BOSTON
COLLEGE

L AW

BOSTON COLLEGE LAW SCHOOL
LEGAL STUDIES RESEARCH PAPER SERIES

RESEARCH PAPER NO. 64
March 16, 2005

A Historical Overview of Informants

Robert M. Bloom
Professor, Boston College Law School

This paper can be downloaded without charge from the
Social Science Research Network:
http://ssrn.com/abstract=688042

Chapter 1

A Historical Overview of Informants
From the dawn of our history, internal law and order has had to depend
in greater or less measure on the informer. [Police Manual]1
Informers date as far back as the first records of governing institutions. As
long as the states and their officials have existed, they have needed information
about challengers to their authority. In fact, the words “informer” and “informant”
derive from the informer’s role as supplier of information. This information is
usually given to the state in its prosecution of crime.2
There are two basic types of informers: the “incidental informer” and the
“recruited” or “confidential informer.” The incidental informer supplies information to
the authorities about one particular incident. These informers might receive a specific
reward, but they are not “on the payroll.” Some incidental informers act out of a sense of
civic duty. They do not have repeated contact with the authorities, but rather supply
information at one meeting. In contrast, the confidential informant provides information
for on-going investigations and is typically paid by the police whom they have repeated
contact with.3
Confidential informers began to play a larger role as our governing institutions
developed more complex policing systems and institutionalized investigative techniques.
1

Gary T. Marx, Thoughts on a Neglected Category of Social Movement Participant: The Agent
Provocateur and the Informant, 80-2 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY 402, 402 (Sept. 1974).

2

BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990) defines “informer” or “informant” as “an undisclosed person
who confidentially discloses material information of a law violation, thereby supplying a lead to officers
for their investigation of a crime. This does not include persons who supply information only after being
interviewed by police officers, or who give information as witnesses during the course of investigation.
Rewards for information obtained from informers is provided by 18 USCA Sec. 3059.”

3

RUSSELL L. BINTLIFF, POLICE PROCEDURAL: A WRITER’S GUIDE TO POLICE AND HOW THEY WORK 80
(1993).

1

From ancient Greece through the early 19th century, there was little widespread or
systematic use of confidential informers. Most informers played a minimal role in the
criminal justice system. Then, beginning with the professionalization of police forces in
Western Europe, the use of informers by police became much more prevalent. This
reflects the general pattern of informer history, but there are examples of extensive use of
confidential informants in ancient Rome and during the Middle Ages. However, this use
of confidential informers represents exceptions to the general operation of criminal
investigations in these times.4
Informers in Ancient Civilizations
The laws of antiquity did not draw a distinction between criminal acts and private
wrongs, as most legal systems do today. Rather, all violations against private individuals
were categorized as delicts (a broader term than our “tort,” but by and large delicts is
what we would today call torts). Victims could bring private actions against their
perpetrators, but the state played no role in gathering evidence or prosecution. For
example, in a homicide case, the victim’s estate would have the burden of initiating,
funding and prosecuting the murderer. Consequently, informers as we understand them
today, as people who give information about a crime to the government or police, were
not widely known or used in these types of cases. 5
Informers were, however, vigorously employed for cases of treason. The
birthplace of democracy, classical Athens (425 to 322 B.C.), had a rich tradition of
See MICHAEL GAGARIN, EARLY GREEK LAW 63-4 (1986); ANDOCIDES, ON THE
MYSTERIES 36.43 ff.2o; JACOB BURCKHARDT, THE GREEKS AND GREEK CIVILIZATION
281 (1998); JOHN E. STAMBAUGH, THE ANCIENT ROMAN CITY 126-27 (1988); Clifford S.
Zimmerman, Toward a New Vision of Informants: A History of Abuses and Suggestions
for Reform, 22 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 81, 165 (Fall 1994).
4

5

GAGARIN, supra note 4, at 63-4.

2

encouraging the reports of planned and already committed treasonous acts. 6 Termed
menutai in Greek, any person could come forward, whether it be man or woman, slave or
free person, citizen or foreigner.7 The informer would report to the Boule or Ekklesia,
courts of capital crimes in Athenian society. As for the system of rewards and
punishment, a 415 B.C. law provided that an informer be given impunity if his
Information was true, but he would be put to death if it was not. Oftentimes an informer
would be a member of the conspiracy to commit treason and would come forward on
condition of impunity.8
The most renowned Greek informer was Andocides. In 415 B.C. he conspired in
the desecration of sacred Athenian statues called the Hermae, which were “sacred pillars
topped by busts of the gods.”9 Antocides was acquitted in exchange for informing on his
fellow conspirators, which included his own father, Legoras. All the named culprits were
executed, except for Legoras, who like his son, informed on other criminals to gain his
freedom.10
Similarly, in ancient Roman society, informers were chiefly used to combat
subversion of the ruling authority. They functioned more like current-day spies. Private

6

DOUGLAS M. MACDOWELL, THE LAW IN CLASSICAL ATHENS 181 (1978).

