Ca l i f o r n i a
Depar t m en t o f C or r ec t i on s an d Rehab i l i t a t i o n

O .H. Close
Youth C orrectional F acility

STAFF SAFETY EVALUATION
August 3 — 18, 2005

C O RRECT I O N S ST A N DA RDS A U T H O RIT Y
6 0 0 BERCU T DRI V E
SA CRA M EN T O , CA LI FO RN I A 9 5 8 1 4
W W W . CSA . CA . GO V
9 1 6 -4 4 5 -5 0 7 3

BACKGROUND ............................................................................................................................ 1
EVALUATION METHODOLOGY .............................................................................................. 1
FACILITY PROFILE ..................................................................................................................... 3
Current Usage ......................................................................................................................... 3
Population Summary............................................................................................................... 4
Staffing Allocation and Availability....................................................................................... 4
PHYSICAL PLANT ....................................................................................................................... 6
Physical Plant/Maintenance .................................................................................................... 6
Staffing.................................................................................................................................... 9
Procedures............................................................................................................................. 11
REVIEW OF DOCUMENTATION............................................................................................. 14
Staff Assault Incident Reports .............................................................................................. 14
Training................................................................................................................................. 17
Safety Equipment.................................................................................................................. 20
STAFF INTERVIEWS ................................................................................................................. 23
Interview Process .................................................................................................................. 23
Custody Staff - Interview with Manager .............................................................................. 23
Custody Staff - Interviews with Supervisors ........................................................................ 24
Interviews with Line Staff .................................................................................................... 25
Interviews with Special/Intensive Treatment Programs ....................................................... 26
Interviews with Non-Custody Staff ...................................................................................... 27
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION ............................................................................................. 28
ENTRANCE LETTER

Attachment A

DATA MATRIX

Attachment B

DESIGN & CURRENT CAPACITY

Attachment C

STAFF QUESTIONNAIRE

Attachment D

EVALUATION TEAM ROSTER & ASSIGNMENT

Attachment E

BACKGROUND
In March 2005, Secretary Roderick Hickman requested that the Corrections Standards Authority
(CSA), develop a plan to evaluate staff safety issues at all of the state’s adult and youth detention
facilities. At the May 19, 2005 meeting of the CSA, the proposal was presented and accepted.
On May 24-25, 2005, a panel of state and national subject matter experts was convened to
establish the criteria by which the evaluations would be conducted. Based on those criteria, a
team was developed and a timeline of evaluations was established.
On August 3-18, 2005, a team comprised of staff from the California Department of Corrections
and Rehabilitation (CDCR) Corrections Standards Authority (CSA), Adult Operations and
Juvenile Justice Division conducted a Staff Safety Evaluation at the facilities located in the
Northern California Youth Correctional Center (NCYCC) complex. Four separate youth
facilities are located within the NCYCC including the DeWitt Nelson Youth Correctional
Facility (DWNYCF), the O.H. Close Youth Correctional Facility (OHCYCF), and the N.A.
Chaderjian Youth Correctional Facility (NACYCF). The Karl Holton Youth Correctional
Facility (KHYCF) is the fourth facility but it is not currently being utilized. Each of the three
open facilities was reviewed individually and the results documented in separate reports.
The evaluation protocol consisted of a request for advance data on staff assaults from each
facility including victim and perpetrator data, a site visit of the physical plant, random interviews
with various custody and non-custody staff, a review of applicable written policies and
procedures governing the operation of the institution and a review of documentation including
incidents of staff assaults, staffing levels, ward population, staff training and safety equipment.
EVALUATION METHODOLOGY
An entrance letter was sent to the OHCYCF Assistant Superintendent, Heyman Matlock,
informing him of the August 3-18, 2005 site visit dates and the proposed operational plan
(Attachment A). The criteria panel had suggested using a data matrix to record information from
the Serious Incident Reports (SIR) for staff assault or attempted assaults by wards to determine if
any trends could be identified. The institution staff was asked to review the reports and complete
the matrix before the site visit (see Attachment B). The evaluation team asked that all incident
reports and related documentation be made available during the site visit. As the evaluation
progressed, the team identified other information appropriate for review and staff at the
institution provided copies of existing documents, or researched their records for information.
The Facilities Standards and Operations Division of the CSA led the evaluation team. The team
was divided into three work teams, each comprised of staff from the CSA, Adult Operations and
Juvenile Justice Division (each team had a member from each discipline – see Attachment E for
a roster of team members and assignment).
The evaluation began on August 3, 2005, at the NCYCC, with a joint entrance conference that
was attended by each facility’s superintendent/assistant superintendent, appropriate institutional
administrative staff and evaluation team members. The conference included an operational

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overview of the institution by Assistant Superintendent Harada as well as an overview of the
evaluation process by CSA Field Representative Bob Takeshta.
Using the Boardroom at OHCYCF as the base of operation, the team broke into workgroups and
began the review process but continued to meet daily to discuss their observations. Available
documentation was reviewed relative to the physical plant configuration, policies, safety
equipment, staffing levels, staff assaults and ward population. The group looked for any trends
or related issues.
The physical plant team reviewed the institution design as it related to staffing, current
procedures and the ward population. The purpose was to identify any issues that would affect
staff safety such as crowding, limited visibility, insufficient supervision or lack of
communication.
Facility managers as well as staff and supervisors on each of the three watches were interviewed
to provide an opportunity to identify their concerns regarding staff safety issues. A questionnaire
was developed in preparation for the review to ensure some consistency among the interviews
and is included as an attachment to this report (see Attachment D). The responses were
categorized and a summary of the responses is included in the Staff Interview section of this
report (pages 23-27). Conflicts between the documentation, the staffs’ perception of the practice
and staffs’ concerns for safety issues were noted during the interviews and are included in this
report. The review team also made their own observations and those are noted.
A joint exit conference was conducted on August 18, 2005 with Eric Umeda, Acting
Superintendent NACYCF; Steve Gardner, Major NACYCF; Heyman Matlock, Assistant
Superintendent, OHCYCF; Anthony Lucero, Treatment Team Supervisor OHCYCF; Jeff
Harada, Assistant Superintendent, DWNYCF; Michael Minor, Chief of Security, DWNYCF;
Bernard Warner, Chief Deputy Secretary of the Division of Juvenile Justice (DJJ); Yvette MarcAurele, Deputy Director of Institutions and Camps Division of the DJJ; Elizabeth Siggins,
CDCR Juvenile Policy and Sharie Wise, CDCR. The exit conference included a presentation of
the team’s findings and observations as well as a summary of comments made by staff.

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FACILITY PROFILE
O. H. Close Youth Correctional Facility (OHCYCF) is located within the Northern California
Youth Correction Center complex (NCYCC), in Stockton, California. The Center includes three
other youth correctional facilities, each being utilized to provide services to a selected ward
population. The Youth Authority Training Center is located next door to and outside of the
secure perimeter of the NCYCC.
OHCYCF was initially opened in 1967 as a young boys program to address the needs of truants
and runaways under the age of 18. The housing units are named after the counties in California.
OHCYCF uses a variety of resource groups and community programs to facilitate a ward’s
growth and development in preparation for his reintegration into society. OHCYCF wards from
Humboldt Sex Offender Program, Fresno Substance Abuse Program and Glenn Young Boys
Program provide public service participation by engaging in the presentation of services and
programs at this institution. Such services include conducting tours to judges and other officials
as well as performing work within the administration area.
Current Usage
The ward population at OHCYCF is generally limited to males under the age of 18 years. On the
first day of our evaluation the facility housed 69 wards over the age of 18 years. With the
closure of the Northern Youth Correctional Reception Center and Clinic (NYCRCC) in
Sacramento in 2004, OHCYCF became the under 18 youth parole violator reception center for
Northern California. The facility remains as an academic and vocational education institution to
provide programs to as many as 251 wards attending classes each period.
This facility utilizes an “Open” program to achieve the Agency’s overall mission of providing a
“Normative Culture” program to wards. The intent is to promote responsibility and bring about
behavior change among wards on regular program. The creation of this social environment
includes the establishment of a community to promote positive peer influence.
While the living units at this facility are not segregated by gang affiliation or by race, careful
attention is given to ensure no single group is allowed to be together in sufficient numbers to
exert control over others.
The living units are individual buildings with dormitory configurations, separated by areas of
grass and recreation courts. Each building has at least one wet room, which is not considered a
sleeping room and is limited to short term use. Each living unit has the capability to video
record daily activities. The facility has the capability to provide "close" security living or
administrative segregation housing on the Inyo living unit. Crowding was not an issue at this
facility.
OHCYCF offers three specialized programs including:
•

The Fresno living unit Drug Program (RSAT) is a 6-month drug treatment program.

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•

The Inyo Detention Unit (Inyo living unit) is a 19 individual sleeping room Temporary
Detention program (TD) designed to deal with “acting out” wards. Depending on
behavior, a ward may be assigned to this program for up to 14 days by authority of
facility management and for up to 28 days by authority from the Chief Deputy Secretary.

•

The Humboldt living unit Sex Offender Program (SOP) deals with sex offenders and
other wards with severe emotional problems.

