CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND REHABILITATION

Corrections Standards Authority G.'.).~:.:.
600 Bercut Drive. 8urte A : ~ .~~..:t.-::: ~

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Sacramento, California 95814 .
www.csa.ca.gov

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TABLE OF CONTENTS
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BAC.KGROUND
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EV:A:l;,UAlION
METHODOLOGY
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FACILITY PROFILE

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Current Usage

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Population Summary

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Staffing Allocation and Availability

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REVIEW OF DOCU.MENTATION

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Staff Assault Incident Reports

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Training

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Safety Equipment

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PHYSICAL PLANT

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STAFF mTER"Vl.EWS

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Interview Process

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Interviews with Managers

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Interviews with Supervisors

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Interviews with Line Staff

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Intel"Views with Non-Custody Staff

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SUMMARY/CONCLUSION

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ENTRANCE LETIER..•..•..........••. ~
. DAl~A MATlU'X

Attachment A

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_4.ttacllnlen t B

DESJGN CAPACITY vs. CURRENT CAPACITy

STAFF QUESTIONNAIRE
EVALUATION TEAM MEMBERS AND ASSIGNMENT

12/30/10115

Attach mcnt C
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AttacllIDcnt D

Attachment E

BACKGROUND
In March 2005, Secretary Roderick Hielanan requested that the Corrections Standards Authority
(CSA). de'Ye}0p"a plan to evaluate staff safety is~;ues at all of the state's adult and youth detention
facilities. :At ·t!le'.MayI9, 2005 meeting of the CSA. the proposal was presented and accepted.
On May 24~25: 2005, a panel of state illld national subject matter experts was convened to
establish the criteria by which the evaluations would be conducted., Based on tbose criteria, a
team was developed and a timeline of evaluations was established.
On July 5-8. 200S. a team comprised of staff from the California Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation's (CDCR) CSA. Division of Adult Operations and Division of Juvenile Justice
'pilot tested the Staff Safety Evaluation criteria at Mule Creek State Prison (MCSP). The
evaluation protocol consisted of a request for advance data on staff assaults including victim and
perpetrator data. a preliminary site visit of the physical plant, random interviews with various
custody and non-custody staff, a review of applicable written policies and procedures governing
the operation of the institution and a review of documentation including incidents of staff
assaults. staffing levels, inmate population and safety equipment. The basic criteria were
deemed appropriate and subsequent evaluations have been based on the outcome of the pilot
criteria.

EVALUATION MrnTHODOLOGY
California State Prison Solano was selected as the third adult facility for review and the MCSP
evaluation protocol was followed. An entrance letler was sent to Warden Thomas L. Carey
infonning him of the October 31 through November 4. 2005 site visit dates and the proposed
operational plan_(Attachment A). The criteria panel had suggested using a data matrix to record
infonnation from incident reports (CDC 837) of inmate assaults on staffto ascertain if any trends
could be identified. The institution staff was asked to review the reports and complete the matrix
before the site visit. (Attachment B). The evaluation team asked that all incident reports and
related documentation be made available during the site visit. As the evaluation progressed. the
team identified other infonnation appropriate for review and staff at the institution provided
copies of existing documents or researched their records for information.
The Facilities Standurds and Operations Division of the CSA lcd the evaluation tcam
(Attachment E). The evaluation began on October 31. 2005 at the institution with an entrance
confcrence with Chief Deputy Warden Robert A. Horel, appropriate institutional administrative
staff and evaluation tcam memben,. The conference included an operational overview of the
institution by Chief Deputy Warden Horel as well as an overview of the evaluation process by
CSA Field Representative Robert Takeshta. Following the entrance conference, the evaluation
team members were provided a tour of the institution.
Using a conference room as the base of operation, the team broke into workgroups and began the
Available
review process but continued to meet daily to discuss their observations.
documentation wa..c; reviewed relative to the physical plant configuration, policies, safety

equipmellt, staffing levels, staff assaults and inmate population. The group Jooked for any trends
or~;~I~\edjs~UPF(!""'·,,".;./ .. ' .
The physical plant tcam reviewed tbe institution design as it relatcd to staffing, and the inmate
populafio:riJ.~he·i?~osewas to identify any issues that wOlJld affect staff safety such as inmate
crowdtng,=tiiri.i~~isibility, insufficient supclVision or lack ofcommunication.
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Institutional managers as well as staff and supervisors on tile second and tbird watch were
interviewed to provide an opportunity to identify their concerns regarding staff safety issues. A
questionnaire was developed in preparation for the review to ensure some consistency among the
interviews, and is included as an attachment to this report (Attachment D). The responses were
categorized and a summary of 1he responses is included in the Staff Interview section of this
report (page 20-24). Conflicts between the documentation, staffs' perception of the practice and
their concerns for safety issues were noted during the interviews and are included in this report.
The review team also made their own observations and those arc noted.
An exit conference was conducted with Chief Deputy Warden Horel and the institution
management staff to provide a summary of the results of the evaluation. The exit conference
included a presentation of the team's perceptions and observations as well as a summary of
comments made by staff.
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:FACILITY PROFILE
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California State Prison, Solano (CSP Solano), located ncar Vacaville, California wilS [lIst opened
as Culiforoja..M~diG~1 Facility - Soutb in 1984. The institution was originally under thc
administraf(onof the 'California Medical Facility - Vacaville, located on the adjacent property.
In 1991, the IUsHtUtions were separated and Califomia State Prison - Solano was established
with iLc; own warden and administration. The institution was initially planned to provide
extensive vocational training programs and Prison Industry Authority programs to Level II and
Lcvel ill male inmates and the mission has remained the same.
According to documentation reviewed at the institution! and discussions with staff, the
institution was originally designed to house 1204 Level II and 1200 Level HI general population
inmates in two facilities, using a' 270-dcgree design, for a total institutional capacity of 2404.
The portion of the institution designated for Level III housing consisted of two 600 bed housing
complexes creating a perimeter around the exercise yard of each complex. The complexes shared
a gymnasiUm" administrative and program support area. Each housing complex was constructed
with six buildings. Each building contained 100 'individually secured cells, each contain.ing a
toiletlwashbasin combination unit.
The original design included a 1204 bed Level II facility that mirrored the Level III facility
footprint; however. the buildings were to be a 27()'degrce dormitory design with 172 beds in
eacb building. While the original design included 12 buildings to house Level II inmates, only 7
were actually built. The Level II portion of the institution also had a shared gymnasium and
program support area
In the late 1990's, five open donnitories were built in the locations originally planned for 270degree dormitories. While designed to house 100 Level II inmates in each, tbe open dormitories
were occupied with 200 inmates each.
Today, the facility has been divided into four facilities designated Facilities 1, 2, 3 and 4. Central
Control, a Correctional Treatment Center (CTC) and the receiving and releasing unit are locatcd
near a central point between the four facilities. A secure electrified perimeter fence surrounds the
entire institution. .

To accommodate the increased population of Level III inmates, each of the single cells in
Facilities J and 2 have been converted to double occupancy. Emergency bedfl (e-bcds),
consisting of75 triple bunks have been added to the gymnasiwn. To accommodate the increased
population of Level II inmates in Facilities 3 and 4, 48 triple bunks have been added each of the
270-degrec dornu1ory units <lnd 75 triple bunks have been added to the shared gymnasium. The
open donnitories continue to house 200 inmales each; The total institution bed count is 6287.

Inmate vocational and academic education and PIA programs are located within the securc
perimeter on the north si.de of thc institution. Located outside of the secure perimeter Rrc

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Design Criteria Guidelines, 19R6

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buildings for various srnff office space, inmate rccords, firchOllsc and tlIe Office of Substance

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Current Usage
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The institution c.oiitiriues to provide inmate programs including educational study for high school
diploma/OED; . speCialized vocational training for several trades and professions
(automotive/mechanical repair, electronics, landscaping, building trades, optical lab, etc.), and
other various programs to either support the community or otherwise better prepare the inmate
for community reentry. CSP Solano's mission is to provide education and training to inmates
and at the time of the evaluation, 3465 inmates (57%) were enrolled in one or more of the many
programs offered at the institution.
Population Summary
The total institution bed count is 6287 (Attachment C). During the evaluation, the inmate count
was 6118. 2512 inmates were designated Level ill and 3606 were Level II; Level III being a
higher security designation. There were 1923 inmates serving life sentences. There were 1101
gang members/associates, the majority ofwhich were considered Northern Mexicans.
Sixteen inmates were designated as being Enhanced Out Patient (EOP) inmates. BOP inmates,
while generally described as mental health patients because of their diagnosis, require a
significantly higher level of clinical care than do other mentally ill inmates. 1410 inmates were
classified as Clinical Care Case Management System (CCCMS), inmates also diagnosed with
mental illness but not requiring the heightened level of careofEOP irunates.
Of the total inmate population, there were 2354 black (38.4%), 1845 white (30.1 %), 1312
Hispanic (21.4%), and 607 other (10.1 %).
Staffing Allocation and Availability
On October 31, 2005, the initial day of the evaluation, the funded slaffmg was establiRhcd at '
832.7 custpdy personnel, which includes the ranks of Correctional Officer through Waruen. Of
the allocated positions, there are currently 65.8 vacant custody positions and 21 employees off on
long-term leave (over 3 months). The below listing rel1ects the ranges of custody classifications.
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Managed:]] cu~tody staff at CS'P SOlano consists of the \Varden, Chief Deputy Warden, 4
Associate Wardens, Correctional Counselor ill and 5 Capmins.
Supervisory custody staff consists of Correctional Lieutenants, Correctional Counselor

118 (CC 11), Correctional Sergeants, and Senior Medical Tcclmical Assistant (SMTA).
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Rank and file custody staff consist of Correctional Officers, Medical Technical Assistants
(MTA) and Correctional Counselor I (CC I) staff. In :lddition 10 the alIoc:lted
Correctional Officer positions at CSP~Solano, there arc 5 part-time intcnnittenl (PTE)
Correctional Officer employees.

