批复) [Response to the Question of Wage for Labor Reeducation
Inmates] (promulgated by the Ministry of Public Security, Feb. 3, 1958) CLI.4.140606
(China).

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Management and Production

The central government as well as every local government was
required by the Regulations on Reform through Labor to establish a
committee in charge of the management and supervision over the production from labor reform camps. Therefore, public security sectors in
the central and local governments set up the Bureau of Labor Reform
to deal with the general affairs of labor reform, and the Committee on
Labor Reform Production and Management, affiliated to the bureau, had
the sole duty to oversee the production from labor reform. The committee was composed of people from the financial and economic sectors,
the public security agency, and the department of justice. The direction
for the development of labor reform production was to push heavily on
agricultural production, particularly grain production, and to develop
auxiliary mining, hydraulic engineering, and road construction.
In order to provide places for labor reform teams to work in,
namely the labor reform units, local governments, especially at the levels
of province, district, and county, started to construct such places for
labor work in 1951. Later they removed some underperforming units
and reorganized small units into bigger ones. Even though labor production was the means and thought reform was the goal, the means usually
overrode the goal, since the production, namely the income of a labor
reform camp, would directly determine the budget for the camp’s operation, particularly the staff members’ wages. Just like putting the cart
before the horse, it caused a huge number of deaths of inmates, especially during the time of the Great Leap Forward, despite the fact that
CCP officials kept emphasizing on the policy of “reform first and production second.” In some cities, labor reform camps and labor reeducation
camps shared the units.

III. Remolding Prisoners inside the Camps
A.

Prisoner Card and Dossier

When the system of labor reform had just commenced in 1951, there
were no uniform rules regarding how to document the prisoners’ identity
information, but labor reform teams had their own way to register prisoners’ names, birth dates, gender, and other important information. The
means used by labor reform teams to catalog personal information of prisoners were dubbed “prisoner identification card,” and this name was later
formalized by the Regulations on Reform through Labor in 1954. Article
41 of the regulation required every labor reform camp to prepare a register
and record prisoners’ names, sex, age, race, birthplace, address, class status,
occupation, literacy level, specialty, crime, sentence, health, family, and the
court that issued the final decision. Some camps also had their own special
types of cards, such as prisoner skill cards. These cards were kept by labor
reform units and were not allowed to be circulated to other units.

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Social Structure in Maoist China

47

In addition to prisoner cards, Article 29 of the Regulations on
Reform through Labor also demanded every labor reform camp to build
dossiers for each prisoner in order to inspect the performance of prisoners in the labor reform process. A prisoner dossier usually included two
kinds of files. The first file collected documents from other organs, such
as court judgments, rulings, law enforcement notifications, and registration forms of closed cases. The second file collected materials produced
during the prisoner’s term in the labor reform camp and duplicates of
important documents, including performance appraisals, records of
rewards and sanctions, accusation and confession reports, court decision
copies, and prisoner’s personal information.
In order to “clean up” the procedural flaws of trials in the earlier
years, the MPS and the MOJ, beginning in the mid-1950s, jointly directed
labor reform teams to list inmates whose criminal proceedings were not
complete or whose materials were lost, and then to supplement their dossiers with required documents, such as indictments or court decisions. If
the sentence was not in proportion to one’s offense or one was found
innocent, courts had to reissue a correct judgment; if prosecutorial offices
were not able to afford the caseload, public security could take on their
duties instead.54
A form of release would be given to prisoners when they were
released from the labor camps, and their prisoner dossiers would be kept
by the units. When being released, a series of documents would be sent
to the local police post or a people’s committee for documenting the restoration of the released person’s household registration status, including
the stub of the form of release, a form of appraisal of release, a duplicate of court judgment (for labor reform inmates) or police decision
(for labor reeducation inmates), and the original political dossier.55 The
ex-prisoners had to hand in their forms of release to the local police post
if in urban areas or a people’s committee if in rural areas to restore their
household registration so that they would be allowed to receive their
ration of food.56 If inmates were transferred from one labor reform unit
to another rather than released, their prison dossiers would be circulated
together with them among the units.

54. Guanyu Jixu Qingli Anfan de Zhishi (关于继续清理案犯的指示) [Directive
on Continuing to Clean Up Criminals]; (promulgated by the Government Administration Council of the Central People’s Government and Sup. People’s Ct., Aug. 27,
1951) (China); Guanyu Jixu Qingli Anfan de Buchong Zhishi (关于继续清理案犯的
补充指示) [Supplementary Directive on Continuing to Clean Up Criminals] (promulgated by the Ministry of Public Security and Ministry of Justice, 1954) (China).
55. Guanyu Tongyi Shifang Zhengmingshu de Lianhe Tongzhi (关于统一《释
放证明书》的联合通知) [Joint Notification on the Unified Form of Prisoner Release]
(China).
56. Guanyu Shiyong Fanren Shifang Zhengmingshu Zhong Jige Wenti de Tongzhi (关于使用犯人《释放证明书》中几个问题的通知) [Notification on Some Questions about Using the Form of Prisoner Release] (China).