7

MATTHEW R. CHRIST, THE LITIGIOUS ATHENIAN 143 (198). The act of informing is referred to as
menysis. DOUGLAS M. MACDOWELL supra note 6, at 181.
8

MACDOWELL, supra note 6, at 181.

9

See THE COLUMBIA ENCYCLOPEDIA (5th Ed 1993); BURCKHARDT, supra note 4, at 281.

10

BURCKHARDT,

supra note 4, at 281.

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entrepreneurs, known as delatores, would bring information to the urban magistrate and
the emperor. These delatores are the closest to being what is now a “confidential
informer” in ancient times. In fact, in the 2nd century A.D., the emperors gave the task of
supplying information about subversive activity to a group called the frumentarii. These
officials were uniquely suited to observe activity across the empire, because they would
supply grain to the legions, giving them contacts across the Mediterranean on a regular
basis.11
Judas Iscariot: The Most Famous Informer
Judas Iscariot, one of Jesus’ twelve apostles, was the “one who betrayed him.”12
His name has become “synonymous with betrayal,”13 and likened to Benedict Arnold.
United States v. Frost, 914 F.2d 756, 770 (6th Cir. 1990). We therefore regard Judas as
one of the early informants.
According to biblical accounts, Judas was an informer for the Romans, the ruling
government at the time, against Jesus Christ. In 33 A.D., the Jewish authorities wished to
arrest Jesus and hand him over to the Romans for execution for sedition. However,
Jesus’ popularity was strong and they were concerned that a public arrest might result in
a riot. During the Passover feast, Judas guided the Roman soldiers to Gethsemane, a
remote grove outside Jerusalem. Judas and the Romans arrived, and under the torch light
Judas signaled to the Romans which man was Jesus by giving him a kiss. Judas supplied
the information needed to avoid an uprising. In exchange for his role as an informant, he
11

STAMBAUGH, supra note 4, at 125-27.

12

See 10 Matthew 4.

13

Martyn Percy, Arguments for Easter: The Day When Even God Needs a Scapegoat; Poor Judas. The
Tendency to Lay the Blame for the Sin of the World at the Feet of One Man Is Not Restricted to Gospel
Writers. Look Around, THE INDEPENDENT (LONDON), Apr. 2, 1999, at 7.

4

received thirty pieces of silver. Without Judas’ information, the arrest might have sparked
an insurrection, bringing the might of the Roman army down on all Jerusalem. 14
From the New Testament we learn little of Judas’ history prior to his betrayal of
Jesus.15 Folklore holds that Judas was born to Reuben and Cyborea, a Jewish couple.16
When Cyborea was pregnant, she had a dream that Judas would grow up to destroy the
entire Jewish people, and out of fear of this dream she put the baby Judas into a chest and
sent him out to sea. Judas was found by the Queen of the island Skariot, who having no
children of her own, kept him and raised him as her own. She later gave birth to a son,
who Judas eventually killed upon learning of his own origins. Judas then left Skariot and
landed in his birthplace, where he entered into a fight with Reuben, not knowing him to
be his father, and killed him as well. Judas, now a member of Pilate’s entourage, married
Reuben’s wife, his own mother, unaware of their relationship.17 When he and Cyborea
uncovered the truth about their familial relations, Judas went to Jesus looking for
forgiveness, became one of his favorite disciples, and was chosen to be the holder of the
purse.18 Judas was one of the twelve men chosen by Jesus to act as his inner circle. They
were known as the twelve apostles. Judas was the treasurer and carrier of the common
purse. Possibly in search of the motivation for Judas’ act, the book of John attributes this
RAYMOND E. BROWN, THE DEATH OF THE MESSIAH: FROM GETHSEMANE TO THE GRAVE
1399-1404 (1994).

14

15

See W.H. Kent, Judas Iscariot, THE CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA, VOLUME VIII, (visited July 17, 2000)
<http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/08539a.htm>
16

See HYAM MACCOBY, THE MYTH OF JEWISH EVIL, 79 (1992).

17

Larry B. Stammer, New Look at Ancient Betrayer; For Centuries, Judas Iscariot Has Been the Archetype
of the Traitor. But Some Scholars Are Beginning to Wonder If He Was a Villain At All, L.A. TIMES,
Apr. 21, 2000, at Al.

