CALIFORNIA STATE AUDITOR
Bureau of State Audits
High Risk
The California State Auditor’s Updated Assessment of High‑Risk
Issues the State and Select State Agencies Face

August 2011 Report 2011‑601

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Elaine M. Howle
State Auditor

CALIFORNIA STATE AUDITOR

Doug Cordiner
Chief Deputy

Bureau of State Audits

555 Capitol Mall, Suite 300

S a c r a m e n t o, C A 9 5 8 1 4

August 18, 2011	

916.445.0255

916.327.0019 fax

w w w. b s a . c a . g o v

2011-601

The Governor of California
President pro Tempore of the Senate
Speaker of the Assembly
State Capitol
Sacramento, California 95814
Dear Governor and Legislative Leaders:
As authorized by Chapter 251, Statutes of 2004, the California State Auditor presents this audit
report assessing high-risk issues the State and selected state agencies face. Systematically
identifying and addressing high-risk issues can contribute to enhanced efficiency and
effectiveness by focusing the State’s resources on improving the delivery of services related to
important programs or functions.
We have added the California State Teachers’ Retirement System’s (CalSTRS) Defined Benefit
Program to the high-risk list. Contribution rates for teachers and administrators, which
can only be changed through legislation, have not changed in decades and are currently not
sufficient to ensure the payment of all promised future benefits. Currently the Defined Benefit
Program is funded at 71 percent, well below the 80 percent considered necessary for a sound
pension plan. Unless the State takes steps, such as raising the contribution rates of CalSTRS
members and their employers, it may be responsible for providing the necessary funding using
taxpayer  money.
We believe that the State continues to face eight other significant high-risk issues: addressing
the budget deficit, funding retiree health benefits, ensuring timely expenditure of the
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 funds, upgrading and expanding the
State’s infrastructure, ensuring a stable supply of electricity, effectively managing the State’s
workforce, strengthening emergency preparedness, and providing effective oversight of the
State’s information technology projects. We further believe that three state agencies continue
to meet our criteria for high risk as they face challenges in their day-to-day operations: the
California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, the California Department of Health
Care Services, and the Department of Public Health.
We will continue to monitor the risks we have identified in this report and the actions the
State takes to address them. When the State’s actions result in significant progress toward
resolving or mitigating these risks, we will remove the high-risk designation based on our
professional judgment.
Respectfully submitted,

ELAINE M. HOWLE, CPA
State Auditor

California State Auditor Report 2011-601

August 2011

Contents
Summary	

1

Introduction	

7

Chapter 1
Improving the State’s Budget Condition and Pursuing	
Sound Fiscal Policy	

11

Chapter 2
Managing the State’s Prison Population and Correctional Institutions	

29

Chapter 3
Modernizing and Improving State‑Financed Infrastructure	

37

Chapter 4
Effectively Managing the State’s Workforce	

41

Chapter 5
Strengthening Emergency Preparedness	

47

Chapter 6
Providing Effective Oversight of the State’s Information	
Technology Projects	

51

Chapter 7
Individual Agencies Exhibiting High‑Risk Characteristics	

57

Appendix
Considerations for Determining High Risk	

61

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Summary
Results in Brief

Report Highlights . . .

Providing leadership, programs, and critical services to the people
of California is a complex endeavor that encompasses the use of
significant resources and is accompanied by inherent risks. A
process for identifying and addressing the high‑risk issues facing
the State can help focus the State’s resources on improving service
delivery and contribute to enhanced efficiency and effectiveness.
Legislation effective in January 2005 authorizes the Bureau of
State Audits (bureau) to develop such a risk assessment process.
We issued our initial assessment of high‑risk issues in May 2007
(Report 2006‑601), and we updated those issues and identified new
issues in June 2009 (Report 2008‑601). Our current review found
that most of the issues we identified in 2009 as posing a high risk
to the State continue to be a high risk; we also identified additional
issues or departments as being at high risk.

Legislation effective in January 2005
authorizes the State Auditor’s Office to
develop a risk assessment process. We issued
two previous assessments of high‑risk issues
facing the State. In our current review, we
identified an additional issue as being at
high risk:

The ongoing budget deficits remain on our list of issues that
pose a high risk to the State. Our current review found that the
State’s budget condition remains unchanged. Specifically, the State
has not yet implemented effective strategies for achieving a
balanced budget. Instead, many of its proposed solutions to budget
deficits push the problem into the future. For example, legislation
enacted in 2008 accelerated revenue by limiting the amount of
tax credits corporations could use to reduce their tax liability but
allowed those unused credits to be carried forward to a future
year and therefore reduced future revenues. Moreover, a number
of factors make it difficult for lawmakers to effectively address the
ongoing budget problem. For example, population segments that
are dependent on some of the State’s most significant programs
continue to increase at rates greater than the increase in the general
population. Additionally, voter‑approved Proposition 22 prohibits
the State’s General Fund from borrowing fuel excise tax revenues,
which reduces the resources available to cover cash deficits and
increases the potential for external borrowing.

»» We found that most of the issues we
identified in 2009 as posing a high risk to
the State continue to be a high risk:

We have added the funding of the Defined Benefit Program of the
California State Teachers’ Retirement System (CalSTRS) as a new
high‑risk issue. These retirement benefits provide an incentive
for teachers to make teaching a career. CalSTRS sets aside funds
collected as a percentage of teachers’ and administrators’ salaries
each year to pay future pension obligations. However, the laws
governing the contribution rates for CalSTRS members and their
employers have not changed in decades. As a result, the Defined
Benefit Program is currently funded at 71 percent, well below
the 80 percent considered necessary to fund a sound pension
program. Additionally, CalSTRS reports that the program’s assets

»» Funding of the Defined Benefit Program
of the California State Teachers’
Retirement System (CalSTRS)—laws
governing the contribution rates have not
changed in decades and the program is
currently underfunded.

•	 The State’s budget condition—
ongoing budget deficits remain.
The State has not yet implemented
effective strategies for achieving a
balanced budget.
•	 Paying for and accounting for
retiree health benefits through the
pay‑as‑you‑go method is unchanged.
The State’s estimated liability increased
$12 billion over the previous two years.
•	 Administration of the billions of federal
funds the State received under the
American Recovery and Reinvestment
Act of 2009—some departments may
have to soon forfeit unspent funds.
•	 Managing the State’s prison population
and prison institutions.
•	 Production and delivery of
electricity—possible unmet targets
to increase the use of renewable
electricity sources and the need to
replace certain power plants.
continued on next page . . .

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•	 Maintaining and improving
infrastructure.
•	 Managing the State’s workforce.
•	 State’s level of emergency
preparedness.
•	 Information technology oversight.
»» The following three state agencies meet
our criteria for high risk:
•	 California Department of Corrections
and Rehabilitation
•	 Department of Health Care Services
•	 Department of Public Health

will be depleted in 30 years. Considering that pension obligations
can extend beyond 50 years, unless the State takes steps, such as
raising the contribution rates for members and their employers, it
may be responsible for providing the necessary funding to ensure
that CalSTRS’ Defined Benefit Program meets its obligations.
Consequently, we have designated the funding of CalSTRS’ Defined
Benefit Program as a high‑risk issue.
Likewise, the risk posed by paying and accounting for retiree health
benefits through the pay‑as‑you‑go method is unchanged, and
therefore this issue remains on our high‑risk list. The State continues
to cover only the current year’s cost of these benefits, without setting
aside funds to cover future obligations. As a result, the State’s total
estimated liability grows each year and as of June 30, 2010, it totaled
$59.9 billion, an increase of nearly $12 billion over the previous
two‑year period.
We also found that the various departments we reviewed still face
challenges in administering funding received under the American
Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (Recovery Act). Some
of the four departments we reviewed are at risk of not being able
to spend all Recovery Act funds awarded to them before the
spending deadline, and they may have to forfeit any unspent funds.
Two of the departments have already had to forfeit a combined total
of $736,303 for two grants that had a spending deadline in 2010.
Additionally, although some departments have not finalized their
expenditures for some grants for which spending deadlines have
passed, significant amounts of Recovery Act funds for these grants
may revert to the federal government. In addition to the potential
of forfeiting federal funds, the four departments we reviewed
continue to demonstrate weaknesses in the internal controls over the
federal programs they administer. Our audits in the past two years
have uncovered many weaknesses in the administration of various
Recovery Act programs by different state departments. A recent
report by the U.S. Department of Education’s Office of the Inspector
General contained similar findings. Further, a report we issued in
August 2011 found that of the seven grants with spending deadlines
by December 31, 2011, that the Department of Education administers,
the expenditures for one raise concerns that all funds will not
be spent before the respective deadline. While spending for the
remaining six grants appears to be on track for them to be fully spent
before their spending deadlines, some subrecipients that received
these grants have spent very little and do not appear to be on track to
use all of their award amounts.
Managing the State’s prison population and prison institutions
continues to be a challenge for the California Department of
Corrections and Rehabilitation (Corrections). The prison population
is currently at 180.2 percent of the prison system’s design capacity.

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Recently, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld a ruling that requires
Corrections to reduce overcrowding to 137.5 percent of design capacity.
Consequently, unless the State is able to construct sufficient facilities
or identify other means of reducing the prison population by almost
43 percent, it may need to release some prisoners. The State has taken
legislative action to reduce the number of prisoners by increasing the
dollar thresholds above which property crimes are considered felonies.
However, as of June 2011 Corrections still needed to reduce its prison
population by 34,000 in two years in order to meet the court’s ruling,
therefore, these initiatives may prove to be inadequate. Also, the prison
health care system is still under federal receivership. The latest report
issued by the federal health care receiver (receiver) indicated successes,
such as completing many of its 48 discrete actions, as well as challenges
to the productivity and implementation of solutions the receiver faces.
Further, the California Office of the Inspector General for Corrections
found that nearly all prisons were ineffective at ensuring that inmates
receive their medications and had poor access to medical providers
and services. Consistent with our previous report, Corrections also
continues to struggle to maintain consistent leadership and still has a
number of vital upper‑level positions that are unfilled.
Maintaining and improving infrastructure remains on our list
of high‑risk issues. The State’s infrastructure is under increasing
strain due to its age and the State’s expanding population. Voters
partially funded the State’s infrastructure needs when they approved
$42.7 billion in bonds in November 2006. A report the bureau released
in May 2011 (Report 2010‑117) found that work still needs to be done to
ensure bond‑funded projects appropriately progress. Additionally, as a
result of the current financial condition, the State was not able to issue
the $48.1 billion in bonds needed to fund infrastructure improvements
included in the next phase of its strategic growth plan. Further, the
State’s worsening budget situation has required decision makers to shift
focus away from the State’s infrastructure needs.
Because a reliable supply of electricity provides a critical foundation
for both California’s economy and its citizens’ standard of living,
we added energy production and consumption as a high‑risk issue
in June 2009. Although the State has made some progress, it still
faces uncertainty related to the need to retrofit or replace certain
power plants. Currently, plants using once‑through cooling, which
is an environmentally harmful cooling method, have submitted
plans to retrofit those systems to reduce the mortality rate of
marine life as required by a state policy. However, these plans have
not yet been approved, and the State faces the risk that the plans
will not be sufficient and the plants will have to be shut down.
Additionally, since our last report California has adopted a more
aggressive target for the use of energy from renewable sources,
such as wind and solar. However, the State still faces obstacles

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related to the construction of the infrastructure needed to transmit
electricity from the locations where it is generated to the consumer.
Consequently, the State is at risk of not meeting those targets.
Managing the State’s workforce is another issue that remains on the
bureau’s high‑risk list. The State continues to face the retirement of
a significant number of both leadership and rank‑and‑file workers
with unique perspectives and institutional knowledge critical to
running state departments and programs. The percentage of state
employees 60 years of age or older in leadership positions who are
choosing to retire rose to 35 percent in fiscal year 2009–10, up from
26 percent in fiscal year 2007–08. We project that approximately
12,847, or 42 percent, of the employees in leadership positions as
of June 30, 2008, could potentially retire by fiscal year 2014–15.
Since our June 2009 high risk update, the State has made progress
in streamlining the hiring process through the Human Resources
Modernization Project (HR‑Mod). However, it is uncertain
which efforts initiated by HR‑Mod will continue and what effect
the governor’s recent proposal to merge the Department of
Personnel Administration and the State Personnel Board into a
single department will have on the State’s efforts to maintain the
State’s workforce. Further, many departments are still in the process
of developing or assessing their workforce and succession plans.
The State’s level of emergency preparedness remains a high‑risk
issue. Although there has been progress in this area, the Department
of Public Health (Public Health) and the California Emergency
Management Agency (CalEMA) still need to address various issues.
Specifically, Public Health has established performance measures and
deadlines in its strategic plan. However, it has not always achieved
those performance measures. For example, it failed to meet its
target of increasing the number of local health departments with
Strategic National Stockpile ratings of 70 or better, which would
mean their performance is acceptable to receive and distribute
public health emergency medical assets. Similarly, although CalEMA
has made progress on its Metrics Project, which is a resource
typing and data gathering project aimed at developing a common
structure and nomenclature for the inventorying and assessment of
emergency resources and capabilities on a statewide basis, it is not
yet complete. Additionally, it did not identify performance measures
in its first strategic plan and has not started some activities related to
the objectives as planned.
Since our last update, the State has shown improvement related
to its oversight of information technology (IT) projects; however,
this remains a high‑risk issue. The California Technology Agency
(Technology Agency) monitors projects to ensure that they
remain on schedule and within budget; rejects projects that lack a
business case, financial resources, or appropriate technology; and

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provides IT infrastructure and shared services. However, although
the Technology Agency has strengthened its role in IT project
oversight, due to the high cost of state IT projects and the
Technology Agency’s relatively new project management structure,
IT oversight remains an area of high risk.
Finally, we have added the Department of Health Care Services and
Public Health to our list as departments that present a high risk to the
State. In recent years, the Legislature, because of a variety of concerns,
has requested a higher number of audits for these two departments and
recent audits have uncovered significant deficiencies in the policies
and procedures of both departments that could affect public health.
We have also identified a number of recommendations that these
departments have not implemented after one year. However, we found
that both of these departments have incurred less in administrative
costs than the former Department of Health Services would have
had the split not occurred. As a result, we no longer believe that
spending by the two departments in comparison to that of the former
Department of Health Services constitutes a high‑risk issue.

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Introduction
Background
Legislation effective in January 2005 authorizes the Bureau of
State Audits (bureau) to develop a risk assessment process for
the State. In particular, Senate Bill 1437 of the 2003–04 Regular
Session of the Legislature added Section 8546.5 to the Government
Code. It authorizes the bureau to establish a high‑risk audit
program, to issue reports with recommendations for improvement
on issues it identifies as high risk, and to require state agencies
responsible for these identified programs or functions to report
periodically to the bureau on the status of their implementation of
the recommendations. High‑risk programs and functions include
not only those particularly vulnerable to fraud, waste, abuse, and
mismanagement, but also those of particular interest to the citizens
of the State and those that have potentially significant effects on
public health, safety, and economic well‑being.
The Bureau’s Criteria for Determining Whether State Agencies and
Major Issues the State Faces Merit High‑Risk Designations
To determine whether a state agency’s performance and
accountability challenges pose a high risk to the State, we
first consider the significance of an agency’s mission or functions
and the extent to which the agency’s management and program
function is key to the State’s overall performance and accountability.
We then determine whether risk is involved and if it constitutes
one of the following:
•	 An issue that could be detrimental to the health and safety
of Californians.
•	 A program that could be at risk of fraud, waste, and abuse. For
example, a program involving payments to claimants for services
provided to third parties involves risk due to the difficulty in
verifying claims.
•	 A systemic problem that has created inefficiencies
and ineffectiveness.
To identify a high‑risk statewide issue we consider the following:
•	 Whether it is evident in several state agencies.
•	 Whether it affects the State’s total resources.

