Independent Operations
and Incident Review
Panel on the
California Institutions
for Men

MARCH 2005

CALIFORNIA STATE BOARD OF CORRECTIONS

State of California
Arnold Schwarzenegger, Governor
Youth and Adult Correctional Agency

Board of Corrections
Independent Operations and Incident Review Panel
California Institute for Men
Members
Glenn S. Goord, Chairman
Commissioner, New York State Department of Correctional Services

William B. Kolender
Sheriff
San Diego County

Gary H. Filion
Assistant Commissioner
New York State Department of
Correctional Services

Joe McGrath
Deputy Secretary (A)
Office of Internal Affairs
Youth and Adult Correctional
Agency

John L. Scott
Chief
Los Angeles County Sheriff’s
Department

Brian Parry
Assistant Director
National Major Gang Task Force

1

INDEPENDENT OPERATIONS
AND
INCIDENT REVIEW PANEL
TABLE OF CONTENTS
A.

INTRODUCTION AND PURPOSE

3

B.

APPROACH UTILIZED BY PANEL

5

C.

PANEL REVIEW FORMAT
PRE-INCIDENT OBSERVATIONS

7

Initial Placement Decisions
Disciplinary Decisions - Inmate Blaylock
Length of Time in Reception Center
Sycamore Hall Housing Unit Incidents
Handling of Threats Against Staff

INCIDENT RELATED OBSERVATIONS
Snapshot of Sycamore Hall
Distribution of Vests
POST INCIDENT OBSERVATIONS

Correctional Policy and Procedure Observations
Tour of Reception Center Central (RCC)
and Sycamore Hall

10
11

D.

RECOMMENDATIONS

14

E.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

16

F.

APPENDIX
PANEL BIOGRAPHIES

17

2

BOARD OF CORRECTIONS
INDEPENDENT OPERATIONS
AND
INCIDENT REVIEW PANEL
March 2005

INTRODUCTION AND PURPOSE
On January 10, 2005, at approximately 10:57 a. m., Correctional
Officer Manuel Gonzalez, a 16-year veteran of the California
Department of Corrections, was fatally stabbed by an inmate at the
California Institution for Men, Sycamore Hall Housing Unit.
In
response to this tragic event, Roderick Q. Hickman, Secretary of the
Youth and Adult Correctional Agency (YACA) and Chairman of the
California Board of Corrections (BOC), requested that the BOC consider
at its next scheduled meeting on January 27, 2005 the creation of an
Independent Panel composed of national, state, and local experts and
that the Panel be authorized to meet, analyze, review, and comment
on the:
•
•
•
•

Details of the death to determine if the prison or reception
center had unsafe working conditions;
Explore related or tangent operational issues, including crisis
response protocols;
Review the process for issuance of vests; and
Issue recommendations for improvement in operations to the
BOC, YACA, Governor, and Legislature.

The Board approved creation of the Independent Panel, per Penal Code
Sections 6027 and 6028, authorizing special commissions to study and
make recommendations regarding state and local penology.
The
appointed Panel members include:
v Glenn S. Goord, BOC Independent Review Panel Chair and
Commissioner of the New York Department of Correctional
Services
v Gary H. Filion, Assistant Commissioner, New York Department of
Correctional Services
v Sheriff William B. Kolender, San Diego County, California Board
of Corrections Member

3

v Chief John L. Scott, Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department,
California Board of Corrections member
v Joe McGrath, Deputy Secretary (A), Office of Internal Affairs,
California Youth and Adult Correctional Agency
v Brian Parry, National Major Gang Task Force
The Panel was provided subject matter expertise by Warden Derral G.
Adams, California Substance Abuse Treatment Facility and State
Prison, Corcoran; Warden David Runnels, High Desert State Prison
Susanville; Captain Debra Hanlon, San Diego County Sheriff’s
Department; Lieutenant Mike Bornman, Los Angeles County Sheriff’s
Department.
Karen L. Stoll, Executive Officer (A) and Don
Representative, Board of Corrections, staffed the Panel.