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There are 446.2 allocated non-custody positiol1S with 92.8 vacancies and J2 employees have
3 months)..
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Of the non-custody vacancies, 22.5 (24 percent) are medical positions, 15 (16 percent)
.are:.edUca\i.Q~.positions, 11.7 (13 percent) arc mental health positions and the other 43.6

.variou~·v~cant positions are less critical Rupport positions.
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See Table I below for a summary ofpositions, vacancies, long-term leave and staff avmlability.
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Custody Staff
Non-Custody Staff
Total

Allocated
Positions
832.7 .
446.2
1278.9

65.8

Long-term Leave
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92.8
158.6

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Vacancies

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Available Staff
745.9
341.4
1087.3

The following finding is related to staffing issues as identified by the team:

FINDING: Shift replacement of custody positions may be a contributing factor to staff assaults.
DISCUSSION: The institution has ':lt1 8.8% vacancy rate among the line custody staff When
including the staff off on long tcon leave (over 3 months for the purpose of this review), the
. effective vacancy rate increases to 9.1 %. Shift replacement must be fOlU1d to replace vacant
officer positions, officers off on long-term leave, officers absent to attend training and officers
off on a short-tenn basis for all other types of leaves. As a result, the number of volunteers to
work overtime is insufficient to fill the required posts and officers must be ordered to work
overtime. The infonnation provided to the team was that as many as 23 officers must be ordered
to work overtinfe each day, after working their assigned 8-hour shift. Officers working shift
replacement overtime may be tired, preoccupied or pcrfonning at less than their full potential
because they are working assignments in which they are unfamiliar. The team was unable to
confirm if staff injuries occurred at a higher frequency during ovcrtime as opposcd 1:0 during
regular ~bifts .. Considering the crowded conditions, the team recommends staffing .levels be
maintained with as few vacancies as possible.

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REVIEW OF DOCUMENTATlON
The iDati:Jbb6.1nMnt'~titin··ii~vi~wTeam reviewed available documentation, records and policy
manuals to identify any trends or common themes among the incidents. The items reviewed

included:

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Incident reports for staff assaults (~r attempted assaults (CDC 837).
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Staff Assault Review Committee Minutes.
State Compensation Reports (SeIF) for assaults on staff.
• Inmate appeals (602).
• Inventories of authorized safety equipment.
• Use ofForce Executive Review Committee (ERe) fmdings.
• Facility training records. .
• Corrective action plans from previous audits and inspections.
• Employee safety grievances.
• Daily chronological/watch commander's report.
• Involuntary overtime by inverse seniority records.
• Staffing information..
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• Classification records.
• Inmate files.
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Department Operations Manual (DOM) - Relevant sections only.
Restricted Department Operations Manual (Red DOM) - Relevant sections only.

Based on the documentation review, interviews and observations, the following findings arc
presented.

Staff Assault Incident Reports
FINDING: After a collective review and discussion of the above listed documents, there were
no obvious trends identified relative to the issue of staff assaults. Other than inmate
classification (Rec discussion below), no issues were identified as being significantly consistent
among the various incidents.
DISCUSSION: Sixteen incidents of battery or attempted battery on staff were reporLed during
the time period from November 1, 2004 through September 30, 2005 at CSP - Solano. The
institution reports thnt 17 staffmembers wcre victims. ofbuttcry or were injured during incidents:
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Seven victims were from the ranks of correctional ofiicers and 2 were correctional sergeants.
The remaining victims included a Supervising MTA, three medical staff, two cooks, one SAP
Counselor and one Prison lndustry AuUlOrily staff member.
Twelve of the victims were male and five were female.
Five of tllC victims were white, 5 were blnck, 5 were Hispanic, and two were reported as
other.

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FINDING: Thc victim demographics
institution staff demographic,..
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generally consistcnt with those of the overall

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DISCUSSION: The average agc of the victims was approximately 44 years with 8.02 years of
servicc while the average age of custody staff is 42 with ·12 years of service. The average age of
non-custodY.·:,s~tr...l~ .49 with 11 years of service. Eight victims had less than 7 years of
expericmcc~wlii)c
g'victims had eight or more years of experience.
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FINDING: Race and age of the involved irunates do not appear to be significant assault factors.
DISCUSSION: No significant variances were noted when comparing the race or age of the
assaultive inmates to that of the overall facility inmate population. Black inmates were involved
in 10 incidents; white inmates were involved in 5 incidents; Hispanic inmates were involved in 2
incidents.
The average age of the involved inmates wa~ 34.9 and they had been incarcerated for an average
of 1152 days. including 122 days at esp. Solano. The institution was unable to provide the
averl1ge age of the total inmate population.
FINDING: While the vast majority of the staff assaults did not initially appear to result in injmy
to the victim staff member or to other personnel involved in the emcrgcncy response; in some
instances follow-up medical treatment has been required resulting in lost work time.
DISCUSSION: In the reports reviewed, serious injuries2 were not initially reported by the
victims and few required medical attention following the initial treatment at the institution's
infinnary. Only one of the victims is currently off duty as a rcsult of an assault and will be off
for at least 30 days. Another was off for 34 days and one officer was off for 14 days. One
officer bas a corrective !Ourgcry scheduled that may result in a 30~day absence.
FINDING: Inmates with high sccurity classifications or scrious mental health issues are marc
likely to commit assaults on staff
DISCUSSION: Fourteen of the incidents involved inmates with lligh security classifications or
serious mental health issues. Twelve of the incidents occurred in the &lhot housc" housing units
(buildings equipped with air conditioning to 110use inmates taking temperatllIe-sensitive
psychotropic mcdicatiom:) or outside the hot house but committcd by a hot house inmate. Five
of the incidents occurred in the medical/mental health treatment arca. Six of the incidents
involved CCCMS inmatcs (inmates diagnosed with mental illncss). Three of the involved
inmate-c; were serving a life sentence.

FINDING: Inmate manufactured weapons were not f:.\ctors in assaults on staff.

2 to. scriulI~ injury is dcrmed by Title 15. Section 3000 01$ :l serious: iml'l\irment of physicul condition, illclulling, but nut limi1ed to,
the following: ICI!'~ IIf consciulIsot:Ss; concll~si(ln; hUlle rr;aclufc; prOtl';lclcd 10:;1: IIr imp;linm:nt of function 01" .. ny hutlily mcmhcr
Clr urwm: II wound fC/1l1iring 1:lIlurillg; lind di!llit,'urcmcnt.

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DISCUSSJON: An inmate manufactured weapon was involved in one of the incidents
reviewed. In that c~se,.alJ inwate used a sharpened toothbrush to stab a PIA laundry worker. In
on~~inc~~'chf, itMin'ci~te '~as i~ the process of concealing or disposing of a weapon but made no
attempt to assault staff with it. An inmate threw an unknown liquid substance on staff in one of
the incidel\ts..atld a. food trdy was used in another. In the remainder of the cases reviewed,
imnates b~ti:e~ed
attempted to batter staff by stdking, kicking or otherwise unlawfully
touchiIig with nieii:hands and/or their feeL

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FINDING: Insufficient data were available to detennine if gang affiliation was a contributing
factorrclated to stnffassaults.

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DISCUSSION: The facility bad 11 OJ inmates documented as being aligned with a gang among
the total population of 6118. In the reports reviewed, only 4 documented that the involved
imnate was a gang member and no single gang was identified in a significant number of
incidents.

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FINDING: Hours of the day may be factors in assaults on staff.
DISCUSSION: TIle frequency of incidents was highest during the third watch with 11
occurrences; second watch had five incidents while only one occurred during first watch. The
probability of bein.g the victim of a staff assault may be higher during third watcb because the
number ofavailable staff is significantly less than that of the second watch.
Altbougb the data were insufficient to draw any conclusions, the frequency of incidents was
highest during the month of September in 2005' with 4 assaults. The frequency of occurrences
was evenly distributed among the days of the week.
FINDING: Insufficient programming l1vailabiIity
consideration ta.improve staff safety.

the inmate population may be a

DISCUSSION: The primary mission of the institution is to provide educational and vocational
training to the men incarcerated at CSP - Solano. Because the prison is crowded with over twice
the original designed number of irunates, many do not ha.ve access to programmed activities or
job assigmnents. The programming space has not been increased to match the increase in
population so many oftbe imnatcs stay on their yards or inside their housing buildings all day.
Fifteen of the 38 educational positions were'vacant at the time of our review. Five of the 28
vocotional education positions were vacant.
Ofthe 6118 inmates at the institution, 3465 bad some type of a program assignment. Included in
that statistic arc the inmates Clssigncd to educational and vocational programs and it also includes
those inmates with job assignments. Most job assigr.mlcnts involved l11a.il1t~nancc and work
crews. For a variety ofreClsom:, not the least of which is the result of crowding, over 43% of the
int11ates at CSP - Solano are not involved in any program activity.

1i'INDING; Accidental injuries arc not a fi-c~qucnt occun"cnc.:e.

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DISCUSSION: The evaluation team reviewed staff injury reports for the period from November
2004 through October 2005 as well as sununaries from previous years. The evaluation team
noted tli!t~taff~jiifjes"li~"e'becb on a downward trend for the last 3 years. Currently, reported
injuries for 2005 are down nearly 40% over the same time period from last year. The safety
'officer ane)., tJ:1,~ ~etu!I! to .work coordinator attribute the dedine to the constant monitoring of
workplacej~fetyissJ,les. Both said injury reports are reviewed; maintenance issues are corrected,
relevarit isijue,S' are :included in the monthly safety meetings and training issues are identified. No
safety grievances have been filed during the time period reviewed.

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.>~ FJNDING: Monthly work area safety inspections

arc not being documented.