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Classification of Inmates

For gaining popular support, the CCP decided in 1951 to apply different treatments to female counterrevolutionaries, elderly criminals, and
juveniles.57 For female counterrevolutionaries, use of the capital sentence
was limited; life sentence and death penalty with reprieve were possible
alternatives. The death sentence was not applicable to those who were
pregnant unless the masses strongly demanded the execution, and even
if the death penalty was unavoidable the execution had to be carried one
to two years after childbirth. In 1952, female convicts with five or less
years’ sentence could be released on parole if they had served one half
or more of the sentence with good performance and the masses agreed
to their release.58 For elderly offenders who were more than sixty years
old and whose sentence was five years or less, parole would be applicable to elderly offenders if the masses agreed, for fear of deaths of elderly
offenders inside the prison. Four years later, the central government lowered the age limit from sixty to fifty-five years old. For juvenile criminals,
the death sentence was never an option because they were still amenable to correction. Besides, they were also required to be incarcerated
away from the adults to prevent them from learning bad habits, and their
reform policy was focused on education. Later, all juvenile inmates were
moved out of labor camps and placed in the juvenile corrective facilities
for indeterminate periods of time for reeducation.59
In addition, weak, sick, and disabled inmates were not allowed to
work in the labor camps because of their poor health conditions.60 Their
health would become worse when they were serving their sentences. The
probability of their death inside the prison was thus heightened. It would
bring about harmful influence on the politics if prisoners became sicker
or even died in the labor camps, so the MPS decided to clean up weak,
sick, and disabled inmates for embodying the humanitarian values of revolution, winning over more popular support, and alleviating the state’s
57. Guanyu Chuli Fan Geming Zuifan Zhong Nufan Shaonianfan ji Laonianfan
de Zhishi (关于处理反革命罪犯中女犯、少年犯及老年犯的指示) [Directive on Handling Female Counterrevolutionaries, Juvenile and Elderly Criminals] (China).
58. Guanyu Chuli Nufan ji Bingcanfan de Buchong Zhishi (关于处理女犯及病
残犯的补充指示) [Supplementary Directive on Tacking Female, Sick and Disabled
Criminals] (China).
59. Guanyu dui Shaonian Ertong Yibanfan Buyu Daibu Panxing de Lianhe
Tongzhi (关于对少年儿童一般犯不予逮捕判刑的联合通知 (promulgated by the Sup.
People’s Court, Sup. People’s Procuratorate, and Ministry of Public Security, 1960)
(China); Guanyu Tiaozheng Quanguo Xianyou Shaonianfan Guanjiaosuo de Tongzhi
(关于调整全国现有少年犯管教所的通知) [Joint Notification on the Restricted Use of
Arrest and Sentence on Ordinary Juvenile and Child Offenders; Notification on the
Adjustment of Statewide Extant Juvenile Corrective Facilities] (China).
60. Guanyu Chuli Laoruo Bingcan Fanren de Lianhe Zhishi (关于处理老弱病
残犯人的联合指示) [Joint Directive on Dealing with Elderly, Weak, Sick, and Disabled Inmate] (promulgated by the Sup. People’s Procuratorate, Sup. People’s Ct.,
Ministry of Public Security and Ministry of Justice, Oct. 29, 1956), Gongfa Youzi No.
256 (China).

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Social Structure in Maoist China