4

Allen,

Field

APPROACH UTILIZED BY PANEL
There were several issues impacting the appropriate timing and
approach of the Panel’s review. The Panel delayed implementation of
their review until the San Bernardino County Sheriff’s Department had
completed their investigation and the District Attorney filed a formal
charge. On February 18, 2005, Inmate Jon Christopher Blaylock was
formally charged with murder with special circumstances. At the end
of this section a profile of Inmate Blaylock is provided.
During the interim period between the Board of Corrections
appointment of the Panel and their first meeting, legal opinions were
requested regarding confidentiality of investigation documents
obtained by the Panel during the normal course of their review and
confidentiality of materials, documents, and discussions relevant to the
prosecution and interview of witnesses involved in the incident. To
avoid any contamination of the prosecution’s case, it was determined
that briefings and questioning of agency representatives would elicit
relevant information pertaining to this review.
The Panel met the week of March 7 – 11, 2005, in Ontario, California
and interviewed the following individuals:
•
•
•

•

Matt Cate, Inspector General
San Bernardino County Sheriff’s Department Homicide
Investigators: Sgt. Tom Bradford; Detectives Mitch Dattilo,
Timothy Jordan, Rod Medley; Lieutenant Thomas Neely
California Institution for Men, Chino: Warden Lori DiCarlo,
Chief Deputy Warden Greg Mellott; Correctional Captain
Manuel Nieto; and Correctional Officers and staff in the
Reception Center and Sycamore Hall
California Department of Corrections Law Enforcement
Investigative Unit staff Linda Mackey and Steve Slaten

After the first day of interviews, the Panel toured the institution and
observed the Chino Institution for Men (CIM) Reception Center Central
(RCC) typical inmate intake process and assignment to housing. The
Panel had an opportunity to speak with Correctional Officers,
supervisory and management staff in the RCC, including those
assigned to the Intake Area and Sycamore Hall housing Unit.
Sycamore Hall where Inmate Blaylock was housed and where the
attack occurred, was visited and several observations were made
regarding facility conditions and operations.

5

Several sources of documentation were reviewed and provided the
basis for questioning of those interviewed, as well as information for
the Panel to consider when making recommendations later in this
report. The materials reviewed for RCC/Sycamore Hall included all
available post incident reports prepared by staff, program status
reports, training materials, past staffing requests, current staffing
recommendations, staff training records, training protocols and lesson
plans, Inmate Blaylock’s Central file, administrative budget materials
from fiscal year 1992/93 to 2003/04, critical plant needs, classification
and disciplinary records, vest related information, Housing Unit Daily
Audit forms, operations manual and memos related to classification,
emergency procedures, alarm response, etc. Other pieces of written
information were provided that are not included in this listing.
Inmate/Suspect Blaylock’s Profile - Jon Christopher Blaylock, 35, is a
parole violator from Los Angeles County, sentenced to 45 years to life
on his most recent charge of attempted murder of a police officer.
Blaylock’s criminal background began as a minor with commitments to
the California Youth Authority. He has served two prior prison terms
and has a well-documented history of predatory and violent behavior.
He was paroled in 2002, and returned to custody at CIM as a parole
violator with a new term on June 23, 2004. Inmate Blaylock’s case
factors included medical issues, numerous inmate enemies, enhanced
mental health issues, extensive prior disciplinary history, and a
proclivity for violence.

