AI Index: AMR 51/061/2006

3 May 2006

USA
AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL’S SUPPLEMENTARY
BRIEFING TO THE UN COMMITTEE AGAINST
TORTURE
This briefing includes further information on the implementation by the United States of
America (USA) of its obligations under the UN Convention against Torture and Other
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (Convention; UN Convention
against Torture), with regard to the forthcoming consideration by the UN Committee
Against Torture (the Committee) of the USA’s second periodic report.(1) The briefing
updates Amnesty International’s concerns with regard to US "war on terror" detention,
interrogation and related policies, as outlined in its preliminary briefing of August 2005,
and provides additional information on domestic policies and practice.
US OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE CONVENTION WITH RESPECT TO
DETAINEES HELD IN THE CONTEXT OF THE "WAR ON TERROR"
1. General supplementary observations on definitions of torture and use of torture
under interrogation, including deaths in custody (Articles 1 and 16)
Evidence continues to emerge of widespread torture and other cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment of detainees held in US custody in Afghanistan, Guantánamo Bay,
Cuba, Iraq and other locations. While the government continues to assert that abuses
resulted for the most part from the actions of a few "aberrant" soldiers and lack of
oversight, there is clear evidence that much of the ill-treatment has stemmed directly
from officially santioned procedures and policies, including interrogation techniques
approved by Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld for use in Guantánamo and later exported to
Iraq.(2) While it seems that some practices, such as "waterboarding", were reserved for
high value detainees, others appear to have been routinely applied during detentions and
interrogations in Afghanistan, Guantánamo and Iraq. The latter include hooding,
stripping and shackling of detainees in painful positions as well as using military dogs to
intimidate blindfolded detainees; prolonged isolation, deprivation of food and sleep and
exposure to extremes of temperature also appear to have been common practice to punish
detainees for failing to cooperate or to "soften them up" for interrogation. (3)
Many of the techniques listed above, even if applied in isolation or for limited periods,
would in Amnesty International’s view violate the prohibition of cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment under Article 16. Such techniques have reportedly
been used against "war on terror" detainees in combination and for prolonged periods,
causing severe pain and suffering (physical, mental or both) and, being inflicted

intentionally by officials for the purpose of obtaining information, thereby amount to
torture.(4) Some of the approved techniques, such as forced shaving of facial and head
hair, stripping and the use of dogs to inspire fear, appear to have had a specific
discriminatory or racist application in the case of Muslim detainees.
It is now known that at least 34 detainees who died in US custody have had their deaths
listed by the army as confirmed or suspected criminal homicides. The true number of
such deaths may be higher as there is evidence that delays, cover-ups and deficiencies in
investigations have hampered the collection of evidence.(5) In several cases, however,
substantial evidence has emerged that detainees were tortured to death while under
interrogation (revealed, for example, in military autopsy reports, investigation records
and recent court testimony). What is even more disturbing is that standard practices as
well as interrogation techniques believed to have fallen within officially sanctioned
parameters, appear to have played a role in the ill-treatment, as the following cases
illustrate:


Two Afghan detainees, Dilwar and Habibullah died from multiple blunt force
injuries inflicted while they were held in an isolation section of Bagram US
airbase in December 2002. Army investigative reports later revealed that both
men were kept hooded and chained to a ceiling while being kicked and beaten
during sustained assaults by military personnel. A soldier who acknowledged
inflicting more than 30 consecutive knee strikes to Dilawar (a slight, 22 year old
taxi driver) as he stood in shackles, told investigators that the blows were standard
operating procedure for uncooperative detainees. An army criminal investigation
report said both deaths were caused primarily by severe trauma to the men’s legs,
adding that "sleep deprivation at the direction of military intelligence soldiers"
was also a "direct contributing factor" in Dilwar’s death.(6) Army medical
examiners found the prolonged shackling had also contributed to his death.(7) 7
low-ranking soldiers, charged variously with assault, maltreatment, dereliction of
duty and making false statements eventually received sentences ranging from five
months’ imprisonment to reprimand, loss of pay and reduction in rank.
 Abdul Jaleel died in January 2004 in the US Forward Operating Rifles Base in Al
Asad, Iraq, after being kicked and beaten during interrogation. He was tied by his
hands to the top of a door frame and gagged when he died. The autopsy report
recorded death from "blunt force injuries and asphyxia". A senior army official
admitted Jameel had been "lifted to his feet by a baton held to his throat" causing
a throat injury that "contributed to his death". (8) Military commanders rejected a
recommendation by army investigators to prosecute soldiers involved, on the
ground that his death had been the "result of a series of lawful applications of
force in response to repeated aggression and misconduct by the detainee".(9)


Major-General Abed Hamad Mowhoush, formerly of the Iraqi army, died during
interrogation in the US detention facility in Al Qaim, Baghdad, in November
2003. An autopsy recorded cause of death as asphyxia and smothering due to
chest compression. Mowhoush died after being rolled back and forth in a sleeping
bag, which was placed over his head and bound with wire, while one of his

interrogators sat on his chest. According to testimony in a subsequent court case,
use of the sleeping bag was part of an approved "stress position" designed to play
upon a detainee’s claustrophobia. It was also reportedly interpreted by officers as
falling within the "fear up harsh" tactics that may still be found in military
operational manuals. There is evidence that abusive interrogation techniques at
the Al Qaim facility were routine and authorized.(10)
The US military initially reported that Mowhoush had died from natural causes.
However, several months later, in the wake of the Abu Ghraib scandal, four US
soldiers were charged in the death. Only one went to trial and was sentenced to a
reprimand, $6,000 forfeiture of pay plus 60 days’ restriction of movement. There
is evidence that Mowhoush was subjected to a brutal beating two days before his
death by personnel from other agencies, including the CIA, none of whom has
been charged.
 A 27-year-old Iraqi male died while being interrogated by US Navy Seals in April
2004 in Mosul, Iraq. During his confinement he was hooded, flex-cuffed,
deprived of sleep and subjected to extreme cold conditions, including the use of
cold water on his body and hood. The exact cause of death was "undetermined"
although the autopsy stated that hypothermia from wet and cold conditions may
have contributed to his death.(11) His treatment included various techniques
similar to those authorized by Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld in his April 2003
memorandum including "environmental manipuation (e.g. adjusting
temperature)", hooding and sleep deprivation.