49

financial burden. Consequently, for inmates who suffered severe illness
with medical proof, they could be released on medical parole; for inmates
of the three types whose sentences were less than five years, the government tried to keep a small portion of them and release the rest by having
them serve the sentence outside the prison or putting them on parole;
for inmates of these three types with sentences of more than five years,
if they were well reformed and unharmful to the society, they could be
released on parole.
On the other hand, there were five main groups of people in the
camps being thought of as detrimental to the state: counterrevolutionaries, landlords, rich farmers, bad influencers (usually criminals), and
rightists. These groups were termed as the five black categories (heiwulei 黑五类). These groups of people were labelled as harmful elements to
society and thus were put on “hats”. A hat here means a label of harmful
element. They needed to have their hats removed (zhaimao 摘帽) so as
to change their own ill components. Counterrevolutionaries would have
their hats removed if they completed their sentences.61 Landlords and
rich farmers had to join the program of forced job placement (liuchang
jiuye 留场(厂)就业, FJP)62 after finishing their sentences, and through the
process of discussion of all workers in the unit, review of the unit cadres,
and the approval of county people’s committee, they would be able to
remove the hats by changing their components from ill to socialist good
such as workers or peasants.63 Rightists were usually detained in labor
reeducation camps and would be released after serving three years of
labor reeducation or even earlier if they performed really well. Release
didn’t mean the removal of hats, however; those released rightists were
still under the supervision of local governments.64
There were also different measures exerted on foreign criminals.65
They would be divided into three groups: serious international espionage
61. Guanyu Fan Geming Fan Xingman Shifang Bing Huifu Zhengzhi Quanli
Hou Shifou Xuyao Banli Zhaidiao Fan Geming Maozi Wenti de Pifu (关于反革命犯
刑满释放并恢复政治权利后是否需要办理摘掉反革命帽子问题的批复) [Response to
the Question that If the Counterrevolutionaries Needed to Undergo the Procedure of
Hats Removal after Release on the Completion of Their Sentences and Restoration of
Their Political Rights] [hereinafter Response] (promulgated by the Sup. People’s Ct.,
April 30, 1957) CLI.3.175509 (China).
62. The details of this program will be discussed infra.
63. Guanyu Dui Laogai Danwei Xingman Shifang Liuchang Jiuye Renyuan
Zhong de Dizhu Funong Fenzi Gaibian Chengfen Chuli Shouxu de Pifu (关于对劳
改单位刑满释放留场（厂）就业人员中的地主、富农分子改变成份处理手续的批复)
[Response to the Procedure for Landlords and Rich Farmers Who Have Completed
Their Sentences in the Labor Reform Units and Now Work in the Forced Job Placement Units to Change Their Components] (China).
64. Guanyu Laojiao Youpai Qiman Chuli Wenti de Tongzhi (关于劳教右派期满
处理问题的通知) [Notification on the Problem of the Management of Rightists after
Their Completion of Labor Reeducation] (China).
65. Guanyu Waiji Anfan Shifou Chanjia Laodong Shengchan de Pifu (关于外
籍案犯是否参加劳动生产的批复) [Response to If Foreign Criminals Can Engage in
Labor Production] (China).

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criminals, counterrevolutionaries, and war criminals had to be detained
in jail and were not allowed to work; criminals who came from imperialist countries were allowed to labor inside the walls; criminals who came
from the Soviet Union, other communist countries, or were stateless
could labor outside the walls.
In summary, there were four main criteria used by the CCP for the
classification of labor inmates in the Maoist era: their capability of labor,
corrigibility, political elements, and the government’s reputation. Elderly,
weak, sick, and disabled offenders had a higher possibility of being
released because they were less capable of doing labor work than ordinary inmates; if they died inside the prison or communicated their illness
to other labor team members, the government’s reputation, the rest of
the inmates’ health, the efficiency of production, and the expenditure of
camps were all implicated. The same considerations were also applicable
to female offenders, particularly the pregnant ones. They were seen as
less productive labor and needed higher budgets. Besides, killing female
offenders or forcing them to labor as hard as male offenders were intolerable in the traditional patriarchal ideology and thus would be harmful to
the government’s reputation. Moreover, juvenile offenders were viewed
as more corrigible than adults for their immaturity and because of their
corrigibility, they were easily led astray if they were detained with adult
criminals. The five black categories and their ill components manifested
the measures the CCP used to govern the politically aberrant population.
C.

Improvement of Prisoners’ Health and Skills

As early as in 1952, the CCP noticed the importance of environmental health in labor reform units. The problem of public health in the
labor reform camps was initially treated as an attack from the imperialist countries by using biological weapons.66 In the next year, the central
government noticed that the public health in prisons had an impact on
the process of labor reform. Instead of considering prisoners as expendables and having the idea that it didn’t matter to lose some of them, the
central government required all labor camps to strive for reforming
more prisoners into newborn human-beings.67 Thus, the CCP followed
the policy of “less eligibility” and instructed local governments to set
up the standards for prisoners’ food and medical supply. But prisoners
couldn’t have better living conditions than the local population where
66. Guanyu Zhuyi Fanren Weisheng Bing Qude Miqie Lianxi de Lianhe Zhishi
(关于注意犯人卫生并取得密切联系的联合指示) [Joint Notification on Paying Attention to the Health of Prisoners and Keeping in Close Contact] (promulgated by the
Ministry of Public Security, Ministry of Justice, and Ministry of Health, July 1952)
(China).
67. Guanyu Jiaqiang Fanren Weisheng Gongzuo de Lianhe Tongzhi (关于加强
犯人卫生工作的联合通知) [Joint Notification on Strengthening the Tasks of Prisoners’ Health] (promulgated by the Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Security and Ministry
of Health, 1953) (China).