6

PANEL REVIEW FORMAT
The discussion in this section of the report is divided into three parts
and the point of reference is related to the stabbing of Correctional
Officer Gonzalez and the reception and housing decisions made for
Inmate Blaylock. The format includes:
I. Pre-Incident Observations
II. Incident Related Observations
III. Post-Incident Observations
I. PRE-INCIDENT OBSERVATIONS
Observations included in this section rely primarily on the
written documentation reviewed of events leading up to the
homicide and include a review of Inmate Blaylock’s records and
housing decisions made related to the handling and housing of
this inmate.
Initial Placement Decisions
Initial intake of Inmate Blaylock at CIM and decisions on his placement
in Sycamore Hall General Population, were based on limited
information available to staff in the RCC Intake Unit which included:
• Los Angeles Sheriff’s Department statement that Blaylock would
not voluntarily leave his jail cell for transfer to CIM;
• Commitment offense of attempted murder of a police officer;
and,
• Inmate Blaylock’s statements at CIM.
Based on the information above, CIM placed Blaylock in general
population. Upon receipt of the OBIS information and/or the inmate’s
Central file in the following days, it is the opinion of the Panel that
Blaylock should have been placed in Administrative Segregation.
Disciplinary Decisions Related To Inmate Blaylock
On July 31, 2004, while inmate Blaylock was housed in General
Population in the RCC, he, by his own admission, stabbed another
inmate in the chest in the Sycamore Hall dining area. Inmate Blaylock
was then moved to the Reception Center’s Administrative Segregation
Unit and a CDC disciplinary rule violation for Battery on an Inmate
With a Deadly Weapon was issued. On August 4, 2004, the charges

7

were reviewed by the Institutional Classification Committee and
Inmate Blaylock was placed on single cell housing status due to his
past history of in-cell violence. A disciplinary hearing was conducted
on September 9, 2004, and the Senior Hearing Officer reduced the
disciplinary finding to mutual combat. On September 17, 2004, the
recommended finding was reviewed by the Facility Captain and on the
same date by the Associate Warden (Chief Disciplinary Officer) who
concurred with the finding. On September 22, 2004, the Institutional
Classification Committee again reviewed Inmate Blaylock’s case based
on the 30-day Administrative Segregation review. The Committee
noted the reduction in the disciplinary charge and released the inmate
back to Sycamore Hall general population confinement, singl e cell, for
continuing reception center processing.
Although the Institutional Classification Committee did not change the
Hearing Lieutenant’s decision to reduce the disciplinary finding, it is
the Panel’s opinion that Blaylock should have been retained in
Administrative Segregation based on his well-documented history of
violence.
Length of Time in Reception Center
A Director’s Review Board (DRB) referral was dated November 19,
2004, and logged in on December 10, 2004 at the California
Department of Corrections, Headquarters office. It is the opinion of
the Panel that the DRB should been completed and submitted well
before December 10, 2004. Furthermore, based on the case factors
contained in the DRB, it is the opinion of the Panel that Blaylock shoul d
have been retained in Administrative Segregation during this process.
Sycamore Hall Housing Unit Incidents
•
•

•
•

Between August 1, 2004 and December 28, 2004, there were
several incidents necessitating the use of force in Sycamore
Hall.
On December 5, 2004, as a result of staff finding weapon stock
missing from a light fixture, written direction was given by the
Warden to conduct increased searches of inmates, living and
common areas, and to exercise caution during inmate
movement.
On December 19, 2004, a riot occurred in the Sycamore Hall
Dining Room between Black and Hispanic inmates.
On December 20, 2004, the Warden issued another written
order to increase searches and exercise caution during inmate

8

•
•

movement, and to keep White and Hispanic inmates separate
from Black inmates.
On December 28, 2004, staff allowed a Black inmate to have
contact with a White inmate worker in Sycamore Hall and the
White inmate stabbed the Black inmate.
On January 3, 2005, the Warden issued another written order
that no inmate workers from Sycamore Hall were to be used.
The Unit was to only use White or Hispanic workers from the
Gymnasium (Permanent Work Crew).

It is the Panel’s opinion that the Warden’s written directions were not
fully followed. Further, there is no indication that supervisory staff
enforced or addressed violations of the Warden’s written direction.
The Panel arrived at this opinion based on the following:
•
•
•
•
•

Incidents occurred that involved weapons.
The number of weapons found after the homicide.
The review of the written documents for Sycamore Hall do not
show that increased searches were conducted between
December 5, 2004 and January 3, 2005.
There were several instances where the written direction on
inmate movement was violated, including the above-mentioned
incident that occurred on December 28, 2004.
The Panel received information that staff used perceived
influential inmates to act as a liaison with other inmates to
reduce racial tension in Sycamore Hall, thus allowing them to
have unrestricted movement on the tiers. This practice allowed
access between inmates of different races, at the open bar cell
fronts, and is in violation of the written directive.