Despite the shocking nature of the treatment described in the above cases, the
government still has not referred to any any of the reported abuses as "torture", nor were
any of those prosecuted charged with torture. As we noted in our previous submission,
the Schlesinger Panel also took an apparently narrow definition of torture. Inquiries into
into detention practices such as the Church inquiry found no link between ill-treatment of
detainees and authorized interrogation techniques, despite the fact that many of the
authorized techniques in and of themselves constituted treatment proscribed under
international standards in general, and the Convention in particular.(12)
The lack of clarity as to how the USA defines torture or other cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment was also reflected in the final report of a high level military
investigation into complaints by FBI agents about abuses they allegedly witnessed of
detainees in Guantánamo Bay between October 2002 and March 2004, a summary of
which was released in July 2005. The report found that requiring one "high value
detainee" to be led around by a leash tied to his chains, placing a thong on his head,
forcing him to wear a bra and to stand naked in front of a female interrogator, insulting
his mother and sister, and using strip searches as an interrogation technique was "abusive
and degrading" in its cumulative effect "particularly when done in the context of the 48
days of intense and long interrogations", but that this did not rise to the level of
"prohibited inhumane treatment". The investigation found that while all these tactics
applied together could be considered abusive and degrading, each of the tactics was

"authorized" under the Army field manual guidelines for the "pride and ego down" and
"futility" approaches. Pentagon and U.S. Southern Command officials have reportedly
told Congress and reporters that the approaches were consistent with the field
manual.(13) The investigation (which did not involve interviews with any detainees)
recommended no action in respect of most of the FBI’s complaints on the ground that
they were either unsubstantiated or the treatment fell within authorized procedures. It did
not review the legal validity of the various interrogation methods which included
techniques outlined in the Army Field Manual and the "more aggressive" techniques
approved by the Secretary of Defense in his memorandum of April 2003 for use when
"necessary".(14)
2. Effective legislative, administrative, judicial measures. No justification for
torture, including in time of war or other emergency (Article 2)
2. 1. Legislative measures/government’s continued exceptionalism

The measures taken by the US government in response to allegations of torture and illtreatment remain far from adequate. As noted in our previous submission, inquiries to
date have lacked independence and scope and none has served to hold senior officials
accountable.
Furthermore, legislation passed by Congress in December 2005 to protect "war on terror"
detainees from ill-treatment (the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005), has serious
limitations. Section 1003 of the Act prohibits the "cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment
or punishment" of persons of any nationality under the custody or control of the US
government anywhere in the world."(15)
Section 1003 (also known as the McCain Amendment) stipulates that the term "cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment" means the "cruel, unusual and
inhumane" treatment or punishment prohibited under the US Constitution "as defined in
the United States Reservations, Declarations and Understandings" to the UN Convention
against Torture, and thus reflects existing US law. While the legislation is an important
step forward, this could still leave the US open to employ a narrower interpretation of
what constitutes such treatment than is recognized under the Convention. The USA
should therefore withdraw its limiting reservations, declarations and understandings to
the Convention against Torture.
Although Section 1003 applies to the CIA, and some of the "enhanced interrogation
techniques" such as "waterboarding"(16) may be outlawed under the legislation,(17) CIA
activities remain largely secret and are exempt from new military rules on interrogation
when outside a Department of Defense facility (see below). Thus, there is no way of
monitoring whether or not they may continue to use interrogation techniques which
violate international law.
Disturbingly, the legislation included another amendment (section 1005, also known as
the Graham-Levin amendment(18)) which curtailed the right of the Guantánamo

detainees to federal habeas corpus review and barred them from seeking review by US
federal courts of their treatment or conditions of detention.(19) The amendment also
allows evidence obtained by coercion (and therefore, possibly, torture) to be weighed for
its probative value by the Combatant Status Review Tribunals in Guantánamo. These
measures serve to fundamentally weaken the prohibition against torture or ill-treatment
by removing key enforcement mechanisms.
The impact of the Graham-Levin amendment was graphically illustrated when the US
government recently sought to have a torture claim brought by a Guantánamo detainee
before a federal court thrown out. The detainee sought an injunction from a federal judge
to ban "extremely painful" methods of force-feeding which included improper use of a
restraint chair and heavy nasal tubing, which his lawyers described as "amounting to
torture".(20) During the proceedings, government lawyers reportedly contended that even
if the treatment breached the "cruel, inhuman or degrading" ban in the McCain
amendment, detainees in Guantánamo had no recourse to the US courts on account of
section 1005 (above).(21) The case was still pending at the time of writing. More
information on government attempts to have appeals thrown out on the basis of the
Detainee Treatment Act is given below.
Of further concern is the "signing statement" President Bush attached to the legislation, in
which he stated that he would construe the law:
"...in a manner consistent with the constitutional authority of the president
...as Commander-in-Chief" [and] "consistent with the constitutional
limitations on the judicial power, which will assist in achieving the shared
objective of the Congress and the President ... of protecting the American
people from further terrorist attacks."(22)
According to legal experts including, reportedly, White House administration officials,
this signals the executive’s intention to reserve the right to waive the provision on
national security grounds. A similar exception was included in a policy directive
governing interrogations of those in military custody which the government approved in
December 2005 (see under Article 11, below). If this is indeed the case, this would
further undermine the protection afforded by the legislation.(23) It would also be
inconsistent with the US government’s obligation under the Convention to respect the
absolute prohibition of torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment in all
circumstances, including in time of public emergency which threatens the life of the
nation(24)
Amnesty International is deeply concerned that this view is not limited to the Executive.
In a recent decision, a U.S. Federal Court judge stated the following:
"While one cannot ignore the "shocks the conscience" test established in
Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172-73, 72 S.Ct. 205, 209-10, 96 L.Ed.
183 (1952), that case involved the question whether torture could be used
to extract evidence for the purpose of prosecuting criminal conduct, a very
different question from the one ultimately presented here, to wit, whether
substantive due process would erect a per se bar to coercive

investigations, including torture, for the purpose of preventing a terrorist
attack. Whether the circumstances here ultimately cry out for immediate
application of the Due Process clause, or, put differently, whether torture
always violates the Fifth Amendment under established Supreme Court
case law prohibiting government action that "shocks the conscience" – a
question analytically prior to those taken up in the parties' briefing –
remains unresolved from a doctrinal standpoint."(25)
It is clear that there is a pervasive view within the USA that in times of war the President
enjoys extremely wide discretion, including the power to violate non-derogable human
rights protected under the Convention. Amnesty International believes that this must be
rectified through legislation incorporating the provisions of the Convention, including
provisions on non-derogability of certain rights, and a firm commitment by the US
executive, judiciary and legislature to abide by the state’s international obligations.
While the government has stated in broad terms that it does not condone torture, Amnesty
International believes it is vital that the US issues a firm clarifying declaration before the
Committee that no-one, the President included, has the right or authority to torture or
otherwise ill-treat detainees and that anyone, the President included, who does so will
have committed a crime; and that criminal law defences such as "superior orders", "selfdefence" and "necessity" will not be available to perpetrators.
2.2. Legal, administrative and judicial status of "war on terror" detainees breach the
Convention
Also of grave concern is the fact that the US continues to hold thousands of detainees in
Iraq, Afghanistan, Guantánamo Bay, and undisclosed locations in conditions which can
facilitate torture or ill-treatment. These include denial of access to courts, prolonged
incommunicado detention, and detention in secret locations amounting to enforced
disappearances. Such conditions can in themselves amount to torture or ill-treatment.
The UN Commission on Human Rights has stated that "prolonged incommunicado
detention may facilitate the perpetration of torture and can in itself constitute a form of
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or even torture".(26) The Human Rights
Committee has stated that provisions should be made against the use of incommunicado
detention(27), and the Committee against Torture has called for its elimination.(28)
2.2. (i) Afghanistan
Hundreds of detainees continue to be held in US custody in Afghanistan, with no
recourse to due legal process or human rights protection. Some have been detained
without charge or trial at Bagram US airbase for two or three years, yet have no access to
lawyers, relatives or the courts. Some of the worst abuses of detainees (including torture
and deaths in custody) in 2002/3 are reported to have occurred in a section of the Bagram
facility to which the ICRC had no access. While Amnesty International has been told that
the ICRC now visits detainees in Bagram every two weeks, detainees remain