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DISCUSSION: The safety officer provides a generic work area safety checklist as a method for
the supervisor or designee to document a workplace inspection at least monthly. The checklist
may be modified as needed for specific site applications. The team reviewed two examples of
the checklist and found both to be useful. Unfortunately. the reporting forms are not being used
and the safety officer had few records of workplace inspections. The review team suggests that
one person be designated to oversee the required review process, maintain the appropriate
documentation, and ensure appropriate follow-up is completed.

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FINDING: The In-Senrice Training (lST) Manager is not being included in the safety meetings.
DISCUSSION: The safety officer schedules safety meetings to discuss safety issues and recent
accidents and injuries. The 1ST manager is not being included in the process. Training is a key
component when ensuring staff performance is consistent with established procedures or when
effecting changes to improve working conditions. The training manager should be attending the
safety meetings and be an active participant in any follow-up process to a critical incident,
accidental injury or injury from a staff assault.
Training
FINDING: Documentation received by the review team provides that custody staff, non-custody
staffI and all new employees· at eSP-Solano are receiving 40 hours of mandated classroom

training.
DISCUSSiON: eSP-Solano has a designated training manager and assistant training manager
who coordinate the training needs of all custody and non~custody staff The 1ST manager
receives a list of required formal training topics from the Office of Training and Professional
Development (OTPD), CDCR headquarters. The training topics identified by the OTPD arc
specific to employee job classifications:: at the institution. Mandated training topics are specified
by the California Penal Code, California Code of Regulations - Title 15, and the Departmental
Operations Manual (DOM). The institution may add training 1Jmt would be considered as being
site-specific. Depending on the institution's mission and construction, site-specifictraiuillg
topics are dctcnnilled by the training manager and subject to fmal approval by the Wnrden. The
following arc the training requirement'! for the various employee classificatic>1ls.

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Custody employees up to the nU11<: of correctional lieutenant are receiving 40 hours of
; ~.~ ,.f~~t~,f~lJ.aJ.tJ;~jniu.g..eSP-Solano does.n?t currently offer On ~e Job .Training (OJT)
, modules that would supplement other trammg. ' However~ OJT IS aVallable from the
employee's supervisor and quizzes in tI1e monthly training bulletin. The review team was
ad~s.I;llil py the, 1ST m~nQ.ger that there is a pl!!n ready to be implemented which will
~praYide qn"additional12 hours ofOJT via module segments. Management clm;sifications
(Captain "tfuo~gh Warden) receive mandatory annual training dw·jng Administrative
Officer of the Day (AOD) training.
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Non custody employees are receiving eight hours offonnal classroom trairling in addition
to any OJT provided by the employee's supervisor or quizzes offered in the monthly'
training bulletin.

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Orientation training is provided for both custody and non-custody staff who are new to
the institution. Employees new to the department receive" orientation. The orientation
training includes 40 hours of classroom instruction specific to departmental requirements
and institutional needs. Lateral transfers, promotions, etc., are not required by the
institution to attend the 40-hour orientation, however they receive a condensed version
which includes a tour of the institution and an orientation package with specific
information about the institution.

In addition to the above atulual training requirements, each employee may attend or request
additional training from the 1ST department. Monthly training bulletins are available to each
employee which provide a, schedule of all upcoming monthly training classes and/or. orr
modules.
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Each employee's training year begins on thcir birthday. not a calendar or fiscal year. The
training :files reviewed indicated that regular~ ongoing training was being pcrfonncd. The
training manager reported iliat all employees, with exception of those on extended leave, were
compliant with the training mandatcs.
FINDING: MTA staff have not been provided training necessary to be proficient as "first
responders" in the event ofa staffinjury.
DISCUSSION: Several staff at eSP-Solano expressed concerns regarding MTAs who are
required to respond to medical emergencies in variOlls locations throughout the facility and arc
I!0t trained or certified as Emergency Medical Technicians (EMT) or Certified First Responders
(CFR). The review team was advised that the institution tIoes not offer avenues or provide' on, site tmiJring that would provide EMT or CFR training or certification for the staff required to
respond and provide fIrst response treatment. Of the MTAs who are EMT certified most have
received EMT training from otllcr agcncies not associated with CDCR. That training came
during prCVi0l.1S employment and at-; with any perishable skill, must be updatcd at appropriate
intervals. Since the MTA staff is the closest medically trained pcrsonnel and the most
appropriatc to rcspond to a ~t.nff injury within tllC secure portion of the facility, the tcnm
suggcl>led ~111 MTA stafr n.:t;cive lhe lmining nccc..'::Sllry to cqual that of community first
responders. The need iH reinforced by the 1:ICt that it may take extra time for ambulancu and fire

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personnel to respond througb thc security to get to an injured officer and the MTA is left to do
whatever he/she can for first aid. The first rcsponding medical personnel should be trained to the
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FINDING: Meeting notes and attendance records arc not being returned to the safcty officer.
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DISCUSSlON::ThcSafcty Officer provides bindcrs to supervisors that contain topics,
information, Jesson plans and testing materials relative to safety issues as part oftIle IlPP training
requirements. The supervisors deliver the safety infonnation to their staff as they deem
appropriate. The safety officer is not bcing provided the documentation that the lessons are
being delivered. All safety training should be documented as being provided and reviewed to
ensure the subject matter is current and relevant to current workplace needs.
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FINDING: Staff members who provide post-specific orientation training do· not receive

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specialized training in being a trainer or in the necessary elements of the post-specific duties that
should be covered.

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DISCUSSION: Supervisors and managers interviewed said the officers performing oricntation
training to new employees for a specific assigned post nre determined by the post and bid process
rather than a formal selection process. Trained officers provide the initial 40-hom orientation
training; however, oncethe trainee is assigned to a post, he or she is paired with the correctional
officer nonnally assigned to thc position to become familiar with the specific duties.
In the past, officers were selected to act as lead officers for the purpose of post-specific
orientation based on the manager's personal assessment of all available staff. The officer who
has bid to that nssignmcnt now trains new staff. No fonnal process is used to recruit and selcct
these trainers and no special tmining is provided to them.
FINDING: No..formal training Prob'TUII1 is in place to provide "field training" to newly appointed
peace officers.
.
DISCUSSION: Supervisors ond managers interviewed said the orientation provided to new
employees is limited to the 40-hour orientation proccss. Once the initial 40-hour training is
completed, officers arc assigned to duty posts. Upon initial assignment, the new employee
works with another officer to become familiar with the tasks involved. While specialized
training officers are utilized for thc initial orientation, post specific training is provided by
officers regularly assigned to the post who mayor may not have been specially trained
thcmsclves.
All deputy sheriff.<i, police officers and the majority of local juvcnile and adult ctllTcctional
officCTS an: required to complctc a fonnal training program Imder the diiection of a specially
sclected and trained officer. TIlc program is designed to ensure the traince is exposed to most
situations that would be routinely encountered during the assignment and instructed OIl the
expectcd perfonnance. The tmining program ensun:s the employee perfonns within the
i1pplicabJe law. the department's policy and in a safc manner. The training officer observes the
employee's pcrfonl1ance at rcgu)<IT intervals, documents the progress, :md provides any

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necessary remedial instruction. The trainee must demonstrate competence before being allowed
to ,~.n~!ift} ?lf~m;.}~, .t\l~ 1?psi~io~: TI~e t~~ sugges~ ~le CDeR Division of Adult !nstitutions
eOD!nder -aCvdl~pmg a formalIzed InstItuttonal trallung program for new recruits and an
abbreviated program for ncwly transferred officers.

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DISCUSSION: Forty hours of orientation is offered every other month. Depending on the
assignment date, orientation cycle and trainer's schedule, a new employee could work for as long
as two months before receiving orientation training. Typically, the new employee is assigned to
the institution and attends the orientation training the following month. The team suggested all
cmployees are provided orientation training before working an assigned shift without being
accompanied by a lead staff/training officer.

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FINDING: Institutional orientation training is not being provided to existing state employees,
'both custody and non-custody who transfer to CSP - Solano from other institutions.

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FIND~Q:.:"N~~ ~!J1P)oyees may work several shifts before receiving orientation training.
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DISCUSSION: Forty hours of orientation t specific to CSP - Solano is only provided to all
newly hired employees, both custody and non-custody. Employees .transferring from other
institutions are not included in the orientation classes and are instead only provided a tour. A
thorough facility-specific orientation should he provided to all employees upon initial
assignment to an institution because California prisons have differing physical plant
characteristics and operational procedures.

FINDING: The review team was unablc to find documentation of institutional orientation
training being provided to contract employees who provide short':'tcnn services at the institution.
DISCUSSION: In order to maintain a sufficient number of staff to provide mandated services;
temporary vac8l1cics arc filled with temporary workers sent to the institution by contract
employmcnt services. Examples include replacement health eare workers such as rcgistry nurses
and physicians. Building and maintenance contractors perfonning repair or construction work
would also be included in this category. These employees may only work ODe day at the
institution or they may work for a fcw days. They are not state employecs. Even though the
responsibility for orientation training may reside with the employment service, the information
maybe better delivered byCDCR staff. Since orientation training is offered every other monlh;
it is conceivable that the contract employcc(s) is no longer working. We discussed so~ne options
such as using a chccklist generated by institution staff or a short video and acknowledgment
produced by CDCR to ensure that D basic standardized oricntation is provided in a consistent
manner to all contract employees.-

FINDING: The transporlation team does 110L receive training appropr.iate for the potential
emergencies they may cncounter while moving nmllltcs outside of the institution.
moveJll~nt of
prison inmates O1ltsidc of the secure perimeter of the institution. Inmates arc transported to and
from courts, cOlmly jnilst medical offtccs, hospitals other institutio1ls using specially equipped

DISCUSSION: The transportation tcams are responsible for the safe and secure

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and marked cars and vans. Members reported dley do not receive specialized training relative 10
this task. The defensive tactics training, defensive driver's training and fu:earms training they are
g~'V,t::ll«s'tbe. ~lIBtJc'asrforJalrstatecorrectional officers whose duties arc typically limited to the
cus10dy environment No 1J aining is provided for emergency vehicle operation or high speed
driving. The officers arc not trained on the operation of the' mobile x:adios, sirens, emergency
lighting
of'other
features of the vehicles.
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The firearms tnLining does not include combat shooting scenarios the team might encounter.
and rescues will probably take place in a public area by armed suspects and further
complicated by 1he presence ofhystandcrs. The setting may be a busy freeway, a rural roadway,
a city street or a medical waiting/treatment rooUl. The review team suggests specialized training
be provided to transportation teams.