Handling of Threats Against Staff
The Panel received information from the Inspector General and San
Bernardino County Sheriff’s Department Homicide Detail that, prior to
the homicide, information was received of threats against staff. The
first threat surfaced two weeks prior to the homicide, when Inmate
Blaylock stated there was a staff threat (unspecified to the Panel), but
that he wasn’t the one making the threat. The second threat occurred
the night before the homicide when Inmate Blaylock attempted to
have personal correspondence mailed as legal mail. When he was
advised that his correspondence was not legal mail it was reported
that Inmate Blaylock stated something to the effect that this was why
staff get “stuck.” When the Panel asked CIM administrative staff for
documentation of these threats, the Panel was told there was none. It

9

is therefore the Panel’s opinion that there is insufficient documentation
available to indicate to what extent these threats were evaluated or
communicated with Sycamore Hall staff.
II. INCIDENT RELATED OBSERVATIONS
Observations in this section of the report include information
from briefings and questioning by the Panel of various
investigative staff, California Department of Corrections staff
interviews/investigations, as well as a comparison of
statements documented in written incident reports. CDC policy
and procedures were also reviewed.
Snapshot of Sycamore Hall, Second Watch, January 10, 2004
There were four staff assigned to Sycamore Hall at the time of the
murder of Officer Gonzalez. The Panel confirmed through written
reports and briefings that:
•

Officer Manuel Gonzalez had let Blaylock out of his cell over the
objections of another Correctional Officer. After some period of
time, Blaylock was returned to his cell to facilitate inmate
movement. After the completion of the inmate movement,
Officer Gonzalez directed another officer to again release
Blaylock from his cell. Blaylock was released.

•

Three other inmates were unrestrained in Sycamore Hall West
on the tier with Officer Gonzalez. They were on the tier for the
following reasons:
o One Hispanic inmate worker was allowed onto the tier to
repair plumbing in cell 432.
o The two Black inmates, who occupied cell 432, were
released onto the tier so that the Hispanic inmate worker
could enter the cell to complete the plumbing repair.

•

A second Hispanic inmate worker was in the plumbing chase to
the rear of the cells (not accessible to the tier).

•

There were six to eight Black inmates from Sycamore Hall that
were staged unrestrained in the officer’s area.

10

•

Officer Espinosa had positioned himself in the doorway to the
main corridor to control a White inmate who was returning to
Sycamore Hall from medical.

•

Officers Marin and Loera were in the officer’s area. Officer Marin
was the officer positioned at the gate to observe Officer Gonzalez
on the West side tier. Officer Loera was positioned at the East
side gate.

It is the opinion of the Panel that the combination of activity was in
violation of the post orders and the modified program for Sycamore
Hall.
Distribution of Vests
Protective vests were received on September 9, 2004, at CIM for 362
officers, including Officer Gonzalez. An additional 100 vests were
received on January 5, 2005. The institution began issuing protective
vests on January 12, 2005.
It appears that prior to the incident,
CIM’s administrative direction for distribution of vests had been to wait
until all vests were received for the CIM reception center staff.
It is the Panel’s opinion that issuing protective vests as they were
received would have been the better course of action.
III. POST-INCIDENT OBSERVATIONS
Observations in this section reflect conditions observed during
the tour of the CIM Reception Center and Sycamore Hall. This
section
also
includes
the
Panel’s
opinions
regarding
correctional policy and procedure.
Correctional Policy and Procedure Observations
Based on the above, the Panel makes the following observations:
•
•

•

Staff responded quickly to the incident and moved Officer
Gonzalez to the medical clinic;
There did not appear to be a coordinated tactical approach to
manage the incident, specifically the crime scene and the
extraction of Inmate Blaylock, and the other inmates loose on
the tier;
Command and control by supervisory staff was inadequate;

11

•
•
•
•
•

The crime scene was not preserved;
The efforts to collect and preserve evidence, search inmates, and
search Sycamore Hall and other areas were not coordinated;
All staff involved in the removal and transfer of Inmate Blaylock
from CIM handled the situation professionally while in a highly
charged emotional environment.
It appears that no post-incident review was conducted by the
institution (e.g. tactical, crime scene preservation, training);
Administrative staff provided appropriate peer support and grief
counseling to all employees;