18

See id. at 104.

5

position to Judas’ being a thief.19 This connection with money is seen as having
corrupted him, and it becomes more credible that Judas then turns to evil and betrayal.
However, this money theory could be interpreted in another way. Since Judas was keeper
of the purse and had ready access to money, then it is unlikely that money would be a
motivation for betrayal. Further given that Jesus gave him this important and responsible
position, Judas was probably regarded at least by Jesus as honest and not a thief.
Another suggested motivation focuses on altruistic motives. Judas had great faith
that Jesus was indeed God. He hoped that when Jesus was seized by the authorities he
would manifest his power for all the world to see. Of course, one could argue that this
was impatience on the part of Judas who was more concerned with an earthly
manifestation of a kingdom than a heavenly one.20
Still another motivation might be personal animus toward Jesus. Judas was the
only apostle from Judean in the South; the rest were from Galilee in the North. Although
he had a trusted position, he was not part of Jesus’ inner circle. He expected Jesus to be a
ruler of an earthly kingdom and Judas would, of course, be an important part of the
regime. Feeling disappointed in his own personal advancement, he began to resent
Jesus.21 Thus the informer, Judas Iscariot, could have been motivated by greed, hate or
possibly altruism. Much of which motivates the informants we see today.

19

See 12 John 6.

20

W. W. STORY, A ROMAN LAWYER IN JERUSALEM IN THE FIRST CENTURY (1908).

21

WARREN W. WIERSBE, CLASSIC SERMONS ON JUDAS ISCARIOT (1995)

6

After his infamous act of betrayal, we learn in the book of Matthew, Judas repents
after seeing Jesus condemned, and gives back the thirty pieces of silver.22 He then hangs
himself. The chief priests use the money, which at this point is blood money and cannot
be put back into the treasury, to buy a field in which to bury foreigners. The field is called
the Field of Blood.
Members of the early Christian Church used the Judas story to discourage
informing among its persecuted members. The literature shows that vilification of Judas
fluctuated with the level of Roman persecution of the church members.23 In
contemporary times, Judas has been associated with such infamous informants such as
Linda Tripp,24 and others who are considered to have betrayed or informed on someone.
The debates continue as to the exact motives of Judas, and as to the proper translation of
the words describing his acts in informing on Jesus. However, the story of Judas
betraying Jesus by informing on him to the Romans is well-known, and Judas is
considered by many to be the epitome of betrayal and informing.25
Classical history, therefore, exhibits how the use of informers mirrored the reach
of state-sponsored law enforcement. Greek and Roman governments were primarily
concerned with crimes against the state’s power and stability, not with crimes against
individuals. Consequently, informers in ancient times were key players only in cases of
treason and subversion.
22

See 27 Matthew 3-5.

23

See id.

24

See Gregg Zoroya, Monica Does D.C. Touring The Favourite Haunts Of The World's Most Famous
Intern, THE TORONTO SUN, Mar. 28, 1999, at T6.

25

See Stammer, supra note 17.

7

Informers from the Middle Ages through the Enlightenment
By 1275, the use of informers in England had broadened to include felony
prosecutions.26 The approver system, as it was termed, set up procedural incentives for
informers to come forward. Any person accused of treason or a felony could confess and
inform on the remaining accused. A successful approver would be fully pardoned and
exiled, but if the approver’s testimony was proved wrong, the approver risked execution.
The system was rife with flaws.27 There was nothing to lose by the appeal to
approve. The accused murderer could stand trial, lose and face execution, or he could
appeal to “approve” against his fellow conspirators, lose and face execution.28 Either way
the accused risked execution. Furthermore, the system provided an incentive to blackmail
innocent parties. A person could threaten to appeal for approval against an innocent
person unless the innocent person handed over money. Also, law enforcement officials
would sometimes compel prisoners to inform on innocent parties in order to extort
ransom. Ultimately, the system succumbed to its long history of abuse and was gradually
replaced by the common informer system.
A common informer was “a person who brought certain transgressions to the
notice of the authorities and instituted proceedings, not because he, personally, had been
aggrieved or wished to see justice done, but because under the law he was entitled to a
part of any fine which might be imposed.”29 This system, too, was subject to widespread

26

Zimmerman, supra note 4, AT 152-56.