E~capes

Safety Equipment
The Department Operations Manual~ Section 55050 addresses equipment such as weapons,
chemical agents and the annory. This section. in part identifies departmentally approved
chemical agents and munitions. eSP-Solano issues chemical agents to correctional officers
during each shift. Additional chemical agents, impact munitions and less-lethal devices are
maintained in various secured locations throughout the institution. A review of the equipment
inventory records did not identify any apparent deficiencies regarding the accountability of
emergency equipment.
FINDING: The institution properly maintains an institutional annory and sub annory for the
storage oflcthal weapons, less lethal weapons, munitions and related emergency equipment.
DISCUSSION: The review team toured the armory and examined documentation pertaining to
required inventory and maintenance of lethal weapons, less lethal weapons, munitions, and all
emergency equipment.
The institution's main armory consists of a freestanding concrete building located outside of the
im.1itutions secured perimeter which is enclosed with a ehain link fence topped with razor wire.
The armory is under constant observation (2417) by an anned tower adjacent to the annory
structure. Access to the annory is restricted to authorized personnel only or as authorized by the
watch commander during extreme emergencies. The Tower #1 officer has direct control of
armol')' access for those individuals authorized to entero
The institution's sub-armory is maintuincd inside of the central control rooin that is conL'lined in
a secured anncd location within the institution's sccured perimeter. The sub~amlOry maintains
lethal weapons, less lethal weapons, munitions and emergency equipment
During the tour of the nnnory the review team noted that appropriate entry and exit log books
were in place and evaluation leam members were required to sign in and out.

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FINDING: The institution provides stab-resisU111t vests to custody classifications of correctional
officer, correctional ~~rgcaT\t and correctional lieutenant; however, several problems have
sutf:ictd'r&g~rdfMd1i ~cn:i ccability.

and

j)ISCUS~ON:." .The, review team tOLIreq the institution and talked with custody staff and the
ann0rY.. se~~~~~"!~iarding the condition of personal stab-resistant vests that have been issued.
Many of CSP-Solano's custody staff relayed complaints about their personally issued stabresis1ant vest The majority of the complaints were related to one particular vest manufacturer.
The original contract for the purchase of vests was with the Protective Apparel COIporation of
America (PACA). Ofthe PACA vests fitted and issued to the custody staff, 24% (168 vests) had
problems associated with the fitting. Staff complained that after a few weeks, the vest fabric
begins to bunch up and sag, which causes the vest to slip from the vital protcction areas. Some
of the vests begin to slip at the" waistline causing interference with the emergency equipment
secured to the duty belts.

The current contract provides for the purchase

~d

fitting of a Second Chance brand vest The
armory sergeant advised the review team that there have not been any complaints or problems
associated with the Second Chance vest. There are currently 47 Second Chance brand vestc; in
service, and 48 Second Chance vests arc on order. The CDCR Emergency Operations Unit
(ROU) has allotted the institution 84 Second Chance vest for the current fiscal year. The armory
sergeant has a pending request with BOD for an additional allotment of 187 Second Chance vests
that would be used to rotate out the unserviceable PACA vests. Of the 697 PACA vest
purchased, 55 are unserviceable and stored in the warchouse.
TIle review team was advised that the Department of General Services (DOS) has initiated
litigation to resolve the manufacturing issues associated with the l'ACA vest.
FINDING: TIle Medical Teclmical Assistants (MTA) and Correctional Counselors (CC), who
are custody st.a.ff, are not fitted and issued stab-resistant vests. .
DISCUSSION: The soft body annor stab-reRistant vest inventory records were reviewed and it
was noted that the MTAs and ees who are custody staff are not issued vests. Vm:ts arc available
for these officers to use when they pIau to go into an area of significant risk; however, they arc
not routinely worn in thcir nonnal assignmentsWhile these classifications are not first rcspondcrs
to alarms, they eould be present or in the immediate vicinity when emergency response is
needed. Absent a policy direction for the distribution ofvests (and the classIfication of employee
designat~d to receive vests), the team suggests that consideration be given to including the MTA
and CC classifications among the staff to be issued vest'l.
Alternatively, institution
administrators must ensure that there is a pool of clean, serviceable vests made uvailablc for
these employees.
FINDING: The institution has an npprovcd Emergcncy Operations PIau (EOP), which outlines
procedures to be implemenled during emergencies. Thcl'c procedures arc contained in 50
individual confidential nOM Resource Supplemcnts which arc specific to a variety of
emergency situaliol1H.

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DISCUSSION: In March of 2005, the institution submitled the BOP to C'DCR Institutions
Qi1!i~ioo (Depu.ty·rJ.ii6cttlr (tir review and approva1.
March 30, 2005, the eSP-Solano EOP
was approved by Suzan Hubbard, Deputy Director (A), Institutions Division.

On

The DO!\i1· R:eso~tcc Supple111~nt outlining m~tual' aid response

was current and among those'

DOM-Su~pl~entSapproved. The mutual aid plan contains a comprehensive plan for the use of
mutual aid resources during emergency situations.
In addition to the DOM Resource Supplements, the review team examined the infltitutioDS plan
for staff accountability. The Institutions Operation Plan (OP CSPS-CS-04-002) was recently
revised and approved by the Warden in February 2005. The staff accountability plan contains a
thorough and weB-developed plan to accurately account for staff in a timely manncr.
FINDING: Pursuant to dcpartment policy, one floor officer and the tower officer are equipped
with radios. Under certain circumstances an officer can be left to supervise' inmates without
radio communication availability.
DISCUSSION: The floor officer designated 10 carry the radio assigned to each unit is also the
designated responder to emergencies or other irunate movements. As a result, the remaining
floor officer on the housing unit can be left without radio communication. The tower officer is
issued a radio and should provide for communication on bchalf of the floor officer; however,
during the on-site review an alarm sounded and the radio-equipped officer left the unit. The
tower officer concentrated his attention on the events occurring outside the llllit leaving the
remaining floor officer to supervise the inmates without the ability to communicate outside the
unit While this points more to the need for training towers officers on their responsibilities, the
team recommends issuing radios to all staff to ensure the safety and security of staff and inmates.

}~ FINDING: Staff reported that radio batteries did not hold a charge. Some staff reported that
batteries lasted only two hours before needing replacement. Defective or worn Qut equipment is
a staff safely issue.
DISCUSSION:

The institution is encouraged to ensure an adequate Sllpply of dependable

batteries are available to staff.
FINDING: Custody staff report to their work site by walking through· ilie institution (where
inmates are participating in programming) wifllout the benefit of some items of standard issue
safety equipment that'may be needed in the event of an emergency.
DISCUSSION: The operating process mandates that staffwalk to thcir work Rite without safety
equipment such as a radio, chemical agent, baton, persol'lul alann, etc. Once at their designated
post, the staff member then receives safety eq uipmcIlt from the officer that is being relieved.
This process is reversed for the staff going oil·duty, as they have to exit thci1" duty stlition by
walking through the illstitution without safety equipment. Non-custody stnffis not issued
, personal alanns until they arrivc llt their work site. It is recommended thnt safety equipment be
issued to staffprior to entering the security area.

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])HYS1CAL PLANT
TIle institution is comprised of four quadrant!> designated as facilities. Each facility contains six
housin,g Ulji~.~~1lla~ed around an outdoor exercise yard. Facility I and 2 are designatep to house
level III ioma1~.~ '~d Facility 3 and 4 are designated to house Level II imnates. Two fences,
approximately 30' feet apart, with a high voltage electric fence in between define the secure
perimeter. AU housing units and support buildings are located within the secure perimeter.
Tltc housing units within Facilities 1 and 2 are all of the 270-degree design. Each living unit
contains 100 cells, originally desib'llcd to house one imnutc iIi each cell. The cells arc located on
two tiers that face an elevated control statioD. The control stations are eaeh staffed with one
anned correctional officer identified as a gUllner. Located below the control station is a sally
port that serves as a means of eiltry and egress to and from the living unit. There are two staff
offices located below the control stations and are assessable to the dayroom. Two correctional
officers are assigned as floor officers.
Located within Facilities 3 and 4 are seven 270-degree design living units. Each of these living
uni1s contains 24 small donnitorics located on two tiers..The original design capaci~y for these
living unitr; is 172, although each of them currently houses more than twice that many inmates.
These clonnitory segments have open fronts (no wall/door or other barrier) and inmates ean walk
unimpeded from the donnitory unit to the dayroom, unless ordered to remain within their
assigned bunk arca by staff. There arc three of these living units located in Facility 3 and four of
these living units are located within Facility 4. In addition to the 270-degrec living units, there
are three large open donnitorics located in Facility 3 and two such dormitories in Facility 4. The
large dormitories were designed to house 100 imnates each though each currently houses up to
200 inmates.
Facilities 1 ancr2 are separated by a common wing (accessible from either side), that contains a
chapel, dining hall, canteen, staff support offices an4, the gynmasium. Facilities 3 and 4 have a
similar configuration. Located in the center of the four quadrants is a release and receiving
building, a tall observatioD tower, a medical clinic, a laundry and a central kitchen:
Thc rrison Industries Authority operates a metal fabrication shop, a biJldillg/printing shop, and
an optical laboratory within the secure perimeter. These shops are located on the we5tem side of
the facility. Additionally, 10 educational classrooms andthc Substance Ablise Program meeting
rooms are located adjacent to the shop areas. A fenced wnlk way leads from the central area to
the classrooms and shops. There is a building between the Sllops/classrooms and the living units
wllerc inmates are searched before ret11millg to their living units.