Tour of Reception Center Central (RCC) and Sycamore Hall
Observations
Reception Center Central
During the tour of the inmate reception area, the Panel observed what
appeared to be a number of operational practices that violate security.
For example, group holding cell doors were standing open with 35-40
unclassified inmates in each of the two holding cells. Permanent Work
Crew Inmates appeared to have unrestricted access to the area. A
number of barriers had been placed in a manner that limited officers’
view of the inmates.
Additionally, there were a number of maintenance issues that have not
been addressed for some time.
In spite of the cramped and
dilapidated conditions, the staff continues to process over 600 inmates
per week.
Following the incident, the receiving area of the RCC obtained the
OBIS system, which provides staff with additional information to
appropriately house arriving inmates.
Sycamore Hall
While conditions during lock down are expected to be less than ideal,
the Panel observed deplorable conditions in Sycamore Hall. The Panel
observed heavy cobwebs, broken windows, fecal matter on the walls,
accumulated filth and food on the floor, gang graffiti on cell walls, an
enormous number of “fish lines,” and inmates blocking officers’ view of
their cells with “curtains.”
The Panel also observed Correctional
Officers using their tier access keys in violation of their post orders.

12

Since January 10, 2005, the administration of CIM has taken the
following actions:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Distributed available protective vests (1/05);
Installed the Offender Based Information System in the
Reception Center (OBIS) (2/05);
Modified post orders regarding cell, bed and common area
searches (3/05);
Made improvements to the cell/area search log books (3/05);
Modified housing Sergeant’s post orders for enhanced
accountability (3/05);
Initiated daily watch meetings (per Warden);
Modified inmate movement policy to require that, at a
minimum, handcuffs be used (3/05); and,
There are a number of pending recommendations suggested
by CIM administration.

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RECOMMENDATIONS
Recommendation #1: The California Department of Corrections
needs to immediately conduct a security audit, management
and training audit, maintenance and physical plant audit, and
assess whether the stated missions of CIM can be safely
accomplished within the existing physical plant.
Discussion: This recommendation is based on the totality of the
Panel’s discussion and overall review.
Recommendation #2: Referrals to the Director’s Review Board
(DRB) should be completed in a timely manner.
Discussion: The DRB referral was dated November 19, 2004 and
logged in at CDC headquarters on December 10, 2004. It is the
Panel’s opinion that the DRB referral should have been completed well
before December 10, 2004.
Recommendation #3: Communication among staff needs to be
improved at CIM.
Discussion: The Panel found deficiencies related to communications,
including:
•
•

Communications to Warden and senior staff regarding high risk
inmates and urgency to transfer;
CIM Reception Center staff needs a process for passing on threat
information to other staff and shifts.

Recommendation #4: CIM should complete a post-incident
review of all critical incidents and take appropriate steps to
identify and address deficiencies.
Discussion: It was indicated that a post incident review was not
completed and the reason given was that they were waiting for
completion of the homicide investigation, Inspector General’s report,
and the Panel’s report. It is imperative that the Warden and senior
staff immediately determine the causal effects of the incident and take
pro-active steps to correct problems. Follow-up review needs to occur
at the highest level possible within YACA and CDC.

14

Recommendation #5: Immediate improvements are needed in
handling crime scenes.
Discussion: There appears to be a long-standing problem with crime
scene preservation that has been noted as an issue in past CIM
incidents. For example, the Warden was debriefed in 2004 by the
LEIU staff about an incident which noted the poor handling of crime
scene evidence and recommended adding investigative staff. The
recent staffing study evaluation reviewed by CDC Headquarters also
recommends adding staff to support this function. The Panel noted
that in addition to additional staff, there is a need for continuous
training of all staff in order to adequately support the priority of
preserving a crime scene.
Recommendation #6: Tools utilized within the facility need
proper control and accountability.
Discussion: During one of the presentations, and later confirmed by
the Warden, the Panel was advised that CIM failed to follow
departmental policy regarding tool control and the use of shadow
boards for tools.
Recommendation #7:
The institution needs to review its
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) agreements with
outside agencies relative to mutual aid and investigation.
Discussion: The Panel received information that there was some
confusion about which agency was responsible for the criminal
investigation, which appears to have delayed the process.