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•	 Whether it stems from some deficiency or challenge that
warrants monitoring and attention by the Legislature through
the Joint Legislative Audit Committee, the Joint Legislative
Budget Committee, other legislative committees, or other
legislative action.
For both state agencies and statewide issues, we also consider a
number of qualitative and quantitative factors as well as whether or
not an agency has taken measures to correct previously identified
deficiencies or whether the State is taking measures to reduce
the risk a statewide issue may pose. In all cases, the ultimate
determination of high risk is based on the independent and
objective judgment of the bureau’s professional staff. The Appendix
further describes these factors. Additionally, the Appendix outlines
the factors we consider in determining whether it is appropriate to
remove a statewide issue or agency from our high‑risk list.
Scope and Methodology
California Government Code, Section 8546.5, authorizes the bureau
to audit any state agency it identifies as high risk and to issue
related audit reports at least once every two years, In May 2007
we issued a report1 that provided an initial list of high‑risk issues,
and in June 2009 we issued an update report2 on the status of those
issues and others that had been added.
Subsequent to our May 2007 report, the bureau continued to
evaluate issues faced by the State for inclusion on our high‑risk list.
For select issues on the list, we also performed in‑depth reviews
to determine whether the risks had been mitigated. As a result, we
issued separate reports specific to the following issues: the State’s
budget condition; other postemployment benefits for retiring
state employees; maintaining and improving infrastructure; the
administration of federal funding received under the American
Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009; and the production and
delivery of electricity, emergency preparedness, and management
of human resources. Each of these reports contains details of our
scope and methodology for conducting the particular review. With
this 2011 update, we are adding the funding of the California State
Teachers’ Retirement System to our list of high‑risk issues.

1	

High Risk: The California State Auditor’s Initial Assessment of High‑Risk Issues the State and
Select State Agencies Face (Report 2006‑601, May 2007)
2	 High Risk: The California State Auditor’s Updated Assessment of High‑Risk Issues the State and
Select State Agencies Face (Report 2008‑601, June 2009)

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To update our analysis of high‑risk issues and departments facing
risks and challenges, we interviewed knowledgeable staff at each
entity with significant related responsibilities to assess their
perspectives on the extent of risk the State faces and reviewed the
efforts underway that they identified as mitigating the risks. We also
reviewed reports and other documentation relevant to the issues.

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Chapter 1
IMPROVING THE STATE’S BUDGET CONDITION AND
PURSUING SOUND FISCAL POLICY
Various fiscal issues continue to pose a high risk to the State, and
one new issue is being added with this report. The State’s budget
condition remains on the list of high‑risk issues because of
continued budget deficits and difficulty in resolving budget
problems. In addition, we have added the Defined Benefit Program
of the California State Teachers’ Retirement System (CalSTRS)
to the list. The funded status of this program has decreased to
71 percent, jeopardizing the ability of CalSTRS to meet its
pension obligations in the future without financial assistance from
taxpayers. Similarly, the State continues to face unfunded liabilities
related to retiree health benefits; these liabilities have grown
by $12 billion in the last two years alone. Finally, the American
Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (Recovery Act) remains an
area of concern. Some state departments we reviewed may have to
forfeit Recovery Act funds due to their inability to spend all funds
before the deadline, and issues involving the administration of
Recovery Act funds make this an area of continued risk.
Addressing the Budget Deficit
The Bureau of State Audits (bureau) designated the State’s budget
condition as a high‑risk issue in February 2009.3 Since that time
the State has continued to face large budget deficits. However, it
has yet to implement effective solutions for achieving a balanced
budget and thus continues to be on our list of high‑risk issues.
Our current review found that the State’s budget condition
continues to pose challenges. In fact, in fiscal year 2009–10 the
State experienced a $62.9 billion deficit, the largest in its history.
A portion of this deficit was the result of the State not receiving
the revenues projected for fiscal year 2008–09. According to the
State Controller’s Office, the State received only $85 billion
of the $101 billion in revenue it had anticipated during fiscal
year 2008–09. However, the State actually spent approximately
$98 billion during the year, creating a significant shortfall. Because
the State had to address this shortfall when developing the fiscal
year 2009–10 budget, it faced a larger deficit than it otherwise
would have. As Figure 1 on the following page shows, although the

3	

High Risk: The California State Auditor Has Designated the State Budget as a High‑Risk Area
(Report 2008‑603, February 2009).

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deficit for fiscal year 2010–11 and the projected deficit for fiscal
year 2011–12 are not as severe as the deficit for fiscal year 2009–10,
they continue to be significant.
Figure 1
Projected General Fund Budget Surpluses and Shortfalls as of the May Revision
Fiscal Years 1989–90 Through 2011–12
$20
10
0
(10)
In Billions

(20)
(30)
(40)
(50)
(60)
(70)
1989–90
1990–91
1991–92
1992–93
1993–94
1994–95
1995–96
1996–97
1997–98
1998–99
1999–2000
2000–01
2001–02
2002–03
2003–04
2004–05
2005–06
2006–07
2007–08
2008–09
2009–10
2010–11
2011–12

12

Fiscal Years
Sources:  Department of Finance’s governor’s budget summaries and the May revisions, and
the Legislative Analyst’s Office’s perspectives and issues, state spending plans, and overviews of the
May revisions.

Despite the history of continuing deficits, the State has not yet
implemented effective strategies for achieving a balanced budget.
As shown in Table 1, 17 percent of the solutions to address deficits
between fiscal years 2002–03 and 2011–12 increased the State’s
debt, and another 19 percent involved a combination of shifting
money from one fund to another, requiring taxes to be paid earlier
than usual, and deferring expenditures for some programs. For
example, legislation passed in 2008 accelerated revenue by limiting
the amount of tax credits corporations could use each year to
reduce their tax liability for the period January 1, 2008 through
December 31, 2009. During this period corporations could not use
credits to reduce their taxes by more than 50 percent of their tax
liabilities, but they could carry over any unused credits to reduce
their tax liabilities in subsequent years. Although this solution
worked to increase the State’s revenues in the short term, it results
in reduced revenues in subsequent years.

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Table 1
Types of Solutions Implemented to Reduce Budget Shortfalls
Fiscal Years 2002–03 Through 2011–12
FISCAL YEARS

Total amount of budget
solutions (dollars in billions)*
Percentage by solution type†

2002–03

2003–04

2004–05

2005–06

2007–08

2008–09

2009–10

2010–11

2011–12

OVERALL

$23.64

$39.40

$16.10

$5.85

$4.93

$23.97

$59.60

$19.30

$24.20

$192.79

71%

Expenditure reductions

32%

21%

31%

Revenue increases
Increased debt‡

17

15

15

2

28%

36%

49%

63%

29%

38%

33

17

23

23

37

21

13

41

39

Fund shifts or transfers

12

10

15

15

–

17

4

6

12

17

12

26

4

6

5

19

10

Accelerated revenues

19

5

Expenditure deferrals

7

5

–

–

12

11

4

–

–

6

–

–

–

8

–

4

1

3

Federal stimulus funds

–

–

–

–

–

–

14

–

–

4

Accounting changes

–

2

–

–

–

8

–

–

–

1

Other

–

–

–

–

–

–

–

–

3

–

Sources:  Legislative Analyst Office’s state spending plans; various publications prepared by the Department of Finance pertaining to enacted budgets.
Note:  Fiscal year 2006–07 is not shown in the table because there was a projected budget surplus in that year.
*	 The solutions in this table do not precisely link with the May shortfalls presented in Figure 1 because of timing differences and the differences
between the shortfalls and the solutions to resolve them.
†	 Some percentages do not add to 100 percent due to rounding.
‡	 Increased debt includes borrowing from internal sources.

Also, certain population segments, such as Medi‑Cal recipients and
higher education students, to which the State devotes considerable
resources, continue to increase more quickly than the general
population on which the State depends for income tax revenue.
As shown in Table 2 on the following page, the State’s population as
a whole increased by 4 percent from fiscal years 2005–06 to
2009–10, while the number of Medi‑Cal recipients and students
seeking higher education increased by 13 percent and 14 percent,
respectively. Over this same period, the General Fund budget
for Medi‑Cal costs increased from $12.8 billion to $14.9 billion.
This disproportionate growth in certain population segments
continues to significantly affect the state budget.

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Table 2
Growth Rate of California’s General Population Compared to the Growth Rates
of Specific Groups
FISCAL YEAR

GENERAL
POPULATION

INMATES

PERSONS ELIGIBLE
FOR MEDI‑CAL

K‑12 STUDENTS

HIGHER EDUCATION
STUDENTS

2005–06

37,275,000

172,561

6,534,981

6,312,436

2,129,185

2006–07

37,655,000

173,312

6,553,257

6,286,943

2,179,196

2007–08

38,156,000

170,973

6,721,002

6,275,469

2,281,431

2008–09

38,477,000

167,832

7,094,877

6,252,031

2,390,847

2009–10

38,827,000

165,817

7,390,537

6,190,425

2,427,996

Increase from
fiscal years
2005–06
through
2009–10

4%

(4)%

13%

(2)%

14%

Sources:  Department of Finance’s Demographic Research Unit’s population estimates; Department
of Corrections and Rehabilitation, California Prisoners and Parolees 2009; Department of Education
enrollment reports prepared by the Educational Demographics Office; Department of Health Care
Services, Medical Care Statistics Section; and California Postsecondary Education Commission higher
education enrollment reports for the fall of each fiscal year.

At the November 2, 2010 General Election, California voters approved
Proposition 25, which changed the vote requirement to pass the state
budget from a two thirds vote to a simple majority. While this change
is expected to have a significant impact on the budget process, other
factors remain that make it difficult for Legislatures to achieve a
balanced budget. Some of these factors exist beyond legislative control,
such as the initiative process itself which can result in voter-approved
spending obligations that generally may not be modified without voter
approval. In addition, Proposition 22, which was also approved by
the voters at the 2010 General Election, prohibits the Legislature from
borrowing revenues generated by the fuel excise tax and using those
revenues for general fund purposes. The Cash Management Bureau
Chief at the Controller’s office states that this reduces the availability of
resources against which the state may borrow to meet short term cash
flow needs.
In addition, a change in federal law related to estate tax has resulted in
lost revenue for the General Fund. Prior to January 2005 the State
generally received about $1 billion of the federal estate taxes that would
have otherwise been paid to the Internal Revenue Service. These
revenues are commonly known as a state pick‑up tax. However, the
Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001 and a
subsequent amendment to it suspended the state pick‑up tax so that, as
of January 1, 2005, the State no longer receives this revenue. The pick‑up
tax is scheduled to be reinstated effective January 1, 2013. One way the
State can make up for this lost revenue is by imposing a state estate
tax. However, current state law, enacted through an initiative measure,
prohibits California from imposing a state estate tax. Voter approval
would be required to modify or repeal that prohibition.

California State Auditor Report 2011-601

August 2011

Table 3
Ballot Measures Approved by Voters in November 2010 General Elections
That Impact State Budget
INITIATIVE

SUMMARY

Proposition 22

Prohibits the State from borrowing or taking funds used for transportation,
redevelopment, or local government projects and services.

Proposition 25

Changes legislative vote requirement to pass budget and budget‑related
legislation from two‑thirds to a simple majority. Retains the two‑thirds vote
requirement for taxes.

Proposition 26

Requires that certain state and local fees be approved by a two‑thirds vote.
Broadens the definition of a State or local tax to include payments currently
considered to be fees or charges.

Source:  Voter information guide for the November 2, 2010 election, prepared by the State
Attorney General.

Finally, as we noted in our 2009 report, various legal, political, and
humanitarian considerations make it difficult for decision makers
to reduce expenditures to a level sufficient to eliminate the ongoing
deficits. For example, the State must provide matching General Fund
money to secure certain federal funding. Further, many expenditures
are mandated by the California Constitution.
We will continue to monitor developments related to the state budget
and to assist decision makers in finding areas to streamline expenses
or increase revenues.
Funding CalSTRS
We have added CalSTRS’ Defined Benefit Program to the list of
high‑risk issues because the State faces the possibility of having to help
finance CalSTRS’ pension liabilities. The contributions required from
CalSTRS members and their employers are currently not sufficient to
ensure payment of all promised future benefits. The funded status of
this program has decreased from 98 percent in 2001 to 71 percent in
2010, well below the 80 percent recommended for pension programs.
As a result, it does not expect to be able to pay the retirement benefits
beyond the next 30 years. Because the State is ultimately responsible
for finding a way to fully fund the benefits promised to CalSTRS
members, unless it takes steps to ensure adequate funding it may be
responsible for supplementing CalSTRS members’ retirement benefits.
CalSTRS was created to provide California teachers with a secure
financial future during their retirement years and to provide an
incentive for them to stay in the teaching profession their entire
working careers. CalSTRS is responsible for administering the State
Teachers’ Retirement Plan, of which one of the programs, the Defined
Benefit Program, provides defined retirement benefits to its members.

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Membership in the Defined Benefit Program includes all employees in
California public schools who are required by state law to participate.
With more than 852,000 members and benefit recipients, CalSTRS is the
nation’s largest public teachers’ pension organization. Retirement benefits
are computed using a formula that takes into account the member’s
years of service, age, and final compensation. CalSTRS prefunds pension
benefits by setting aside funds each year to pay for future pensions, in
addition to paying the current year’s pension obligations. The members,
their employers, and the State are required to contribute a percentage of
members’ salaries to prefund pension benefits for CalSTRS members.

The Defined Benefit Program is
not currently funded at the level
necessary, and contributions are
not sufficient to pay retirement
benefits to members beyond the
next 30 years.

However, the required contributions for CalSTRS members and
their employers have not changed in more than two decades. These
contribution rates, unlike the rates for most national pension plans,
including the California Public Employees’ Retirement System, are
established by state law. As a result, only the Legislature, not the
CalSTRS board, has the authority to change the contribution rates. An
employer’s contribution to CalSTRS’ Defined Benefit Program remains
at 8.25 percent of the participating member’s current salary, and the
member’s contribution rate has remained at 8 percent of his or her
current salary since at least 1976. Further, recent changes in law have
reduced the State’s contribution to the Defined Benefit Program from
the roughly 4 percent it paid two years ago to approximately 2 percent
of the salaries of CalSTRS members. As a result, the Defined Benefit
Program is not currently funded at the level necessary, and contributions
are not sufficient to pay retirement benefits to members beyond the
next 30 years.
To ensure that retirement systems have enough assets to provide
pension benefits to members over the long run, these systems need to
maintain a certain level of annual funding. According to a 2008 study by
the U.S. Government Accountability Office, a sound pension program
needs a funded ratio of 80 percent or better. This means that in any given
year the pension program should have enough assets to cover at least
80 percent of its current‑year and future pension liabilities. However,
poor investment returns due to the economic recession and the inability
to adjust funding contributions have caused the funded status of the
CalSTRS Defined Benefit Program to decrease from 98 percent in 2001
to 71 percent in 2010, as shown in Figure 2. According to CalSTRS,
although its pension liabilities for current and future retirees extend
beyond the next 30 years, the program’s assets, including expected future
revenues, will be depleted within the next 30 years.
The State is ultimately responsible for finding a way to fully fund the
benefits promised to CalSTRS members and beneficiaries in the event
that a funding plan is not resolved. The CalSTRS board believes that it
has the authority and the fiduciary responsibility to request that the State
sufficiently fund the system to ensure a financially sound retirement
system with stable and full funding over the long term.