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Based on the assessment and related intcrviews conducted by the physical plant team, the

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FINJHNG: The insLitution.is crowded, .Ieading to unsafe conditions.

following findings nre presented:

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DISCUSSION: Emergency-beds are utilized wiUun several housing unilc:: and the gymnasiums
have heen converted to dormitories. The additional heds have in many cases Jed to limited
sjgb~liQ£f (a~~.!'idv6I'Self impacted staffs' ability to supervise and monitor the activities of
inmates. In the gymnasiums, the bunks are so close together that walking between the rows of
. bunks is ill advised. The additional inmate population has taxed the resources available for
inmate snpervis.ip.h; outside yard opportunities and inmate services. The conversion of the
gyrnnasiWhs: fo oreate living spaces has also eliminated vital recreation areas and altered tbe
initial intent ofthe facility program.
.
FINDING: Building 11 has been used as overflow housing for inmates classified to
administrative segregntion. This building is not equipped to safely house Administrative
Segregation inmates and doing so is contrary to policy.
DISCUSSION: Building 10 was originally designed and constructed to house inmates requiring
administrative segregation. Due to persistent crowding, Building 9 was identified as the
overflow building for inmates requiring administrative segregation. Building 9 was retrofitted
with food ports and secure shower areas several years ago in response to the increased
classification of inmat~s housed within it As crowded conditions have continued, Building 11 is
now identified and utilized as the overflow. Food ports in the cell doors and secure shower areas
arc not provided within Building 11. The institution is encouraged to install food ports in the een
dO'ors and secure shower areas within Building 11.

FINDING: Due to staff vacancies, there is an insufficient number of staff to safely supervise
inmates in the Prison Industry Authority shops.
DISCUSSION: Prison Industry Authority staff reported nine vacancies. These nine positions
provide supervision of the irunates working in the Prison Industry Authority shops. As a result
of these vacant positions (which are reportedly not backfilled). supervision ofinmatcs is reduced
in all of the Prison Industry Authority shops. Proper inmate supervision is necessary for the
safety of every~.l}e in the inStitution. The institution is encouraged to fiU these vacant positions.
FINDING: When an alann activates in education, there is no audible alann to alert other
education stnffto a problem. Custody staffmust cheek every classroom to locate the emergency.
DISCUSSION: It is recommended when an alann activated, an audible alert sounds at the
specific area ofthe emergency.

:.\FlNDlNG: Some housing units had severa) inoperative overhead lights. Dimly lit nrcas do not
foster a safe environment.
DISCUSSION: The team recommends Plant Operations check and repair all overhead lights on
a continual basis and encourage staff 10 bettcr report the need to replae!:: lights.

FINDING: The Public Address (PA) system docs not work properly ill all housing, units. In
addition to other functions, thiR Rystcm al~rL" ~taff and inmale!; of emergency ~ituations.

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DISCUSSION: The team recommends that Plant Operations check all PA systems on a regular
basis and make repairs as necessary.
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'~·:.I;'INDING: Evaluation team members observed loose stones on the exercisc yards. Some of

these stones, w~r~
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.. and could be used as weapons.

DIscussioN: :TIle Institlltion is encouraged to remove the loose stones from inmate areas.
..~~ FINDING: The evaluation team observed windows in facility classrooms covered with papers
(inmate school work, etc.) that prevent custody s~ff from providing classroom security without
entering the room.

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DISCUSSION:
classrooms.

Institution staff is encouraged to remove the papers from the windows Jn

FINDING: Plant Operations staff indicates there are a limited number of electric vehicles.
These vehicles are the primary means for transporting plant operations staff and equipment in
and around the institutions to make repairs to the facility. Delayed repairs Imve potential staff
safety implications.
DISCUSSION: The in!'titution is encouraged to purchase additional electric vehicles.
··fFINDlNG: The Institution allows inmates to possess personal property in cxcess of Department
. Operations Manual (DOM), Chapter 5, Article 43 - Inmatc Property.
DISCUSSION: During a tour of the institution, specifically in the open dorm settings and
temporary gym dOID1S, the evaluation tcam noted cxcessive amounts of personal property being
stored under bunks in cardboard boxes, at the edge of lockers and bed areas, on top of lockers,
and numerous elotheslines strung from bunks and lockers. Stomge lockers are provided to each
inmate for the storage of personal property that will accommodate tile six cubic feet allowed per
DOM. The amount of property being stored outside of the lockers creates an additional fuel load
and could interfere with fire fighting efforts and ob!'truct the escape routes during emergencies or
actual fires. In addition to the safety concerns associated with excessive property, the items
hanging from clothes lines create a security concern because the officers do not have f:l clear line
of sight to observe movement and activities within the dorm and gym living areas.

FINDING: According to DOM Chapter 5, Article 24, Section 52090.7.6, Annual Inspections,
the State Fire Marshal is to conduct an inspection ofthe institution annually.
DISCUSSION: Fire department staff informed the review team that an annual fire inspection
has not been conducted in the last several years because the State Fire Marshal is not obligated to
operate under the requirements of DOM. The State Fire Marshal cmmot inspect 1l1C institution
annually due to budget constraints. The institution is encouraged to find a merms to receive the
required fire inspections.

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FINDING: The windows located under the stairwells in the dnyrooms of Buildings 1 through
12 arc a staffsafety concern.
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DISCUSSION: The windows under the stairwells serve no apparent pll1J>ose. The natural light
resulting from ~e placement of the windows is minimal. These windows ~e decorative in
nature:aid: ~o .n~t enhance supervision or security. The majority of the windows are broken due
to jnmate~ pounding on Ulem in an attempt to get the attcntion of other inmates on the outside
exercise yard. Officer time is spent keeping inmates away from the windows, diverting their
attention from other matters. Plant Operation staff reported these windows are replaced
regularly. These windows are 9/16 glass-clad-polycarbonate and are expensive. The evaluation
team recommends removing these windows and replacing them with cemcnt block similar to that
oftbe surrounding wall material.
FINDING: In the 27D-dehTfee 'design buildings, many of the windows locatcd in the floors of the
tower area that provide sight lines down into the sally port and offiees below need to be replaced.
The majority of the windows are scratched and cracked to the point that vision through them is
obscured.

DISCUSSION: Plant Operations staff reported they are aware of the need to replace many of
these windows; however, a means of replacing these windows has not been developcd at this
time, Apparently the window frames will be damaged if disassembled to remove the damaged
glass and Plant Operations staff believe the integrity of the reassembled window frames will not
provide the level of security needed to protect the tower area from inmate access. Buildings 1
through 12.are 270-degrce design and weapons and munitions are locatcd within their tower
areas. The institution is encouraged to develop a means of replacing these windows and
expediting the repair.

FINDING: The fire alarm system needs to be replaced,
DISCUSSION: The safety officer infonned the team that the fire alarm system that was
originally installed in the buildings has outlived its usefulness. The system is difficult to repair
and many oftbe components are either no longer available or are in short supply. The institution
needs to begin the process to replace the system.

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STAFF INTERVIEWS

Interview Process
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The ~taff:Sp.f~ty:.Evaluation Team conducted random interviews with custody and non-custody
staff at Oalifornia' State Prison - Solano from MondaYt October 31 through, FridaYt November 4,
2005. Members o(the tcam interviewed staff about safety related issues (e.g., safety equipment
issued to staff and their perception of personal safety at the institution). The list of specific
questions asked by the interview team is attached to this report (Attachment D).
The evaluation team conducted random interviews with staff during the second and third watches
at the following work locations: receiving and release; Level IT yards; Facility III and IV,
Buildings 13-24 and G Dorm;' Level III yards; Facility 1 al1d II Buildings 1-12 and H Donn,
canteent infinnary, satellite clinic, kitchcns, mailroom, and inmate visiting. Custody staff
classifications interviewed included: the Chief Dcputy Warden, Associate Wardens t Correctional
and Facility Captains, Lieutenants, Sergeants, Correctional Officers, Senior Medical Technical
Assistant, Medical Technician Assistants, Correctional COW1selors I, II, and III. Non-custody
staff classifications includcd: the Medical Physicians t Senior Registered Nurse t Registered
Nurses, Senior Psychiatrist, Psychiatrists, Psychiatric Technicians, Pharmacy Technicians,
Associate Govcrmncntal Program Analyst, Office Technician, Office Assistant, Correctional
Cooks, and Teachers.
Responses arc grouped for custody staff and non-custody staff.

Interviews with Managers
The interview team met with the Chief Deputy Warden, Associate Wardens, Captains, and'
Correctional Counselor III.
The managers stated that CSP-Solano is a Level II and III institution, with all inmate population
of 6118 inmates (snapshot on November 4, 2(05). This popuJation exceeds the facility design
capacity by more than ] 00%. They said that crowding in the open donnitorics (Facilities III and
IV) and the gymnasiums (Facilities II and N) are areas of great concern as it relates to staff
safety.
Staff safety issues identified by the

ll1anager~;

included the following:

FINDING: The iJU11ntc population in the open dormitories in Facilities III and IV exceed the
fi:lcility design, and the lise of the gymnasitmls as living ullits compromise the security of the
institution and the safety of staff.
DISCUSSJON: The mnnagcrs said lhal thc open donnitories have 348 beds, and the housing
bays nrc crampcd with double and triple hunks. They told us that d'llc to this crowding; one
additional post has bcen added to the second :l1Id third watch (n total of three staff). The
gymnasium for Facilities J and 11 (rcferred to as 1-1 Dorm) and Fucilities ITT and lV (refcrred to as

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G Doml) have 225 beds each. H Donn has a "guJUler" station and a raised podium, and is
5taffcd with two fioor officers. G Donn does not have a "gunner" station, and there are three
flQGro{ftC(cts.: IDn'cl'ldttie/crcHvded conditionc;, officers' sight lines are obstructed (clothes, towels
and other items banging from the bunk beds), and it is difficult for staff to maneuver from one
s~ction of the gym to other side.
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FINDlNG:=P6St
and bid prevents managers from filling posts with the best-qualified staff.
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DISCUSSION: The managers said that "post and bid" (a process in which lieutenant, sergeants
and COs request to work a specific post based on tJleir seniority) restricts their ability 10 ensure a
high level of institutional and staff safety. Managers said that supervisor post and bid has limited
their ability to place qualified supervisory staff in administrative positions identified for prison
program facilitation and operation. They told us in the past, iliey could cross train staff, so they
could be more proficient in key"job areas. Now, senior staffbid a job (primarily bascd on the
shift and days off it provides) and operational need become secondary. Managers said that "post
and bid" gives the employees the sense of entitlement, and can lead to staff complacency.