Population Summary
The current design capacity at OHCYCF for all housing units is 400. Thirty-five rooms can be
used as individual temporary detention rooms. On the first day of our evaluation, the facility
housed 289 wards. The wards' ages ranged from 14 to 22 with an average age of 16.4 years.
Sixty-nine wards (23% of the facility’s population) were over the age of 18. Older wards may
remain in OHCYDF because they could be near the end of their term or they may be
participating in a particular program.
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•
•
•
•

Approximately 21 percent of the ward population has been committed for crimes involving
sexual assault.
Sixty wards are assigned to the Humboldt Sex Offender Program.
Seventy-one percent of the population has been committed for crimes involving some type
of assault.
Fifty-two percent of the population has been identified as needing some type of drug
counseling or drug intervention.
Forty-seven wards are currently enrolled in the Fresno RSAT program.

While about 78 percent of the wards have histories that include documented gang affiliations,
management staff informed us that many others are making efforts to become gang members.
Those wards are impressionable, seeking recognition from their peers, trying to fit in and survive
within the population. Staff went on to say that many of the wards remain defiant, argumentative
and challenging to authority.
Fifty-five percent of ward population was Hispanic, twenty-two percent African American,
thirteen percent Caucasian and ten percent were classified as "other".
Staffing Allocation and Availability
The management staff at OHCYCF consists of the Assistant Superintendent and a Captain
designated the Chief of Security at the facility. On the initial day of our evaluation the funded
staffing was established at 122 custody personnel (including the management staff), Lieutenants,
Sergeants, Youth Correctional Counselors, Youth Correctional Officers, Parole Agent I/III, and
Casework Specialists. OHCYCF has 7 custody personnel off work or otherwise unavailable for
assignment. On the initial day of our evaluation the funded staffing allocation for non-custody
personnel was 89 positions.

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Medical services are provided at a central location for all facilities within the NCYCC complex.
The Outpatient Housing Unit (OHU) is staffed with 33 medical personnel. Mental Health
Services are also provided by a staff of six. Twelve MTAs are assigned to the OHU.
See Table I below for a summary of positions, vacancies, long-term leave and staff availability.
Table I
Custody Staff
Non-Custody Staff
Total

Allocated
Positions
122
89
211

Vacancies
0
11
11

5

Long-term Leave
13
13

Available Staff
109
78
187

PHYSICAL PLANT
This facility is comprised of nine living units contained within four buildings situated in a
circular fashion around a large recreation field. Each building contains a dining hall. The
medical clinic, control unit, chapel, educational classrooms and vocational spaces are also
situated around the recreation field within the secure perimeter.
Educational services are provided onsite within the OHCYCF’s secure perimeter. There are 25
classrooms. Some of these classrooms are vocational education programs. Some of the
vocational programs available to the wards include landscaping, graphics arts, welding, and
cabinet making.
Each of the living units has similar design configurations. An officer station is centrally located
within each living unit. One long dormitory, a shower/restroom area and a dayroom are
circularly located around the control room. Opening into the dormitory are twelve singleoccupancy sleeping rooms. Two of these sleeping rooms are utilized as cool down rooms for
wards requiring a brief period of room confinement. Each of the “cool down” rooms contain a
combination wash basin/toilet unit and a camera that is monitored from the building’s officer
station. The remaining ten single-occupancy sleeping rooms do not contain plumbing fixtures.
Additionally, office space and storage rooms are provided in each living unit.
Each unit has one staff assigned to the first watch, two staff on the second watch and three staff
on the third watch. An additional staff is assigned to overlap the second and third watches.
The El Dorado unit contains a mixture of general population wards and wards assigned to a
mental health program. Some of the wards participating in the mental health program are
prescribed psychotropic medications.
The Amador and Butte units were closed and the time of the evaluation due to the low ward
population. The Fresno unit houses wards assigned to a six-month drug treatment program. The
Inyo unit contains 19 single occupancy sleeping room and houses ward placed on temporary
detention
The evaluation team toured the institution, reviewed institutional procedures and interviewed
staff at various classification levels. The evaluation team looked specifically at the overall
conditions of the physical plant, the staffing levels within each area of the institution, and the
number of wards within each building of the institution. The evaluation revealed the following
concerns:
Physical Plant/Maintenance
Finding: The lack of maintenance for the entire complex contributes to an unsafe environment.
Discussion: The lack of maintenance is apparent immediately upon entering the front gate of the
complex. Overflowing trash cans, lawn areas that were brown, flowerbeds overgrown with
weeds, and fields of heavy plant growth were observed driving through the complex to the

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facility. These same issues were observed within the facility.
maintenance issues were observed throughout this facility:

The following facility

ELECTRICAL
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•
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Numerous perimeter fence lights are burned out/not working.
Numerous interior lights are burned out/not working.
The electrical supply is not sufficient for the demands of current equipment. This was
particularly evident in the school area where only half of the computers and copiers could be
turned on at one time without tripping the breaker.
PLUMBING

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Standing water was observed on the floors due to leaking pipes.
Standing water and large puddles of mud were observed throughout the facility grounds
created by leaking irrigation water lines.
Team members observed many washbasins and showers that cannot be turned off and
continually run.
Exterior hose bibs continuously leak and create standing puddles.
Numerous showers, toilets, and washbasins within each living unit were observed out of
order.
Each living unit has broken or missing urinals. Plant Operations reports these fixtures are
antiquated and that replacement parts are no longer available. Furthermore, the standardized
plumbing application utilized by modern urinals will not match up to the antiquated
drain/water supply provided. As a result, modern urinals cannot be used as a replacement.
STRUCTURAL

•
•
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Window and doorframes are severely rusted in the shower/bathroom area. In some cases,
the frames are no longer able to hold the glass and allow for pieces of metal to be pried away
and used as a weapon.
There is significant structural damage to walls in the shower areas due to leaky or broken
water pipes and fixtures.
In addition to peeling paint, large holes were observed in the interior walls on several units
providing a haven for contraband and weapons.
VERMIN/VECTOR CONTROL

•
•

Several evaluation team members observed ants and roaches and rodent droppings in the
food preparation areas of the facility kitchen and in the central food service kitchen.
Large populations of ground squirrels inhabit the complex and facility. The burrows create
a significant safety issue for staff responding to emergencies and to the wards utilizing the
outdoor recreation areas. Plant Operations personnel report the three large water storage
tanks that supply water to the entire complex are in jeopardy due to the squirrels burrowing
underneath them.

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•

Large populations of skunks inhabit the complex and facility. Evaluation team members
observed skunks on the grounds. Supervisory staff reported occasions where staff were
recently sprayed by skunks and sent home.
HVAC

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The living units utilize swamp coolers. Staff reports that these coolers provide minimal
cooling during the summer months and that temperatures within the living units typically
exceed eighty-five degrees.
FENCING

•
•

The sliding gate at the entrance to the complex is damaged and will not close. This gate is
part of the primary security fence that surrounds the complex and helps prevent escapes and
unauthorized entries.
The bottom edge of the perimeter fence is not set in concrete. As a result, there are several
areas where animals have burrowed under and created spaces for unauthorized entrance or
egress.
CENTRAL KITCHEN

•

Walk-in refrigerators, freezers and chillers have deteriorated to the point that some units
cannot keep up and over heat. In some instances this is due to large holes that allow outside
air to exchange with the cool air. In an effort to cool one of these refrigeration units, a
garden hose with a sprinkler head continuously applies water to the unit. The water flows
onto the unit and across a walkway, which is used daily by office staff. Algae have formed
on the sidewalk forming a slip hazard. Standing water provides a breeding area for
mosquitoes and mud is a constant problem as well.
EMERGENCY POWER

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Central plant operations for the complex utilizes LP gas to fuel the central boiler that
supplies steam, hot water, and heat to central operations buildings within the complex.
Additionally, LP gas is the fuel source for the emergency power generators that operate the
domestic water supply delivery pumps and effluent pumps for the complex. In the event
that the supply of LP gas were lost, a large propane tank is located on site that serves as a
back up fuel supply. A conversion station is utilized to convert the propane gas into a
compatible fuel for the generators. Plant Operation staff report this conversion station is in
disrepair and the manufacturer will not supply parts for the conversion station due to its age
and disrepair.