California State Auditor Report 2011-601

August 2011

Figure 2
The Value of the Assets of the California State Teachers’ Retirement System
Defined Benefit Program as a Percentage of Its Liabilities
From June 30, 2001 Through June 30, 2010

80

82

83

2004

98

2003

Percentage of Liabilities

100%

86

87

88

87
78

71 *

60
40
20

2010

2009

2008

2007

2006

2005

2001

2002†

0

Percentage as of June 30
Source:  California State Teachers’ Retirement System (CalSTRS) Defined Benefit Program Actuarial
Valuation as of June 30, 2010.
*	 According to a study by the U.S. Government Accountability Office, a sound pension plan should
have assets that are at least 80 percent of its current and future liabilities.
†	 Government Accounting Standards Board (GASB) No. 27: Accounting for Pensions by State and
Local Government Employees only requires actuarial valuation to be performed biennially.
Although CalSTRS performs such valuation each year, it did not do so in 2002.

Pension systems have extraordinarily long‑lived liabilities—in
some cases, promised benefits are required to be paid out in excess
of 50 years past the date they are first offered. Indications that
CalSTRS Defined Benefit Program may not be able to meet its
retirement obligations beyond the next three decades are of
significant concern. Unless the State takes steps to ensure that the
CalSTRS Defined Benefit Program is adequately funded, it may be
responsible for supplementing the necessary funding using taxpayer
money. Therefore, we have designated CalSTRS Defined Benefit
Program as a high‑risk issue.
Funding Retiree Health Benefits
As of June 30, 2010, California’s total estimated liability for retiree
health benefits under its current funding method was $59.9 billion,
nearly $12 billion more than the $48.2 billion liability that existed
as of June 30, 2008.4 This liability presents a risk for the State in
providing the level of health benefits promised to its retirees.
Therefore, managing the State’s retiree health benefits liability
continues to be a high‑risk issue.

4	

These amounts do not include the University of California or the trial courts.

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August 2011

Liability for state retiree health benefits has continued to grow,
with an associated increase in future General Fund expenditures,
further burdening future generations of Californians. According to
the State’s most recent actuarial study, as of June 30, 2010, its
total estimated retiree health benefits liability was $59.9 billion.
This amount represents, in today’s dollars, the future cost of
retiree health benefits that state employees have already earned.
Currently, all of this liability is unfunded because unlike pension
funds, the State has not established a trust or set aside any money
to pay for retiree health benefits. Instead, the State continues to
use a pay‑as‑you‑go method of funding these benefits. Each year
the State determines its annual required contribution, which is
an actuarial determined level of funding that is projected to cover
the cost of benefits earned during the current year and a portion
of the cost for benefits earned in prior years if it is paid on an
ongoing basis. However, under the pay‑as‑you‑go method, the
State addresses only the current year’s cost of retirees’ medical and
dental insurance premiums and does not set aside funds to cover
any future costs to the State. Because this method does not address
the benefits that must be paid to state employees in the future, the
future liability continues to grow.
For example, at the beginning of fiscal year 2010–11, the State had
a recognized liability, which is the unpaid accumulated annual
required contributions from prior years, of $7.2 billion for retiree
health benefits. In fiscal year 2010–11, the State’s annual required
contribution was $4.2 billion. This amount would have paid for
that year’s benefits earned and a portion of the benefits earned in
previous years. Including the interest and adjustments resulting
from the fiscal year 2009–10 contribution deficiency, the State
needed to pay $11.4 billion to ensure that there was no liability
for financial reporting purposes at the end of fiscal year 2010–11.
However, the State was expected to pay only $1.6 billion,
representing the payment due for that year’s premiums. As
Figure 3 shows, the projected retiree health benefits liability as of
the end of fiscal year 2010–11 increased to $9.8 billion.
Other methods of funding retiree health benefits include
either partial or full‑funding of the total liability. Prefunding retiree
health benefits—setting aside assets in advance to earn additional
money over time—whether partially or in full, would reduce the
annual required contribution and unfunded liability. As Table 4 on
page 20 shows, the State could reduce its total liability by more
than $21 billion by committing to fully prefunding retiree health
benefits in fiscal year 2010–11 and subsequent years. Even partially
prefunding retiree health benefits at 50 percent during fiscal
year 2010–11 and subsequent years, as shown in Table 4, would
reduce the State’s total liability by about $12.5 billion.

California State Auditor Report 2011-601

August 2011

Figure 3
Projected Calculation of the State’s Liability for Retiree Health Benefits
Fiscal Year 2010–11
(in Thousands)
Annual Required Contribution
Interest and actuarial adjustments*

+

$4,168,016
$39,758

$4,207,774
Annual Retiree Health
Benefits Expense
Expected employer cash payments

$4,207,774
– $1,625,475

$2,582,299
Increase in Projected Liability
Recognized Liability, July 1, 2010

$2,582,299
+ $7,247,651

$9,829,950
Projected Liability, June 30, 2011

$9,829,950

Sources:  State of California Retiree Health Benefits Program; Government Accounting Standards
Board Nos. 43 and 45; Actuarial Valuation Report as of June 30, 2010.
Note:  This calculation does not include the University of California or trial courts.
*	 This amount is the interest on the July 1, 2010, retiree health benefits liability and an actuarial
adjustment resulting from the fiscal year 2009–10 contribution deficiency.

California is not alone in facing the issue of funding retiree health
benefits. An April 2011 Pew Center on the States report titled The
Widening Gap: The Great Recession’s Impact on State Pension and
Retiree Health Care Costs (Pew report) indicates that states that have
made significant promises for retiree health care and other benefits
could face an enormous fiscal burden in the future if they do not
set aside more savings or better manage costs. According to the
Pew report as of the end of fiscal year 2008–09, 19 states, including
California, had retiree health benefits liabilities that are almost
entirely unfunded as of the most recent fiscal year. Further, many
states, including California, have contributed less than 50 percent of
their annual required contributions.

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California State Auditor Report 2011-601

August 2011

Table 4
Comparison of the Effects on Liabilities of California’s Contributing Different Levels of Cash Payments for
Retiree Health Benefits
Fiscal Year 2010–11
(in Billions)
FUNDING METHOD
PAY‑AS‑YOU‑GO
FUNDING POLICY

Assumed rate of return on investments*
Total estimated liability for retiree health
benefits as of June 30, 2010
Savings over pay‑as‑you‑go funding policy
Annual required contribution
Savings over pay‑as‑you‑go funding policy

4.5%†

PARTIAL‑FUNDING
POLICY (50 PERCENT)

6.13%

FULL‑FUNDING
POLICY (100 PERCENT)

7.75%

$59.91

$47.43

$38.47

–

12.48

21.44

4.17

3.42

2.93

–

0.75

1.24

Expected employer cash payments

1.63

2.28

2.93

Projected liability for fiscal year 2010–11

9.83

8.48

7.39‡

Sources:  State of California Retiree Health Benefits Program; Government Accounting Standards Board Nos. 43 and 45; Actuarial Valuation Report as
of June 30, 2010.
Note:  The University of California and trial courts had separate actuarial studies performed so the amounts in this table excluded these public entities.
*	 Government Accounting Standards Board Statement No. 45 requires that employers use the long‑term assumed rate of return on the investments
that employers expect to use to pay retiree health benefits as they come due.
†	 Although the actuarial study based this 4.5 percent interest rate for the State’s Pooled Money Investment Account on a long‑term perspective, the
actual rate of return on these underlying investments will vary.
‡	 Under the full‑funding policy, this amount is any previously recognized retiree health benefits liability for prior fiscal years, including interest and
actuarial adjustments.

Although the State has taken some steps to address its growing liability
for retiree health benefits, these efforts are not enough to fully resolve
this issue. In an effort to manage rising health care costs and achieve
cost savings, legislation that took effect March 24, 2011, requires
the Board of Administration of the Public Employees’ Retirement
System to negotiate with carriers offering health benefit plans to
add a less expensive health plan option to the existing portfolio of
health plans or to implement other measures to achieve ongoing
cost savings beginning in fiscal year 2012–13. Further, the State has
unsuccessfully attempted to prefund retiree health benefits and
continues to search for mechanisms to reduce these costs. Between
January 2010 and June 2010, the State and the California Association
of Highway Patrolmen (CAHP) briefly prefunded approximately
$4.8 million in retiree health benefits. However, subsequent bargaining
unit agreements temporarily redirected those contributions away
from prefunding retiree health benefits. The State plans to resume
or begin prefunding the retiree health benefit liability for the CAHP
and certain other state employees at a later date. However, it remains
unclear whether the State will begin prefunding this liability for all
other employees and how the State will manage the risks associated
with its large and growing retiree health benefits liability.

California State Auditor Report 2011-601

August 2011

Ensuring Timely Expenditure of Recovery Act Funds
The State is at risk of losing some of the $8.6 billion in Recovery
Act funds that remain unspent as of March 31, 2011. Various
state programs must ensure that these funds are spent before the
respective deadlines for spending these funds end to avoid having
to forfeit them to the federal government. Further, many state
departments continue to have a significant number of internal
control weaknesses related to their administration of federal
programs and Recovery Act grants. Finally, a recent report by the
U.S. Department of Education’s Office of the Inspector General
found instances of improper use of Recovery Act funds by selected
local educational agencies. Because of the significant amount
of funds involved, and because California has demonstrated
weaknesses in the administration of the programs for which these
funds have been awarded, administration of Recovery Act funds
continues to be a high‑risk issue for the State.
Imminent deadlines for spending some of the Recovery Act
funds place greater emphasis on the departments’ ability to
ensure that the entire award is spent before the funds revert.
Many of the Recovery Act awards contain a spending deadline by
which the State must ensure that the full amounts awarded are used
for the purposes intended. As shown in Table 5 on the following
page, the four departments we reviewed—the Department of
Education (Education), the Employment Development Department
(Employment Development), the Department of Health Care
Services (Health Care Services), and the Department of
Social Services (Social Services)—reported spending $26 billion
of the $29 billion in Recovery Act funds awarded to them by the
federal government. Any unspent funds for these grants after
the respective deadline must revert to the federal government.
For some programs, the spending deadlines already passed and the
unspent Recovery Act funds reverted to the federal government.
For example, the spending deadline for the Emergency
Contingency Fund for Temporary Assistance for Needy Families
State Program, administered by Social Services, was September 30,
2010. Although Social Services noted that it has not finalized the
expenditures for this grant as of July 2011, it expects that it will
have to revert roughly $35 million to the federal government.
Social Services explained that only $5 million of the $40 million
estimated for a contract to pay household utility payments
for program beneficiaries was actually spent due to complex
eligibility determinations and overall difficulties in administering
the program, and because the process to draft and approve the
necessary contract limited the time available to spend the money.
Similarly, Education and Social Services did not fully spend
Recovery Act funds awarded to them for Child Nutrition and

Any unspent funds for these
grants must revert to the federal
government at the end of the period
of availability.

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August 2011

the Emergency Food Assistance Program (Administrative Cost),
respectively. As a result, these departments forfeited a combined
total of $736,303. Both departments indicated that accounting and
cost adjustments at the state or local level caused them to have
unexpended funds that reverted to the federal government.
Table 5
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 Funds Expended and Remaining for the Four Departments
We Reviewed as of March 31, 2011
TOTAL RECOVERY
ACT AWARD

RECOVERY ACT
FUNDS SPENT

RECOVERY ACT
FUNDS REMAINING

American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009
(Recovery Act) funds administered by the State

$38,811,804,746

$30,210,751,784

$8,601,052,961

22.2%

Recovery Act funds awarded to the Departments of
Education, Social Services, Health Care Services, and
the Employment Development Department

$29,275,197,883

$26,312,883,448

$2,962,314,435

10.1%

$6,253,587,701

$5,129,986,332

$1,123,601,369

12,864,683

12,174,129

690,554

DEPARTMENT/GRANT

Department of Education
Child Nutrition Programs
Child Care and Development Block Grant
State Fiscal Stabilization Fund - Education State Grants

PERCENTAGE
REMAINING

SPENDING DEADLINE

18%
5.4

September 30, 2010

220,273,864

206,939,203

13,334,661

6.1

September 30, 2011

3,190,419,360

2,858,293,390

332,125,970

6.8

December 31, 2011

Title I Grants to Local Educational Agencies

1,124,920,473

903,111,084

221,809,389

19.7

December 31, 2011

Special Education Grants to States

1,226,944,052

1,038,313,306

188,630,746

15.4

December 31, 2011

Education Technology State Grants

71,578,424

18,200,000

53,378,424

74.6

December 31, 2011

Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, Part B, Section 619

41,028,219

29,332,333

11,695,886

28.5

December 31, 2011

Education for Homeless Children and Youth
School Improvement Grants
Department of Health Care Services
Medical Assistance Program
Department of Social Services
Emergency Contingency Fund for Temporary Assistance
for Needy Families State Program

13,795,989

9,562,517

4,250,837

30.8

December 31, 2011

351,762,637

54,060,370

297,702,267

84.6

September 30, 2013

$12,880,200,000

$11,336,300,000

$1,543,900,000

12,880,200,000

11,336,300,000

1,543,900,000

12.0

$1,486,004,765

$1,333,759,016

$152,245,749

10.2%

12.0%
June 30, 2011

1,253,500,000

1,112,200,000

141,300,000

11.3

September 30, 2010

Emergency Food Assistance Program
(Administrative Costs)

10,004,765

9,959,016

45,749

0.5

September 30, 2010

State Administrative Matching Grants for the
Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program

21,700,000

21,700,000

–

–

September 30, 2010

Adoption Assistance

97,100,000

90,400,000

6,700,000

6.9

June 30, 2011

4.1

June 30, 2011

Foster Care Title IV-E

103,700,000

99,500,000

4,200,000

$8,655,405,417

$8,512,838,100

$142,567,317

488,646,876

407,448,466

81,198,410

16.6

June 30, 2011

46,970,564

42,980,106

3,990,458

8.5

June 30, 2011

Program of competitive grants for worker training and
placement in high growth and emerging industry sectors

1,250,000

784,677

465,323

37.2

December 31, 2011

Workforce Investment Act Dislocated Workers, extended

9,990,477

1,283,462

8,707,015

87.2

June 30, 2012

Employment Development Department
Workforce Investment Act Dislocated Workers
Employment Service/Wagner-Peyser funded activities

1.6%

California State Auditor Report 2011-601

August 2011

DEPARTMENT/GRANT

Program of competitive grants for worker training and
placement in high growth and emerging industry sectors
Program of competitive grants for worker training and
placement in high growth and emerging industry sectors
Unemployment Insurance - special transfer in fiscal
year 2009–10 for administration

TOTAL RECOVERY
ACT AWARD

RECOVERY ACT
FUNDS EXPENDED

RECOVERY
ACT FUNDS
REMAINING

PERCENTAGE
REMAINING

SPENDING DEADLINE

547,500

–

547,500

100.0

June 30, 2012

6,000,000

941,389

5,058,611

84.3

January 28, 2013

59,900,000

17,300,000

42,600,000

71.1

NA

Extension of emergency unemployment
compensation program

5,241,800,000

5,241,800,000

–

–

NA

Federal funding for extended unemployment program

1,514,600,000

1,514,600,000

–

–

NA

Federal additional unemployment compensation program

1,285,700,000

1,285,700,000

–

–

NA

Sources:  California Recovery Task Force, California Department of Education, Department of Health Care Services, Department of Social
Services, and Employment Development Department (Employment Development).
NA = Not applicable. The U.S. Department of Labor and Employment Development indicated that the Unemployment Insurance ‑ special
transfer in fiscal year 2009–10 for administration program, Extension of Emergency Unemployment Compensation program, Federal Funding
for Extended Unemployment program, and Federal Additional Unemployment Compensation program have no deadline by which grant
funds must be spent.