incommunicado during the initial period of detention as well as between visits. The ICRC
still has no access to detainees held in an unknown number of US Forward Operating
Bases, where detainees may reportedly be held for up to ten days, or possibly longer.(29)
AI is concerned at the lack of a clear or recognized legal framework governing the US
forces’ actions in Afghanistan, including in respect of detentions and interrogations.
There is no longer an international armed conflict in Afghanistan, and while provisions of
international humanitarian law, such as Article 3 common to the four Geneva
Conventions, apply to the ongoing non-international armed conflict in which US forces
are involved, they provide little or no guidance as to the procedural aspect of
"internment." AI believes that those deprived of liberty are protected directly by human
rights law, including the requirement for a judicial review of the lawfulness of detention,
the right for persons deprived of their liberty to challenge the lawfulness of their
detention before a judicial body, the right to legal representation, and the prohibition of
all forms of ill-treatment, including through indefinite detention (see below). However,
currently detainees in Afghanistan may be held indefinitely in US military custody,
without any such review.(30) An August 2005 agreement between the USA and
Afghanistan to transfer Afghan detainees from US detention facilities at Bagram (and
Guantánamo Bay) has yet to be implemented.
According to a recent report in the New York Times, based on interviews with current
and former administration officials, the number of detainees held in the Bagram facility
has been increasing since 2004 and holds about 40 non-Afghan prisoners, some of whom
were previously held by the CIA in secret interrogation centres in Afghanistan and other
countries.(31) According to unnamed officials cited in the article, the intelligence agency
had been reluctant to send some of those prisoners to Guantánamo because of the
possibility that their CIA custody could be eventually scrutinized in court. The article
reported that some 500 detainees were being held in Guantánamo as of February 2006
and quoted a Pentagon official as stating that the average stay was 14.5 months. Because
the military does not identify the prisoners or release other information on their detention,
information on how long people were detained and under what circumstances had not
previously come to light.
2. 2. (ii) Iraq
The US-led Multi-National Force (MNF) in Iraq has continued to detain people in
connection with the ongoing insurgency, the vast majority of them in US military
custody. Thousands of "security internees" have been held by the US for months, many
for more than two years, without charge and with no right to challenge the lawfulness of
their detention before a court. (32) While provisions of international humanitarian law,
such as Article 3 common to the four Geneva Conventions, apply to the ongoing noninternational armed conflict in which the MNF is involved, they provide little or no
guidance as to the procedural aspect of "internment." AI believes that those deprived of
liberty are protected by human rights law, including the requirement for a judicial review
of the lawfulness of detention.

In its Update to Annex One of its report to the Committee, the US refers to the practice of
having a military magistrate conduct an initial review within 7 days of the decision to
intern. However, such review appears to be generally conducted on the basis of files on
individual internees without his or her presence and without the presence of legal
counsel. Thereafter, there is a review by a non-judicial body at least every six
months.(33)
Security internees are not allowed access to legal counsel for the first 60 days of
internment and, it appears that, in practice, visits of security detainees by legal counsel at
any time are extremely rare, the main reason being the belief that it is futile to seek legal
counsel when the detainee will not be brought before a court of law.(34) Relatives of
detainees have also reported difficulty in gaining access to internees.
Although the ICRC is in principle allowed to visit MNF-held detainees at locations
throughout the country, AI has been told that access is limited to detainees in internment
facilities, and the ICRC has no access to those held in US division or brigade holding
facilities immediately after arrest. Detainees may be held for days or weeks in such
facilities. On 28 November 2005, the MNF were holding 650 persons in such
facilities.(35)
Regulations governing MNF detentions post-June 2004 (when the interim Iraqi
government replaced the Coalition Provisional Authority) stipulate that security detainees
must either be released after 18 months or transferred to Iraqi criminal jurisdiction.
However, the rules allow for internment by the MNF beyond 18 months, and for an
indefinite period, for reasons of "continued imperative reasons of security".(36) Such
extended internment requires the approval of the Joint Detention Committee (JDC),
which is comprised of Iraqi, US and UK officials. By mid-February 2006, an application
for the extension of internment beyond 18 months of 266 detainees had been made to the
JDC.(37)
AI is concerned that hundreds of "security internees" held by the MNF since before the
handover of power in June 2004 may be held indefinitely with no formal review
procedure. In a letter to AI dated 19 February 2006, Major General Gardner, Commander
of Task Force 134, which is in charge of MNF operations, stated that at the end of 2005
the number of security internees held for more than 18 months was estimated to be 751.
The letter confirmed that approval by the JDC to keep an internee beyond 18 months is
only required for those "internees detained after 30 June 2004".(38)
AI considers that indefinite internment may constitute a violation of the prohibition on
torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, as well as
constituting arbitrary detention in the absence of judicial review. Any deprivation of
liberty, even when carried out in accordance with international humanitarian law,
inevitably causes some stress or a degree of mental suffering to the internee and his or her
family, although this will not automatically render the deprivation unlawful. However, AI
is concerned that the "security internees" held by the MNF, are being deprived of their
liberty in circumstances that cause unnecessary suffering, such as indefinite and