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Social Structure in Maoist China

51

the labor reform unit was located.68 Two years later, the central government set the standards of daily goods and medical support for prisoners
in different areas.69 As the policy of rationed supply of grain was adopted
in August 1955, labor reform camps, most of which were located in the
rural areas, suffered from the shortage of food, so the central government
allowed labor reform farms to plant more yams and potatoes as food for
prison workers.70
As stipulated in Article 30 of the Regulations on Reform through
Labor, labor reform production has to engage itself in agricultural and
industrial development and serve the state’s economic development in
the framework of planned economy. Therefore, the equipment and facilities of labor reform camps and the skills of prison workers would play
an important role in the process of labor reform production. With regard
to agriculture, labor reform farms took on the duties of grain production for the state. The central government noticed the importance of
irrigation works to the economy and hence, demanded that the departments of agriculture, public security, and water resources cooperate with
each other to complete the necessary irrigation construction.71 The labor
reform production in the industrial field was focused on mining, ceramics,
and other infrastructure construction and also supported the development and operation of labor reform farms. At first, the production from
labor camps fell far behind expectations due to the poor skills and management. In order to make up for the production inefficiency, the central
government ordered the related departments of local governments to
assist the labor reform factories, by supplying materials, engaging in production management, forming a system of sale, and developing cadres
with useful skills.72
Aside from the assistance from other governmental agencies, the
camps also gave skillful prisoners special treatments. The MPS ordered
that the deployment of skillful prisoners, such as engineers, technicians,
68. Guanyu Youguan Yewu de Jige Wenti de Dafu (关于有关业务的几个问题的
答覆) [Response to the Relevant Questions about Duties] (China).
69. Guanyu Fanren Shenghuo Feiyong Kaizhi Biaozhun de Guiding (关于犯人
生活费用开支标准的规定) [Regulation of the Standards for Prisoners’ Daily Expenditure] (China).
70. Guanyu Laogai Fanren Liangshi Gongying Wenti de Zhishi (关于劳改犯人
粮食供应问题的指示) [Directive on the Problem of Food Supply for Labor Reform
Prisoners] (China).
71. Guanyu Jigeng Guoying Nongchang ji Wanmu Yishang Laogai Nongchang
Shuili Jianshe de Jixiang Guiding de Lianhe Zhishi (关于机耕国营农场及万亩以上劳
改农场水利建设的几项规定的联合指示) [Joint Directive on the Irrigation Construction on State-Owned Tillage and Labor Reform Farms of More Than Ten Thousand
Acres] (promulgated by the Ministry of Agriculture, Ministry of Public Security, and
Ministry of Water Resources, Mar. 15, 1954) (China).
72. Guanyu Jiaqiang Laogai Gongye Shengchan Lingdao de Lianhe Zhishi (
关于加强劳改工业生产领导的联合指示) [Joint Directive on Strengthening the Production of Labor Reform Industry] (promulgated by the Ministry of Local Industry,
Ministry of Third Machinery Industry, and Ministry of Public Security, Oct. 28, 1955)
(China).

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doctors, medical assistants, laboratory analysts, or pharmacists, or those
who had a degree from colleges or high schools in industry, agriculture, water resources, finance, statistics, or business, shall be conducted
under the instructions of MPS, and local governments were not allowed
to occupy the skilled prisoners without authorization.73 These prisoners
of skills also had better living supports in their food, pocket money and
rewards, such as additional allowances from RMB 5 to 11 per month if
their skill reached an operator’s level, additional allowances from RMB
15 to 30 per month if their skill reached the levels of engineer, technician,
professor, or doctor, and rewards if they had special contribution during
their reform works.74
D.

Reforming Inner Self

In addition to advancing prisoners’ labor skills, thought reform was
also an indispensable portion of the course of labor reform. According
to an early administrative order, the goals of thought reform were to
make prisoners admit their guilt, espouse the CCP and socialist society,
develop the ideas and habits of labor, and eventually become qualified
workers possessing socialist morality. Thus, improving prisoners’ literacy, their obedience to prison cadres, and their loyalty to the CCP and
the socialist society were substantial parts of the cultural and political
education administered in the labor reform camps. Illiterate prisoners
were required to participate in courses of elementary education and,
if they fulfilled the requirements, primary education diploma or certificate in literacy could be conferred upon those prisoners.75 They were
required to take part in language courses with textbooks edited by labor
reform officials. For political education, the means in common use during
the early years were to read and discuss some classic communist books,
attend lectures, criticize oneself and admit one’s own fault, or secretly
report another prisoner’s incorrectness. Later in 1953, a mass line was
also adopted: public criticism by other prisoners or ordinary citizens was
one of the commonly used methods of political education.
Following the requirements of Regulations on Reform through
Labor, there was a system of rewards and penalties in the labor reform
camps. Prisoners would receive rewards for completely following rules
and orders, reporting other prisoners’ faults, achieving substantial performance in their labor production, improving production techniques
or technology, preventing possible incidents or disasters, or performing
73. Guanyu Tongyi Diaopei Jishu Fanren de Tongji (关于统一调配技术犯人的
通知) [Notification on the Unified Deployment of Skillful Prisoners] (China).
74. Guanyu Tongyi Diaopei Jishu Fanren de Buchong Tongji (关于统一调配技
术犯人的补充通知) [Supplementary Notification on the Unified Deployment of Skillful Prisoners] (China).
75. Fu Laogai Fanren Yeyu Xuexiao Xueyuan de Shizhi Zhengshu ji Biye
Zhengshu de Banfa Wenti (复劳改犯人业余学校学员的《识字证书》及《毕业证
书》的颁发问题) [Response to the Question of Conferral of Certificate of Literacy
and Primary Education Diploma from Labor Reform Spare-Time Schools] (China).