Providing proper levels of building maintenance is as important to the overall safe operation of a
secure detention facility as is providing sufficient staffing levels. A seemingly harmless loose or
broken bolt can become a potentially harmful weapon. The affects from many years of neglect
endured by this facility were observed in every building trade. In many instances, it is obvious

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that the solution to some maintenance issues has elevated from a simple repair to costly
replacement.
Plant Operations staff reports that the maintenance staffing level was not increased in 1991 when
the N.A. Chaderjian facility opened. Currently, there are 44.5 maintenance personnel assigned to
the complex and only 28 of those positions are filled. Preventive maintenance does not occur at
this facility or at any of the facilities within the complex. Maintenance occurs only on an
emergency basis and the emergencies are prioritized daily. Due to the constant crisis mode,
Plant Operations was unable to provide documentation regarding the number of work orders
finished.
Finding: The work order tracking system currently utilized by Plant Operations and the facility
is ineffective.
Discussion: Evaluation team members were unable to determine which work orders were
addressed and which ones were still outstanding. Evaluation team members observed frustration
with the tracking system by both Plant Operation staff and facility staff. The ineffective tracking
system combined with a lack of communication between Plant Operation staff and facility staff
combines to exacerbate the frustration level. The evaluation team recommends regular meetings
between Plant Operations staff and facility staff to discuss and prioritize maintenance issues.
Additionally, reexamination of the current work order tracking system is needed to ensure
requests for work are addressed to the satisfaction of Plant Operations and facility staff.
Finding: There was heavy plant growth between the perimeter fences that could conceal
contraband or aid in escapes. In some areas, the heavy plant growth is a fire hazard.
Discussion: While this is not necessarily a staff safety issue, the team recommends assigning
regular landscape maintenance personnel to keep plant growth to a minimum.
Staffing
Finding: When teaching staff does not report for work for various reasons, a substitute is not
brought in. As a result, wards are returned to their living unit to wait until the next period to
return to the school program.
Discussion: Staffing within the living unit is reduced during the second watch (typically two
staff as opposed to three staff on third watch) because the wards are scheduled to be out of the
living units and in school during this time. The evaluation team observed groups of wards,
numbering as many as twenty, within the dayrooms of several living units not attending school
during school hours. Supervising these wards creates a safety issue for the living unit staff
during this time. The team recommends either increasing the staffing in each living unit to
adequately supervise and provide programming to the wards during the second watch, or provide
sufficient numbers of teaching staff to accommodate the ward population.
Finding: The use of staff in vehicles monitoring ward escort/movement and some “patrol”
functions is ineffective.

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Discussion: Security staff (YCO) is assigned to the large movement yard and are responsible for
monitoring the movement of ward to and from various activities. This is accomplished with
vehicles being used to follow wards from housing units to school activities and other
movements. Additionally, security staff responding to incidents within the facility also uses the
vehicles.
Consideration should be given to eliminating the use of staff patrol units to escort wards during
ward movements. Staff presence in a vehicle during ward movement ensures the wards report to
the proper areas, but it does not provide interaction or direct supervision of the movement. Staff
assigned to the vehicle cannot hear the conversations of the wards. Staff posted in vehicles are
ineffective in quelling disturbances. The elimination of the vehicle escorts and posting of staff
on foot as escorts would greatly enhance the escort process. This would allow the staff to
communicate with the population, gather intelligence, and identify the victims and assailants
should an incident occur during ward movement.
Additionally, security staff assigned to the large movement yard should be assigned specific
duties to patrol and monitor the units during movement and non-movement periods. These staff
could tour the living units, provide individual escorts, random searches of common areas, ward
cells/rooms and wards themselves. Each position could be responsible for specific housing units
and should remain visible at all times. With specific responsibility for assigned units, security
staff could be in a better position to respond to emergencies, or assist unit staff should the need
arise.
Finding: Direct supervision of security staff is not being adequately accomplished.
Discussion: Currently there is not an assigned security and escort supervisor or recreation field
area supervisor dedicated to the sole supervision of security staff assigned to the housing units or
to the facility’s large recreation yard. Instead, YCOs assigned to these areas are supervised by
security supervisory staff who are assigned other duties and posts that require their constant
presence. The evaluation team recommends assigning a facility Sergeant on both 2nd and 3rd
watches dedicated to supervise the work of the YCOs assigned to the units and to security and
escort functions.
Finding: Current staffing patterns do not allow for the Senior Youth Correctional Counselors
(SYCC) to adequately supervise the YCCs assigned to each hall housing wards.
Discussion: There are frequently times when there is not an SYCC assigned to a unit to oversee
the staff working in the unit. Also, when SYCCs are present, they are assigned to a posted
position and cannot leave their assigned hall to provide supervisory oversight in the sister hall of
the unit. The evaluation team recommends assigning a SYCC (that does not have post
assignment responsibilities) to each unit on the 2nd and 3rd watches. This would allow for more
effective supervision of YCCs and of the program delivery.
Finding: At times, there are too few security and escort staff to safely respond to emergencies
within the facility.

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Discussion: There are only two security and escort staff assigned to each watch. At times,
multiple alarms occur simultaneously within the facility. An additional security and escort staff
should be assigned to each watch.
Procedures
Finding: The DJJ lacks a formal objective classification system. The current method for
determining ward facility and housing assignments fails to account for the security and custody
needs of the youth.
Discussion: When asked how the institution managed the ward population, we were told that the
agency had no central classification system. An in depth and detailed assessment of each ward is
performed at intake into the system but the information is not readily available to staff members
dealing with the ward in the living units. Currently the DJJ Headquarters decides placement
based on age and program needs. At the facility level, staff uses several factors to decide
placement. Age, program needs and gang affiliation appear to drive the process of housing
wards. The Parole Agent III constantly monitors the distribution of known gang members
among the lodges to maintain a balance so that no one group is of sufficient numbers to dominate
over others. The role requires constant intelligence gathering as well as frequent monitoring of
current placements.
Program designation for the more difficult to manage wards is also determined at Juvenile
Justice Headquarters and in consultation with mental health services providers. Adjustments are
made depending on the ward's progression in the assigned program.
Another classification related measure is the category level of the ward. Categories 1-7 are
determined at the time of intake into the state system. The levels are based primarily on the
original crime for which the ward is committed. Categories 1-2 are the highest security level and
include wards committing murder and serious assaults. Categories 5-7 are the lowest and
typically include wards failing to complete programs at the local level and the sentencing judge
referred them to the state. This measure is seldom used to determine placement because it is not
a dependable indicator of the ward's conduct while in custody.
Local adult and juvenile detention facilities and the Adult Operations Division of CDCR utilize a
means of identifying those in their care who require different security levels and/or housing
needs to ensure the safety and security of the person in custody, others in custody and the staff.
A formal classification system is planned for the youth correctional system but it is not
operational. The system is expected to include: an intake risk needs assessment, a
custody/security classification and reclassification process, and a parole risk/need assessment.
Staff was unaware of an expected start date for implementation.
The team recommends that the Juvenile Justice Division continue to develop a system for
identifying and reviewing the security needs of each ward in custody and identify specific
housing and programming based on those needs. It is further recommended that policies and

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procedures be developed for each type of housing unit based on the classification of wards being
held.
Finding: Staff reported that emergency fire evacuation drills are not be conducted.
Discussion: The First watch staff have indicated they do not conduct any simulated Fire Drills.
The second and third watch staff indicated that the emergency fire evacuation drills are not
consistently conducted. Specifically staff reported that to the best of their memory these drills
have not been conducted within the last two years. Additionally we could not locate any
documentation within the living units or control center to support evacuation drills have been
conducted. Emergency fire evacuation drills are necessary to ensure the safety of the staff
working at this facility as well as the wards in their care.
Finding: There is no accountability for tools maintained in the units.
Discussion: Staff reported that barber boxes and unit tools such as scissors, barber tools, brooms
and mops are not being inventoried. Methods are needed to accurately inventory tools and
equipment to which wards have access.
Finding: Post orders for the YCC and YCOs do not contain the signature of authority or date of
revision. There is no process in place (in the units) to ensure staff has read and understand the
requirements of the post orders (post order acknowledgement).
Discussion: Updated post orders are essential for the safe operation of detention facilities. The
high turnover of staff working on units they are not normally assigned to or familiar with
exacerbates this situation.
Finding: Post orders provided by staff posted within each living unit were outdated and may not
reflect current practice.
Discussion: Of particular concern were post order related to emergency response duties for the
staff posted within the living unit. The team recommends updating post orders and providing
training to staff regarding emergency response duties.
Finding: Staff indicated that individuals are assigned to the emergency response teams as they
report to work. The unit post orders did not delineate responsibility for emergency response. In
addition unit staff were uncertain as to who would respond to incidents or emergency situations
and what security equipment to take.
Discussion: Updated post orders and procedures requiring staff to read and understand post
orders are essential for the safe operation of detention facilities.
Finding: No documentation was present to support that area searches are being conducted.
Discussion: Documentation was not present requiring the searching of school classrooms,
maintenance areas, common grounds, vocational education areas etc. Although staff reported

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some searches were being conducted, there was no documentation indicating that a search had
taken place. Procedures for ongoing random area searches and documentation of those searches
are essential components of maintaining a safe institution.
Finding: Staff were unable to produce current policy and procedures regarding emergency
procedures, deployment of chemical agents, or daily operations procedures.
Discussion: Staff relied on memos issued by the facility management for direction on many of
these policy matters and developed their own procedures for implementation. Secure detention
facilities must have clear policy and procedures that direct the daily operations of the institution.

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REVIEW OF DOCUMENTATION
Team members reviewed available documentation, including reports, records and policy manuals
to identify any trends or common themes among incidents. The team also noticed some general
areas of concern and included them in the discussion. The items reviewed included:
•
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Serious Incident Reports for staff assault or attempted assaults (SIR) for 12-month period
(2004/2005).
Staff Assault Review Committee Minutes.
State Compensation Reports (SCIF) for assaults on staff.
Safety Committee Meeting minutes including the Risk Management Plan.
Inventories of authorized safety equipment.
Use of Force Executive Review Committee findings.
Facility training records.
Corrective action plans from previous audits and inspections.
Employee safety grievances.
Daily Operations Reports.
Duty Roster Worksheet for first day of site visit.
Involuntary overtime by inverse seniority records.
Staffing information.
Classification records.
Ward files as requested.
Ward Grievances.
Youth Authority Manual (YAM).
Institutions and Camp Manual.
Institution Operation Manual.
Administrative Summary.
OBITS Report.
Summary of the annual Safety and Security review (1800 Report).
Section 4000 Audit Report.
Section 7000 Audit Report.