incommunicado detention, that cannot be justified as an unavoidable part of a "lawful
sanction".(39) The Human Rights Committee has referred to prolonged, indefinite
"administrative detention" as incompatible with the prohibition against torture or cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment under Article 7 of the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights (ICCPR).(40) Similarly, the UN Committee against Torture has
found that administrative detention by a party to an armed conflict may constitute cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, based inter alia on its excessive
length.(41)
2. 2. (iii) Guantánamo:
As of March 2006, around 490 detainees from more than 30 countries continued to be
held without charge or trial in the US Naval Base at Guantánamo, many for more than
four years. Although the US Supreme Court ruled in Rasul v. Bush that US courts had
jurisdiction to consider challenges to the legality of their detentions, appeals by the US
government have thus far prevented any such review. Furthermore, the Detainee
Treatment Act of December 2005 curtailed the right of Guantánamo detainees to bring
habeas corpus and most other actions before the US courts, a decision the US government
is seeking to apply retroactively.(42) While the issue of retroactive application and the
scope of the provisions remain the subject of further appeals, the government’s position
places further, severe, obstacles to court review and justice in these cases.
Neither the Combatant Status Review Tribunal (CSRT), an administrative body set up in
2004 to review the status of each detainee, nor the annual review by an Administrative
Review Board (ARB), established in September 2004, satisfy the requirements for a
judicial review of the legality of the detentions (see pages 47-63 of Guantánamo and
Beyond (AI Index AMR 51/063/2005).
In its Annex One of its report to the Committee against Torture, the US government
reasserts its position that it is entitled to hold members of the Taleban, al-Qa’ida or their
affiliates and supporters as "enemy combatants" under the "law of armed conflict" until
the "cessation of hostilities". It justifies its initial decision not to grant POW status to
detainees in Guantánamo or Afghanistan, or to have their cases determined by a
competent tribunal as required by Article 5 of the Third Geneva Convention, on the
ground that: "Because there is no doubt under international law as to the status of alQaida, the Taliban, their affiliates and supporters, there is no need or requirement to
review individually whether such enemy combatant detained at Guantanamo is entitled to
POW status".(43)
This position has been repudiated by international human rights bodies who have
emphasized, inter alia, the following principles:


International human rights law and international humanitarian law complement
each other in times of armed conflict, rather than the latter superseding the
former. Accordingly, the status of the Guantánamo detainees is well within
international human rights law;



Under international humanitarian law, of all those captured during an
international armed conflict must enjoy the status of prisoners of war (POWs)
until and unless a competent tribunal has determined otherwise. This means that
persons so captured who have neither been treated as POWs nor had their status
determined by a competent court are being arbitrarily deprived of their liberty, in
violation of international human rights law. As discussed above, the suffering
caused by arbitrary detention, especially when prolonged, may constitute
violations of the Convention;



Under international humanitarian law, POWs and "internees" captured during an
international armed conflict must be released once hostilities have ceased, unless
they face criminal proceedings for an indictable offence. The continued detention
of those captured during the international armed conflict in Afghanistan, which
ceased in June 2002,(44) without charge or trial is therefore arbitrary;



Those not captured within an armed conflict cannot be held under provisions of
international humanitarian law; instead they are entitled to the full protection of
international human rights law.(45)

Despite the US government’s assertion to the Committee that no doubt exists as to their
status as "enemy combatants", four years on, many questions remain regarding the
histories and background of the Guantánamo detainees. Although the government has
failed to provide statistics on where people were initially detained or other information, it
is now known, through habeas corpus applications (prior to the Detainee Treatment Act)
and other sources, that the Guantánamo detainees include people seized as far away from
Afghanistan as Gambia, Zambia, Bosnia and Egypt and Thailand.(46) There is also
evidence to suggest that some of those detained during the conflict in Afghanistan were
not involved in fighting but may have been innocent civilians who were simply in the
wrong place at the wrong time. According to a statistical analysis of Department of
Defense data on 517 Guantánamo detainees undertaken for the US law group the Center
for Constitutional Rights in February 2006, 55% had no hostile acts listed against them as
the basis for their detention and only 5% were captured by US forces, with the rest not
picked up on the battlefield in Afghanistan but in Pakistan and handed over to the USA
by warlords for bounty.(47) The US military itself has reportedly admitted to detaining
innocent civilians in Guantánamo as well as low level fighters.(48) None has ever
received a fair opportunity to raise their claims that they are unjustly imprisoned.
The USA’s lack of transparency about who is being detained and its failure for more than
four years to provide a list of detainees, have been further obstacles to justice in such
cases. In March 2006, the Pentagon released transcripts of the CSRT hearings at
Guantánamo which gave the names and countries of many of the detainees. This was
done only pursuant to a court order after a protracted lawsuit filed under the Freedom of
Information Act by the Associated Press. Even then, this was not a list of names as such,
and the information was not complete (the minority of detainees who have not yet gone
through CRST proceedings were not included).

2. 3. Continuing concerns about torture and ill-treatment of detainees in Iraq and
Afghanistan:
Although the US has reportedly improved its procedures since Abu Ghraib, there
continue to be reports of torture or ill-treatment of detainees by US troops. In September
2005, several members of the National Guard were sentenced to up to 12 months’
imprisonment after pleading guilty at courts-martial to ill-treating Iraqi detainees in
March 2005. Although the military authorities have declined to provide full details, the
ill-treatment reportedly included using an electro-shock stun-gun on handcuffed and
blindfolded detainees. The Los Angeles Times referred to a member of the battalion as
having reported that "the stun gun was used on at least one man’s testicles".(49) In
December 2005, five soldiers received sentences ranging from 30-days to six months
confinement for kicking and punching Iraqi detainees as they were awaiting transfer to a
detention facility in September.
The US authorities apparently took swift action to investigate the abuses and prosecute
the perpetrators in the above cases, which AI welcomes. However, the organization is
concerned that there are insufficient safeguards to protect detainees from torture and
other ill-treatment. There have been other reports of the abusive use by US troops of
electro-shock weapons such as tasers: dart-firing weapons which can also be used closeup as stun guns. Memos obtained by the ACLU in December 2004 under Freedom of
Information Act requests, for example, revealed that four members of a US special
operations unit had been disciplined for excessive force, including improperly using
tasers on prisoners. According to the memos, dated June 2004, detainees held in Iraq
often arrived at prisons bearing "burn marks" on their backs.(50) An eye-witness told
Amnesty International about a more recent incident in November 2005 in which two
detainees were shocked with tasers used as stun guns while they being transferred to a
medical facility within Camp Bucca. Such incidents, particularly during transfers, were
not uncommon, according to the same source. AI believes that electro-shock weapons are
inherently open to abuse and it has called on the US authorities to suspend their use of
tasers.
AI has also received reports of Iraqi detainees in US custody being subjected to
disciplinary sanctions which amount to torture or other ill-treatment. There have been
reports that Camp Bucca internees, for example, have been exposed to extreme cold as
punishment, including being forcibly showered with cold water and later exposed to a
cold air conditioner.(51)
In December 2005, AI wrote to the US authorities about a photograph in which a juvenile
was shown immobilized in a four-point restraint chair in Abu Ghraib prison, reportedly as
a punishment. AI drew attention to international and US standards stipulating that
restraints should never be applied as punishment and expressing concern that prolonged
immobilization in restraints in the manner shown could carry a health risk. The US
authorities informed AI that they had suspended use of the restraint chair in Abu Ghraib,
pending a review of procedures.(52) However the restraint chair continues to be used in
other US facilities housing "war on terror" detainees, including Guantánamo, where there

have been further allegations of ill-treatment involving use of the chair (see below).
In Afghanistan there have been reports of detainees held in forward operating bases, at
least up to March 2005, being subjected to abuses including hooding, shackling and
deprivation of food and water(53). In October 2005 the Pentagon announced an
investigation into television footage purportedly showing a group of US soldiers burning
the bodies of two Taliban members and using their charred corpses to taunt villages
suspected of harbouring insurgents. While conditions in the Bagram detention facility are
reported to have improved, they are still very basic with many prisoners held in wire pens
or living under bright indoor lights which are dimmed for only a few hours a night.(54) It
has also been reported that detainees have been subjected to cruel punishments, including
being handcuffed for hours in a small cell or placed in isolation for days, for minor rule
infractions.(55)
2. 4. Torture and ill-treatment and cruel, inhuman and degrading conditions in
Guantánamo Bay
AI considers that the conditions of confinement of the Guantánamo detainees, together
with the indefinite nature of their detention, constitutes cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment in violation of Article 16 of the Convention.