FINDING: Managers said that since provisions to reduce sick leave abuse were eliminated from
. the Bargaining Unit 6 contract, staff use of sick leave has increased. The increased sick leave
results in a greater reliance on overtime and can negatively impact staffperformance.
DISCUSSION: Managers said it is difficult to hold employees accountable for sick leave abuse.
They said prior to the last labor agreement with Unit 6, they could require an employee, who
called in sick, to return to work with a doctor's note to explain thc reason for their absence.
Managers said that many of the staff feel entitled to use sick leave as they would vacation time.
Due to staff shortages, whenever an employee calls in sick, on·duty line staff must be ·'drafted"
(ordered over) to cover the staff vacancy. When staff becomes tired from working double shifts,
facility security can be compromised.
FINDING: Managers said there is little incentive for staff to promote to the ranks of supervisors
or managers.
DISCUSSION: Managers said that pay scale!; are compacted for sergeants, lieutenants and
captains, Senior officers express no interest in promoting because they wil110sc "post and bid"
seniority for a preferential shift, and that the monetary compensation is minimal. For example, a
senior correctional officer said he can work two shifts of overtime, and will take home more
money than a sergeant. Lieutenants are equally unintcrested in promoting because of the
workload of the captains, the lack of monetary compem;ation, and not having eqlllil retirement
benefits (3% at 50).
FINDJNG: Managers morale is low due to their increasing workload, and a lack of
acknowledgement for their efforts.

DISCUSSJ ON: Operational requirements, ongoing audits, compliance monitoring and court
agreements are contributing to lhe frm;lration of managers. Many of lhe managers WOllld -prefer
to delegate some of their responsibilities to subordinates to tdlow them to takc a morc active role

12!.ltl12ll\l~

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in the operational security of the institution and Lo tmin and develop their staff; however, policy

dOf~.nqt .aP~v.: '{Pl..tl? p~~Hr.

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FINDING: Managers feel that Headquarters does not empower the institution with the authority
to decide h.9~.~.implement agency policy.
- ...... ..
DISCUSSION:' The managers said that Headquarters does not grant them the authority to
implement agency policy.
They gave the following example: Headquarters issued a
memorandum stating that sergeants were required to sign inmate housing logbooks (using red
ink) once per shift. Managers said this memorandum essentially dictated policy and procedures
for them to accomplish this task. They told us that "proof of practice" (signing of the logbook)
docs not guarantee an effective outcome; the sergeant's signature in the logbook does not ensure
that the log entries are accurate, or that required policy and procedures are met. They said this is
another example of trying to assign blame ,(if the 'logbook is not signed) rather than implement all
effective practice. Managers recommend that Headquarters dictate policy and trust the
institution to develop specific procedures to accomplish it.
-

1ntcrviews with Supervisors
The first and second line supervisors (Sergeants, Lieutenants, Senior Medical Technical
Assistant, and Correctiollal Counselor TI) were interviewed at various work locations throughout
the institution. Supervisor CODeems mirrored those of managers in the areas of post and bid and
sick leave abuse.
FINDING: Supervisors feel that the importance of inmate programs takes p~ority over facility
security.
DISCUSSION: Supervisors said that 1he institution is inundated with contraband (illegal
narcotics, homemade weapons, and illegal possession of cell phones by inmates). They told us
that the institu1ion docs not have an adequate number of staff available to conduct thorough
searches of buildings, yards, or inmates' personal property for these contraband items.
Secondarily, they told us that they would be criticized for closing inmate programs while these
searches werc taking place. They believe additional contributing fac10rs for the increase in
illegal drugs is because the main gate is not manned to screen visitors, and visitors are allowed to
park in restricted parking, where they hide drugs for outside work crews.
Additionally, supervisors sta1ed that staff is denied the opportunity to conduct on going
investigations (staff are discouraged from developing informant'll, or to request outside
aSf\istance. They said as a result of this lack of interdiction, drugs are prevalent within the
institution.
The staiT sarely evaluation team revicwt:d incic.1cnl reports (CDC 837$) from January September 2005. There were n total of 418 incidcnLo:: documented. 13 8 incidents wcre drug
related incidents (pos..;ession of dmgs, etc.) and 39 incidents involved an inmale in possession of
a wcapon. These offenses represent 42.34% of all incic1cnL'i reports.

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FINDING: Supcrvisors said line staff ncedadditional training in critical job skills such as
dealing with mentally ill inmates.
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DISCUSSION:
Supervisors said mandated training emphasizes complying with court
mandatesJ but.it cl9~s not provide line staff with the "Lools" to improve staffsafety. They said
that stateJ}~ea.··ad(Jiiional commlUlication and awareness training. They told us, in past years,
staffwa(able lo'shut down inmate programs for a short period so all staff could participate in
"OIT", which focused on officer safety issllcs. The supervisors believe that the institutional
priority is inmate programs while security and stuff safety is secondary.
Interviews with Line Staff

The interview team conducted random interviews with line staff throughout the institution.
FINDING: Crowding is a major safety concern with line staff.
DISCUSSION: Correctional Officer, Correctional Counselor I, and Medical Technical
Assistant personnel told us that they would like to see additional staff assigned to G and H
Donns (gymnasiums). They sai.d it is difficult, if not impossible to see beyond the. first TOW of
triple bun~s, and they cannot maintain visual observation on staff when they are conducting
security checks due to sight line obstructions.
FINDING: Line staffreported tbat they felt comfortable and satisfied with the safety equipment
that is issued to them 'at the institution.
DISCUSSION: AlI line staff interviewed said they fell relatively safe working at CSP Solano.
They told us the primary reason is because there are very few incidents of staff assaulls. Line
slaff told us that they are provided with' personal alarms, rad.io~ in designated positions,
handcuffs, expZlIldable batons, and OC spray. Staff members felt that the safety equipment
issued to them is adequate for the job, although they would like to see an additional radio
assigned to each building.
Custody staff interviewed by the team said they were fitted for a stab vest. The majority of the

staff that we spoke with told us that their vest did not fit them correctly (the PACA vests were

t

too big or too small, the bottom of the vest "rolled up" or the top "dropped down"). While staff
said that they were required to wear a vest if they were issued one, it was evident during our
review that a substantial nwnbcr of staff were not wearing a vest Staff told us they were not
wearing a vest because their vest was turned in for repair or replacement; the vest doesn't fit
correctly; or, they don't like to wear Ole vest.

I

FINDING: Medi~a1 Technical AssistanL (MTA) and Correctional Counselor I (CC J) staff
reported they have not been fitted or issued a stab vest at CSP Solano.
DISCUSSION: MTA and CCJ staff do noL have stnh vcstli issued to them for duty a,.;sibrnments
at CSP Solano. They believe they nre pcrfoI1l1ing line staff peace onicer functions, and Lhey

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should be issued the same sllfety equipment as Correctional Officers, Sergeants, and Lieutenants.
Tnay shl(J\tJlis ISSue to Ue donsidered during the next contract negotia ti;n.

is

FINDING,:

.¥TAs.~rc

in need of emergency medical training (e.g., first responder for medical

emergcncit:s:Y ~ .. '~
- ...... ... ..

,

DISCUSSION: The majority ofMTAs arc licensed vocational nurses, who are graduating from
nursing school, with IiUle or no emergency medical training. MTAs are the primary responders
for emergency medical response at this institution, and it would be beneficial if they received
additional training in emergency medical response. The fire chief and the medical staff echoed
tIns feeling.
FINDING: Line staffwould like to be promptly informed of relevant safety issues such as a riot
at another institution in the event the circumstances incite tension or a similar event at CSP
Solano.
DISCUSSION: Line staff said that they would like to see communications improved for sharing
information regarding incidents at other prison sites, rather than hearing the infonnation
second/third hand or from the inmates themselves.
Interviews with Non-Custody Staff
The interview teaD} spoke with non-custody staff at various work locations.
Findings: Medical staff said they would like to see communication improve between custody
and non-custody staff.
DISCUSSION~' Medical staff said if an inmate assaulted custody staff, they would like to know

prior to treuting the inmate. This would condition medical staff to be more on the alert, or to
request that a MTA is present during treatment They told us that more open discussion
concerning individual inmates would benefit both medical and custody operations. Infonning
each other of changes to the inmate's behavior or custody status (e.g., medication, disciplinary
status, or change of custody level) could mutually benefit and possibly mitigate future assaults.
FINDING: Teachers would
conducting classes.

lik~

to see a 1:,'Tcatcr presence of custody staff while they are

DISCUSSION: Tcnchers said they feel relatively safe while working at the institution. They
Raid they would welcome tlle presence of a uniformcd officer periodically while they arc
instructing class.. They said it helps by letting the inmates know that custody staff is in the
jmm~diate area, and it makes the teachers fecI safer.
HNDING: Prison hl<lustry Authority (PIA) stafT believed that the alnnns in the PIA areas
should be tested daily.