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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
It is the Panel’s opinion, after reviewing all of the pertinent
information, that Inmate Blaylock should have been placed in
Administrative Segregation when he was first received by CIM - and
numerous times afterward. It is the Panel’s conclusion that the
inmate’s predatory violent behavior, prior confinement in security
housing units in prior incarcerations, and prior referrals to the
Director’s Review Board, should have raised concerns related to
appropriate housing level and assignment.
While the Warden issued directions for increased searches, program
modifications, and limited inmate movement, it is the Panel’s opinion
that the unit was not properly supervised, directions were not
followed, and there appeared to be a pattern of not following
established post orders.
In addition to the steps that have been taken since January 10, 2005
by the CIM administration, it is the Panel’s opinion that review,
involvement and support of CDC Headquarters is imperative. For
example, CIM has submitted a staffing augmentation request, which
includes staffing for an investigative squad, which the Panel believes is
vital for enabling the appropriate handing of crime scenes and criminal
investigations. The remainder of staffing needs identified in the March
2005 Staffing Study evaluated by Headquarters needs to be expedited
through the budgetary process. Once these positions have been filled
the staffing requirements need to be routinely re-examined in concert
with the facility mission to assure the safe operation of the facility.
The Panel was asked to comment on the process for issuance of vests.
Our finding, after reviewing the department's policy on vests, fittings
and fitting dates for CIM officers, vests ordered and dates of receipt, is
that the vests received on September 9, 2004, by CIM should have
been immediately distributed to staff.
In conclusion, the last point the Panel wished to communicate is that
CDC needs to evaluate the number of inmates being processed to
determine how many inmates can be safely processed and housed at
CIM.

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Glenn S. Goord
Commissioner
New York Department of Correctional Services
Commissioner Goord is a native of Clifton, NJ graduated in 1973 from
Fairleigh Dickinson University in Rutherford, New Jersey, with a
Bachelor of Arts in psychology. He is a 31-year employee of the New
York State Department of Correctional Services, and rose through its
ranks to become Commissioner in 1996 of what is now the nation’s
fourth-largest state prison system.
Commissioner Goord has had an extensive and broad correctional
experience in the New York Prison system, which began in 1973 as a
drug abuse rehabilitation counselor. He has served as a drug abuse
counselor, supervisor of inmate grievance programs and volunteer
services supervisor at five New York prisons.
In 1980 he was
temporarily reassigned to Albany to participate in writing a five-year
master plan for the Department's future. Dramatic and unexpected
inmate population increases, occasioned by “crack cocaine,” caused
implementation of the master plan to be delayed. But the experience
provided Mr. Goord with a broader knowledge and deeper
understanding of this diverse agency. In 1982 he transferred to the
maximum-security Eastern Correctional Facility, becoming Deputy
Superintendent for Administration where he was responsible for fiscal
planning, personnel and facility maintenance as well as the operation
of the 150-bed medium-security annex. He returned to Albany in
1985 as Assistant Commissioner for Correctional Facilities where he
oversaw daily operation of the state’s prisons. In 1988 he became
Deputy Commissioner for Correctional Facilities responsible for the
management, direction, oversight and operations of all prisons.
He administers an operating budget of $2.2 billion in state and federal
funds, plus $205 million in capital expenditures. He manages an
agency employing 30,400 workers and housing approximately 63,700
inmates in 70 prisons, plus an 850-bed drug treatment center.
Mr. Goord’s commitment to security contributes to the fact that
inmate-on-staff and inmate-on-inmate assaults in recent years were
the fewest in nearly a quarter-century.
He is implementing the
Governor’s plan to “right-size” the prison system. He has overseen the
construction of 4,950 maximum-security beds for violent and
predatory offenders, the largest such expansion in state history. At the
same time, he has implemented the Governor’s punishment
alternatives for nonviolent offenders that have allowed 63,000 inmates