The USA has reported to the Committee that detainees receive adequate housing,
recreation and medical facilities; write to and receive mail from their families and
friends; and may worship in accordance with their beliefs. However, numerous detainees
have alleged that the medical and dental care provided has been slow and on some
occasions withheld as part of a punitive and coercive regime.(56) There have been long
delays in receiving mail which is often heavily redacted; some mail has allegedly not
been received at all. There have also been allegations that detainees have at various times
been subjected to religious intolerance by their captors; these have included allegations of
guards damaging copies of the Qu’ran, laughing at detainees while they were praying and
playing loud music during the call-to-prayer.
While some detainees have been transferred to a section where they have more out-ofcell time and contact with other detainees, most continue to be confined to small cells
with little contact with other inmates and minimal opportunities for exercise. Some
detainees are held in extreme isolation in Camp V: a segregation block apparently
modelled on "supermaximum" security prisons on the US mainland, which the
Committee has found to be "excessively harsh".(57) Inmates in Camp V are reportedly
held for up to 24 hours a day in solitary confinement in small concrete cells. They are
allowed out of their cells three times a week for a shower and exercise, although
reportedly this is often reduced to once a week. Such conditions fall short of UN
minimum standards which provide that prisoners should receive at least one hour of
exercise daily. Prisoners in Camp Five are reportedly subjected to 24 hour lighting, which
US courts have held to be "cruel and unusual" in US mainland segregation units.

The conditions and uncertainty about their fate has reportedly contributed to severe
mental and emotional stress and there have been numerous suicide attempts. The US
Department of Defense has reported over 30 suicide attempts but has reclassified others
as "manipulative self-injurious behaviour",(58) indicating a disregard for detainees’
welfare as well as the circumstances underlying such incidents. As of February 2006, an
unknown number of detainees remained on a hunger strike that initially started in mid2005. Some are reported to be seriously ill.(59)
There have been serious allegations of ill-treatment of the hunger strikers during forcefeeding. Although AI has no position on force-feeding per se, it considers that if forcible
feeding is done in such a way as deliberately to cause suffering – as is described below –
this would constitute torture or other ill-treatment.
Detainees have alleged having nasal tubes roughly inserted into their noses without
anaesthetic or gel, causing choking and bleeding. Some of the hunger strikers have
alleged being placed in punitive restraints during force-feeding and being subjected to
verbal and physical abuse by guards. For example, Yousuf al-Shehri, a Saudi Arabian
national, has described how, after seven days without food, he and several others were
taken to the camp hospital, where they had shackles or other restraints placed on the
arms, legs, waist, chest and head before being force-fed; he said that they were hit in the
chest if they moved. Hunger strikers have also described being subjected to verbal abuse.
(60) Lawyers for other detainees have told AI that hunger strikers had been moved into
isolation in cold rooms, immobilized in restraint chairs and deliberately force-fed too
much food, causing them extreme pain and, in some cases, diarrhoea. Detainees on
hunger strike have also reportedly been deprived of "comfort items" such as blankets or
books. The Department of Defense has denied that detainees have been ill-treated while
being force-fed, stating that only in rare cases are the tubes inserted against detainees’
will but admitting that uncooperative detainees "would need to be restrained".(61)
Kuwaiti national Fawzi al-Odah told his lawyer that on 11 January 2006 he ended his
hunger strike after being threatened with force-feeding using a thick tube with a metal
edge whilst restrained, and after hearing the screams of other hunger strikers. Most but
not all of the hunger strikers had reportedly stopped the hunger strike by late February.
In February 2006 five UN special rapporteurs, including the Special Rapporteur on
torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, issued a report on
their investigation into conditions at Guantánamo, calling for the facility to be closed.
The rapporteurs said that some of the treatment, including use of solitary confinement,
holding detainees naked, use of excessive force and the manner of force-feeding of
detainees during the hunger strike amounted to torture. (62)
AI remains deeply concerned by the continued refusal of the USA to open up
Guantánamo to independent, outside scrutiny. AI is particularly concerned by the refusal
of the USA to allow visits by independent experts of the UN Commission on Human
Rights consistent with the standard terms of reference for such visits.(63) This concern is
heightened by the continuing reports of ill-treatment and poor condition of the hunger

strikers and conflicting accounts given by the Pentagon and detainees and their lawyers.
AI has called on the US government inter alia to close the Guantánamo facility and open
up all US "war on terror" detention facilities to independent external scrutiny; to
promptly and impartially investigate all allegations of torture and other cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment of detainees; to ensure all detainees are provided with
appropriate medical care; to ensure that detainees are allowed adequate contact with their
families and that the families are kept fully informed of their legal status, health and wellbeing.
2.4.(i) Children in Guantánamo
At least three detainees who were under 18 when first detained remain in Guantánamo.
They are Mohammed C, a Chadian national picked up in Pakistan, who was transferred to
Guantánamo in January 2002 when he was just 15, Omar Khadr, aged 15 when captured
in Afghanistan in July 2002, and Yousuf al-Shehri, whose alleged ill-treatment during
force-feeding is described above. Mohammed C and Omar Khadr have alleged that they
were tortured in US custody, including being beaten, placed in painful shackles,
threatened with dogs and subjected to sleep deprivation; Omar Khadr also states he was
threatened with rape and had pine solvent poured on him. Throughout their detention,
they have been held in the same harsh conditions as adults, including prolonged solitary
confinement in Camp V. Neither has been provided with rehabilitation or educational
programs consistent with international standards for the treatment of juveniles in custody.
In November 2005, more than three years after his capture, Omar Khadr was named to
stand trial before a military commission on a charge of murdering a US soldier in
Afghanistan. Court documents indicate that during his detention he has undergone
repeated interrogations during which he was given none of the special protections
children are entitled to under international standards, including the right to counsel and to
the presence of a parent or guardian at all stages of proceedings.(64) While AI considers
that military commissions cannot in any case provide a fair trial (65) AI is particularly
concerned that Omar Khadr should face such a proceeding and that evidence may be used
against him which was extracted while he was held in violation of standards for the
protection of children in custody. This would render his trial in any adult court unfair. AI
is further concerned that evidence obtained as a result of treatment constituting torture or
other ill-treatment may be used against him, in violation of Article 15 of the Convention,
despite new instructions issued by the Department of Defense on admissiblity of
statements (see below under Article 15).
The detention of children in the circumstances described is in grave violation of
international standards which recognize that children or child offenders are entitled to
special care and protection. The standards require, among other things, that children
should be detained only as a last resort, with their cases determined promptly. Omar
Khadr’s detention is also contrary to international standards on the treatment of child
soldiers.(66)