Further, the spending deadline for five other grants was
June 30, 2011. Although Employment Development has not
finalized its expenditures for Employment Services/Wagner‑Peyser
Funded Activities and the Workforce Investment Act Dislocated
Workers program, it believes that it has fully spent these
two grants and that the funds for these grants will not revert to
the federal government. Moreover, Social Services and Health
Care Services have also not finalized their expenditures for the
remaining three grants that expire on June 30, 2011; but, they
believe that they were limited in their ability to spend Recovery
Act funds for these grants and that the unspent funds do not
represent a loss to the State. Specifically, the departments stated
that the Recovery Act funds awarded for Foster Care Title IV‑E,
Adoption Assistance, and Medical Assistance Program (Medicaid)
were to supplement the benefits provided under the regular federal
grants that these departments administer. As such, the Recovery
Act funds supplemented, to a certain extent, those expenditures
that the State would have had to pay from nonfederal sources. For
example, the federal Medicaid program generally pays 50 percent
of the benefits provided to the beneficiaries. The State must pay
the remaining 50 percent using nonfederal funds. The federal
government allocated $12.9 billion in Recovery Act funds to
Health Care Services to pay up to an additional 11.6 percent of the
benefits provided under Medicaid, effectively reducing the State’s
share of the cost. Health Care Services noted that the Medicaid
benefits provided during the time allowed by the Recovery Act
grant did not allow it to use all grant funds allocated to the State.
Social Services noted similar reasons for not being able to use all
Recovery Act funds for the other two grants.

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Although we determined that departments have made
some progress in improving their internal controls over the
administration of federal funds, weaknesses in this area continue
to be an issue. The four departments we reviewed administered
almost 80 percent of all Recovery Act funds awarded to all state
departments. Each of these departments had an equal number or
fewer internal control findings in fiscal year 2009–10 compared
to fiscal year 2006–07. As Table 6 shows, the total number of
internal control findings for these four departments fell from 45 in
fiscal year 2006–07 to 31 in fiscal year 2009–10. Nevertheless, the
fact remains that these departments continue to have weaknesses
in their internal controls over federal programs they administer.
Table 6
Internal Control Findings for Selected State Departments
Fiscal Years 2006–07 Through 2009–10
FISCAL YEARS
DEPARTMENT

Department of Education
Employment Development Department
Department of Health Care Services
Department of Social Services
Totals

2006–07

2007–08

2008–09

2009–10

21

26

23

16

5

7

5

3

15

10

9

8

4

12

14

4

45

55

51

31

Source:  Information from Bureau of State Audits’ reports 2007‑002, 2008‑002, 2009‑002, and
2010‑002. Bureau of State Audits’ Internal Control and State and Federal Compliance Audit Report
for Fiscal Years ended June 30, 2007; June 30, 2008; June 30, 2009; and June 30, 2010.

We have also identified weaknesses in the administration
of Recovery Act funded programs by other state agencies.
Specifically, a series of reports we issued in 2009 and 2010 on
the administration of certain Recovery Act funds awarded to the
California Energy Resources Conservation and Development
Commission (Energy Commission),5 the Department of
Community Services and Development (Community Services),6
the Department of Housing and Community Development
(Housing and Development),7 and the California Emergency

5	

California Energy Resources Conservation and Development Commission: It Is Not Fully
Prepared to Award and Monitor Millions in Recovery Act Funds and Lacks Controls to
Prevent Their Misuse (Report 2009‑119.1, December 2009).
6	 Department of Community Services and Development: Delays by Federal and State
Agencies Have Stalled the Weatherization Program and Improvements Are Needed to
Properly Administer Recovery Act Funds (Report 2009‑119.2, February 2010).
7	 Department of Housing and Community Development: Despite Being Mostly Prepared, It
Must Take Additional Steps to Better Ensure Proper Implementation of the Recovery Act’s
Homelessness Prevention Program (Report 2009‑119.3, February 2010).

California State Auditor Report 2011-601

August 2011

Management Agency (CalEMA)8 identified several weaknesses in the
respective agencies’ abilities and preparedness to administer specific
Recovery Act awards. For instance, we reported that the Energy
Commission was slow in developing guidelines and implementing
the internal controls needed to administer the Recovery Act funds
for its State Energy Program. We also found, among other things,
that Housing and Development had not yet developed a written
plan for monitoring its subrecipients, and that Community Services
needed to improve its procedures for managing federal cash for the
weatherization program and, at the time of our review, had not yet
used its Recovery Act funds for any weatherization projects. Further,
we reported that CalEMA needed to improve its monitoring of
Recovery Act Edward Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance Grant
Program funds it had awarded.
Our recent updates on some of these reports found additional issues.
For example, the bureau’s July 2011 letter report concluded that
Community Services9 faces challenges in its efforts to determine how to
allocate the remaining funds to maximize production and weatherize
enough homes to ensure that the grant funds are spent so that they
do not revert by the March 31, 2012 deadline, while also ensuring
that it meets its production goals under the annual weatherization
grants that expire June 30, 2012. Additionally, a second July 2011 letter
report10 concluded that as of June 9, 2011, $69.9 million in reported
expenditures, or 31 percent of the $226 million in Recovery Act funds
administered by the Energy Commission, do not reflect the amount of
Recovery Act funds actually spent for State Energy Program projects.
Based on its agreement with the U.S. Department of Energy, the
Energy Commission must spend the remaining funds by April 30, 2012
and, according to the Energy Commission’s deputy director of the
Administrative Services Division, the Energy Commission is on track
to fully use the Energy Program funds by that date. However, we could
not verify portions of the Energy Commission’s efforts to monitor the
status of projects and subgrant funds it had awarded because it was
not always able to provide evidence sufficient to support its assertions.
Finally, our high‑risk report dated December 2010 indicated that state
agencies did not always report the Recovery Act jobs data accurately.11

8	

California Emergency Management Agency: Despite Receiving $136 Million in Recovery Act
Funds in June 2009, It Only Recently Began Awarding These Funds and Lacks Plans to Monitor
Their Use (Report 2009‑119.4, May 2010).
9	 Department of Community Services and Development: Status of Funds Provided Under the
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 for the Weatherization Assistance for
Low‑Income Persons Program (Report 2011‑503.2, July 2011).
10	 California Energy Resources Conservation and Development Commission: Status of Funds
Provided Under the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 for the State Energy
Program (Report 2011-503.3, July 2011).
11	 High Risk Update—American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009: The California
Recovery Task Force and State Agencies Could Do More to Ensure the Accurate Reporting
of Recovery Act Jobs (Report 2010‑601, December 2010).

We could not verify portions of the
Energy Commission’s efforts to
monitor the status of projects and
subgrant funds it had awarded
because it was not always able
to provide evidence sufficient to
support its assertions.

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Moreover, the U.S. Department of Education’s Office of the
Inspector General issued a report in April 2011 on selected
local educational agencies and Education’s administration of
Recovery Act funds that identified instances of noncompliance
with applicable federal requirements, resulting in improper use of
Recovery Act funds.12 According to the report, about $23,000 of the
$771,000 in local educational agency charges of Recovery Act funds
for Title I, Part A, of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act
reviewed by the federal Inspector General were for unallowable
personnel and entertainment costs. In addition, the report
described significant data quality issues related to reporting on the
number of jobs created or retained using Recovery Act funds.

The overall spending for one grant
appears insufficient to ensure
that all funds are spent before the
spending deadline.

Further, the letter report the bureau issued in August 201113
found that the State is at risk of having to return to the federal
government some Recovery Act funds for various programs
that Education administers. Education awards most funds for
the eight Recovery Act grants that it currently administers
to subrecipients, which are responsible for spending
the funds. One of the grants that Education administers has
a spending deadline of September 30, 2011 and six others
have a spending deadline of December 31, 2011. However, the
overall spending for one of these seven grants appears insufficient
to ensure that all funds are spent before the deadline. Specifically,
subrecipients for the Education Technology State Grants spent an
average of only $9.5 million per quarter. With the fast approaching
spending deadline, assuming that the pace of spending does
not change substantially, the subrecipients will have spent just
81 percent of the $71.6 million for the Education Technology State
Grants before the deadline.
In addition, although based on their overall spending the
remaining six Recovery Act grants that must be spent on or before
December 31, 2011 appear to be on track to be substantially spent
before the spending deadline, some of the subrecipients that
received the funds for these grants have spent very little and do not
appear to be on track to use all of the funds awarded to them. For
example, although based on the current pace of spending it appears
that subrecipients will have fully spent by December 31, 2011,
substantially all of the State Fiscal Stabilization Fund-Education
State Grants funds Education awarded to 1,518 subrecipients,
76 subrecipients had spent 50 percent or less of their awards as
of June 30, 2011. With only two quarters remaining before the
spending deadline, these subrecipients must spend a combined total
12	

American Recovery and Reinvestment Act‑California: Use of Funds and Data Quality for
Selected American Recovery and Reinvestment Act Funds (Report ED‑OIG/A09K0002, April 2011).
13	 Department of Education: Status of Funds Provided Under the American Recovery and
Reinvestment Act of 2009 for Various Grants (Report 2011‑503.4, August 2011).

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August 2011

of $64 million. Education noted that it periodically sends reminder
letters to encourage subrecipients to spend their remaining
Recovery Act funds. However, Education cannot force subrecipients
to spend their awards at an increased pace to ensure that all
funds are spent before grant deadlines. Nevertheless, because
subrecipients must spend these funds on allowable activities, the
short amount of time remaining to spend the Recovery Act funds
increases the risk that Recovery Act funds could either revert or be
used inappropriately.

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Blank page inserted for reproduction purposes only.

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Chapter 2
MANAGING THE STATE’S PRISON POPULATION AND
CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTIONS
In 2006 the Bureau of State Audits (bureau) designated the California
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (Corrections) as a
high‑risk department because of litigation related to overcrowding
in its prisons, its inability to achieve or maintain a constitutional
level of health care for its prison inmates, and issues related to
the consistency of its leadership in upper management. Although
Corrections has made progress in providing health care to its inmates
over the last four years, a recent decision by the U.S. Supreme Court
will require Corrections to reduce its prison overcrowding, and the
department’s recent reorganization will continue to affect its ability
to provide consistent leadership. For these reasons, Corrections
continues to represent a high risk to the State.
Reducing Overcrowding in the State’s Prisons
The State’s correctional institutions house well over the maximum
level ordered by a federal court. As a result, Corrections may have
to reduce its prison population or construct additional prisons to
comply with the federal court’s ruling. However, little progress has
been made in this area. Recent legislation should reduce the prison
populations in state prisons, although the impact of this legislation
is currently unknown. Given that Corrections must ensure that its
prison population is no more than 137.5 percent of prison capacity
within two years, prison overcrowding remains an area of high risk.
Corrections’ data show that as of June 8, 2011, the number of
inmates housed in adult institutions caused the system to reach
180.2 percent of their design capacity. Design capacity refers to the
number of inmates a prison can hold based on one prisoner per cell.
On May 23, 2011, the U.S. Supreme Court (Supreme Court) upheld
a 2009 lower court ruling requiring Corrections to reduce its
prison population to 137.5 percent of design capacity by May 2013.14
Complying with this ruling would require Corrections to either
release 34,000 prisoners, increase design capacity by constructing
new beds, or implement some combination of these two options.
The lower court stated in its prior ruling that overcrowding was the
primary cause for the unconstitutional level of medical care found
in California’s prisons, and that a prisoner release order may be the
most compelling means for relief.

14	

(Brown, Governor of California et al. v. Plata et al.)

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The Supreme Court stated that the lower court retains the authority
to further amend its existing order and may extend the May 2013
deadline, though it noted that even with an extension of time
to construct new facilities and implement other reforms, it
may become necessary to release prisoners to comply with the
court’s order.

AB 900 of the 2007 Regular Session
provides funding to Corrections in
two phases to construct additional
beds, yet four years after the
passage of the law, Corrections
has shown little progress
in construction.

Assembly Bill 900 of the 2007 Regular Session (AB 900) authorizes
Corrections to construct and renovate prison space and to
initiate and improve rehabilitation programs to reduce prison
overcrowding. Specifically, AB 900 provides funding to Corrections
in two phases to construct additional beds. However, four years
after the passage of the law, Corrections has shown little progress
in construction. In fact, as shown in Figure 4, as of April 2011,
AB 900 construction has not increased the design capacity of
state prisons. Only one AB 900 project had been completed,
adding a total of 50 medical beds, some of which are used for
short‑term medical treatment and do not, therefore, increase the
prison’s overall capacity. Furthermore, some of the medical beds
Corrections is creating are not new beds, but rather beds that are
being altered from their original purpose of housing prisoners to
serve a medical purpose. The construction involved in repurposing
these beds creates new medical treatment and office areas and
allows Corrections to better serve inmates already housed in
those areas. Although medical beds increase the ability to provide
medical care, not all increase design capacity.
Six AB 900 projects are currently under construction. Once they
are completed, Corrections estimates they will add 1,831 design
capacity beds, 1,781 medical beds, and 808 repurposed beds to the
prison system. Corrections expects these projects to be completed
between October 2011 and July 2013. Seven additional projects,
adding 1,814 design capacity beds and 675 repurposed beds, are
in the design phase, and Corrections’ planned completion dates
for those projects are between February 2013 and October 2013.
In total, through AB 900 Corrections has created, is constructing,
or is designing a total of 3,645 design capacity beds, 1,831 medical
beds, and 1,483 repurposed beds. However, this increase in
prison bed capacity will not come in time to reduce prison
overcrowding to 137.5 percent of design capacity as required by
the federal ruling.