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Social Structure in Maoist China

53

other conduct beneficial to the country or citizens. On the other hand,
they would be punished for violating rules or orders, stirring up trouble in
the reform process, or hindering production procedures. Since the cadres
had the authority to administer the rewards and penalties, prisoners
would be expected to learn obedience to the cadres through the operation of system of rewards and penalties. Every prisoner’s performance
would be recorded in writing, and performances would be periodically
reviewed—by month, season, half year, and year—with the focus on each
prisoner’s ideological reform, obedience to rules and orders, labor production efficiency, and health management.
For the development of prisoners’ loyalty to the CCP and socialist society, in addition to the necessary political work by cadres, the CCP
also fostered and mobilized the activists within prisoners to assist the
labor reform and support the leading of CCP. Those “active prisoners”
would form a special group which was positioned as a bridge between
cadres and prisoners. The MPS allowed camps to form a committee of
active prisoners, which didn’t have the legal authority to manage other
prisoners but had the substantive power to do so by providing suggestions to cadres or participating in the management of prisoners’ food
supply and public hygiene under the guidance of cadres.76 Through the
operation of this special group of active prisoners, prisoners hence had
the incentive to be qualified as activists, those who were well reformed
and had demonstrated their political loyalty to the party. Consequently,
this institution of active prisoner group also consolidated the socialist
leadership of the CCP and the obedience of prisoners to cadres.

IV. Post-release Control
A.

Forced Job Placement

After 1953, the CCP’s principle for releasing prisoners from labor
reform camps was to keep many and free few (duoliu shaofang 多留少
放). This was the outset of the program of forced job placement (FJP).
The purposes of FJP were to protect the society from possible crime
threats and to improve the economy of the state, so FJP allowed prisoners to stay in the same labor reform unit or to relocate to another
unit after completing their sentences, if prisoners were voluntary. Those
who served their labor reform sentences in desolate areas and wanted
to settle down right there were also permitted to do so. Additionally, if
release would cause prisoners to become homeless or unemployed, the
person must be kept inside the camp. Seventy percent of prisoners were
held within the camps and the rest were to be released under this policy.77
76. Guanyu Zuzhi Fanren Jiji Fenzi Weiyuanhui Youguan Wenti de Yijian (关
于组织犯人积极分子委员会有关问题的意见) [Opinion on the Relevant Questions of
Organizing a Committee of Active Prisoners] (China).
77. Mosher, supra note 8, at 50; Pejan, supra note 5, at 22.