Staff Assault Incident Reports
Finding: Insufficient data was available to identify obvious trends relative to the issue of staff
assaults.
Discussion: After a collective review and discussion of the above listed documents, there were a
few notable statistics; however, no issues were identified as being significantly consistent among
the various incidents. Ten incidents of battery on staff were reported during the 2004-2005 fiscal
year at the O. H. Close Youth Correctional Facility. After review, the team saw no significant
trends.

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•
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The victims were limited to those job classifications of Senior Youth Correctional Counselor,
Youth Correctional Counselors, Youth Correctional Officers, Parole Agent and a teacher.
No medical staff were involved.
The victims included 5 males and 5 females.
The race of the victims included:
o 6 white.
o 4 black.
The average age of the victims was 38 with 5 of the victims being over the age of 45.
Six of the victims had over 10 years of experience with the department and the remaining
four victims had four or less years of experience. All had over 2 years of experience.

Finding: Race, age, gang affiliation and length of time in custody shed little light on the profile
of assaultive wards.
Discussion: No significant variance was noted when comparing the race, age or length of time in
custody of the assaultive wards to that of the overall ward population. African American wards
were involved in three incidents, Caucasian wards where involved in three incidents, Hispanic
wards were involved in two incidents, a Native American ward was involved in one incident and
an Asian ward was involved in one incident, a ratio not inconsistent with the facility population.
The average age of wards involved was 16, just below the facility population’s average age. All
of the wards involved in the incidents have documented gang affiliations. No single gang was
dominant among the combatants. Eight of the wards had been at OHCYCF more than 13
months; one ward had been at OHCYCF for four months.
Finding: Hours of the day may be factors in assaults on staff.
Discussion: The frequency of incidents was highest during the third watch with 6 occurrences, 3
occurrences on second watch and one occurred during first watch. Three incidents occurred
within a 9-day period in May 2005. These three incidents appear to be unrelated. The remaining
incidents varied in months separating them. No incidents occurred on Friday or Saturday. The
majority of incidents took place on Mondays.
Finding: Insufficient data existed to identify any relationship between the wards involved in
assaultive behavior and their program involvement or housing assignment.
Discussion: Seven incidents involved wards on general program status and three incidents
involved wards participating in a special program. Two were in temporary detention (TD) and
one was in a sex offender program (SOP).
Two incidents of staff assault occurred in each of the following locations: Glenn Hall, Del Norte
Hall and the school area during the years of 2004/2005. One staff assault occurred in each of the
Inyo, Humboldt and Calaveras Halls. OHCYCF assault information suggests that most assault
were by the wards hands and objects thrown at staff.

15

Finding: Ward manufactured weapons were not factors in assaults on staff.
Discussion: Ward-manufactured weapons were not utilized in the incidents reviewed. Two of
the assaults involved gassing. In three of the incidents, a book, ball, or shoe was used and
thrown at the staff person. In four of the cases reviewed, wards used their hands to batter or
attempt to batter staff. One case involved a ward using his foot as the weapon.
Finding: Statistics provided by the safety officer support the need for increased training in areas
including ward relations, and officer safety. Reinforcement by supervision at all levels is needed
to ensure the information received during the training is applied in the workplace. Further,
injuries do not appear to be initially well documented.
Discussion: In the Serious Incident Reports reviewed from fiscal year 2004-2005, the victims
initially reported no serious injuries and few required immediate medical attention following the
initial treatment at the institution’s infirmary. A review of the safety records suggests the
injuries are much worse. The safety officer reported that five victims were off duty as a result of
assaults. One victim has been off duty for almost one year.
Finding: The safety officer has made significant efforts to promote safety among the staff.
Discussion: The safety officer holds regular safety meetings and includes the appropriate
persons. Recent injuries are discussed. Action plans are developed and reviewed at subsequent
meetings. The safety officer at DWNYCF writes a monthly safety newsletter and shares with
other safety officers at the NCYCC complex. The safety officer at OHCYCF sends relevant
safety information to all staff via electronic mail monthly. The newsletter produced by
DWNYCF is posted for staff to review.
Finding: Current staffing levels have resulted in mandated overtime for custody staff.
Discussion: Custody staff members are ordered to work overtime at an average rate of 12 times
per month. Managers explained that the need for overtime backfill stemmed from heightened
sick leave usage following a change in the employment contract. The absent officer must be
backfilled as well as officers off work for training, vacation, or absent as a result of a vacancy.
The issue is a concern for the increased potential for staff injuries, increased worker
compensation claims, increased sick leave usage and effects on employee morale.
Finding: Staffing levels among non-custody staff may be an underlying cause for concern for
staff safety.
Discussion: OHCYCF has 11 vacancies among the allotted 89 non-custody positions. Of
particular concern, 10 of the 40 educational staff positions are vacant. The team was told that
due to budget constraints, teachers are not replaced when they are absent from work and the class
is cancelled. When wards are not in the classroom, they are returned to the living unit where
custody staff is at a minimum.
Finding: The Institutional Policy Manual needs to be reviewed and updated.

16

Discussion: The review page used to document revisions and updates in the front of the manual
reviewed by the team had not been completed. No revision dates or signatures of authority were
entered. Pages within the policy manual were dated 1999. Absent these indicators, it is difficult
for staff to determine if these procedures are outdated, current, or reflect procedural changes to
the emergency operational plans.
Finding: The Institutional Policy Manual sections pertaining to emergency response and staff
accounting need to be reviewed and updated.
Discussion: The review page contained within the Institutions Multi-Hazard Emergency Plan
was dated February 17, 2005; however, it did not contain signatures of authority on the specific
procedures. Absent these indicators, it is difficult for staff to determine if these procedures are
outdated, current, or reflect procedural changes to the emergency operational plans.
The review team noted that the institution's Policy and Procedures Manual, and the Youth
Authority Manual (YAM), do not include a written emergency plan for the visual accountability
of on-duty staff. The institution currently utilizes the Identix/Bio-Metric System to process
employees in and out of the institution. However, this system has not functioned properly in the
past 14 months. While the entrance building has a check–in/out process for staff and visitors;
there is no written documentation that details how staff are accounted for in the event of an
emergency.
A review of the Facilities Multi-Hazard Emergency Plan for Mutual Aid response revealed that
the current procedure (OHC Resource Supplement 28) is very vague, outdated and contains
incorrect information. Some contact phone numbers are wrong and one contact agency, the
Northern California Women’s Facility (NCWF) no longer has available resources. Mutual Aid
agreements are in place, however they are vague and outdated.
Training
Finding: Custody staff appear to be receiving training in safety related issues, but mandated
annual training hours are not being completed.
Discussion: The policy manual sections reviewed by the team specify that custody staff receive a
minimum of 52 hours of annual training. The policies identified a baseline of training topics to
be included. Institutional-specific training supplements the baseline in order to total the 52
hours of required training.
The Training Manager provided documentation concerning the delivery of mandated training for
custody staff. The documentation reviewed was not in compliance with policy. Custody staff
was provided less than the required hours of annual training during the last 13 months (July 2004
through July 2005). Selected non-custody staff was also included in the training offerings; if it
was determined the training was related to their duties.
The annual training included the following subjects:
• Water safety, 2 hours

17

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Staff/Offender interaction, make-up, 4 hours
Team meetings/safety/security, make-up, 4 hours
First aid, 4 hours
CPR, 4 hours
Staff/Offender interaction, 1 hour
Injury Illness Prevention Program (IIPP), 2 hours
Respirator fit testing, 2 hours
Use of force, 2 hours
Other mandatory and miscellaneous subjects including: Code of Silence, suicide
prevention, drugs and medication, staff/supervisor interaction and disciplinary decision
making system.