1,831

50
1,781
0

Medical
Beds†

1,483

0
808
675

Repurposed
Beds‡

2010

December
California Institution for
Women Acute/Intermediate
Care Facility
45 design capacity beds
45 medical beds

October
California Medical Facility
Intermediate Care Facility
64 design capacity beds
64 medical beds

2011

California State Prison
Corcoran Administrative
Segregation Unit Enhanced
Outpatient
99 repurposed beds

October
Central California Women's
Facility Enhanced Outpatient
Program Office and
Treatment Building
124 repurposed beds

DeWitt Nelson
Correctional Facility
684 design capacity beds

California Health Care Facility
1,722 design capacity beds
1,622 medical beds

July
Salinas Valley State Prison
Enhanced Outpatient Program
Office and Treatment Building
300 repurposed beds

Northern California Reentry
Facility (Stockton)
500 design capacity beds

April
Estrella Correctional Facility
630 design capacity beds

October
California Men's Colony
Mental Health Crisis Beds
50 medical beds
December
California Medical Facility
Enhanced Outpatient
Program Office and
Treatment Building
658 repurposed beds

March
California State Prison
Sacramento Psychiatric
Services Unit Office and
Treatment Building
152 repurposed beds

2013

July
California State Prison
Los Angeles Enhanced
Outpatient Program Office
and Treatment Building
150 repurposed beds

2012

•
•

Source:  Auditor‑generated based on information from California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation’s chief deputy secretary of Facility Planning, Construction, and Management and acting director
of Division of Planning, Acquisition and Design.
*	 Design capacity beds are beds that increase a facility’s overall capacity for housing inmates.
†	 Medical beds include short‑term medical treatment beds that do not increase design capacity and long‑term medical treatment beds that can increase design capacity. Medical beds include those
designated by Corrections as Correctional Treatment Center beds, Mental Health Crisis Beds, Medical‑Low Beds, Medical‑High Beds, Acute Psych, Intermediate Care Facility, and Intermediate Care
Facility‑High.
‡	 Repurposed beds are not new beds and do not serve new prisoners. Instead, Corrections creates new treatment and office buildings to better serve inmates with mental health or medical needs.
	 Denotes that the project is under construction.
	 Denotes that the project is being planned.

3,645

Total AB 900 beds completed, under construction,
or being planned

2009
December
California State Prison
San Quentin Central Health
Services building
50 medical beds

Design
Capacity
Beds*
0
1,831
1,814

2008

Total AB 900 completed
Total AB 900 beds under construction
Total AB 900 beds being planned

May
Assembly Bill 900 (AB 900)
takes effect

2007

Figure 4
Timeline of Actual and Planned Completion Dates and Numbers of Beds to Be Constructed Under Assembly Bill 900, as of March 2011

California State Auditor Report 2011-601

August 2011

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Although Corrections expects to receive the funding through
the second phase of AB 900, it must first meet all 13 benchmarks
outlined in the legislation. The benchmarks cover a broad spectrum
of objectives such as the number of beds under construction
for medical, dental, and mental health purposes; creation of the
California Rehabilitation Oversight Board; and the implementation
of a plan to address management deficiencies that Corrections
is struggling to address, as we discuss later. Further, the funding for
the second phase is to be made available over a long‑term period.
Considering that Corrections has only until May 2013 to ensure that
its prison population is no more than 137.5 percent of the capacity, the
additional funding may not come in time to help with this effort.
In addition to increasing capacity, the State has taken some steps
to reduce the prison populations in Corrections’ prisons. In 2011
legislation was passed that reclassifies certain crimes that formerly
required incarceration in state prisons. Under Assembly Bill 109
(AB 109) many felonies that are not classified as violent or serious
will no longer result in a prison sentence; instead, the offender will
serve his or her term in a county jail. Additionally, AB 109 transfers
the responsibility of monitoring many parolees from the State to the
counties and makes parole violations subject to time in a county jail,
rather than a state prison. The 2011–12 Budget Act, which was signed
into law in June 2011, makes money available for this purpose. Another
bill that took effect on June 30, 2011, delayed implementation of
AB 109 until October 2011. Corrections plans to begin implementing
the changes in AB 109 as soon as certain provisions of the law go into
effect. However, Corrections anticipates that the full impact of AB 109
will not be immediate.

Although the total effect of this
legislation is unknown, Corrections
believes that this bill has
contributed to a drop in the prison
population, and the reduction will
continue in the future.

Finally, Corrections noted that a law enacted in 2009 will also
help reduce prison overcrowding. Specifically, Senate Bill 18 of the
Third Extraordinary Session of 2009 (SBX3‑18), changed the Penal
Code to decrease the number of parolees returned to prison for parole
violations. This bill increases the dollar threshold above which theft
and certain property crimes are classified as felonies as opposed to
misdemeanors, from $400 to $950. In addition, the bill allows prisoners
to receive up to six weeks of credit toward their sentence each year for
completing programs in prison, creates a fund to aid communities in
rehabilitating parolees, institutes irrevocable parole for some parolees,
and creates reentry courts. Although the total effect of this legislation
is unknown, Corrections believes that this bill has contributed to a
drop in the prison population, and will continue to reduce the prison
population in the future. However, given that as of June 8, 2011,
Corrections needed to reduce its prisoner population by 34,000 within
two years in order to meet the federal court’s ruling, the various
initiatives it is undertaking may prove to be inadequate.

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August 2011

Improving Medical Care for Prisoners
Prison health care reform is a costly process, and although the
federal health care receiver (receiver) has reported successes in
its efforts to increase the quality of medical care for California’s
inmate population, it has also reported challenges. Due to the
continuing work to bring California’s medical care for inmates
to a constitutionally adequate level, this issue remains on our
high‑risk list.
In February 2006 the U.S. District Court for the Northern District
of California (District Court) appointed the receiver to oversee
the State’s prison health care system and ordered him to remain
in place until the court was satisfied that the State had the will,
capacity, and leadership to maintain a system for providing
constitutionally adequate health care to inmates. According to
data reported in several governor’s budgets and information
provided by the receiver, costs directly attributable to the delivery
of medical care for inmates in California prisons have grown from
$841 million in fiscal year 2005–06 to a high of $1.9 billion in fiscal
year 2008–09, with $1.5 billion budgeted in fiscal year 2011–12.
However, the receiver’s total costs are higher still because the
receiver is also responsible for some portion of Corrections’ overall
overhead allocations. Corrections’ total overhead costs ranged
from $210 million in fiscal year 2005–06 to a budgeted $457 million
in fiscal year 2011–12. Furthermore, until fiscal year 2010–11 the
receiver included the cost of transporting and guarding prisoners
for medical treatment in its budget. The costs to the receiver for
this service varied from $65 million in fiscal year 2005–06 to an
estimated high of $281 million in fiscal year 2008–09. According to
the associate director of the receiver’s fiscal management branch,
as of July 2010 these costs have completely reverted to Corrections
because they involve access to care and not the provision of care.
The receiver reported both successes and challenges in its latest
report to the District Court. In June 2008 the District Court
approved the receiver’s updated Turnaround Plan of Action
(turnaround plan). Of the 48 discrete actions in its 17th triannual
report dated May 15, 2011, the receiver identified 34 as complete
and 14 as in process or ongoing. In our 2009 high risk report,
we noted that, of the 46 actions identified in the 10th triannual
report, two actions had been completed, 23 were on schedule
for completion, and 21 were either delayed or not progressing. A
specific success the receiver reported in the 17th triannual report
was the filling of executive positions throughout the State. The
receiver also identified the State’s fiscal crisis as having an impact
on productivity and the timelines for implementing solutions to the
issues it faces.

Costs directly attributable to
the delivery of medical care for
inmates in California prisons have
grown tremendously.

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The inspector general found that
nearly all prisons were not effective
in ensuring that inmates receive
their medications and that they
are seen or provided services for
routine, urgent, and emergency
medical needs according to
set timelines.

To evaluate and monitor the progress of medical care delivery to
inmates at each prison, the receiver requested that the California
Office of the Inspector General (inspector general) for Corrections
conduct an objective, clinically appropriate, and metric‑oriented
medical inspection program. To fulfill this request, the inspector
general assigns a score to each prison based on multiple metrics
to derive an overall rating of zero to 100 percent. Although only
the federal court may determine whether a constitutional standard
for medical care has been met, the inspector general uses the
Receiver’s scoring criteria for three levels of adherence to policies
and procedures, with 75 percent being moderate adherence.
Scores below 75 percent denote low adherence, while those above
85 percent reflect high adherence. Using this tool, the inspector
general has rated California’s 33 adult institutions at 72.9 percent,
on average. It reported on each adult institution in California at
least once between November 2008 and May 2011, and reported
on seven institutions twice. Six of the seven institutions received
a higher score upon the second visit, while one institution scored
0.4 percent lower in its second review. High Desert State Prison
scored lowest, at 62.4 percent, and Folsom State Prison received
the highest score, at 83.2 percent. The inspector general found that
nearly all prisons were not effective in ensuring that inmates receive
their medications. In addition, prisons were generally not effective
at ensuring that inmates are seen or provided services for routine,
urgent, and emergency medical needs according to timelines set
by Corrections’ policy. However, the inspector general did find
that prisons generally performed well in areas involving duties
performed by nurses, and in the continuity of care.
Maintaining Consistent Leadership
Corrections continues to struggle with ensuring consistent
leadership. Although it has made progress toward achieving the
goals outlined in its new strategic plan, many vital positions remain
unfilled. In addition, a recent reorganization of the department
jeopardizes Corrections’ ability to ensure consistent leadership.
Finally, in order to receive its second phase of funding for
construction of additional beds under AB 900, Corrections must
demonstrate that it has filled at least 75 percent of its management
positions for at least six months. As a result, maintaining consistent
leadership remains a high risk for Corrections.
Since our 2009 high risk report, Corrections has implemented
a strategic plan covering the years from 2010 through 2015. The
strategic plan has four goals with 26 objectives. Corrections has
developed a Web site on its intranet to track its progress against
these objectives. This Web site generates charts detailing the
number of on‑time milestones and the implementation progress

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August 2011

for each objective. According to updates posted on its Web site
regarding its progress, as of July 26, 2011, over 80 percent of the
tasks associated with two of its four goals were on schedule, and
between 60 percent and 80 percent of the tasks for the remaining
two goals were on schedule.
Although it has established a strategic plan, Corrections remains
unable to fully staff its management and warden ranks. A lack of
consistent leadership at the top and in its upper‑ and mid‑level
management hampers Corrections’ ability to succeed. Corrections’
vacancy rate in its top administration and warden positions was
34 percent in 2007. That rate dropped to 30 percent in 2009, but
by May 2011, 38.2 percent of these positions either were vacant or
were filled in an acting capacity. According to Corrections, 12 of its
33 wardens—more than 36 percent—were serving in an acting role.
Furthermore, our review of top administration positions revealed
that nearly 41 percent of these positions were vacant or filled in an
acting capacity. Additionally, a recent restructuring of Corrections
by the governor eliminated 32 executive level positions and over
100 manager and supervisor positions. As a result, consistent
leadership will continue to be an area of high risk for Corrections.

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Chapter 3
MODERNIZING AND IMPROVING
STATE‑FINANCED INFRASTRUCTURE
The State’s aging infrastructure and its ability to supply reliable
electricity to its residents remain areas of high risk. The State
issued bonds to partially finance the upgrades of its infrastructure;
however, it continues to struggle with ensuring bond accountability.
Further, continuing budget problems have steered the focus
away from improving infrastructure. In addition, uncertainties
exist regarding requirements to retrofit or replace certain
environmentally harmful power plants, as well as the State’s ability
to meet its new target for renewable energy. Therefore, maintaining
and improving the State’s infrastructure and the production and
delivery of electricity remain areas of high risk.
Upgrading and Expanding the State’s Infrastructure
Issues involving accountability for the State’s infrastructure bonds,
as well as the State’s shift of focus away from infrastructure projects
due to budget issues and the economic recession, mean that the
State’s infrastructure remains on our list of high‑risk issues faced by
the State.
At the time of the State’s most recent road assessment, issued in
March 2008, approximately 13,000 miles, or 26 percent, of the
State’s roadways were in fair or poor condition. To improve
the conditions of the State’s infrastructure, voters approved
$42.7 billion in bonds to partially fund the State’s strategic growth
plan to rebuild California’s infrastructure. The total investment
called for in the plan is more than $500 billion. Due to the size of
this undertaking, the former governor issued an executive order to
ensure accountability for the expenditures of funds received from
these bonds.
We found numerous problems related to bond accountability. Our
May 2011 report related to bonds for water projects15 found that
the Department of Finance (Finance) lacks procedures to ensure
that agencies administering bond‑funded projects update the bond
accountability Web site required by the executive order and that
the project information on the Web site is complete and accurate.
Further, the Department of Water Resources (Water Resources)
did not post all project information to the Web site, omitting

15	

General Obligation Bonds: The Departments of Water Resources and Finance Should Do More
to Improve Their Oversight of Bond Expenditures (Report 2010‑117, May 2011).

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August 2011

some projects under certain bond programs. Also, we noted that
while Finance had begun conducting audits of bond expenditures
related to the strategic growth plan, as of late April 2011 it had
issued audit reports on only three state entities administering the
general obligation bonds. Without these audits, Finance cannot
be sure that expenditures are consistent with bond laws or that
projects achieve the benefits or outcomes intended when they
were originally awarded. Finally, we reported that Water Resources
needs to strengthen its monitoring of project deliverables and
its divisions need to ensure that grant recipients submit periodic
progress reports and that final site visit results are documented.
These concerns are not new, as we reported similar findings in our
2009 high risk audit.
In addition to concerns over
bond accountability, we found
that the State has shifted its
focus away from improving
California’s infrastructure.

In addition to the concerns over bond accountability, we
found that the State has shifted its focus away from improving
California’s infrastructure. The 2008 update to the strategic
growth plan indicated that in addition to the $42.7 billion in
approved infrastructure bonds from 2006, the State needs to make
further investments in its infrastructure to maintain and improve
California’s quality of life and continue its economic growth. The
updated plan proposed placing an additional $48.1 billion in general
obligation bonds on the ballot for voter approval in the 2008 and
2010 general elections. However, only $9.95 billion of bonds related
to infrastructure have been placed on the ballot, and these bonds
were approved in the 2008 general election.
Additionally, the updated strategic growth plan did not anticipate
the economic recession. According to Finance, given the economic
recession, the focus of the governor and Legislature has shifted to
the State’s budget problems and deficit resolution. Finance further
noted that until the more immediate fiscal issues are resolved, it
is unlikely that decision makers will turn their attention back to
infrastructure on a statewide basis. In addition, Finance stated
that due to economic and fiscal changes since the 2008 update
of the strategic growth plan, once the State is prepared to
focus comprehensively on infrastructure, a complete review of
programmatic needs and financing approach will need to occur.
According to the Legislative Analyst’s Office, with the ongoing
budget problems, the State will continue to experience difficulty in
addressing fundamental public sector goals, such as improving its
aging infrastructure.