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The compensation for FJP workers at first had some ambiguities: in
some units, if workers restored their political rights, they got paid, but in
other units, no workers got paid. For dealing with the differences among
different units, the central government required all units to pay wages
to FJP teams,78 but there were still differences in the wages and benefits
between those with and without political rights.79 “Distribution according to one’s job performance” and “equal pay for equal work” were the
two guiding principles for FJP team members.80 Skillful FJP workers
would receive better wages and benefits than other members; their salary
rates were at the same level as skillful ones in the ordinary state-owned
work units.81 However, FJP workers were not allowed to have any insurance for their labor. As the central government explained, labor camps
were different from the ordinary state-owned enterprises, and FJP workers were also not the same as ordinary workers, especially taking the
harm FJP workers had done to the society into consideration.82
The same policy for the removal of hats in the labor camps was also
applied to FJP workers. The procedure of hat removal usually consisted
of a public assessment, a police agency’s review, and the approval of the
county people’s committee. Counterrevolutionaries who stayed in FJP
teams did not need to undergo the ordinary procedure of hat removal
because they had completed their sentences and their ill elements were
thus eliminated.83 As for the FJP workers who used to be landlords and
78. Guanyu Xingman Liuchang Jiuye Renyuan he Laodong Jiaoyang Fenzi de
Gongzi Naru Jihua de Lianhe Tongzhi (关于刑满留场就业人员和劳动教养分子的工
资纳入计划的联合通知) [Joint Notification on the Inclusion of Wages for FJP Team
Members and Labor Reeducation Inmates into Budget Plans] [hereinafter Joint Notification] (China).
79. Guanyu Fuxing Qiman he Jiechu Laodong Jiaoyang hou de Liuchang Jiuye
Renyuan Fanren Laodong Jiaoyag Fenzi Bei Qingli Shi de Daiyu ji Suoxu Jingfei
de Lianhe Tongzhi (关于服刑期满和解除劳动教养后的留厂就业人员、犯人、劳动教
养分子被清理时的待遇及所需经费的联合通知) [Joint Notification on the Treatments
and Budget When FJP Team Members, Prisoners Who Completed Their Sentences, or
Ex-Inmates of Labor Reeducation Were Cleaned Up] (China).
80. Guanyu Xingman Liuchang Jiuye Renyuan Jiechu Laodong Jiaoyang Liuchang Jiuye Renyuan de Laodong Gongzi Jihua Guanli he Laodong Jiaoyang Fenzi
de Gongzi Guanli Yiji Zhexie Renyuan Jinnian Tiaozheng Gongzi Wenti de Tongzhi
(关于刑满留厂就业人员、解除劳动教养留厂就业人员的劳动工资计划管理和劳动教
养分子的工资管理以及这些人员今年调整工资问题的通知) [Notification on the Management of Wage Plan for FJP Team Members and of Wages for Labor Reeducation
Inmates and the Question about Adjusting Their Wages This Year] (China).
81. Guanyu Xingman Liuchang Jishu Renyuan de Anzhi Yijian (关于刑满留
场技术人员的安置意见) [Opinion on the Placement of Skillful FJP Team Members]
(China).
82. Guanyu Zai Xingman Jiuye Renyuan Zhong Bu Shixing Laodong Baoxian
Tiaoli de Pifu (关于在刑满就业人员中不实行劳动保险条例的批复) [Response to the
Inapplicability of Regulations of Labor Insurance to FJP Workers] (China).
83. Guanyu Dui Liuchang Jiuye Renyuan Zhong Zhaidiao Fangeming Maozi
he Gaibian Difu Chengfen Wenti de Pifu (关于对留场就业人员中摘掉反革命帽子和
改变地、富成份问题的批复) [Response to the Question about Removing the Hats
of Counterrevolutionaries and Changing their Components of Landlords and Rich

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55

rich farmers, they had to undergo the procedure of hat removal so as to
change their ill components.84
The policy for the FJP program was somewhat altered a decade
later when the principle of keeping four and freeing four (siliu sibuliu
四留四不留) was adopted in the Sixth National Conference of Labor
Reform Work in 1964. This policy required the camps to retain four types
of prisoners: those who were poorly reformed, lived along the border or
the coast, would be dangerous to the society if released, and had special circumstances. Camps also had to free four types of prisoners: those
who were well reformed, lived in the rural areas, declined to stay or were
needed by their families, or were so old, weak, sick, or disabled that
they had lost their counterrevolutionary capacity and posed little risk
to the society. This transition was brought about by the alteration in the
makeup of the prison population over the past decade. During the 1950s,
most of the prisoners were counterrevolutionaries, so it was reasonable
for the CCP to adopt the policy of keeping many and freeing few. Beginning in the early 1960s, however, 80 percent of the prison population were
the people of working class and it was hence inappropriate to apply the
same policy.
FJP workers would usually not stay in the working units for more
than three years, despite there being no specific rules or orders setting
such limits. Once being released from the FJP teams, there were three
ways for units to place those ex-prisoners: the first was to place them in
the ordinary work units if they had special skills needed by the units; the
second was to keep them in labor reform teams and assessed their wages
on their skills or other requirements; and the third was to place them on
farmlands and organize them into collective production groups and thus
to build up new villages there. For prisoners who used to work in the
government, in general they were not allowed to return to their original
work posts after release, unless their offenses were minor, they performed well during labor reform process, and had special skills needed
by the government.85
Those ex-prisoners who were discharged from FJP teams would
receive wages for the month during which they left FJP teams, allowance for their previous production work, and a disability pension if they
suffered permanent harm and lost working capacity during their reform
Farmers When They Have Completed Their Sentences in the Labor Reform Units and
Now Work in FJP Units] (China).
84. See Response, supra note 61.
85. Guanyu Xingman Shifang Jiechu Laojiao hou Nengfou Hui Yuandanwei
Jiuye ji Qi Pizhun Quanxian Wenti de Pifu (关于刑满释放、解除劳教后能否回原单
位就业及其批准权限问题的批复) [Response to the Questions about If Prisoners Who
Used to Work in the Government Were Allowed to Return to the Original Work Unit
and Who Had the Power to Approve Their Return] (promulgated by the Ministry
of Internal Affairs, Ministry of Public Security, and Supreme People’s Court, Nov. 4,
1963) CLI.3.295 (China).