Finding: Tracking attendance and ensuring all persons actually attend training as scheduled
remains a challenge for the Training Manager. The team members were concerned that not all
officers were trained on the appropriate subjects. A dedicated training manager may ensure all
staff receive the appropriate training.
Discussion: The attendance rate at training appeared to be about 94% among the officers
scheduled to attend. Training records only track hours, not which classes were actually attended.
Limited follow up is done to ensure absentees attend the "make-up" classes. The training
manager indicated that he was unable to fully track absentees due to the lack of clerical support.
The training manager told us he has several duties other than training and training is not his
primary assignment. If staff missed training assignments the training manager has attempted to
forward information to managers to address their employees. The training manager reported that
staff might be disciplined if they do not attend training. Not all officers were sent to all of the
training classes. The Training Manager said headquarters determines which training classes are
relevant to certain assignments and designates specific staff to attend. . With few exceptions,
because of mandated overtime, all officers have the potential of working all possible assignments
and should receive the appropriate training. The training manager indicated that most training is
conducted on an overtime basis due to the abolishment of 7K.
Finding: Policies for orientation and training of non-custody staff have not been updated since
1999. Many non-custody staff receive little or no initial training or new employee orientation.
Discussion: The policies specified that all non-custody staff receive 16 hours of orientation
training prior to assuming their regular duties and that they receive annual update training as
designated by the Superintendent. The Training Manager is not always informed of the arrival or
departure of employees. He said, when he is informed of the hiring of a new employee, the
Captain provides a one-hour tour of the facility and one hour of orientation and uses a checklist
to document the orientation, far short of the 16-hour training requirement.
Finding: No special training is provided to staff members specific to officer safety in
combative/assaultive situations.
Discussion: A 2-hour update regarding use of force is limited to the policy intent. Actual
application techniques are not included. A review of the training documentation revealed no

18

annual update classes regarding control holds, restraint application, defensive tactics, weapon
take-aways, weaponless defense, and chemical agents.
Finding: No special training is provided to staff members who act as training officers for
purposes of orientation training.
Discussion: Supervisors and managers interviewed said the orientation training officers are
selected based on the manager’s personal assessment of the staff selected to provide the
orientation. No formal process is used to recruit and select trainers. No special training is
provided to staff members who act as training officers for purposes of orientation training.
Finding: No formal training program is in place to provide “field training” to newly appointed
officers.
Discussion: The team asked if a “field training” program was in place to train new recruits
(custody staff). Supervisors and managers interviewed said the orientation provided to new
employees is limited to a 16-hour orientation process. No specialized training officers are
utilized for the training/orientation.
All deputy sheriffs, police officers and the majority of local juvenile and adult correctional
officers are required to complete a formal training program under the direction of a specially
trained patrol officer. The program is designed to ensure the trainee is exposed to most
situations that would be routinely encountered during the assignment and instructed on the
expected performance. The field training program ensures the employee performs within the
applicable law, the department’s policy and in a safe manner. The training officer observes the
employee’s performance at regular intervals, documents the progress and provides any necessary
remedial instruction. The trainee must demonstrate competence before being allowed to function
alone in the position. The team suggests the DJJ consider developing a formalized institutional
training program for new recruits and an abbreviated program for newly transferred officers.
Finding: The Supervisors are not receiving annual refresher training necessary for their positions
including effective supervision, leadership, discipline and contract agreements.
Discussion: After discussions with staff and upon review of the training records, it appears that
any supplemental training or update training regarding supervision issues is dependent on the
interest level of the facility management. No formal training plan was provided to the facilities
to provide direction regarding supplemental supervision training. Instead, it is up to the facility
management to decide appropriate and necessary training.
Finding: Training records do not reflect that Youth Correctional Counselors are receiving
training updates specific to ward counseling and supervision.
Discussion: In the training records reviewed, the team was unable to identify annual training
specific to the subject of ward counseling. The Institutional and Camps policy manual specifies
that all YCC and YCO staff are to receive 16 hours of annual training.

19

Finding: An annual training plan needs to be developed for the facility in concert with an
agency-wide annual training plan.
Discussion: When asked if an annual training plan was available to review, the team was told
that the formal plan was available. All training directives originate from headquarters. Subject
matter, lesson plans and the names of the designated attendees are included in the directives.
Training is often litigation driven or reactionary to a change in policy, practice or the law. Such
frequent changes make long-term planning difficult. The Training Manager was aware and had a
copy of the Agency’s annual training plan. He understood it was still in the development stage
and not been operationalized.
Finding: Training deficiencies at OHCYCF could be improved through better coordination and
forming partnerships with other facilities within the NCYCC complex (e.g. YATC, NACYCF,
DWNYCF and the Galt training center).
Discussion: The Illness and Injury Prevention Program (SB 198 mandate) training is not
included in the annual training plan. The Illness and Injury Prevention Program (IIPP) training is
coordinated through the Safety Officer at the facility and not the Training Manager. While the
time and attendance of the IIPP training is documented and reported to a central training
coordinator, it is not credited toward the mandated annual update. The team thought, depending
on the subject matter, IIPP training might serve to satisfy both requirements if the programs were
coordinated.
The Training Manager and the team suggested combining training resources with other facilities
within the NCYCC complex and the Galt Training Center, to provide some of the training. The
Galt Training Center is able to offer a 40-hour orientation class to all employees before they
assume their duties. Training materials would be delivered in a consistent manner to all staff.
Duplication of materials and resources would be reduced resulting in significant savings to the
department.
The court liaison officer identified a training need in criminal case preparation including
interview techniques, evidence collection and preservation, and other issues related to the
successful prosecution of offenses committed within the facility. Information sharing with
neighboring facilities and improved relations with law enforcement agencies might present
opportunities to provide additional training to staff to improve investigative techniques.
Safety Equipment
Finding: The personal alarm system utilized by the facility is comprised of several systems.
Each system is zone specific and staff must know what zone they are in and have the proper
alarm actuator for the system to work.
Discussion: Most staff prefer to wear alarms as opposed to carrying a radio. Each living unit is
assigned three radios for usage throughout the shifts. Security personnel are issued a radio use
throughout the shift. The alarms are smaller than the radios and the history of wearing an alarm

20

precedes the radio. Two types of alarms are used because not all of the alarms will function
properly in all areas of the facility. The building construction and signal coverage determine
which alarm format provides the best service. Officers are issued the alarm most appropriate for
the work location; however, staff report that even with the proper alarm equipment, there are
areas within the facility that are not covered by the alarm systems.
Finding: The personal alarm systems used by staff are undependable.
Discussion: Staff reported there are several dead spots throughout the living units that do not
receive the signal when activated. Evaluation team members observed several alarm tests where
staff demonstrated these blind spots. The FM alarms do not provide coverage within the
classrooms and a separate Unisec alarm system is utilized. Teaching and facility staff reports
this alarm system is unreliable as well. If an article of clothing is covering a portion of the
device, the signal will be blocked when activated. Additionally, there are dead spots throughout
the school portion of the facility. Facility and teaching staff that were aware of the shortcomings
of these alarm systems stated they felt reasonably comfortable with the personal alarm system,
however, those that are unaware of these shortcomings are placed in an unsafe situation.
Management staff reports that a new personal alarm system is in the installation process,
however, this process is in its second year and no completion date has been provided.
Finding: Officers are provided safety equipment as specified by policy, but the inventory of
specific items may be insufficient due to the facility size and design.
Discussion: Each officer is issued handcuffs, OC/Mace spray and latex gloves. Respirators are
available in all living units and located in security vehicles. A "911 Rescue Tool", a tool used to
cut a suicide ligature, is available in all living units and is issued to staff in roving assignments.
CPR masks are available in the housing units and security vehicles.
The facility is large and many of the buildings that are occupied by wards are not living units,
consequently, some consideration should be given to issuing safety items to officers rather than
just making equipment available in the living units. A rescue could be delayed because a CPR
mask or 911 Tool needed for an emergency occurring in a location other than a living unit was
not readily available.
Finding: Stab vests have been issued to the Inyo living unit.
Discussion: Only the officers assigned to Inyo living unit are issued soft body armor stab
resistant vests and a supply of vests is stored in the living unit for visitors or shift replacement
staff to wear. The vests are not fitted to individual officers and must be relinquished when the
officer changes assignment. The team agrees that the department should purchase addition vests
to compliment the 8 vests on facility grounds.
Finding: Some stab vests need to be replaced and a formal replacement program needs to be in
place.

21

Discussion: A review of the inventory revealed 8 vests labeled with manufacturing dates of
March of 1996 and February of 1997; making them over 8 years old. Perspiration and cleaning
materials can weaken the materials and reduce the effectiveness of the protective vests. The team
agrees that OHCYCF is in immediate need of replacing the existing vest inventory.
Finding: Staff reports there are not enough personal radios for all staff and that the batteries in
the personal radios assigned to them do not hold a charge. Furthermore, the staff does not have
the capability of charging the batteries on the unit and must request another battery from central
control. Staff reported that at times, four to five battery changes are needed per shift.
Discussion: Personal radios are the means by which staff communicates with each other.
Sufficient numbers of radios with dependable battery supplies are necessary for the safe
operation of the facility.
Finding: The O.H. Close sub-armory lacks adequate oversight and documentation.
Discussion: The evaluation team conducted an inspection of the O.H. Close sub-armory during
the safety review. The sub-armory is located inside of the security perimeter adjacent to the
vehicle and pedestrian sally port across from the administration building; however it is not
visually monitored by staff 24/7.
The armory maintains a limited supply of emergency equipment, munitions and 37 mm
launchers. The space appeared adequate for the storage of the equipment and munitions on hand.
The expiration dates on the CN chemical agents were current, however nearing the 3-year shelf
life. The Oleoresin Capsicum (OC) items were within a safe range of the 4-year shelf life.
The inventory of chemical agents, munitions, weapons and emergency equipment was not
current and was dated April 2001. The sub-armory entrance log was more current; however, was
not used since 7-19-05. Other related state approved armory forms were not being used.
A staff member should be assigned responsibility for the duties associated with the armory.
Additionally, post orders are needed that clearly define processes for the inventory, maintenance
and inspection of armory related equipment.
Finding: Staff is assigned Oleoresin Capsicum (OC) spray canisters. These canisters are not
checked regularly and there is no procedure in place to ensure the canisters are operable.
Discussion: Staff report that they check OC canisters with the armory sergeant when the think
the canister is near empty. Procedures are needed to ensure the Oleoresin Capsicum (OC) spray
canisters are regularly checked to ensure they are operable. All staff should be issued an OC
holder that is specifically designed to hold the canister in a safe and ready manner.