27

Id. at 155-56

28

LEON RADZINOWICZ, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS ADMINISTRATION FROM 1750,
Vol. 2 138 (1981).
29

Zimmerman, supra note 4, at 157-66

8

abuse.30 For instance, in the 18th century, poachers learned to have a friend come
forward as the informer because they would have rights to the fine. “Five pounds sterling
went from the poacher to the JP [Justice of the Peace], then to the friend (as informer)
and back again to the poacher over a pint in the alehouse.”31 Thus, the common informer
system proved too costly and vulnerable to corruption for the small benefits of justice it
produced.32
The Rise of Professional Police and Informers in the Nineteenth Century
Western European states began to develop more sophisticated police forces in the
early nineteenth century.33 In France, Francois Vidocq, imprisoned for a minor crime,
agreed to provide information to the police about other prisoners.34 He was later released
in exchange for having given this information, and went on to found the Paris Surete, a
criminal investigation division for the Paris police. From 1810 to 1827, Vidocq set up a
network of informers, hired former criminals as detectives, and pioneered systematic use
of police surveillance and investigation.
In 1877 an English barrister, Howard Vincent, emulated Vidocq’s work and
established the Criminal Investigation Division (CID). Much like the approver and
common informer systems, CID informers provided new opportunities for police

30

DOUGLAS HAY ET AL., ALBION’S FATAL TREE: CRIME AND SOCIETY IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY ENGLAND
198 (1975).

31

See id.; Zimmerman, supra note 4, at 157-66.

32

GARY T. MARX, UNDERCOVER: POLICE SURVEILLANCE IN AMERICA 18-19 (1988); JOHN BRIGGS ET AL.,
CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN ENGLAND: AN INTRODUCTORY HISTORY 216-17 (1996).
33

Marx, supra note 32, at 18-19.

34

Briggs, supra note 32, at 216.

9

corruption, and by the 1920’s the metropolitan CID “had become a thoroughly venal
private army.”35
Despite the failures and abuses of these abandoned methods of criminal
investigation and prosecution, England developed a deep tradition of using informants
effectively. These systems, while imperfect, laid the institutional foundations for
establishing improved systems of information gathering, particularly in the policing of
colonies such as Ireland and America. English imperial history is full of examples of the
Crown forces skillfully using an informer to sabotage the machinations of its enemies.36
For instance, in America, the British used informers to enforce the unpopular
Navigation Acts and other similar legislation.37 Distrusting informers was a large part of
American colonials’ distrust of British rule, and after the Revolution the new
governments refrained from employing these same policing techniques. In fact, it was not
until American cities developed professional police forces in the mid-19th century that
informers came back into use. By this time, even private enterprises like Allan
Pinkerton’s private detective agency used a network of informers to carry out the
assignments of its corporate clients.
Informers in the Twentieth Century
Prohibition and communism increased the demand for informer activity. With the
threat of Bolshevism in Russia at the end of World War I, more American citizens and

35

See ANDREW BOYD, THE INFORMERS: A Chilling Account of the Supergrasses in Northern Ireland 7-24
(1984)

36

CHARLES A. WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 5702 (1992).

37

THE HANDBOOK OF CRIME AND PUNISHMENT 444-45 (MICHAEL TONRY, ed. 1998).

10

law enforcement officials supported the use of informers to combat crime.38 The Federal
Bureau of Investigation, set up by Theodore Roosevelt in 1908, developed and cultivated
informers, who were essentially domestic spies, across the country. From the 1920’s to
the 1970’s, the FBI infiltrated and investigated what they considered to be radical groups,
such as the Black Panthers, the Student Democratic Society, the Progressive Labor Party,
and Vietnam Veterans against the War.39 Their work was meant not only to investigate
crimes, but also to sabotage the work of these groups. For the most part, these were
political operations, and they hearken back to ancient times when informers were
primarily used to undermine subversive activity.
Informers were also used by the FBI in criminal investigations. The FBI
distinguishes between people with legitimate occupations whom they call confidential
sources and those with close contact with criminal elements who are classified as
informant. In fact, the FBI is infamous for its use of informers in investigating organized
crime. Recently, the FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin (November 1998) addressed the
informer issue directly in Avoiding the Informant Trap: A Blueprint for Control. This
article dealt with the failures and abuses which have plagued informer systems since
ancient times. It also discussed 1) how to recruit reliable informants; 2) how to document
and assess the value of informant information; 3) how to identify false or misleading
information; and 4) how “to handle” informants.40

38

Marx, supra note 1, at 405-09.

39

Avoiding the Informant Trap: A Blueprint for Control, FBI LAW ENFORCEMENT BULLETIN (Nov. 1998).

11

As much of the crime in America involves willing participants, the need for
informants has increased substantially. In order for law enforcement authorities to solve
crimes such as drug dealing, gambling, loan sharking, money laundering and political
corruption, they need information from individuals who are either closely aligned with
the participants or are participants themselves.

12