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Ensuring a Stable Supply of Electricity
We designated electricity as a high‑risk issue in 2009 because
California faced multiple challenges and problems related to
energy production and consumption. Our current review found
that although the State has made some progress in addressing
these challenges, uncertainties still exist regarding utilities’ ability
to implement required retrofitting of certain power plants and
the State’s ability to meet its increased renewable energy target.
Therefore, the State’s supply of electricity continues to be a
high‑risk issue.
Although the uncertainty surrounding direct access—an option that
enables customers to choose an electricity provider other than their
default utility—could affect the ability of investor‑owned utilities to
rely upon a fairly consistent set of customers it will not likely affect
the availability of electricity because the load remains the same.
Direct access is currently available only to commercial customers.
Further, the State has set limits on the electricity supplied by direct
access providers. Residential customers do not have the right to
direct access until the Legislature, by statute, lifts the suspension.
In addition, the investor‑owned utilities are required to work with
the California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) to ensure
an adequate 10‑year supply of electricity through a long‑term
procurement plan, which is revised every two years. This further
mitigates the impact of direct access on the electricity supply for
the State.
In our 2009 report on electricity as a high‑risk issue, we expressed
concerns that many aging power plants may need to either undergo
expensive modification of their cooling systems or shut down.
Specifically, power plants that use the once‑through cooling
method—the process of drawing in ocean water, circulating it
through heat exchangers, and then discharging the water back
into the ocean at a higher temperature—generated approximately
30 percent of the State’s 2008 total electrical capacity. The
once‑through cooling method causes injury and death to marine life
trapped on intake screens, drawn through the power plant’s cooling
system, and exposed to the discharged heated water. In May 2010,
in an effort to minimize this environmental impact, the State Water
Resources Control Board (Water Board) adopted a policy which
was effective October 2010, requiring modification of power plants’
cooling systems or other comparable measures to reduce mortality
rate of marine life to an amount comparable to the effect of a
93 percent reduction in the existing water intake flow rate.
As of June 2011, 14 of the 17 fossil fuel plants using once‑through
cooling had submitted implementation plans and schedules to
comply with the policy. Of the remaining three, one has been

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It is currently unknown whether
implementation plans submitted
by fossil fuel plants are adequate
to address the new policy and
what impact they will have on
electricity production.

repowered with an air cooling system and two have shut down. The
State’s two nuclear facilities will conduct special studies to address
their unique issues. Although the owners of all 14 plants that
continue to use the once‑through cooling method have submitted
plans, the Water Board and other state agencies and entities that
are responsible for the regulation of these power plants are jointly
in the process of reviewing these plans to ensure that they are
realistic and will not cause disruption in the state’s electrical power
supply. Therefore, it is currently unknown whether these plans are
adequate to address the new policy and what impact they will have
on electricity production.
Further, the State has increased its target for renewable energy,
and the uncertainty and difficulty surrounding the construction
of infrastructure to transmit the renewable energy still exist. In
April 2011 the governor signed into law a bill that set the State’s
target for renewable energy production at 33 percent of retail
electricity sales in California by 2020. According to the CPUC,
in 2010 the three large investor‑owned utilities reported that
they generated 17.9 percent of their electricity from renewable
sources such as wind and solar. Although the State is making
progress toward achieving the new renewable energy target, it
needs to overcome several barriers to do so by 2020. Several
regions in California have great potential for electricity generation
from wind and solar power; however, the complex regulation of
power plants and transmission poses difficulties with siting and
constructing renewable electricity generators and transmission
capacity in these regions. For example, depending on the type and
location of the facility, various federal, state, and local entities can
be involved in the facility’s siting approval process. Additionally,
the Independent System Operator, which operates the wholesale
power system for approximately 80 percent of California, and
the other five California balancing authorities must approve the
interconnection of any new power‑generating facility to their
respective electric grids.

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Chapter 4
EFFECTIVELY MANAGING THE STATE’S WORKFORCE
Given the uncertainties surrounding the efforts to modernize human
resources management and the fact that many agencies are still in the
process of developing or evaluating their succession plans, managing
the State’s workforce remains a high‑risk issue. A large proportion of the
State’s workforce is nearing retirement age, particularly those in leadership
positions. Because these individuals likely have institutional knowledge
that is critical to running various state departments and programs, it
is crucial for the State to have a plan to deal with these retirements.
Moreover, although the State has made efforts to modernize and
streamline its recruitment process for certain positions, its future efforts
in this area are uncertain. Further, although some of the state departments
we surveyed that provide critical services have developed workforce and
succession plans, they are still in the process of implementing them.
State Workforce Retirements
The aging of the State’s workforce, and an increase in retirements, could
deprive the State of the unique perspectives and institutional knowledge
possessed by individuals who are retiring. As a result, this issue remains
on our list of high‑risk issues.
As of June 2010 more than half of state employees in leadership roles and
nearly 40 percent of rank‑and‑file employees were 50 years of age or older.
In addition, state employees have been retiring at an increasing rate over
the last three years, as Table 7 shows. For instance, in fiscal year 2007–08,
26 percent of state employees in leadership positions who were 60 years of
age or older chose to retire. By fiscal year 2009–10 that retirement rate had
increased to 35 percent.
Table 7
Percentage of Retirements by Age Group for State Civil Service Employees in
Leadership Positions

AGE GROUP

Under
50 years

PERCENTAGE OF GROUP
RETIRING IN FISCAL
YEAR 2007–08

0.01%

PERCENTAGE OF GROUP
RETIRING IN FISCAL
YEAR 2008–09

0.01%

PERCENTAGE OF GROUP
RETIRING IN FISCAL
YEAR 2009–10

0.00%

50 to 54 years

4.06

4.27

6.04

55 to 59 years

11.54

13.72

17.31

60 years
and older

26.12

28.23

34.64

Source:  Bureau of State Audits’ analysis of personnel data provided by the State Personnel Board and
the State Controller’s Office.
Note:  Includes only state civil servants in full‑time, permanent, or career executive assignment (CEA)
positions. Excludes employees of the California State University, judicial branch, and legislative branch.
Leadership positions include managerial, supervisory, and CEA positions.

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In our 2009 high risk update,16 we calculated the projected
retirements through fiscal year 2014–15 for employees who were
in leadership positions as of June 30, 2008. As Figure 5 shows,
the actual retirements between July 2008 and December 2010
are relatively consistent with the retirements we projected for the
same period. For example, we had projected that 13.4 percent of
the employees in leadership positions as of June 30, 2008, would
retire during fiscal year 2009–10. Our review of available retirement
data found that 13.9 percent of those in leadership positions during
fiscal years 2008–09 and 2009–10 retired during those two years.
The projection estimated that, by the end of fiscal year 2014–15,
nearly 12,847—or about 42 percent—of employees who were in
leadership positions as of June 30, 2008, could potentially retire.
Regardless of the precise timing of these retirements, planning is
prudent to ensure continued delivery of state services.
Figure 5
Projected Retirements Compared to Actual Retirements Since
Fiscal Year 2008–09
14
12
10
8
Actual Retirements

6

Projected Retirements

4
2

2014–15

2013–14

2012–13

2011–12

2010–11

2009–10

0
2008–09

Retirements From Leadership Positions
(In Thousands)

42

Fiscal Years
Source:  Bureau of State Audits’ (bureau) analysis of data provided by the State Personnel Board
(Personnel Board) and the State Controller’s Office (Controller).
Note:  Projected retirements are based on information received from the Personnel Board and the
Controller for the bureau’s 2009 report, and include only those employees who were in leadership
positions as of June 30, 2008. Actual retirements are based on data provided by the Personnel Board
as of December 31, 2010, and include those employees who were in leadership positions at the time
they retired.

16	

High Risk: The California State Auditor’s Updated Assessment of High‑Risk Issues the State and
Select State Agencies Face (Report 2009‑601, June 2009)

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August 2011

Modernizing Hiring Procedures
Since our June 2009 report the Department of Personnel
Administration (Personnel Administration) and the State
Personnel Board (Personnel Board) have made additional progress
in streamlining the State’s hiring process for certain positions,
but there are uncertainties surrounding the future of the efforts
initiated through the Human Resources Modernization Project
(HR‑Mod). Therefore, this issue continues to be a high‑risk area for
the State.
HR‑Mod’s mission is to modernize and streamline the State’s
human resources programs. During its first year, HR‑Mod
established 15 ambitious objectives, with a plan to implement a
large‑scale integrated technology solution. However, the State’s
economic condition necessitated a shift toward implementing
a smaller‑scale, less costly version. Currently, HR‑Mod has
10 objectives focusing on various areas, including workforce
planning, simplifying job classifications, improving recruitment and
hiring, coordinating statewide training, and increasing collaboration
between state agencies. One of HR‑Mod’s accomplishments
related to these objectives includes the implementation of 16 online
exams. According to HR‑Mod’s executive project director,
making exams available online has increased the pool of qualified
candidates while eliminating duplication of effort, because multiple
state entities can choose candidates from the eligibility lists created
by the online exams.
Other accomplishments by HR‑Mod include simplifying the State’s
complex civil service structure by abolishing or consolidating
many civil service classifications and releasing competency models
that identify the general competencies required for successful
job performance in a specific occupational group. For example,
HR‑Mod has abolished 300 job classifications in an effort to allow
state agencies to collaborate to jointly develop examinations and to
cross‑train employees, among other goals.
A recent proposal by the governor to reorganize the State’s
personnel agencies would, if enacted, place Personnel
Administration and the Personnel Board into a new
single department called the Department of Human Resources.
It will take effect on July 1, 2012, unless the Legislature adopts
a resolution through a majority vote that repeals the proposed
reorganization plan. Therefore, it is uncertain which efforts initiated
by HR‑Mod will continue and what effects the reorganization will
have on the State’s efforts to manage its workforce.

It is uncertain which efforts initiated
by HR‑Mod will continue and what
effects the reorganization will have
on the State’s efforts to manage
its workforce.

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Workforce and Succession Planning
Seven Steps Identified in the Department of
Personnel Administration’s State of California
Workforce Planning Model
Step 1: Review strategic plan. Review your department’s
strategic plan mission, vision, and measurable goals and
objectives, and time frames for accomplishing them.
Step 2: Identify work functions. Identify the work functions
that must be performed in order to accomplish the
strategic plan.
Step 3: Identify staffing requirements. Identify the staffing,
both in number of staff and competencies, required to
accomplish the work functions.
Step 4: Project workforce supply. Project your workforce,
including numbers of staff as well as competencies, taking
into account attrition, and assuming no management
actions taken to replace staff lost through attrition.
Step 5: Analyze workforce gaps. Compare the staffing
requirements in step 3 with the projected workforce supply
in step 4 and determine the gap.
Step 6: Develop priorities and implement solutions.
Analyze your workforce needs (the gap), establish priorities,
and implement solutions for meeting those needs.
Step 7: Evaluate the plan. Assess what is working and what
is not. Make adjustments as needed. Address new workforce
and organizational issues.

Since our June 2009 high risk report, Personnel
Administration and the Personnel Board have
made additional efforts with regard to workforce
planning. However, because many departments
are still in the process of creating these plans,
if they have begun to do so at all, it is not clear
whether the plans will ensure a smooth succession
and adequate staffing. Therefore, this issue
continues to be a high‑risk area for the State.
The Personnel Board and Personnel
Administration have provided resources to
state departments seeking to develop workforce
and succession plans. Although there is no
requirement to develop such plans, some
departments have undertaken the effort to do
so, using the model that the Personnel Board
has created. Further, the Personnel Board has
expanded the workforce planning courses that it
offers to state department personnel. Personnel
Administration has also developed a seven‑step
workforce planning model, as illustrated in the
text box, to assist state entities in developing their
workforce plans.

Further, the Personnel Board has expanded
its two‑day introductory course for workforce
planning to a three‑day course in which
department staff learn all aspects of workforce
and succession planning using their own
organization’s data. The Personnel Board expects that attendees
will leave with a workforce action plan and the knowledge and
tools required to develop a workforce plan for their organization. In
addition, the Personnel Board offers an advanced two‑day course
exploring the challenges of workforce planning, such as knowledge
transfer strategies and communication skills. Also, Personnel
Administration has held meetings in which staff from different state
entities discuss strategies their agencies have used in implementing
a workforce plan.

Source:  Department of Personnel Administration.

According to the results of a July 2008 survey by Personnel
Administration, only 9 percent of the 104 state departments that
responded to the survey indicated that they were implementing and
evaluating their workforce plans, 32 percent were in the process of
developing these plans, 35 percent had just begun developing their
plans, and 24 percent had not yet started these efforts. Similarly,
the results showed that 16 percent of the departments responding

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August 2011

to the survey were currently in the process of implementing and
evaluating their succession plans, 32 percent were in the process
of developing these plans, 30 percent had just begun, and the
remaining 22 percent had not yet started these efforts. In our 2009
high risk report we noted that our review of five departments—
California Emergency Management Agency (CalEMA), Department
of Health Care Services (Health Care Services), Department of
Public Health (Public Health), Department of Social Services
(Social Services), and the California Department of Transportation
(Caltrans)—found that except for Social Services the departments
were in the early stages of workforce and succession planning.
In response to our current survey of these five departments for this
update, CalEMA and Health Care Services noted that they have
not yet completed their succession and workforce plans. Further,
Caltrans is creating workforce plans for each occupational group,
rather than the department as a whole. It noted that it is currently
implementing and evaluating succession plans for the career
executive assignment and maintenance occupational groups. Public
Health and Social Services indicated that they have completed
their succession and workforce plans and are in the process of
implementing and evaluating these plans. However, because none
of these plans have been implemented yet, the five departments
cannot be assured that their plans will adequately address the
concerns related to losing employees that possess the knowledge
necessary to provide various services.

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Chapter 5
STRENGTHENING EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS
The State’s emergency preparedness continues to be an area of
high risk. In previous reports we noted that the Department
of Public Health (Public Health) and the California Emergency
Management Agency (CalEMA) needed to address multiple issues
to ensure that the State and local governments would be able to
respond effectively in an emergency. During our current review
of these issues we found that progress has been made in many of
these areas; however, significant milestones and deadlines have yet
to be accomplished.
Preparing for Public Health Emergencies
Public Health has incorporated emergency preparedness into
its strategic plan, establishing key performance measures with
specified deadlines. However, it has not achieved some of these
objectives. In addition, uncertainty exists regarding continued
federal funding and local health departments’ budget challenges.
Therefore, this area continues to warrant inclusion on the list of
high‑risk issues.
One objective of Public Health’s strategic plan required that
90 percent of Public Health personnel complete Standardized
Emergency Management System, National Incident Management
System, and Joint Emergency Operations Center training by
June 30, 2010. However, only 16 percent of Public Health’s personnel
actually completed training in all three areas. Public Health also
encountered challenges in meeting its goal of ensuring that 43 local
health departments received a Strategic National Stockpile17 rating
of at least 70 percent by the end of fiscal year 2008–09, with only
29 local health departments achieving this rating level. According
to Public Health, the narrowly focused state and local efforts to
respond to the 2009 influenza pandemic prevented planners from
addressing broader public health preparedness issues. It further
noted that although reduced staffing and budgets will hamper local
health department planning efforts, through focused efforts at the
state and local level Public Health has been able to ensure that more
than 92 percent of Californians live in jurisdictions with a rating of
70 percent or better and that areas most at risk of a bioterrorism
attack have an average rating of 84 percent. Also, Public Health
17	

The Strategic National Stockpile has large quantities of medicine and medical supplies to
protect the public if there is a public health emergency severe enough to cause local supplies
to run out. Each state has plans to receive and distribute medicine and medical supplies to local
communities as quickly as possible.

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increased the number of local health departments achieving
the rating of 70 percent to 46 departments by the end of fiscal
year 2009–10 and stated that its fiscal year 2010–11 target of
54 departments is achievable with current staffing and budgets.
Public Health’s deputy director of
emergency preparedness continues
to express concern about the
uncertainty of federal grant levels
and financial resources.