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STAFF INTERVIEWS
Interview Process
The Staff Safety Evaluation Team conducted random interviews with custody staff, Sex
Offender Program staff, and non-custody staff at the O.H. Close Youth Correctional Facility
(OHCYCF) from Wednesday, August 3 through Friday, August 5. Members of the team
interviewed staff about safety related issues (e.g., safety equipment issued to staff and their
perception of personal safety at the institution). The list of specific questions asked by the
interview team is included as Attachment D.
The Staff Safety Evaluation Team conducted random interviews with OHCYCF staff, on the
first, second, and third watches at the following halls: Inyo, Fresno, Glenn, Del Norte, Calaveras,
Humboldt, El Dorado, (Butte and Amador were closed for intake). Interviews were also
conducted at the gymnasium and education classrooms. Custody staff classifications interviewed
included: the captain, lieutenants, sergeants, correctional officers, and medical technician
assistant. The Sex Offender Program included: parole agent III, parole agent I, senior
psychologists, psychologists, treatment team supervisors, senior case management specialists,
case management specialists, senior youth correctional counselors, and youth correctional
counselors. Non-custody staff interviewed included: the medical physician, psychiatrists,
registered nurses, principal, teachers, cooks, and office technicians.
Additionally, the evaluation team conducted random interviews with Central Services staff on
second watch at the following areas, plant operations warehouse, laundry, kitchen, warehouse,
plant operations manager, fire station, outpatient housing unit, chief medical officer, central
services major, and central administration.
For purposes of this report, the interview team is summarizing staff safety perceptions that were
shared by staff during our interviews. Responses are grouped for custody staff, the
Specialized/Sex Offender Programs, and non-custody staff.
Custody Staff - Interview with Manager
The interview team met with the management staff on August 3, and asked them to describe their
concerns for staff safety at OHCYCF. Members present at the interview were, assistant
superintendent, captain, program administrator, both treatment team supervisors, parole agent III,
supervising casework specialist, health and safety officer, supervisor of correctional education
programs (principal), personnel supervisor, and senior psychologist. All of the management team
concurred that the ward population has dramatically changed at OHCYCF. All agreed that more
than 90% of the wards claim gang affiliation. Additionally, these wards demonstrate violent
behavior towards other wards, which directly affects the safety of staff. Wards do not concern
themselves about consequences for violating the institutional rules. With the possible closing of
Inyo, (temporary detention halls with single cells which segregate assaultive and disruptive
wards from the main population) all managers expressed concern that this would directly affect
the safety of staff and the program/treatment of the ward population at OHCYCF.

23

Finding: It is critical that OHCYCF be allowed to maintain adequate programming space for
assaultive wards, specifically Inyo Hall.
Discussion: When the team asked them about solutions to reduce staff assaults, they all agreed
that the ward’s behavior should dictate the program needs. They said progressive discipline is an
important tool, and if wards constantly step outside the program boundaries, they should be held
accountable for their actions.
The managers informed the team that wards could be placed on Temporary Detention Program
(TD) at Inyo if they meet one of the following criteria. 1) danger to self, 2) endangered from
others, 3) danger to others, 4) at risk to escape. As an example, this would include a ward that is
involved in a group disturbance, and/or serious gang fight or battery.
When wards are assigned to Inyo, their behavior and well-being are monitored daily by staff and
the program manager. The assistant superintendent reviews the status of all wards assigned to
Inyo each day, using the WIN 2002 system. The assistant superintendent personally makes
contact with each ward, and he is aware of the ongoing process to reintegrate the ward back onto
a living unit. Managers told the team that the average stay at the Inyo Hall is two to three days
before they are returned to their program. This unit was clean and appeared well run. The staff
reported the individual secure recreation areas were not in use. A larger, secure recreation area is
attached to the Inyo Hall and wards are taken in small groups for outdoor exercise.
The Staff Safety Evaluation Team concurs with the managers, that it is essential for staff and
ward safety to continue to operate Inyo as a temporary detention unit. The majority of the wards
temporarily housed at Inyo display unpredictable behavior, which can and does manifest into
aggressive outbursts. When these wards are removed from the “Open Program”, it allows the
remainder of the group to continue with their treatment plans, without disruption from wards
unwilling to participate in the program.
Finding: Formal orientation training is not provided to non-custody staff prior to their
assignments.
Discussion: An additional common theme was the lack of a training officer assigned to the
facility. This void directly effected daily operations of OHCYCF. All of the managers stated
that newly assigned non-custody staff have not received their required mandatory orientation
classes in over two years. The principal specifically expressed concerns with teachers assigned
to classrooms at OHCYCF without a single hour of orientation. She stated she attempts to fill
this void (when time allows) with on the job training conversations and spot checks. All
managers expressed concern with the staffing at OHCYCF. All agreed that the presence of more
custody staff would directly affect the behavior of the ward population in a positive manner.
Custody Staff - Interviews with Supervisors
The first and second line supervisors (sergeants and lieutenants) were interviewed at various
work locations from August 3 - 5.

24

Finding: Supervisors concurred with management that the possible closure of Inyo will result in
increased assaults, and staff is deeply concerned for their personal safety.
Discussion: With the potential loss of the Inyo program space, the wards will know that staff
have no means to control disruptive behavior, as they cannot administer appropriate
consequences for rule challenging wards.
Finding: There is a need for additional custody staff, especially on the second watch.
Discussion: The typical staffing pattern requires two staff to be assigned to one hall, unless it is
a Sex Offender Program (SOP). Due to operational absences (i.e., staff injuries, illnesses, and
scheduled vacations), or vacancies, the senior youth correctional counselor (SYCC) is routinely
used to fill a posted position in a hall. During our tours of the halls, we observed supervisors
working as the second staff position at numerous halls. In the team’s opinion, this results in the
SYCC not being able to perform their supervisory responsibilities including: developing and
training staff, completing staff work on time, conducting investigations, and preparing staff
evaluations.
Additionally, the day-to-day operations require constant ward movement from the hall to exterior
programs (i.e., education, dining hall, outpatient housing unit, and recreation). When this
movement occurs, floor staff must escort the wards and leaves a single custody officer (YCC) on
the housing unit, to supervise up to 30 wards. While the Staff Safety Team was conducting
interviews, we were constantly reminded of this issue as we watched wards moving about the
institution grounds, without direct supervision from staff and/or grouping together outside of
their halls. The Staff Safety Team also observed that approximately 25% of the ward population
did not have their identification card properly affixed to their chest for quick identification by
staff. When asked why this was being allowed to continue, the response given was that it could
not be enforced. On more than one instance, the interview team witnessed wards verbally
challenging staff inside open dormitories.
Interviews with Line Staff
The interview team canvassed the institution from August 3 - 5, conducting random interviews
with line staff.
Finding: Line staff concurred with the manager and the supervisors that there is a need for
additional program space for disruptive wards. All line staff stated the need for additional ward
supervision (custody) staff.
Discussion: All line staff voiced the same concerns as the supervisors, as it related to the
possible closure of Inyo, and the need for additional staff. Line staff said that an additional staff
member is needed in the open dormitories. Line staff said if they have a disruptive ward acting
out in these areas, it is difficult to isolate him, because of the open setting. Staff said it is
important to control the situation as soon as possible, so other wards don’t become physically
involved. They reiterated that they would be less likely to take action, if they were the only staff
on the hall, because of the potential to be attacked by more than one ward.

25

Finding: Line staff is concerned about their safety because of the inadequacy of their OC spray
for group application.
Discussion: The interview team asked line staff to describe the safety equipment issued to them.
As a group, they said they were issued: personal alarms, radios in designated positions,
handcuffs, OC spray, and/or CN gas (A side note: YCC staff told the team that the OC spray that
they are supplied with is only good for a one on one situation, too often they (YCCs) are
confronted with group disturbances. They said being allowed to carry Z505 fogger would help
in their ability to quell the incident).
Finding: Line staff is concerned about their safety because of the intermittent efficiency of their
radios.
Discussion: Staff informed the interview team that they must carry a radio when outside the
halls, but they are not required to carry them inside. The interview team noted that in most halls,
staff maintained the radios on top of a cabinet or desk, not immediately accessible to staff.
When the interview team questioned staff as to why they would not carry a radio as a primary
communication device, they told us that the culture at the institution is to rely on their personal
alarms, to request assistance in the case of an emergency. Additionally, staff in several halls
complained of the batteries for the radios not holding a charge for more than an hour.
Finding: Line staff is concerned about their safety because of the intermittent efficiency of their
personal alarms.
Discussion: Staff voiced their concerns about their safety because of the intermittent efficiency
of the personal alarms. They told the interview team that depending on their work location; they
may have to carry two different personal alarms (i.e., FM frequency or Unisec). They said the
FM alarm works in certain halls and buildings, but not outside of the structures. They informed
us that the alarm might activate in 75% of the instances that staff may deploy it. Additionally,
staff stated that many of the overhead audio monitors in the unit do not work. These units allow
the control sergeant to identify and audibly communicate with the unit identified with the alarm
situation. The control sergeant verified this concern.
Interviews with Special/Intensive Treatment Programs
These programs are intensified, as they deal with the most difficult and troubled wards. It is
essential that there is a sufficient number of qualified and trained staff available at all times to
deliver and monitor the program.
Findings: The interview team had the opportunity to spend several hours at each of these
locations. During our stay, we observed staff interacting with wards in a positive manner (i.e.,
acknowledging the ward), while at the same time, being cognizant of safety and security issues.
Finding: Custody staff needs training in how to deal more effectively with mentally ill wards.