2. 5. Secret Detention:
As noted in our preliminary submission, the USA is believed to be holding an unknown
number of detainees in secret CIA-run detention facilities (sometimes called "black
sites") outside the USA. Such facilities have reportedly been located at various times in
countries which include Jordan, Pakistan, Thailand, Afghanistan, the British Indian
Ocean territory of Diego Garcia and countries in Eastern Europe. Not even the ICRC has
access to such detainees whose names, fate and whereabouts remain unknown, leaving
them outside the protection of the law in what therefore constitute "disappearances", a
crime under international law. Such a practice facilitates the perpetration of torture and
other grave violations and may in and of itself amount to torture. (67)
The US government has refused to confirm or deny it is holding suspects in secret
detention, but sources allege that the practice was instituted under enhanced powers given
to the CIA to conduct covert operations following 11 September 2001.(68) The
government has admitted to taking a number of senior alleged members of al-Qa’ida into
custody, whose whereabouts remain unknown, in some cases for more than three years.
They include Ramzi bin al-Shibh, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed and Abu Zubaida. Amnesty
International’s inquiries to the US authorities about these and other cases have been
without response. (69)
Although the practice is shrouded in secrecy, there is also a growing body of testimony
from individuals who allege having been held in secret US detention facilities and
subjected to torture or ill-treatment. They include detainees who have reported being held
in a secret US-operated prison in Afghanistan before being transferred to Guantánamo.
While in Afghanistan, they say they were held in total darkness, chained to walls,
subjected to loud music and tortured with sleep deprivation.(70)
In 2005, Amnesty International conducted extensive interviews with three Yemeni men
who separately gave consistent accounts of having been held for up to 19 months in at
least four secret US-run facilities, one of which was underground. From information
provided subsequently it is likely they were held in Djibouti, Afghanistan and somewhere
in Eastern Europe.(71) All three remained in isolation, including from each other, for the
whole period of their detention. According to their testimony, they were held for more
than a year in one facility apparently designed for incommunicado detention and were
kept in cells with blank walls, no floor coverings, no windows and constant artificial
light. They spoke to no-one but their interrogators. They allege that in their cells there
was a constant low-level hum of "white noise" (indistinct non-musical sounds),
sometimes replaced by loud western music. They did not know which country they were
in or whether it was night or day. Although none of the men alleged that they were
beaten, prolonged solitary confinement in the conditions described can have severe
physiological and psychological effects. One of the men told AI that over time, the daily
horror of his isolation took a profound toll, so much so that he began to think he might
already be dead. "I did believe this for a long time", he said, "and sometimes I am still
afraid it is true".

While the Yemeni detainees said they never saw another detainee, they described signs in
one facility suggesting that others were also being held (for example, swabs left in the
shower-room and a reading list in various languages). None of the three, who were
eventually handed over to Yemeni custody by the USA in May 2005, appeared to be
"high value" detainees. Their cases suggest that the network of clandestine interrogation
centres may be larger, more comprehensive and better organized than previously
suspected. The three remained in Yemeni custody, reportedly at the behest of the USA,
until their release in March 2006.
2. 6. Treatment of enemy combatants in the USA – case of Ali-Saleh Kahlah al-Marri
Ali-Saleh Kahlah al-Marri, a Qatari national, currently the only person detained as an
"enemy combatant" on the US mainland(72), has been held without charge or trial in a
military prison in Charleston, South Carolina since June 2003. He had no access to an
attorney for more than a year after he was detained, and a habeas corpus application is
currently proceeding slowly in the US courts.
In August 2005, lawyers on behalf of Ali-Saleh Kahlah al-Marri filed a complaint in the
federal courts seeking injunctive relief for the torturous conditions under which he was
then confined. These included sleep deprivation, sensory deprivation, punitive shackling,
exposure to cold, denial of a prayer rug and clock and disrespectful handling of the
Qu’ran, treatment which has resulted in severe physical and mental health problems.(73)
AI considers the treatment described to constitute cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment
possibly amounting to torture.
The government filed a motion to dismiss the lawsuit on the ground that the plaintiff’s
claim was "barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity" as the "United States is
engaged in active military hostilities and plaintiff has been declared an enemy
combatant". The government stated that, while the courts had played a role in challenges
to the legality of the detention of enemy combatants (citing, inter alia, Hamdi) "the
details of the conditions of detention for military detention has [sic] always been a matter
left to the discretion of the military and Executive Branch officials, subject only to
international obligations, which are not judicially enforceable".(74) Thus, the government
has sought to foreclose judicial review of the conditions of detention of "enemy
combatants" held in the USA who would otherwise be protected by the US Constitution,
as well as claiming that the USA’s international obligations are "not judicially
enforceable" in US courts. AI is deeply concerned that this is yet another reflection of the
US government’s view that in the "war on terror", it has unfettered authority, including
the freedom to violate the provisions of international treaties, even those that are nonderogable. Appeals in the case continue.
Meanwhile, Al-Marri’s treatment remains entirely at the discretion of the US
government. While there have been some modest improvements in his conditions since
the lawsuit was filed, any "privileges" he receives (such as a prayer rug, exercise, items in
his cell) are at the discretion of the detaining authority, and are reportedly often
arbitrarily withdrawn for extended periods of time.(75) He continues to be held in

extreme isolation, with no contact with any human being other than military staff and
occasional visits with his attorneys.(76) For the 2 years and 8 months of his detention, he
has not been allowed any visits or even telephone communication with his family,
including his wife and five children, a situation that could continue indefinitely. Letters to
and from his family are heavily censored and delayed. No current prisoner or detainee in
the USA is subjected to such blanket social isolation and denial of communication with
the outside world. AI considers these conditions to violate the Convention against
Torture.(77)
3. Refoulement and renditions (Article 3)
Information continues to emerge about the US practice of renditions and
"disappearances" with which the practice has been closely linked. Several inquiries by
European governments and the Council of Europe are underway following reports about
alleged secret CIA-run detention centres in Central Europe, abductions of individuals by
US agents from countries in Europe, and movement of aircraft believed to have been
used by the CIA to transport detainees.
The US administration has acknowledged that it uses "rendition", maintaining that the
practice is aimed at transferring "war on terror" detainees from the country where they
were captured to their home country or to other countries where they can be questioned,
held or brought to justice. It has contended that these transfers are carried out in
accordance with US law and international treaty obligations. However, there is mounting
evidence that the US has systematically violated international law in the practice of
renditions, by carrying out abductions; transfers of individuals to countries with a record
of torture; and enforced disappearances.
Although the government has denied sending people to countries for the purpose of
torture, there is evidence that they have arranged for specifically selected countries with a
record of torture to receive certain "war on terror" detainees for interrogation, effectively
"outsourcing" torture. While the government has provided no details of such cases, there
is direct testimony from individuals who allege they were tortured after being rendered
by the USA, or with US collusion, to other countries. (78) In addition, numerous
detainees are alleged to have been threatened by US interrogators that they would be sent
to countries where they would be tortured, if they refused to cooperate.(79) New
information on the practice, with case examples, is given in Amnesty International’s
recent report: Below the radar: secret flights to torture and rendition.(80)
As stated in our preliminary submission AI considers diplomatic assurances, which the
US government relies on in certain cases, to be unacceptable as evidence that no
substantial risk of torture or ill-treatment exists in the receiving state. We note also that,
in his interim report to the General Assembly, the UN Special Rapporteur on torture also
expressed the firm view that such assurances are unreliable and ineffective in the
protection against torture and ill-treatment; that such assurances are sought usually from
states where the practice of torture is systematic; and that states cannot resort to them as a
safeguard where there are substantial grounds for believing that a person would be