17

to earn early release since 1995, allowing the takedown of more than
6,000 lower-security beds.
Commissioner Goord’s outstanding contributions to furthering
excellence in corrections has earned him recognition and honors from
several state and national associations such as the Middle Atlantic
States Correctional Association, the American Society for Public
Administration (ASPA); the National Association of State Correctional
Administrators; the American Correctional Association (ACA).
Mr. Goord’s service has included creation, implementation or oversight
of some of the Department’s best innovations and improvements:
n Directed the task force in the mid-1980’s that drafted the Shock
Incarceration Program. Now the largest program of its type in
the nation, it is also recognized as the best.
n Created a close relationship between the Crisis Intervention
Units and the Correction Emergency Response Teams in a
program that ensures negotiators and the “Orange Crush” work
together to find the least forceful means to resolve any prison
incident.
n Oversaw the ACA’s accreditation of every prison in New York,
ensuring each meets nationally-accepted standards for operation
and management. The ACA presented him with its Eagle Award
in 2001, recognizing New York as the largest jurisdiction in the
nation in which all its facilities were accredited.
Gary H. Filion
Assistant Commissioner
New York Department of Correctional Services
Assistant Commissioner Filion began his career with the New York
State Department of Correctional Services in 1968 as a Correction
Officer at Green Haven Correctional Facility. Prior to his present
position as Assistant Commissioner for Human Resources/Training, he
has served the Department as a Sergeant, Lieutenant, Captain,
Director of the Department's Correctional Emergency Response Team
Operations, Superintendent at two Shock Incarceration Facilities, two
medium security facilities and one maximum security facility.
Mr. Filion received Departmental and FBI certification as a Physical
Training and Defensive Tactics Instructor and Departmental
certification as a Situation Controller for the Department's Crisis
Intervention Unit. He was also designated by the Commissioner to

18

serve as a security expert witness for the Department of Correctional
Services, working with the Assistant Attorney General with regard to
litigation against the State.
During the past five years, Mr. Filion has provided leadership training
to all new sergeants, lieutenants, captains, deputies, and
superintendents for the New York State Department of Correctional
Services.
Mr. Filion is an ACA Auditor for the American Correctional Association
and has served as a consultant to the State of New Jersey's
Department of Personnel, Selection and Placement.
William B. (Bill) Kolender
Sheriff
San Diego County
Sheriff Kolender, a native of Chicago, earned a Bachelor of Arts degree
in Urban Affairs and Public Administration from San Diego State
University in 1964. He is the 28th elected Sheriff of San Diego County,
a position he has held since 1995. He currently provides leadership to
4,000 employees, including sworn and support personnel, and he
oversees a budget of approximately $4755 million. Prior to becoming
Sheriff he was appointed by Governor Pete Wilson in 1991 as the
Director of the California Youth Authority (CYA) where he administered
the largest youth correctional agency in the nation, with a budget of
about $350 million annually, more than 5,000 employees, and
approximately 9,500 youthful offenders in 11 institutions and 4
conservation camps.
Kolender has been a career law enforcement professional, serving for
13 years as the Chief of the San Diego Police Department. He was
appointed at the age of 40--one of the youngest big-city police chiefs in
the nation--and retired in 1988.
From that time until his appointment as Director of the Youth
Authority, Kolender served as Assistant to the Publisher of the UnionTribune Publishing Co., which publishes the San Diego Union-Tribune
in California's second-largest city.
Kolender started with the San Diego Police Department in 1956 and
worked at every rank on his way to becoming chief in 1975. He was