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production in the labor camps.86 During the policy change in 1964, however, the allocation of benefits was also shifted. FJP workers who were
qualified to be reserve workers or regular workers were still eligible for
receiving these benefits, but other FJP workers would not receive an
allowance for their previous production work and would acquire limited disability pension.87 Additionally, once they returned to their own
hometown, they had to reactivate their household registration status with
certification issued by labor reform camps so as to claim their rationed
food and cooking oil.88
During the decade of the Cultural Revolution, the FJP program
was completely shut down after 1968. Most FJP workers were dismissed
and sent back to their hometowns, and the rest of the members received
such low wages that it was only enough to maintain their lowest life conditions. The situation lasted for a few years until the FJP program was
gradually restored after 1972, and the policy of keeping four and freeing
four played a pivotal role during the course of FJP restoration by retaining fewer prisoners than in the time of keeping many and freeing few.
B.

Parole and Labor Reeducation Camps

Prisoners who were released on regular or medical parole would
receive a certification for the use of household registration in corresponding districts and the local public security agency would take on the duty of
supervision over the parolees. If the parolees performed badly or recovered from their illness or injury, they would be sent back to their original
labor reform camps.89 Parolees were not eligible for the FJP program
unless they voluntarily wanted to stay in the labor reform teams.90 Additionally, parolees’ political status would determine the level of their social
benefits. If a parolee’s political rights were still under suspension, social
86. Mosher, supra note 8, at 50; Pejan, supra note 5, at 22.
87. Guanyu Liuchang Jiuye Renyuan he Fanren Laodong Jiaoyang Fenzi Bei
Qingli Shi de Daiyu Ji Suoxu Jingfei de Zhanxing Duiding (关于留场就业人员和犯
人、劳动教养分子被清理时的待遇及所需经费的暂行规定) [Interim Rules for the
Treatments of FJP Team Member, Prisoners, Labor Reeducation Inmates When They
Were Cleaned Up and Necessary Budget] (promulgated by the Ministry of Finance,
Ministry of Labor, and Ministry of Public Security, May 18, 1965) (China).
88. Guanyu Bei Shifang de Zuifan Jiechu Laojiao de Fenzi he Pizhun Lichang
de Jiuye Renyuan zai Fanxiang hou Liangyou Gongying Wenti de Tongzhi (關於被釋
放的罪犯、解除勞教的分子和批准離場的就業人員在返鄉後糧、油供應問題的通知)
[Notification on the Question about the Supply of Food and Cooking Oil for Ex-Prisoners, Labor Reeducation Ex-Inmates, and Discharged FJP Team Members] (China).
89. Guanyu Jiaqiang Jianwai Jiuyi Jianwai Zhixing he Jiashi de Fanren Jiandu
de Tongzhi (关于加强对监外就医、监外执行和假释的犯人监督的通知) [Notification
on Strengthening the Supervision over Prisoners Who Were on Medial Parole, Serving
Sentence Outside Prison, or on Parole] (promulgated by the Sup. People’s Court and
Ministry of Public Security, Nov. 14, 1977) CLI.3.185989 (China).
90. Guanyu Dui Zuifan Jiashi hou de Zhengzhi Wuzhi Daiyu Wenti de Pifu
(关于对罪犯假释后的政治、物质待遇问题的批复) [Response to the Question about
Parolees’ Political Rights and Social Benefits] (promulgated by the 11th Bureau of the
Ministry of Public Security, Mar. 7, 1981) (81) Gonglao Guanzi No. 135 (China).

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benefits for the parolee would be lower than an ordinary FJP worker; on
the other hand, if a parolee’s political rights had been restored, the social
benefits would be the same as that of FJP workers.91
Since the labor reeducation camp itself was treated as another type
of FJP for training social deviants into good citizens, there was not a unified policy for the management of ex-prisoners who were relieved from
the reeducation units, and various measures were applied depending
on the circumstances. Soldiers who were relieved from the reeducation
units, for example, could return to their original troops if their military
status was still kept; otherwise, these veterans would be rejected from
their original troops and had to acquire a job with the local government’s
referral or stay with their labor reform teams.92 Released rightists were
usually eligible to remove their hats unless they performed extremely
badly during their reeducation period. If their work status was kept, they
could return to their original work units; if not, they could choose to join
a people’s commune or stay with their reeducation units.
Ex-inmates from labor reeducation camps who had useful skills or
special qualifications would receive different treatment. Skillful ones
who chose to stay in reeducation units were compensated at the same
rate as ordinary skilled workers. Those who were intellectuals, celebrities in the capitalist class, or ex-cadres of the CCP were placed in work
units by local governments after release.93 Thus, these placements could
be deemed as a similar type of FJP program within the labor reeducation
system. The principles of “distribution according to one’s job performance” and “equal pay for equal work” were as applicable to the labor
reeducation workers as they were to FJP workers.94