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DISCUSSION: The alamls for non-custody staff in Prison Industry Authority program arcns
are tested 011ce per week. Staff infonned the evaluation team that custody personnel complete
atamfltdstingl\1rt"th'e'Wedflesday of each week. This process is accomplished by utilizing a
_special key that activates the alarm test process. Prison lndustry Authority staff reported that they
-could compl~te t~e a1ann testing daily if they were assigned the - alarm-testing key.
Considca}i'Ql1~shd~ld be given to test alanns on a daily basis to ensure the safety of staff.
.....
..
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25

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SUMMARY/CONCLUSION
•

This report details the findings of the seventh staff ~afety eva) uation conducted at the direction of
the CorrcCY9,n~:Stal1dards Authority and the third adult institution evaluated (four Division of
Juvenite Justic.e~J~~iIities have also been evaluated). There are many fmdings outlined in this
report thatlare similar to those found in the other adult institutions evaluated (though there are
institution specific findings as well). There arc three primary reasons for the similar findings;
I. One of the objectives of criteria development panel was to avoid duplicating audits,
inspections and evaluations that were already been conducted. As such, the scope of
these evaluations has been limited to specific issues concerning staff assaults,
training. safety equipment, staffmg, physical plant issues and interviews with staff.
2. Many of the findings arc a result of institutional crOWding. The adult facilities are all
crowded and that crowding results in similar findings across the institutions.
3. Othcr similar fmdings relate to established policy, provisions of employee contracts.
the issuance of safety equipment. and limited resources. As these are system-wide
issues, many of the resulting findings will occur in all institutions evaluated.
Crowding is again the greatest concern identified by the staff safety evaluation tcam and
institution staff. Until the number of inmates in the CDCR adult institutions is reduced, the
crowding re~ated :fIndings in this report will remain at issue.
Despite the crowded conditions at CSP Solano, the staff take pride in their work and their
institution. There were some encouraging findings indicating that staff injuries are on Ole
decline at CSP Solano and thenwnber of assaults on staff resulting in serious injury were lower
at CSP Solano than at the other institutions evaluated.
As directed by the Corrections Standards Authority, the findings from this evaluation will be
presented to the CSA at their next scheduled meeting and copies of the report will be provided to
CSA members, CDeR administration and Wardeu Carey. It is outside the scope of this project
for the CSA to rcceive and monitor a corrective action plan and appropriate aclion will be the
responsibility ofCDCR Division of Adult Institutions.

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~TATE

A TTACHMENT A

OF CALIFORNIA - DEPARTMENT OF CORRrCTIONS A.ND RI:HI\DILlTATION

ARNOLD SCIIWARZENEGGER. GOVERNOR

CORRECTIO~~. ~Tf.'l'JP~~S,~uniORt;Y.
Drive
fBcramento. CA 95814
~OO Bcrcut

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October 18, 2005

Thomas 1. Carey, Warn en

P. O. Box 4000
Vacaville, CA 95696-4000
Dear Warden Carey:

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The CalifoJIlia Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDeR) asked the Corrections Standards
Authority (CSA) to develop a plan to evaluate staff safety issues at Adult Operations and Division of
Juvenile Justice detention facilities. At their May 19, 2005 meeting, the CSA unanimously approved a
proposal to assemble a panel of subject matter experts to develop criteria for conducting staff safety
evaluations.

The panel met on May 24-25. 2005 and established the criteria by which the evaluations will be conducted.
As a result,. a team comprised of CSA. Adult Operations and Division of Juvenile Justice will be
conducting the evaluations over the next 28 months. We expect to be on site at California State Prison
Solano for five days, October 31·November 4 and. plan to observe operations during all shifts if possible.
We would like to begin with an entrance conference with you and/or appropriate administrative stalT on
October 31, 2005 at 9:00 a.m. to discuss the method by which the staff safety evaluations will be
couducted and to get a-gcneral overview of facility operations and any concerns you may have.
In order to facilltatc the process. please provide the following for the evaluation team's use while at CSP
Solano (The evaluation team may ask for aduitional rcsources. depending on the initial assessment.):

•

A con1.1ct person with whom the team may coordinate their activities (plcase call or e-mail this
information when the contact is identified).

•

An office or conference room equipped with C1 table. chairs, fileility map. facility telephone
directory and a telephone in wbich a tcam ofnine may work.

•

Access to aU levels of Rtaff for short interviews. These interviews can take place at their
assigned work areas and we will avoid interrupting their schedules a~ much as possible.

•

lncident Reports for Assaults on Staff ~ CDC 837:
o A data collection form was c-mnilcd asking that fncility starr cClde s1aff as!wult
incident reporl'; for lhe past year in the identilied format. addressing incident
information, inmate information and victim(s) information (please provide :m
clec.:tronic copy of this (lata as soon as practical).

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A ~opy. 9f ~hoe ~Qnfidential and Restricted Department Operations Manual (Red DOM)

•

Facility Health and Safety Committee Minutes*
o Gricvances, Recomm('"lluations, Actions
• Inmate Appeals (CDC) *
• Daily Activity Report (DAR); Notice of Unusual Incident (NOV) at certain facilities*
• Authorized Equipment and Functionality
• Use afForce Committee Minutes and responses to recommendations:!:
• Employee Training records including summary of curriculum and attcndance for orientation
and annual updates for selected areas*
• Corrective Action Plans for previous audits*
• Safety Committee Meeting Minutes and Risk Management Action Plans
• Program descriptions and locations
• Staffing summary including duty roster, allotted positions, vacancies, and leave of absence for
over 120 uays for all staff.
• Staffing profile summary including age, sex, years of service and ethnicity
• facility design and current capacity
• Men's Advisory Counsel (MAC) minutes*

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Sumn{arics of State Compensation Reports (SeIF) for all injmies on stair and/or the compJde
reports. Summaries are reportedly available from facility Return to Work Coordinator

Supplemental Data Sources:" to be accessed as needed

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Staff Assault Committee Minutes

Upon completion of t1J~ on site portion of d1e evaluation, we would like to schedule an exit conference
with you and/or appropriate members of your staff (on or about November 4, 2005). The results of the
evaluation will be reported to the CSA at its regularly scheduled meeting and a written report will be
forwarded to CDeR with a courtesy copy sent to you.

Thank you in advance fOT your anticipated cooperation in this matter. If you have any questions, plea"e
feel free to contact Jerry Read, Deputy Director (A), at (916) 445-9435 or j~ad@bdcorroca.{!Ov.

Sincerely,

Karen L. Stoll, Execulive Director (A)

*:0,:

cc:

2005 to dale

Joe McGratll, Chief Deputy SCCTctUry Adult Opcrilfions
John J)ovey, Director, Adult Institutions

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Atla~!1me;-,1

California State Prison Solano
Staff Assault Data1012004 TO 10/2005
INCIClf.IIT IHfOIl\'ATlOIi

\II:::111olIli'QRIol~nOll

IlllAATElNARlllN FORMATION

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Attachment C
CO.RRECTIONS STANJlARJ>S ALJTHOIUTY - STAHrl SAFETY EV ALUATJONS
Institutional J nformation
~ '. ., Ii:. : It! "., : .' . ;1 ~ LIVING AREA SPACE EV ALUATJ ON
FACILITY: CSP~SO~'\N.~.,

."

TYPE:

~

Double

IJl

100

2

0

199

General Population

5

2

2

Building 2

Double

JJI

100

2

0

195

General Population
Heat Sensitive Building

5

2

2

Building 3

Double

fIf

100

2

0

198

General Population

5

2

2

Building II

Double

JJI

100

2

0

199

General Population

5

2

2

Building 5

Double

III

100

2

0

198

General Population

5

2

2

Building 6

Double

In

100

2

0

199

General Population

5

2

2

Building 1

]0 classrooms
1 library

Educntion
Cl3ssrooms

Gym

Donn

III

226

226

1

DATE: October 31,2005

1

1

1 1

]

1

1

1

I

]

1

General Population

2

Yard officers

0

2

2

II dorm

Facility H

1Il

2

0

2 2 2 3 2

.-l -i -

nullrling 7

Douhle

III

100

2

0

193

General Pllpulation

5

2

2

Buildin~

8

Double

III

100

2

()

190

Gencrall'upululinll
Ilc."!t Sensitive Building

5

2

2

I

IhlildinJ: 9

Double

111

100

2

AdScg

2

2

2

(i

Uuildinl: 10

Double

III

100

2

AdSt:~

2

2

1 I

6 4

- i - , - - . - ,..

nllj)dill~

11

Duuble
•. _ ....... _ J.

._---

. . . . _ _..._ _A,.

_. .......- 1()[)

111

..... ..... '-

,.,

----1I
147
0

.....
2

175

_- _..... _.....
II

...

.....-... .IlJO

• ,:","':-_::.7' .:"::._ ....:.....: ••• : ~ - : ~ -

_._--

......
'-' .
General 1'0)1111<11 i 011
Ad Sc~ Cherllow

___

_~--~_._~~~_.!--:..

1

_-

...
5

2

1-'

_... ... ..... ..
~

:2

'- _... - .- .. _-

... --.' - .

. ----

I

I

.......
..
J

Facility IJI

.,. ' .
'

., '" lJ

Yard o(ficc:rs

0

I

3

I

Building 13

Donn

II

24

112

176

337

General Population

2

3 3

~

Uuilding 14

Donn

II

24

112

176

341

General Population

2

3

t

Building IS

Dornl

II

24

172

176

179

General Population

2

3 3

Building 16

Donn

Jl

100

100

199

General Population
Hc:at Sensitive Building

2

2

2

100

100

199

General Population

2

2

2

100

100

221

General Populntion

2

2 2

2

2

II

11

Bundip~17

1

0

0 0 3 4

2

3

Dorm

I;
II

Building 18

Donn

r

Education

Classrooms

f.