19

described by the Governor as "fair but firm." During his tenure as chief,
he served as a board member of the International Association of Chiefs
(IACP), the San Diego Criminal Justice Council, past president of the
Major City Police Chiefs’ Association, member of the California Attorney
General's Commission on Narcotics, member of the Commission on Peace
Officer Standards and Training (POST), chairman of the task force that
integrated the San Diego City schools, past president of the San Diego
Police Officers' Association, member of the Mayor's Crime Control
Commission and chair of the Criminal Justice Resource Panel, among
others. He also served for eight years on the California Community
Colleges Board of Governors.
Sheriff Kolender is currently representing California on the Western
States Information Network (WSIN) Board of Directors along with the
State Attorney General. He is also serving the Governor as a member of
the California Board of Corrections and Judicial Selection Advisory
Committee. He is also incoming President of the California State Sheriffs'
Association and will be sworn in next week. Kolender has received many
honors over the years, including the 2004 Courageous Leadership Award
by the San Diego Regional Chamber of Commerce, the prestigious John
M. Penrith Award for “Excellence in Law Enforcement Administration,”
given by the Alumni and Foundation of the National Executive Institute in
June 1999, "Outstanding Alumnus" from San Diego State University in
1985, the Urban League's "Equal Opportunity Award" in 1981, and the
"Diogenes Award for Truth and Honesty in Government" from the San
Diego Chapter of the Public Relations Society of America. He is an active
member of or on the boards of directors of several community-based law
enforcement and charitable organizations.
Sheriff Kolender has also served two terms for the Governor as
Commissioner on the State of California’s Commission on Peace Officer
Standards and Training (POST). He has also been a member of the
Governor's Policy Council on Drug and Alcohol Abuse, the Board of the
Presley Institute of Correctional Research and Training, and the California
Council on Criminal Justice (CCCJ).
John L. Scott
Chief
Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department
John L. Scott, a 36-year veteran of the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s
Department, started his career in January 1969.
As a deputy he
patrolled the Lakewood Station area. In 1974, he was promoted to

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Sergeant and held assignments at Firestone Station, the Special
Enforcement Bureau, and the Emergency Operations Bureau. Following
his promotion to the rank of Lieutenant in 1984, he was assigned to
Men’s Central Jail, Carson Station, Field Operations Region II
Headquarters, the Office of Emergency Management, Employee
Relations, and the Office of the Assistant Sheriff. In 1995, he was given
command of Carson Station, following his promotion to Captain. In
2001, he was promoted to the rank of Commander and assigned to
Custody Operations Division. On April 1, 2003, he was promoted to the
rank of Chief and assumed command of the Custody Operations Division.
Chief Scott holds a Bachelor’s Degree in Management and a Master’s
Degree in Public Communications. In August 2003, Chief Scott was
appointed as a member of Board of Corrections. He also serves as a
member of the American Correctional Association and the American Jail
Association.
Joe McGrath
Deputy Secretary (A)
Office of Internal Affairs
Youth and Adult Correctional Agency
Joe McGrath has worked in California corrections for 26 years and is
currently the Deputy Secretary, Office of Internal Affairs, California Youth
and Adult Correctional Agency. His most recent accomplishment includes
the successful revision and implementation of the employee discipline and
investigation processes for the Agency. Immediately prior to his current
post, Mr. McGrath was the Warden at Pelican Bay State Prison. Mr.
McGrath is an industry expert in prison operations including emergency
response and use of force. Mr. McGrath is a certified Phi Theta Kappa
instructor in leadership and ethics for public safety officers and earned a
Bachelor of Arts degree in Corrections and Social Justice from California
State University, Sacramento.
Brian Parry
National Major Gang Task Force
In 2002, Brian Parry retired from the California Department of
Corrections after 31 years of service. At the time of his retirement
Brian was the Assistant Director in charge of the Law Enforcement and
Investigations Unit. The Unit was responsible for gang suppression,
intelligence and management, apprehension of paroled fugitives and
escapees, Officer Involved Shootings, Threat assessments as well as
other investigatory duties.

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Brian has a Bachelors degree from the University of Dayton and has been a
firearms instructor and a polygraph examiner.
He has received 32
commendations from law enforcement agencies and received the
Distinguished Service Medal on behalf of the unit's exemplary work during
the 1993 Los Angeles riot. During his career Brian has taught all over the
country on gangs and officer safety issues. Since his retirement Brian has
been working as an expert witness and consultant on gang related issues.
Brian has been on the National Major Gang Task Force's Leadership Council
since 1997.

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