Public Health’s deputy director of emergency preparedness
continues to express concern about the uncertainty of federal
grant levels and financial resources. For the upcoming five‑year
Public Health Emergency Preparedness Grant, the U.S. Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) identified 15 public health
target capabilities beginning in fiscal year 2011–12. These target
capabilities are designed to provide guidance and recommendations
for preparedness planning at the state and local levels, such as
medical material management and distribution, and the sharing
of emergency public information and warnings. States apply for
funding each fiscal year to address selected capabilities and need
to demonstrate that they meet that fiscal year’s target capabilities to
continue to receive funding. However, the deputy director noted
that the federal budget contains unallocated cuts to both the
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services and the CDC.
Although Public Health is unsure of the impact of these cuts at this
time, it anticipates that they will affect the public health emergency
preparedness grants, which represented 58 percent of Public
Health’s budget related to emergency preparedness. The deputy
director also noted that local health departments face overall
budget challenges.
Establishing Priorities for the New CalEMA
Since our 2009 high risk report, CalEMA has published its
first strategic plan outlining its goals and objectives to protect
the State during a disaster; however, our review indicated that the
plan does not include specific performance measures, and some
tasks have not yet started even though their planned completion
dates have passed. In addition, to address the emergency
preparedness issues from a 2007 gap analysis, which attempted to
identify the shortfalls between what resources are available and
what will be needed in a catastrophic event, CalEMA initiated the
Metrics Project. The Metrics Project is targeted to result in specific
deliverables, such as a common format and repository for data,
including quality, capability, and location of specific resources.
Although CalEMA has made some progress with the Metrics
Project, it is not yet complete. Therefore, this area continues to be
on our list of high‑risk issues.
In 2009 CalEMA developed its first strategic plan covering the
five‑year period from 2010 to 2015. This plan included various
goals and objectives that CalEMA believes will help it accomplish

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August 2011

its mission. However, the plan does not include any measures
to gauge its success at meeting these goals and objectives.
For example, one of its objectives is to enhance state and regional
operational capabilities and readiness. To achieve this objective, the
plan outlines activities such as ensuring that facilities including
the warning center, regional emergency operations centers, and
state operational center are modernized. However, there is no
way to measure how successful CalEMA has been at achieving
this goal. According to the chief of staff, CalEMA plans to develop
measurements and benchmarks to quantify its progress toward
various objectives.
Further, although CalEMA established completion dates for some
of the activities related to various objectives, it has not started
some of these activities, even though their planned completion
dates have passed. For example, CalEMA’s priorities and objectives
task report indicates that a set of user training classes, with
an intended completion date of June 30, 2010, has yet to start.
CalEMA’s audit chief noted that the report does not accurately
reflect the progress CalEMA has made. Further, the director of
policy and strategic initiatives indicated that CalEMA is reviewing
and revising its strategic priorities, and plans to complete the
update by June 30, 2011.
Additionally, CalEMA’s Metrics Project has made some progress;
however, it is not yet complete. The Metrics Project will enhance
the ability to effectively prepare for and respond to disasters by
developing a common format and repository for data, including
quantity, capability, and location of specific resources. The project
supports a common structure for inventory and assessment
of emergency resources and capabilities. Currently, individual
communities define, organize, and maintain the data, while
CalEMA coordinates it through the Metrics Project. According to
the project manager, CalEMA encountered challenges in collecting
useful data from many diverse constituencies that had not
previously understood the importance of capturing and maintaining
the data and that are currently overtasked and underresourced. The
Metrics Project coordinator noted that CalEMA is developing an
online system that will allow local communities to readily gather,
define, and display resource and capability data. It is currently
working with several Bay Area communities and the California
National Guard, on a pilot basis, to test this online system. CalEMA
expects to launch this system statewide by July 2012.

According to the project manager,
CalEMA encountered challenges
in collecting useful data from
many diverse constituencies that
had not previously understood
the importance of capturing
and maintaining the data and
that are currently overtasked
and underresourced.

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Chapter 6
PROVIDING EFFECTIVE OVERSIGHT OF THE STATE’S
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY PROJECTS
The State’s oversight of information technology (IT) projects
continues to be an area of high risk. The Bureau of State Audits
identified IT as a high‑risk issue in 2007 because, despite efforts
to establish statewide governance, the State had lacked strong IT
oversight for many years and its prior governance models had
limited authority and success. Our current review found that the
California Technology Agency (Technology Agency)18 has grown in
size and responsibilities and has more authority as a control agency
than its predecessors. However, with 70 state IT projects under
development totaling more than $7.8 billion and a relatively new
project management system, IT project oversight remains on our
list of high‑risk issues.
IT Governance
The Technology Agency’s governance authority over the State’s
IT systems—including its leadership in the areas of planning and
policy development—has improved.
In our inaugural high risk report, we faulted the Technology
Agency’s predecessor for not having a clearly defined approval
role or responsibilities. Many key IT functions, such as enterprise
IT management and information security, data center and shared
services, and IT procurement policy, are now the responsibility
of the Technology Agency. The governor’s 2009 reorganization
plan integrated the Department of Technology Services, the
Telecommunications Division within the Department of General
Services (General Services), and the information security functions
previously provided by the Office of Information Security and
Privacy Protection into an expanded Technology Agency. Further,
the reorganization plan transferred duties related to the State’s
procurement of IT from the Department of Finance (Finance),
General Services, and the Department of Information Technology
to the Technology Agency. Assembly Bill 2408, signed into law
in February 2010, subsequently codified the governor’s plan.
The agency is now responsible for IT procurement policy and is
required to review requests for proposals for state IT projects,
giving it more authority than its predecessors.
18	

Governor’s Reorganization No. 1 of 2009–10 Regular Session took effect on May 10, 2009. This
plan was later codified by Assembly Bill 2408 of the 2009–10 Regular Session, which renamed the
Office of the State Chief Information Officer (OCIO) as the California Technology Agency. Within
this report we refer to the former OCIO as the Technology Agency.

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The Technology Agency continues to operate under a governance
model in which the State, agencies, and departments maintain
authority and accountability for IT at their respective government
levels. At the statewide level the Technology Agency provides IT
infrastructure and shared services, agencies provide program and
policy direction and resource consolidation, and departments
provide daily operations and support. Accordingly, the Technology
Agency issues policy letters to state agencies and departments
regarding various IT policies, standards, and procedures.
According to the Technology Agency’s chief technology officer,
the reorganization facilitated IT transparency and communication
among the various state offices charged with IT responsibilities.

The Technology Agency rejects
projects if they lack a business case,
financial resources, or appropriate
technology, and through this
process the Technology Agency
has rejected 132 IT projects as
of March 2011.

In addition, the Technology Agency uses a statewide IT capital plan
as a planning mechanism to ensure that the State’s IT investments
are aligned with business priorities in a manner consistent with the
State’s technology directives. According to the chief technology
officer, the Technology Agency rejects projects if they lack a
business case, financial resources, or appropriate technology,
and through this process the Technology Agency has rejected
132 IT projects as of March 2011. Further, the Technology Agency
and Finance entered into a memorandum of understanding in
August 2009 that requires the Technology Agency to review budget
change proposals related to IT systems and IT infrastructure.
According to the chief technology officer, this review process
allows the Technology Agency to monitor whether projects are on
schedule and within budget, because departments need to submit a
budget change proposal if their projects exceed approved contract
values by 5 percent or more.
Finally, a concern we raised during our first report identifying
statewide IT as a high‑risk issue was that the Technology Agency’s
predecessor attempted to tackle too many challenges at once rather
than establishing a set of priorities and taking on only the most
important issues. Our current review found that the Technology
Agency has a strategic plan in place that outlines the mission,
vision, and philosophy of the State’s IT program; describes the
statewide IT goals, strategies, and high‑level actions; and includes
recent IT accomplishments and planned initiatives. The Technology
Agency appears to track the dates and completion status for goals
and action items outlined in its strategic plan. The Technology
Agency included in its 2010 strategic plan performance report
metrics that included baseline and fiscal year 2013–14 targets
for key IT metrics to measure its progress against the strategic
plan. The performance metrics were not included in its 2011
strategic plan because, according to the chief technology officer,
the Technology Agency chose to include this information as part
of another report it provides to the Legislature. The Technology

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Agency provided documents showing that it continues to measure
its progress toward the long‑term targets it outlined in its
2010 strategic plan.
IT Project Oversight
While the Technology Agency has strengthened its role in IT
project oversight, due to the high cost of state IT projects and
relatively new project management methodologies, its oversight of
IT projects remains an area of high risk.
The Technology Agency continues to use the
California Project Management Methodology
(project methodology) as a guideline to manage
state IT projects. State departments classify their IT
projects as high complexity, medium complexity, or
low complexity based on criteria established in the
project methodology, some of which are described
in the text box. As of May 18, 2011, the State had
70 IT projects under construction, with a total cost
of more than $7.8 billion.19 Of these projects, 35 are
designated high complexity with an estimated total
cost of $5.6 billion, 23 are medium complexity with
an estimated total cost of $151 million, and the
remaining 11 are low complexity with an estimated
total cost of $38 million.

Examples of Criteria the California Technology
Agency Uses to Determine Project Criticality
•	 The level of experience of the project manager and the
project team.
•	 The level of financial risk to the state.
•	 The level of security within the information
technology (IT) system.
•	 The volume of transactions anticipated for the IT system.
Sources:  California Project Management Methodology,
State Administrative Manual, and Statewide Information
Management Manual.

The Technology Agency assigns part‑time or full‑time staff on
some high‑risk projects. According to the deputy director of the
Program Management Office, for high complexity and critical
projects the Technology Agency receives project information
from multiple sources, such as project status reports from
independent verification and validation and independent project
oversight providers, as well as Technology Agency staff working
on the projects. However, less oversight is performed on low‑ and
medium‑complexity projects. This appears reasonable for projects
classified as low complexity because, as noted in the previous
paragraph, these projects make up a small portion of state IT
projects under construction and are, by definition, of low criticality.
According to the deputy director, it is the responsibility of the
department project managers to report accurate and complete
information to the Technology Agency regarding the status of
19	

The Technology Agency does not have the same oversight authority over projects undertaken
by the Administrative Office of the Courts (AOC) and the federal court‑appointed receiver for
the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (Corrections) that it has over other
state entities. Nevertheless, Corrections has chosen to report project information on an exempt
IT project to the Technology Agency, and the AOC provides periodic reports to the Technology
Agency and an annual report to the Legislature that includes updates for one of its IT projects.

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these projects. However, the Technology Agency appears to have
appropriate measures in place to ensure that medium‑complexity
projects are completed on time and within budget. Specifically,
the deputy director stated that the Technology Agency receives
independent reports from the oversight providers of these
projects and also receives information during meetings with
the project staff and by reviewing IT project documents.
Additionally, state agencies must submit to the Technology Agency
a special project report when a project deviates by 10 percent or
more from the most recently approved project cost, benefits,
or schedule. Nevertheless, because its project management
methodologies are relatively new and because state IT projects
take time to complete, it is too early to asses the sufficiency of the
Technology Agency’s project oversight.
Escalating Costs of Major IT Projects
Despite the progress made in the IT governance and oversight
areas, the State continues to experience issues such as increasing
costs and slipping timelines. The State’s IT projects can be
significant in scope and cost, and mismanagement of these projects
can lead to substantial costs to taxpayers. Therefore, this area
continues to be included on our list of issues presenting a high risk
to the State.

Through May 2011 the State has
spent $44 million on its financial
information system. However
Finance has not updated the
total projected cost of the system
since 2007.

We recently reviewed, are monitoring , or have received
information on four large projects with a combined total cost of
$4.4 billion, that could have a major impact on state operations,
and identified concerns related to project funding, increasing cost
estimates, slipping deployment schedules, and inadequate project
management. For instance, although the Financial Information
System for California (FI$Cal) recently received an exemption to
the hiring freeze for certain positions, the project sponsor—a key
leadership position responsible for, among other things, ensuring
sustained buy‑in at all levels and approving significant changes
to the master project plan—was recently replaced when he was
appointed as executive director of General Services in May 2011,
and this change in leadership may pose a challenge for the
project. FI$Cal reported costs of $44 million through May 2011.
However, Finance has not updated the total projected cost of
FI$Cal since 2007, when it projected a total cost of $1.6 billion. It
anticipates updating the project’s total projected cost and timeline
in January 2012. Further, Finance presented funding options for
FI$Cal, which included funding the project costs in the budget as
the costs are incurred, financing some contract costs through the
vendor, or financing a portion of the project through bonds.

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Similarly, the 21st Century Project, designed to combine the State’s
various payroll, employment history, leave, position, and attendance
data into one statewide system, has reported significant challenges
with converting legacy data to the new system. It indicated that this
has caused an unplanned delay affecting multiple activities required
for successful implementation. As of June 2011 the project manager
was unsure how this challenge would affect the total cost of this
project, and she estimated that the deployment of this project
will be delayed by as much as nine months. As of April 2011 the
approved cost for the project was $307.8 million and $153.8 million
had been spent. The Technology Agency has assigned oversight
staff to both the FI$Cal and 21st Century projects.
Corrections’ Strategic Offender Management System (SOMS) is a
large IT project that is not under the oversight of the Technology
Agency. Corrections maintains responsibility for the implementation
of SOMS but is working with the federal court‑appointed health
care receiver (receiver) who became involved in SOMS, in part, to
expedite the procurement process for Corrections. The receiver
filed, on behalf of Corrections, a request to the federal court to waive
state contracting statutes, regulations, and procedures for SOMS,
which was approved by the court. The waiver exempted SOMS
from the State’s IT oversight. However, Corrections has chosen to
report project information to the Technology Agency. Corrections
reported significant variances in the project’s schedule, milestones,
deliverables, and costs in its March 2011 status report to the
Technology Agency. According to the SOMS project director, these
variances existed because Corrections had not updated the project
scope, cost, and timeline since 2006. Information provided by the
project director indicates that SOMS is scheduled for completion
in October 2014 and will cost $500 million—two years later and
$84 million more than we reported in our June 2009 high risk
review. Corrections attributes these increases to the lack of timely
state budgets for the past two fiscal years, mandatory furloughs,
and changes in the programs that the SOMS project supports.
Corrections noted it is exploring several budget alternatives, as well
as evaluating the impact of Assembly Bill 109, discussed in Chapter 2,
before it updates its project scope, cost, and timeline. According to
its status report to the Technology Agency, the project has incurred
costs of $142 million through May 31, 2011. Although the Technology
Agency has no authority over SOMS, Corrections nonetheless
provides status updates to the Technology Agency, and the
Technology Agency has a staff person assigned to monitor and report
on the SOMS project.
The Technology Agency also does not have the same oversight
authority over the case management system being developed by
the AOC that it does over other State IT projects. The AOC is
responsible for managing the development of the most recent

SOMS is scheduled for completion
in October 2014 and will cost
$500 million—two years later
and $84 million more than
we reported in our June 2009
high risk review.