Gym

Dorm

10 c1asllTooms
1 library

225

II

222

3

Gdorm'

I

II

Facility IV

Building 19

Dorm

11

Building 20

Donn

II

nuilding21

Donn

11

Donn

n

_._._.nuilding 22

..
811i1dinl: 13

__

0

1

100

100

197

General Population
Heat Sensitive Building

2

2 2

24

172

176

343

Geneml Population

2

3 3

24

172

176

348

General Population

2

3 3

24

172

--176

344

Genernll)npulation

24

172

176

3:l6

IlJO

199

.- -

0

0

0 3

3 3

1---

2

3 3

GCllleml POJlulation

2

:I

_._-._------General l)lIpulalion

...-.-

.-_ ...

2

2 2

._.

II

Donn

----._._-

-_. -

Yard officers

-..-

-- "_.-.
II

8nildint: 24

DUrin

,-_._-_ ... _..

.. -~'--

-_.- --

100

.. - ..

_._--_

..

.

-'"

_._.... -

3

..- -_.

Hcat ?cnsitivc Building

._. ' - ' ..

--

.-:....

--..... -

,-.

-

...

_.

-

.-

'--'--

-------_.__

.

I·

I
I:

Attachment D

~·,~.·I"i (:'.(.'"".

California SL"ltc Prison - Solano

;"':1

~'O'ctobcr31-N()vcmbcr4,2005

Line St"lff; .
J .. ' .

I
I
1
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I

1.

:WJia{is' your current job title?

2.

What is your assignment.? What arc your primary duties (post Orden;)?

3.

When did you start working for the department as ... ?

4.

How long have you heen assihrned to this facility?

5.

How many inmatcs do you supervise? What is their general classification?

6.

What safety equipment is issued to you? What safety equipment do you utilize at
all times, otherwise have access to, or have to cheek out from a central location?

7.

What is thc general condition of your safety equipment?

8.

Is the safety equipment issued to you adequate for your job duties?

9.

If the answer is no, what additional safety equipment is necessary?

10.

Do you have a stab vest? Have you been fitted for one? Do you wear it at all
times?

11.

On a scale of 1 to 10, with 1 as the lowest score and 10 us the highest scure, how
safe do you feel working at this facility? Why do you feel thal way?

12.

Where do you feci the least s'lfe'! Cun you describe why that is? Where and
when do yOll fecI the most safc?

AttCichment D

13.
What staffsafety issue are you most concerned about? What worries you the
~ "~'. l"l (.nl<ii:t as'yoitnrc pcrfomling your duties?

14.

? nojroU: llave any general suggestions or commcnts rclating to staff safety?

15.

What most would you like to do or sec changed to improve staff stlfety?

16.

How often do you sec and/or speak with your supervisor? Your supervisor's
supcrvisor? The warden?

17.

Are protocols in place for emergency responses?

18.

(Policy?)What happens when a staff member is assaulted? Ifthe staffperson is
injured, where do they go for first aid or for emergency treatment in morc serious
cases? How long might that take? Who investigates? Are criminal charges filed?

Supervisors:
1.

How many years have you beeD a supervisor?

2.

Have-you worked as a supervisor at any other CDC institutions?

3.

Have long have you been assigncd to this facility as a supervisor?

4.

DCRcribe your duties and responsibilities, and how you carry them out during a
routine shift.

5.

How many officers do you directly supervise?

6.

How many do you indirectly supervise?

7.

What is the perccntage of Lilnc (shift) do you spend pcrnonnlly observing your

subordinates'?

AHflchllll:nl D

K~""':· ,'f WlIU.t J<Ult1oft6n~)laihts"uo you gt::t from staff! An:. Lht:n:: ~lI1Y pal.tl,;TIls that

emerge? llow tlo you halllllc them'!
.;

;

...

. .
- Hov....riftcJl·c!o yOll :-lee your supervisors?
,

9.

I

.

10.

What safety equipment is i::>l\ued and carried by your staff?

It.

Is there any other safety equipment, which you know of, available for stafrs use?
What is it, and how is it is~ued?

]2.

Dot::s your stair have stab vests'! Have they been fitted for one? Do you ensure
that they wear it at all times?

13.

Do you have a stab vest'! Have yOll been fitted for one? Do you wear it at all
times?

14.

On a scale of 1 to 10, with I as the lowest score and 10 as the highest score, how
safe do you fecI working at this facility?

15.

What i!t your greatest conccm about staff safety for your subordinates'!

16.

What would you like to do or see changed to improve staff safety and reduce staff
assaults'!

17.

Whal do yuu do to ensure .. l':lfc working environment for your staff?

lIt

What protocols in place

1C).

Whal harpl~n!\ when a !\taff memher is ass:lullcd? 1f the staff pc.r~on is ir~i\lrcd.
where do Ihey gil (ill'lil'st aid or Illr l:mcrg,cncy trealment in morc ~crio\ls C;\SCS?
Huw long mighllhal take? Who i\lvcsl.igal.l~s'! Arc criminal charges filed?

f()('

emergency responses'!

._---,- ---_..

_-

~--

---

..
Attadunenl D
Maullgers:
· •.
•

~.

.
,
It'
How JIl<Jny years do
- ~.,

., .t .' " •

· T.

l.

:;

It.

t

•

.

'.

~

•

,

.•

..

:'''

'

yOll

have as a manager'!

... ".

2. _

l-Inve.yoti
,
. . been a mamlgcr at any other CDC institution?

3.

How long have you been assigned to this facility as a mamlgcr?

4.

Describe your duties and responsibilities, and how you carry them out during a

routine shift.
5.

Have often do you walk through the fhcility to talk with staff and observe genera]
staff safety practices?

6.

Can you describe the safety equipment that is issued to line slaff? What is
available for them to use?

7.

Is there any other safety equipment. which you know
What is it, and how is iL issued?

8.

How ITHlny of your stltffhave been issued sLab vests? How many }lave been
fitted? What is the timeHnc for issuing vests? Who has been identified 10 receive

o~

available for staffs usc?

them?
9.

On a sen Ie of 1 to 10, with 1 as the Jowe.~t score and 10 as the highest score, how
safe do you fecI working at this facility?

10.

When considerlng l'lnrfsafely, what types ofconccms do you have?

11.

From your perspective. what carries the l,.'Tcatcst potential for :>laff injury'!

12.

What mighlillitigatc or reuuce staffass:H1hs?

-_.---_._-----------------_._-----------

.
l\ Ilac..:hmcnl J.)

l:t

))0

you h:lvc :my long range plans 10 ensure !\Iaff safety and to reduce liltlfr

... I

i "~' a~Aa\ln ~ (!' "'.

14.

I

,".

:J

~,

wh:itJdil(ls.o~\:omplaints 00 you get from slaff! Art Ihel't~ any pattcms that
- .• '.., ..
,

cmcfgc!.

'

15.

lfyOll had sufficient resources (money and S1.1ff), what changes would you make
to your opcmtion to reducc !>taffnssnults or the potential for assaults? Physical
phmt, service and supply. operational chnnges andlor staff chnngcfo>?

16.

What protocols in place for emergency responses?

17.

What happens when a starr member is assaulted? If the person is injured, where
do they go for first aid or for emergency treatment in more serious cases'! How
long might thnt lake? Who investignteR?, Are criminal charges filed?

.._ - - - , . _ - - - - , ..

_--

·

t>

A ttadulJcnt B

Evaluation Team Members
CSP SOLANO
.. '

t .... ,

Team]
Stafllntcrvicws:
Robert Tukcshta, CSA Field Representative
):" ..:.10),111; McAuliffe, AcluH Operations, Correctional Counselor 11
:.~ .: -. .....
Jeff Plunl<ett, Juvenile Justice, Captain

.t·~"

. \ -.

,

.,(, ...' •.: ....•,
,

'.

~,

•

,

Team 2
Physical Plant, Staffing and P()pulation~
Gary Wi on, CSA Field Representat.ive
Mark Perkins, Adult Operations, Facility Captain
Gina Lum, Juvenile Justice, Lieutenant

TeamJ
Facility Profile, Documentation Review and Data Analysis:
Don A lIell, CSA Field Representative
Dave Stark, Adult Operations, Lieuttm:mt
David Finley, Juvenile Justice, Major
Robert Takeshta, Field Representative
Corrections Sladards Authority
Phone: 916-322-8346
Fax:
916-327-3317
E-Mail: btnkeshta(ci}bdcorr.cFl.gov

Dave Stark, Lieutenant
Adult Operations
Phone: 916-358-2473
Fax:
916-358-2499
E-Mail: dave.stark@corr.ca.gov

Gary Wion, Field Represenlative

E-Mail: gwion@bdcorr.co:9ov

Mark Perkins, Captain
Adult Operations
Phone: 916-358-2626
Fax:
916-358-2499
E-Mail: mperkins@corr.ca.gov

Don Allen, Field Representative

Jeff Plunkett, Captain

Corrections Stadards Authority
Phone: 916-324-9153

Division of Juvenile Justice
Phone: 916-262-0802
Fax:
916-262-1767
E-Mail: jplunketllQ>cyil.ca.qov

Corrections Stadards Authority
Phone: 916-324-1641

Fax:

916-327-3317

Fax:

916-327·3317

E-Mail:

Qallen@bdcorr.c~.g~

John McAuliffe. Correctional Counselor II
Adull Operations
Phone: 916·358-2628
fax:
916-358-2636
E-Mail: john.ll)£!I111i(fe@corr.EE.:9.q~

David Finley, Major
COeR - Juvenile Justice Division
Ventum Youth Correclional Facility
Pilone: 805-278-3710
Fax: 805-278-1499
E-Mail: dfinl~@cYD .eel.goy
Gina Lum, Lieutenant
COCR - Juvenile Jus\ice Division
N.A. Chclderjian YouIII Facility
Pholle: 200-944-6580
E-Mail: !1!!l!n.@.~Q(~!:9'.1ill~