Conclusion
After placing the system of labor camps and post-release management into a broader context, we are able to see the close connection
between the carceral mechanism and the social structure in the Maoist
era. The combination of work unit, household registration and political
dossier was a national plan implemented by the CCP for the purpose of
exerting its omnipresent influence on every citizen’s daily life in its economic, demographic, and political aspects, so as to hold the reins of China
and maintain its communist and authoritarian regime. The measures of
social control enacted through those institutions can be summarized with
91. Youguan Jiashifan de Jige Wenti de Pifu (有关假释犯的几个问题的批复)
[Response to Some Questions about Parolees] (China).
92. Guanyu Budui Laodong Jiaoyang Fenzi Jiechu Laojiao hou Anzhi Chuli
de Tongzhi (关于部队劳动教养分子解除劳教后安置处理的通知) [Notification on Settling Down Ex-Inmates from Labor Reeducation Who Used to Be Soldiers] (China).
93. Guanyu Qingli Laodong Jiaoyang de Youpai Fenzi de Tongzhi (关于清理劳
动教养的右派分子的通知) [Notification on Cleaning Up the Rightists in Labor Reeducation Units] (promulgated by the Ministry of Public Security, Nov. 9, 1961) (China).
94. See Joint Notification, supra note 78.

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two ideas: human typology95 and organized dependence.96 Not surprisingly, the CCP applied a similar strategy to the management of inmates
in their labor camps. Prison in communist China during the pre-reform
period was considered another tool of social control for the unqualified
labor force.
The unique feature of the nexus between punishment and profit-seeking made labor camps in China an integral part of economic
development and political control in Mao’s time. During the early years
when the communist state had just been established, labor was in extreme
shortage and the prison population, an unused vault of a great amount
of labor force, promptly filled up the gap of human resources. Moreover,
from a political point of view, social stability was the major concern of
the CCP when it took over the territory, and thus preventing any social
disorder was the central precept of the new government. Since labor
camps were mostly located in desolate areas for cultivation or for setting
up basic infrastructure, socially unstable elements were kept away from
the masses and under the control of public security cadres. Consequently,
labor camps in communist China were positioned as the amalgam of
criminal sanction, economic production, and political control.
As we have learned from Mao’s ideals, thought reform and profit-seeking were set as the two primary goals of the Chinese socialist
prison in his time. In reality, production outweighed reform or punishment and became the first and the foremost goal of prison work. Since
labor camps were required to be self-sufficient, inmates were nothing but
an exploitable labor force. They were no longer criminals who needed
to be punished, nor deviants who needed to be reeducated. Under the
condition that reform work inherently relied on production work, it is
no doubt that the reform or punitive purpose had to yield to economic
demands. The directive “reform first and production second” served as
a mere slogan in the labor reform sites, despite the strong appeal from
the central government. Moreover, the remoteness and desolation of the
camps’ locations, together with the FJP program, caused the inevitable
result that labor camps and their adjacent areas formed small societies
containing a prison, enterprises (farms, factories, mines, etc.), and other
social groups which provided daily supports, such as electricity, water,
medication, education, or postal services. In this kind of prison-based
society, the source for prison personnel was mainly the original staff
members’ children, and thereby these areas became self-circling prison-labor complexes.97

95. Fei-Ling Wang, Organizing through Division and Exclusion: China’s
Hukou System 9–13 (2005).
96. Walder, supra note 36.
97. Zhang Sujun (张苏军), Woguo Jianyu Guanli Fazhi Zhuanxing Yanjiu (我国
监狱管理法制转型研究) [A Study on the Transition of the Law of Prison Management
of Our Country], 6 Xingshifa Pinglun (刑事法评论) [Crim. L. Rev.] 520, 542–45 (2000).

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In summary, the CCP utilized the means of “mandatory labor as
punishment” to deal with the huge number of criminals and deviants and
attempted to remold them into good labor so that they would be beneficial to the development of the country and be fit for socialist society after
release. The details of the reform strategies shared several similarities
with the general structure of social control, including the installment of
party-state mechanism, the prisoner cards and dossiers, and the typology
of prisoners. The mixed nature transformed labor camps into huge prison-labor complexes; it was designed to produce a class of good labor for
socialist society and kick the bad materials out through the production
line. In other words, the special state-owned enterprise in the Maoist era
manufactured not only good products, but also a qualified labor force.