26

Discussion: The SOP staff said, many times, custody staff is assigned to work in the intensified
or specialized treatment programs, and they are not familiar with the needs of this population.
They suggested that In-Service-Training provide a block of training for all staff, in the
identification, recognition, and systematic approach for dealing with mental health issues.
Interviews with Non-Custody Staff
The interview team spoke with non-custody staff from August 3 - 5 at various work locations.
Findings: The teachers would like to see a more visible presence of uniform custody officers,
while they are working in a classroom. They also feel that when they report or document wards
misbehavior their reports have no clout.
Discussion: Teachers noted that ward movement to and from class is monitored by custody
staff, but usually from a distance. Every teacher the interview team spoke with would feel safer
if more custody officers were present while the wards filed into and out of the classrooms. Many
teachers complained that wards, who are disruptive and challenging, are brought back to their
classrooms too soon. This sets a bad example and illustrates the frustration and lack of clout the
teachers have in maintaining discipline in their classrooms.

27

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
O.H. Close Youth Correctional Facility (OHCYCF) was the second Division of Juvenile Justice
facility to be evaluated by the Staff Safety Evaluation Team, the first being conducted at Preston
Youth Correctional Facility (PYCF). There were several issues identified during this evaluation
that were common to PYCF, O.H. Close Youth Correctional Facility as well as DeWitt Nelson
Youth Correctional Facility and N.A. Chaderjian Youth Correctional Facility which were
evaluated immediately following the OHCYCF evaluation.
It is becoming apparent that adequate resources have not been provided to the Division of
Juvenile Justice despite the filing of Budget Change Proposals and requests for additional
funding (or restoration of funding that fell victim to budget cuts). The lack of resources has
negatively impacted staff safety at DJJ institutions. The benign neglect that the team witnessed
at PYCF appears to permeate the Institutions and Camps Division.
In a praiseworthy effort to return to the rehabilitative mission of the DJJ, it appears that staff
have lost the authority or ability to discipline wards in a meaningful manner. Many wards
recognize that there is little consequence for negative behavior and as such, there is an
insufficient disincentive for bad behavior. It must be recognized that many of the wards in the
DJJ system are adults who happen to have been adjudicated in the Juvenile Court System. DJJ
management should revisit the policies for correcting undesirable behavior of wards to ensure
that the policies are effective and appropriate for the ward population.
As directed by the Corrections Standards Authority, the findings from this evaluation will be
presented to the CSA at their next scheduled meeting and copies of the report will be provided to
CSA members, CDCR administration and Assistant Superintendent Matlock. It is outside the
scope of this project for the CSA to receive and monitor a corrective action plan and appropriate
action will be the responsibility of CDCR Division of Juvenile Justice.

28

ATTACHMENT A
STATE OF CALIFORNIA — DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS AND REHABILITATION

ARNOLD SCHWARZENEGGER, GOVERNOR

CORRECTIONS STANDARDS AUTHORITY
600 Bercut Drive
Sacramento, CA 95814

July19, 2005
Heyman Matlock, Asst. Superintendent
O. H. Close Youth Correctional Facility
7650 S. Newcastle Road
Stockton, CA95213-9001
Dear Assistant Superintendent Matlock:
CDCR Secretary Roderick Hickman asked the Corrections Standards Authority (CSA) to develop a plan to evaluate staff
safety issues in the Division of Adult Institutions and the Division of Juvenile Facilities. At their May 19, 2005 meeting,
the CSA unanimously approved a proposal to assemble a panel of subject matter experts to develop criteria for conducting
staff safety evaluations.
The panel met on May 24-25, 2005 and established the criteria by which the evaluations will be conducted. As a result, a
team comprised of staff from the CSA, Adult Operations and Juvenile Justice will be conducting the evaluations over the
next 28 months and will be evaluating staff safety at the Northern California Youth Correctional Center on August 3-12,
2005. We expect to be on site for eight days and plan to observe operations during all shifts at all three facilities.
We would like to begin with an entrance conference with you and the superintendents from N.A. Chaderjian and DeWitt
Nelson and appropriate administrative staff on August 3, 2005 at 9:00 a.m. to discuss the method by which the staff
safety evaluations will be conducted and to get a general overview of facility operations and any concerns you may have.
In order to facilitate the process, please provide the following for the evaluation team’s use while at O.H. Close Youth
Correctional Facility: (The evaluation team may ask for additional resources, depending on the initial assessment.)
•

A contact person with whom the team may coordinate their activities (please call or e-mail this information when the
contact is identified).

•

An office or conference room equipped with a table, chairs, facility map, facility telephone directory and a telephone.
The room should be large enough for a team of nine evaluators.

•

Access to all levels of staff for short interviews. These interviews can take place at their assigned work areas and we
will avoid interrupting their schedules as much as possible.

•

Copies of all documentation relative to each incident of staff assault including: Incident Reports for Assaults on Staff
(CYA 8.403 Behavior Report; CYA 8.412 Serious Incident Report, CYA Use of Restraint Report); State
Compensation Reports (SCIF) generated as a result of each incident; Use of Force Review findings. It would be
helpful if all documentation relative to each incident was assembled and then indexed in a binder by incident.

•

Completion of the data collection form that was sent via e-mail asking that facility staff code staff assault incident
reports for the past year in the identified format, addressing incident information, inmate information and victim(s)
information (please provide an electronic copy of this data as soon as practical).

1

ATTACHMENT A
•

Summaries of State Compensation Reports (SCIF) for injuries on staff.
(Summaries are reportedly available from facility Return to Work Coordinator)

•

Access to copies of applicable operations manuals.
Supplemental Data Sources –

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Facility Health and Safety Committee Minutes*
o Grievances, Recommendations, Actions
Staff Action Grievance (CYA)*
Daily Operations Report (DOR); Notice of Unusual Incident (NOU) at certain facilities*
Authorized Equipment and Functionality
Use of Force Committee Minutes and responses to recommendations*
Employee Training records including summary of curriculum and attendance for orientation and annual updates for
selected areas*
Corrective Action Plans for previous audits*
Safety Committee Meeting Minutes and Risk Management Action Plans
Program descriptions and locations
Administrative Summary of ward population
Staffing summary including duty roster, allotted positions, vacancies, leave of absence for over 30 days for all staff.
Staffing profile summary including age, sex, years of service and ethnicity
Facility design and current capacity

Upon completion of the on site portion of the evaluation, we would like to schedule an exit conference with you and/or
appropriate members of your staff (on or about August 12, 2005). The results of the evaluation will be reported to the
CSA at its regularly scheduled meeting and a written report will be forwarded to CDCR Administration with a courtesy
copy sent to you.
Thank you in advance for your anticipated cooperation in this matter. If you have any questions, please feel free to
contact Jerry Read, Deputy Director (A), at (916) 445-9435 or jread@bdcorr.ca.gov.
Sincerely,

Karen L. Stoll, Executive Director (A)
*= 2004 and 2005 to date
cc:

Silvia Huerta-Garcia, Director (A)
Division of Juvenile Facilities

OHCYCF STAFF ASSAULT DATA
June 2004-June 2005

Date
5/29/2004

Time

Site and
Location

Type of
Assault

Serious
Injury

Inmate
Weapon

IM#/YA#

Classification

IR/SIR#

Day of
Week

INMATE/WARD INFORMATION

Ethnicity

INCIDENT INFORMATION

Attachment B

Rec'd CDCCYA

Rec'd Inst

Anticipated
Special
Rel
Program/
Date/PBD Age Housing Loc MH Status

Gang

1800 Sat.

Gym

Battery

No

Feet

83035 Wht. Gen'l Pop.

8/19/1999

5/17/2004 Discharged

22 Sierra

DischargedNone

1/8/2005

20:27 Thurs.

Sierra Dorm Battery

No

Fists

87739 His.

Gen'l Pop.

6/26/2002

11/24/2004 10/27/2006

19 Sierra

CDC

1/15/2005

8:20 Thurs.

Dining Rm.

Battery

No

Carton

89024 Asi.

Gen'l Pop.

7/1/2003

10/1/2003

7/17/2010

20 Klamath

NACYFC None

1/16/2005

943 Fri.

Modoc Dorm Battery

No

Hands

89618 His

Drug Prog.

1/5/2004

5/12/2004

4/18/2004

20 Modoc

NACYCF N. Hisp.