subjected to such treatment upon return.(81) AI’s concern about US practice in this
regard is compounded the fact that the US conditioned its ratification of the Convention
on the understanding that, under Article 3, the phrase "substantial grounds" means "if it is
more likely than not" that someone would be tortured, a higher standard of proof than is
intended under the Convention. AI shares the Committee’s views that the USA should
withdraw its reservations, interpretations and understandings relating to the
Convention.(82)
AI is concerned that former Guantánamo detainees have been returned to countries where
they are at risk of torture or ill-treatment or prolonged, arbitrary detention. In March
2006, the Pentagon reported that 187 Guantánamo detainees had been released since
2002 and 80 others to prisons in more than a dozen countries, including Saudi Arabia and
Morocco, both with a known record of torture and arbitrary detention. In September
2004, 29 Pakistan nationals were returned from Guantánamo to the "control of Pakistan
for continued detention".(83) More than six months later they were still detained in
Pakistan without charge or trial. Wahid al Qadasi was returned to Yemen in April 2004
where he was held without charge or trial until his release earlier this year. Several
former detainees returned to Russia from Guantánamo in March 2004 have been arrested
and allegedly tortured in Russian custody. One of them, Rasul Kudaev, was detained in
October 2005 and reportedly kicked in the head, beaten and severely injured by members
of the Organized Crime Squad in Nalchik, in the North Caucasus region of KabardinoBalkaria. He was then transferred from police headquarters but continued to be detained
without charge, without any information given to his family about his whereabouts or
state of health. (84) He remained in detention as of March 2006.
The US government has recently announced its intention to transfer around two-thirds of
the remaining Guantánamo detainees to their home countries for release or possible
further detention. AI continues to urge that none of the Guantánamo detainees be sent
back to countries where they are at risk of violations including torture or ill-treatment,
arbitrary detention or unfair trials.
4. Training of persons involved in the custody, interrogation or treatment of
detainees and rules for interrogations (Articles 10 and 11)
AI is concerned that the prohibition of torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment has not been fully included in the training of law enforcement personnel or
others who may be involved in the interrogation, custody or treatment of individuals
detained in the context of the "war on terror". Although interrogation rules have
reportedly been revised, and the report of the April 2003 Pentagon’s Working Group on
Detainee Interrogations apparently rescinded,(85) there remain a number of concerns as
outlined below.
The Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Section 1002, provides that no person in the
custody of the Department of Defense (DoD) or in a DoD facility shall be subjected to
any treatment or interrogation technique not authorized by and listed in the US Army
Field Manual on Intelligence Interrogation. While this undoubtedly will provide more

protection than has hitherto been the case, there remain issues of concern.
A new Army Field Manual, the first revision in 13 years and reported to be in near-final
form, has not yet been published. While it will reportedly expressly prohibit the use of
dogs in interrogations and other practices such as prolonged stress positions, stripping
and food and sleep deprivation, there remain questions as to whether it may retain
practices – for example "fear up harsh" -- which could involve torture or other illtreatment. Also, while the field manual would cover treatment of all detainees in DoD
facilities (even if questioned by non-military personnel), it does not apply to other
facilities, for example, CIA-run secret detention facilities.
In December 2005, the US government approved a new 8-page policy directive
(Directive 3115) governing interrogations of those in military detention to accompany the
revised Field Manual. The directive assigns responsibility for interrogation techniques to
senior Pentagon civilians and commanders and establishes training and reporting
guidelines. However, while it states that "acts of physical or mental torture are
prohibited", it does not does elaborate other than to ban the use of dogs in interrogations
and to order that detainees be treated humanely "in accordance with applicable law and
policy". The directive does not explicitly bar "cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment",
nor does it incorporate provisions of international treaties such as the ICCPR, the Geneva
Conventions’ Common Article 3 or the UN Convention against Torture.
While the directive requires that CIA interrogators follow Pentagon guidelines when
questioning military prisoners, this does not apply to detainees outside DoD custody, e.g.
in "black sites" (see Secret Detention,2. 5, above). The directive also reflects the
Executive’s view that ultimately its authority at war is not limited, in that it appears to
allow for exceptional authorization even of prohibited techniques, stating, under Section
3.4.1. "Intelligence operations will be conducted in accordance with applicable law, this
Directive and implementing plans, policies, orders, directives and doctrine ... unless
otherwise authorized, in writing, by the Secretary of Defense or Deputy Secretary of
Defense." (AI emphasis).
4. 1. Role of medical personnel in interrogations:
There have been credible reports of army medical personnel having been complicit in
devising psychological and physical methods of interrogation of detainees at Abu Ghraib
prison in Iraq and Guantánamo, some of which amounted to torture or cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment.(86) They are alleged to have assisted in using detainees’ medical
records to design individual prisoner interrogation plans that included sleep deprivation,
prolonged isolation and exposure to temperature extremes, and to have coached
interrogators on questioning techniques. Medical professionals are also reported to have
failed to report evidence of torture or ill-treatment, falsified medical records to cover up
torture and other human rights violations and failed to maintain medical records or
provide proper care of disabled or injured detainees.(87)
In June 2005 the Department of Defense (DOD) issued a memorandum setting out