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We also found that the AOC’s cost
estimate for the system grew from
$260 million in 2004 to $1.9 billion
in 2010. Further, over the same
period, complete deployment to the
superior courts was postponed by
seven years.

version of a statewide court case management project called the
Court Case Management System (CCMS). In February 2011 we
reported that the AOC had experienced challenges with the project.
Specifically, we reported that it had not adequately planned the
statewide case management project since 2003, that it had failed
to contract for adequate independent oversight, and that future
funding for this project was uncertain. We also found that the
AOC’s cost estimate for the system grew from $260 million in 2004
to $1.9 billion in 2010. Further, over the same period, complete
deployment to the superior courts was postponed by seven years.
In our report we recommended, in part, that the AOC retain an
independent consultant to review the system before deploying to
three early‑adopter courts.
According to the director of the AOC’s Information Services
Division, as of June 13, 2011, the AOC has awarded the contracts for
independent code quality assessment and a rapid quality assessment
of the CCMS software development project and resulting
products and anticipates that the reviews will be completed by
August 30, 2011. The AOC also hired a contractor to conduct a
cost‑benefit analysis of CCMS. However, our review of this analysis
found that the data the AOC provided to the contractor excluded
and understated certain costs, assumed certain benefits of CCMS
that were questionable, and used a deployment model that included
some unrealistic assumptions. Furthermore, the contractor
acknowledged five critical factors that would affect CCMS’s return
on investment: delays in court deployment, the speed at which
courts begin to realize benefits, budget overruns by the project,
increases in court deployment costs, and the elimination of manual
data entry of case files with justice partners. As of May 2011 the
AOC estimated that it will complete CCMS by June 2017 and that
the project will cost nearly $2 billion. According to its May 2011
report to the Legislature, as of June 2010 CCMS had already cost
the State $454 million. The AOC anticipated that it will spend an
additional $93 million on the project in fiscal year 2010–11. However,
on July 22, 2011, in reaction to State budget cuts, the Judicial Council
reduced CCMS funding for fiscal year 2011–12 by $56 million, which
will result in a one‑year delay in the deployment activities for the
project to June 2018.

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Chapter 7
INDIVIDUAL AGENCIES EXHIBITING HIGH‑RISK
CHARACTERISTICS
We have added the Department of Health Care Services
(Health Care Services) and the Department of Public Health (Public
Health) to our list of departments posing a high risk to the State
because these two departments meet a number of the criteria we use
to determine whether an agency presents a high risk. The Appendix
describes the methodology and criteria we use to determine whether
a state program, agency, or issue should be on the high‑risk list. Both
departments have been the subject of numerous audit requests by
the Joint Legislative Audit Committee (audit committee) since they
became separate entities from the former Department of Health
Services (Health Services) in July 2007. In addition, we have made
several recommendations to each department in our prior audits that
remain outstanding one year after the recommendations were issued.
Considering that some of the audit findings we have reported for these
departments in the last few years can affect the health and welfare of
the public, we have designated both departments as being a high risk.
However, we have removed from our list of high‑risk issues the split
of Health Services into Health Care Services and Public Health. Our
review found that both Health Care Services and Public Health have
been measuring their progress toward the objectives in their strategic
plans, and that their expenditures since the split have remained
cost‑neutral for certain cost centers compared to Health Services’
expenditures after adjusting for inflation and state furloughs.
Health Care Services
We have designated Health Care Services as a department
presenting a high risk to the State. Health Care Services provides
a variety of services, such as ensuring access to comprehensive
health services through the use of public and private resources,
and emphasizing prevention‑oriented health care measures that
promote health and well being, and the effects of a failure could
negatively affect the health and safety of Californians. Further,
Health Care Services has been at the center of legislative branch
attention. From January 2007 through February 2011, the audit
committee had approved four audit requests involving Health Care
Services—in essence one new audit every year. Among the issues
the Bureau of State Audits (bureau) discovered as a result of these
requests are that providers of durable medical equipment frequently

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overcharged Medi‑Cal20 and that Health Care Services needed
to streamline Medi‑Cal treatment authorizations and respond to
authorization requests within the legal time limits.21
As of December 31, 2010, Health
Care Services had not fully
implemented 11 recommendations
dating back a year or more.

Finally, Health Care Services has a number of unresolved
recommendations from previous audits. Specifically, as
of December 31, 2010, Health Care Services had not fully
implemented 11 recommendations dating back a year or more.
Of these recommendations, three have a direct impact on public
health and safety. For example, in August 2005 the bureau issued a
report reviewing Health Services’ administration of the Medi‑Cal
Administrative Activities Program22 and recommended that the
department require the local administrating entities to prepare
annual reports that include participation statistics, outreach efforts
and results, and other performance measures to assess the impact
on the program recipients. Health Care Services, which now
administers Medi‑Cal has yet to implement this recommendation.
Public Health
We have designated Public Health as a department posing a
high risk to the State. We found that because of the services
Public Health provides, such as preventing disease, disability, and
premature death, and preparing for, and responding to public health
emergencies, the effects of a failure at the department could have
an adverse impact on the health and safety of Californians. Further,
Public Health has also drawn the legislative branch’s attention.
From January 2007 through February 2011, the audit committee has
approved five audit requests involving Public Health—an average
of one new audit every ten months. Among the issues the bureau
discovered as a result of these requests are that the department
faces significant fiscal challenges and lacks transparency in its
administration of the Every Woman Counts program,23 that it
must improve its oversight to better protect the public from
low‑level radioactive waste,24 and that it reported inaccurate
20	

Department of Health Care Services: Although Notified of Changes in Billing Requirements,
Providers of Durable Medical Equipment Frequently Overcharged Medi‑Cal
(Report 2007‑122, June 2008).
21	 Department of Health Care Services: It Needs to Streamline Medi‑Cal Treatment
Authorizations and Respond to Authorization Requests Within Legal Time Limits
(Report 2009‑112, May 2010).
22	 Department of Health Services: Participation in the School‑Based Medi‑Cal Administrative
Activities Program Has Increased, but School Districts Are Still Losing Millions Each Year in
Federal Reimbursements (Report 2004‑125, August 2005).
23	 Department of Public Health: It Faces Significant Fiscal Challenges and Lacks Transparency in
Its Administration of the Every Woman Counts Program (Report 2010‑103R, July 2010).
24	 Low‑Level Radioactive Waste: The State Has Limited Information That Hampers Its Ability to
Assess the Need for a Disposal Facility and Must Improve Its Oversight to Better Protect the
Public (Report 2007‑114, June 2008).

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financial information—an overstatement of $9.9 million as of
June 30, 2009—in its management of the State and Federal Health
Facilities Citation Penalties accounts.25
Finally, Public Health has a number of unresolved recommendations
from previous audits. In fact, Public Health still had not fully
implemented 20 recommendations dating back a year or more.
Of these recommendations, 15 had a direct impact on public
health and safety. For example, in September 2008 the bureau
released a report regarding Public Health’s Laboratory Field
Services and recommended that it perform all its mandated
oversight responsibilities for laboratories subject to its jurisdiction
operating within and outside California including, but not limited
to, inspecting licensed laboratories every two years, sanctioning
laboratories as appropriate, and reviewing and investigating
complaints and ensuring necessary resolution.26 Public Health has
yet to fully implement this recommendation.
The Reorganization of the Former Health Services
In our 2009 high risk update, we identified that both departments
developed strategic plans in 2008, as well as processes for
measuring the overall success in achieving the goals of the strategic
plans. Although each department was measuring its actions against
its respective plan, we determined that more time was needed
to prove these plans effective. Our most recent review of Health
Care Services’ implementation efforts for its strategic plan, and
Public Health’s strategic plan progress report and extension report
found that Health Care Services and Public Health have met, or
are on track to meeting, their goals. For example, Health Care
Services indicated that it met one of its goals by establishing an
online customer service portal to provide Medi‑Cal beneficiaries
with greater accessibility to information and resources concerning
their options for enrolling in managed care. Similarly, Public
Health noted that it is on track to accomplish one of its goals to
increase the proportion of adults who are vaccinated annually
against influenza.
In addition, as we noted in the 2009 high risk report, although
the combined budget for the two new departments during fiscal
year 2007–08 was higher than the fiscal year 2006–07 budget
for Health Services, it is nearly impossible to determine which
25	

Department of Public Health: It Reported Inaccurate Financial Information and Can Likely
Increase Revenues for the State and Federal Health Facilities Citation Penalties Accounts
(Report 2010‑108, June 2010).
26	 Department of Public Health: Laboratory Field Services’ Lack of clinical Laboratory Oversight
Places the Public at Risk (Report 2007-040, September 2008).

Public Health has a number of
unresolved recommendations from
previous audits—it had not fully
implemented 20 recommendations
dating back a year or more of
which 15 had a direct impact on
public health.

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costs would have increased even if the split had not taken place.
For example, the State’s share of Medi‑Cal spending increased
from $13.8 billion in fiscal year 2006–07 under Health Services to
$14.9 billion in fiscal year 2009–10 under Health Care Services.
However, it can be said that the increase would have been the
same had Medi‑Cal still been administered by Health Services.
Although the same argument can be made for increases in some of
the administrative costs, these costs are more likely to be affected
by the split, especially those related to functions for which the
two departments previously shared the same funding source. As a
result, we compared administrative costs incurred since the split
and charged to funds that the two departments shared with those
from fiscal year 2006–07 before the split and charged to the same
funds. Our review found that the amount, adjusted for inflation
and the effect of furloughs, that Health Services would have
spent was greater than the total amount spent separately by the
two departments.

We prepared this report under the authority vested in the California State Auditor by Section 8546.5 of
the California Government Code.
Respectfully submitted,

ELAINE M. HOWLE, CPA
State Auditor
Date:		

August 18, 2011

Staff:		
		
		
		
		
		
		
		
		

Kris D. Patel, Project Manager
Angela Dickison, CPA
Richard Power, MBA, MPP
Christopher P. Bellows
Josh Hooper, CIA
Tina Kobler
Martin T. Lee
Greg Martin
Angela Owens, MPPA

Legal Counsel:	 Donna Neville, Associate Chief Counsel
For questions regarding the contents of this report, please contact Margarita Fernández, Chief of
Public Affairs, at 916.445.0255.

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Appendix
CONSIDERATIONS FOR DETERMINING HIGH RISK
Introduction
Senate Bill 1437 of the 2003–04 Regular Session of the Legislature
(Chapter 251, Statutes of 2004) added Section 8546.5 to the
Government Code to provide the Bureau of State Audits (bureau)
with the following authority:
•	 To establish a high‑risk government agency audit program for
the purpose of identifying, auditing, and issuing reports on
any agency of the State, whether created by the Constitution
or otherwise (state agency), that the bureau identifies as
being at high risk for the potential of waste, fraud, abuse,
or mismanagement or that has major challenges associated
with its economy, efficiency, or effectiveness. This includes
challenges that cut across programs or management functions at
all state agencies or multiple state agencies; we refer to these as
statewide issues.
•	 When identifying state agencies or statewide issues that are at
high risk, in addition to reviewing the audit and investigative
reports produced by the bureau, to consult with the Legislative
Analyst’s Office, the Milton Marks Commission on California
State Government Organization and Economy, the Office of the
Inspector General, the Department of Finance, and other state
agencies with oversight responsibilities.
•	 To issue audit reports with recommendations for improvements
in state agencies or with regard to statewide issues identified as
being at high risk not less than once every two years.
•	 To require state agencies identified as being at high risk,
including state agencies with responsibility for a statewide
issue, to periodically report to the bureau on the status of
recommendations for improvement made by the bureau or other
state oversight agencies.
In addition, Section 8546.5 requires the bureau to notify the Joint
Legislative Audit Committee whenever it identifies a state agency or
statewide issue as being at high risk.

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Qualitative and Quantitative Factors
In determining whether a state agency or statewide issue
should be identified as being at high risk, we consider a number
of qualitative and quantitative factors. Although we consider
many qualitative factors, we focus in particular on whether the
risk could result in significantly impaired service; program failure;
significantly reduced efficiency and/or effectiveness; public injury
or loss of life; reduced confidence in government; or unauthorized
disclosure, manipulation, or misuse of sensitive information.
To the extent possible, we take into account the risk to the State
in terms of monetary or other quantitative aspects. We consider
that a $1 billion investment by the State for a program would be
an indicator of potential material loss. We also look at changes in
assets—additions and deletions—as an indicator of potential risk
to major agency assets being lost, stolen, or damaged. We further
consider risks that revenue sources may not be realized or improper
payments may be made. Finally, we also consider the number of
employees each state agency is authorized to hire in determining
the magnitude of human capital.
Responsiveness to Recommendations and Corrective Measures
Senate Bill 1452 of the 2005–06 Regular Session of the Legislature
(Chapter 452, Statutes of 2006) requires that state agencies
provide the bureau with updates on the implementation of
recommendations we have made to them in the form and at
intervals prescribed by the bureau. Moreover, Chapter 452, Statutes
of 2006, places additional reporting requirements on state agencies
that have not implemented audit recommendations that are over
one year old.
The bureau also receives whistleblower complaints about improper
governmental activities under the California Whistleblower
Protection Act and regularly issues public reports on substantiated
complaints. That act requires state agencies either to take corrective
action on substantiated complaints and report to us what action
is taken or, if no action is taken, to indicate the reason for not
doing so.
We consider whether each state agency audited or investigated
demonstrated commitment in implementing audit
recommendations or taking corrective measures for any
substantiated complaints or issues noted in our reports. The
final determination as to how committed agencies are to making
changes to address audit recommendations or taking corrective

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measures stemming from investigations may include additional
follow‑up reviews by the bureau and ultimately is based on our
professional judgment.
Ongoing Reporting and Future Audits
Once the bureau identifies a state agency or statewide issue as being
at high risk, the bureau may require the affected agencies to report
on the status of recommendations for improvement made by the
bureau or other state oversight agencies. Related to that, the bureau
may require affected agencies to periodically report their efforts to
mitigate or resolve the risks identified by the bureau or other state
oversight agencies. In addition, the bureau may initiate audits and
issue audit reports with recommendations for improvement in the
affected agencies.
Removal of High‑Risk Designations
When we designate agencies or statewide issues as being at high
risk and place them on our high‑risk list, removing the designation
takes a demonstrated commitment by the leadership of the state
agency or agencies responsible for addressing the risk. The agency
or agencies should appoint a person, group, or entity responsible
to address the risk, and those responsible must devote sufficient
resources to mitigate or resolve it. Further, those responsible must
develop detailed and definitive action plans, including, when
necessary, plans to seek legislative action. Those plans should define
the root cause of the risk, identify cost‑effective solutions, and
provide a timetable for completion. Moreover, the responsible party
must have a process for independently monitoring and measuring
the effectiveness of steps taken and for periodic reporting
regarding progress.
When legislative and agency actions result in significant progress
toward resolving or mitigating a high‑risk issue, we will remove
the high‑risk designation. The agency or agencies must also
demonstrate progress in implementing corrective measures.
However, we will continue to closely monitor these issues. If risks
again arise, we will consider reapplying the high‑risk designation.
The final determination of whether to remove a high‑risk
designation will be based on our professional judgment.

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cc:	

Members of the Legislature
Office of the Lieutenant Governor
Milton Marks Commission on California State
Government Organization and Economy
Department of Finance
Attorney General
State Controller
State Treasurer
Legislative Analyst
Senate Office of Research
California Research Bureau
Capitol Press