3/17/2005

16:49 Fri.

Sierra Dorm Battery

No

Fists

86318 His

Gen/ Pop

6/6/2001

12/13/2004

12/6/2006

19 Sierra

CDC DVI N. Hisp.

N. Hisp.

ATTACHMENT C
CORRECTIONS STANDARDS AUTHORITY – STAFF SAFETY EVALUATIONS
Institutional Information
LIVING AREA SPACE EVALUATION
FACILITY: O. H. Close Youth Correctional Facility

Building/Housing Unit
#
Design
EACH CELL
Cell
Capacity
Beds
E Beds
s

Location

Cell
Type

Humboldt

Dorm

50

1

50

Single

1

12*

1

Dorm

50

1

50

Single

1

12*

1

Dorm

50

1

50

Single

1

12*

1

Dorm

50

1

50

Single

1

12*

1

Fresno

Single

1

48

Glenn

Dorm

50

Single
Inyo
Amador

El Dorado

Calaveras
Del Norte

Butte

DATE: 8-5-05

TYPE:

Each Building
Pop on
this day

Program/Security Level

10

59

10

Staffing
1st

2nd

3rd

Sex offender program.

1

2

3

44

General population unit.
One half of the unit houses
mental health wards.

1

2

3

10

45

General population unit.

1

2

3

10

44

General population unit.

1

2

3

1

0

46

Six month drug treatment
program..

1

2

3

1

50

10

46

General population unit.

1

2

3

1

12*

1

Single

1

19

19

0

10

Temporary detention unit.

1

2

1

Dorm

50

1

50

10

0

Closed

Single

1

12*

1

Dorm

50

1

50

10

0

Closed

Single

1

12*

1
2

2

2

Security and
Escort
Note:
Cells in Inyo contain a combination unit.
* Singles cells contain a combination unit.

Attachment D
O.H. Close Youth Correctional Facility
August 3 – 12, 2005
Line Staff:
1.

What is your current job title?

2.

What is your assignment? What are your primary duties (Post Orders)?

3.

When did you start working for the department as…?

4.

How long have you been assigned to this facility?

5.

How many wards do you supervise? What is their program assignment?

6.
What safety equipment is issued to you? What safety equipment do you utilize at all times,
otherwise have access to, or have to check out from a central location?

7.

Do you have a stab vest? Have you been fitted for one? Do you wear it at all times?

8.

What is the general condition of your safety equipment?

9.

Is the safety equipment issued to you adequate for your job duties?

10.

If the answer is no, what additional safety equipment is necessary?

Attachment D
11.On a scale of 1 to 10, with 1 as the lowest score and 10 as the highest score, how safe do you feel
working at this facility? Why do you feel that way?

12.Where do you feel the least safe? Can you describe why that is? Where and when do you feel the
most safe? How do other staff feel about this?

13.What staff safety issue are you most concerned about? What worries you the most as you are
performing your duties?

14.Do you have any general suggestions or comments relating to staff safety?

15.What most would you like to do or see changed to improve staff safety?

16.How often do you see and/or speak with your supervisor? Your supervisor’s supervisor? The
superintendent?

17.Are protocols in place for emergency responses?

18.(Policy?)What happens when a staff member is assaulted? If the staff person is injured, where do
they go for first aid or for emergency treatment in more serious cases? How long might that take? Who
investigates? Are criminal charges filed?

Supervisors:
1.

How long have you been assigned to this facility as a supervisor?

2.

How many years do you have as a supervisor?

Attachment D

3.

Have you worked as a supervisor at any other CYA institution?

4.

Describe your duties and responsibilities, and how you carry them out during a routine shift.

5.

How many staff do you directly supervise?

6.

How many do you indirectly supervise?

7.

What is the percentage of time (shift) do you spend personally observing your subordinates?

8.

Can you describe the safety equipment that is issued to line staff?

9.

What safety equipment is issued and carried by your staff?

10.

Is there any other safety equipment, which you know of, available for staff’s use?

11.

If the answer is yes, what is the additional safety equipment and how is it issued?

12.

Do you have a stab vest? Have you been fitted for one? Do you wear it at all times?

13.
Does your staff have stab vests? Have they been fitted for one? Do you ensure that they wear it
at all times?

Attachment D

14.

How often do you see your supervisors?

15.

How many of your available staff are on overtime? Ordered over? Voluntary?

16.
On a scale of 1 to 10, with 1 as the lowest score and 10 as the highest score, how safe do you feel
working at this facility?

17.

What is your greatest concern about staff safety for your subordinates?

18.
What kind of complaints do you get from staff? Are there any patterns that emerge? How do
you handle them?

19.

What do you do to ensure a safe working environment for your staff?

20.

What would you like to do or see changed to improve staff safety and reduce staff assaults?

21.

What protocols in place for emergency responses?

22.
What happens when a staff member is assaulted? If the staff person is injured, where do they go
for first aid or for emergency treatment in more serious cases? How long might that take? Who
investigates? Are criminal charges filed?
Managers:
1.How long have you been assigned to this facility as a manager?

Attachment D
2.How many years experience do you have as a manager?

3.Have you been a manager at any other CYA institution?

4.Describe your duties and responsibilities, and how you carry them out during a routine shift.

5.Have often do you walk through the facility to talk with staff and observe general staff safety
practices?

6.Can you describe the safety equipment that is issued to line staff? What is available for them to use?

7.Is there any other safety equipment, which you know of, available for staff’s use?

8.If the answer is yes, what is the additional safety equipment and how is it issued?

9.How many of your staff have been issued stab vests? How many have been fitted? What is the
timeline for issuing vests? Who has been identified to receive them?

10.On a scale of 1 to 10, with 1 as the lowest score and 10 as the highest score, how safe do you feel
working at this facility?

11.When considering staff safety, what types of concerns do you have?

12.From your perspective, what carries the greatest potential for staff injury?

Attachment D

13.What might mitigate or reduce staff assaults?

14.What kinds of complaints do you get from staff? Are there any patterns that emerge?

15.Do you have any long range plans to ensure staff safety and to reduce staff assaults?

16.Do you have anyone assigned to monitor staff assaults or track occurrences to identify trends?

17.If you had sufficient resources (money and staff), what changes would you make to your operation to
reduce staff assaults or the potential for assaults? Physical plant, service and supply, operational
changes and/or staff changes?

18.Have the number of vacancies, SCIF 3301, other leave of absences affected staff safety? Do you
have mandated overtime for staff and supervisors?

19.Do you have any staff off duty as a result of an assault? How long? Have you had contact with them
while they were off duty?

20.What level of repair is your facility? Have you made requests for service or special projects that
affect the level of staff safety? Have those requests been approved?

21.What protocols in place for emergency responses?

22.What happens when a staff member is assaulted? If the person is injured, where do they go for first
aid or for emergency treatment in more serious cases? How long might that take? Who investigates?
Are criminal charges filed?

Attachment E
Evaluation Team Members
Northern California Youth Correctional Center

Team 1
Staff Interviews:
Robert Takeshta, CSA Field Representative
John McAuliffe, Adult Operations, Correctional Counselor II
Jeff Plunkett, Division of Juvenile Justice, Captain
Team 2
Physical Plant, Staffing and Population:
Gary Wion, CSA Field Representative
Mark Perkins, Adult Operations, Facility Captain
Mark Miller, Division of Juvenile Justice, Lieutenant
Team 3
Facility Profile, Documentation Review and Data Analysis:
Don Allen, CSA Field Representative
Dave Stark, Adult Operations, Lieutenant
David Finley, Division of Juvenile Justice, Major

Robert Takeshta, Field Representative
Corrections Stadards Authority
Phone: 916-322-8346
Fax:
916-327-3317
E-Mail: btakeshta@bdcorr.ca.gov

Mark Perkins, Captain

Gary Wion, Field Representative

Jeff Plunkett, Captain

Corrections Stadards Authority
Phone: 916-324-1641
Fax:
916-327-3317
E-Mail: gwion@bdcorr.ca.gov

Division of Juvenile Justice
Phone: 916-262-0802
Fax:
916-262-1767
E-Mail: jplunkett@cya.ca.gov

Don Allen, Field Representative

David Finley, Major
Division of Juvenile Justice Division
Phone: 805-278-3710
Fax: 805-278-1499
E-Mail: dfinley@cya.ca.gov

Corrections Stadards Authority
Phone: 916-324-9153
Fax:
916-327-3317
E-Mail: dallen@bdcorr.ca.gov

John McAuliffe, Correctional Counselor II
Adult Operations
Phone: 916-358-2628
Fax:
916-358-2636
E-Mail: john.mcauliffe@corr.ca.gov
Dave Stark, Lieutenant
Adult Operations
Phone: 916-358-2473
Fax:
916-358-2499
E-Mail: dave.stark@corr.ca.gov

O.H. Close Report Don.doc

Adult Operations
Phone: 916-358-2626
Fax:
916-358-2499
E-Mail: mperkins@corr.ca.gov

Mark Miller, Lieutenant
Division of Juvenile Justice Division
Phone: 209-274-8394
Fax: 916-262-1525
E-Mail: mmiller@cya.ca.gov