principles and procedures to guide medical personnel in the protection and treatment of
detainees in US military custody.(88) However, these guidelines were seriously deficient
and differed in a number of key areas from the UN principles of medical ethics.(89)
While the UN principles state that it is a breach of medical ethics for health personnel to
be involved in any professional relationship with prisoners or detainees the purpose of
which is not solely to evaluate, protect or improve their physical or mental health, the
DOD guidelines limited the principles to personnel involved in "provider-patient
treatment relationship with detainees". Thus, this could still allow medical personnel not
directly involved in patient care to participate in interrogations. While the DOD
principles referred to the obligations of all health personnel to "uphold the humane
treatment of detainees", this was not defined and there was no reference to upholding
international standards, as specifically provided in the UN principles; rather the DOD
guidelines allowed health professionals to continue to assist in interrogations, stating only
that they should not assist in those which are "not in accordance with applicable law".
The guidelines also allowed disclosure of detainee medical records for any intelligence or
national security related activity. As Physicians for Human Rights has pointed out, this is
not only a breach of medical ethics but "the disclosure of medical records to interrogators
is likely to deter detainees from seeking medical care in the first place. This is an
extraordinarily important protection, particularly given the high levels of depression and
suicide attempts among those in detention".(90)
The 2006 Defence Authorization Act included a section requiring the Secretary of
Defense to establish a uniform policy on medical professionals’ interaction with
detainees and revised guidelines were reportedly being drafted or nearing completion as
of March 2006.(91) The Act required the Secretary of Defense to submit to the
congressional defence committees a report on the policy not later than 1 March 2006, but
the Senate Armed Services Committee had reportedly not received a report as of 22
March 2006. AI has urged the DOD to ensure that such guidelines conform to
international standards and believes that the US government should provide clarification
of this issue without delay.
5. Failure to investigate or punish torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment; failure of command accountability (Articles 2, 4, and 12)
In its preliminary submission, AI notes inter alia that no US agent has been prosecuted
for "torture" or "war crimes" despite available legislation and this remains the case, as
does failure to make torture a distinct crime within US territory.
In Human Dignity Denied, Amnesty International describes cases of torture and other
violations where punishments do not appear to have been commensurate to the gravity of
the offence, as required under Article 4(2). They include the case of an army private
sentenced to 3 years for shooting an unarmed Iraqi detainee, who was handcuffed, in the
back of the head. The soldier, who had allegedly said earlier that he wanted to kill an
Iraqi, was charged with premeditated murder, which carries a potential life sentence, but
the court-martial panel of soldiers reduced this to involuntary manslaughter. The mild
penalties imposed in this and other cases contrasted with heavier sentences imposed on

members of the US military charged with offences against fellow soldiers.(92) Soldiers
have continued to receive light penalties even in cases involving deaths under torture, as
illustrated by the Dilawar, Habibullah and Mowhoush cases, cited above. In the Bagram
cases no-one was charged directly with the deaths, and only one soldier received a
custodial sentence (of five months’ imprisonment). One soldier, who admitted
administering more than 30 blows to the legs of one of the detainees who died received a
demotion and an honorable discharge.
AI’s report also noted that, while the Army Criminal Investigation Command,
responsible for investigations into abuses by the military, is described by the Pentagon as
an "independent investigative agency", it is the commanders in the field who decide
whether to pursue judicial or disciplinary action. Many cases, including cases involving
serious crimes, have been dealt with administratively, with light penalties imposed.(93)
Of some 250 military prosecutions to date for alleged abuses committed by US personnel
in the "war on terror", the heaviest sentence is believed to be the ten year prison term
imposed on Charles Graner, convicted on ten charges including aggravated assault and
maltreatment for the torture of detainees at Abu Ghraib.
In some cases which have gone to trial light sentences have been imposed after soldiers
testified that that they were acting under unclear rules or procedures, or believed they
were obeying lawful orders. As AI has already noted, most of those court-martialled have
been low-ranking soldiers and no senior officers who may have been responsible for
ordering, or turning a blind eye to ill-treatment, have been prosecuted.
AI has already drawn the Committee’s attention to serious deficiencies in investigations
into deaths in custody, including delays and cover-ups, which have hampered
prosecutions. A comprehensive report published by Human Rights First in February 2006
reveals the shocking extent of such deficiencies. The report notes that although nearly
100 detainees have died in US custody in the "war on terror", with 34 cases being
classified as suspected or confirmed homicides, only 12 deaths have resulted in
punishment of any kind for any US official and that, while the CIA has been implicated
in several deaths, not one CIA agent has faced a criminal charge. Moreover, the penalties
were generally mild, with the five month sentence imposed in the Bagram case being the
steepest sentence for anyone involved in a torture-related death. The report found that the
lack of accountability stemmed from investigative and evidentiary failures including
inadequate record-keeping; failure of agencies to disclose critical information on cases
and routine failure of investigators to interview key witnesses or collect and maintain
usable evidence. They also found that commanders often failed to report deaths of
detainees in the custody of their command or delayed reporting them for days or weeks,
complicating efforts to collect evidence.(94)
The report noted that, while the military have taken some corrective steps, including
reopening over a dozen investigations and clarifying the rules for reporting deaths and
conducting autopsies, they have not addressed systemic flaws in investigations or in the
prosecution and punishment of wrongdoers. Amnesty International supports the
recommendations contained in the report, namely, that the President as Commander-in-

Chief should immediately move to implement the ban on cruel, inhuman and degrading
treatment and clarify his commitment to abide by the ban; that the President, US military
and relevant agencies should take immediate steps to make clear that all acts of torture
and abuse are dealt with seriously and take concrete steps to hold all those who engage in
wrongdoing accountable;(95) and that Congress should establish an independent
commission to review the scope of US detention and interrogation operations worldwide.
As a matter of principle, across all countries, Amnesty International takes the position
that justice is best served by prosecuting war crimes, crimes against humanity, and other
grave violations of international law, such as torture, in independent and impartial
civilian courts.
6. The right of individuals to have complaints of torture or ill-treatment promptly
and impartially examined, and to compensation for torture or ill-treatment (Articles
13 and 14)
In its report to the Committee, the USA states that its legal system provides a variety of
mechanisms through which persons subjected to torture or other abuse may seek redress,
including the filing of civil actions for monetary damages or declaratory relief. However,
such avenues are largely excluded to non-US nationals held in US custody outside the
USA. A potential avenue for accountability is the Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA), which
provides federal jurisdiction over tort claims filed by aliens over violations of
international law or a treaty to which the US is a party. In March 2005, the ACLU and
Human Rights First filed a federal lawsuit on behalf of eight former detainees who had
been tortured and ill-treated in US miliary custody in Afghanistan and Iraq. The lawsuit
sought a declaration that Secretary Rumsfeld and other senior commanaders were legally
responsible for the acts of torture and it also sought compensatory damages under the
ATCA.(96) In March 2006 the government filed a motion to dismiss the case arguing that
Secretary Rumsfeld was immune from the suit because he was acting "within the scope
of his employment" and, further, that the federal courts had no jurisdiction over the
claims for compensation in such cases. The motion stated inter alia that "the United
States is unaware of any authority allowing such extensive judicial instrusion into warmaking functions" in the case of "alien detainees dissatisfied with the military’s wartime
detention practices". The government also contended that the Detainee Treatment Act,
barring the cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment of detainees held outside the USA,
"does not create a private cause of action".(97) A ruling on the motion was pending at the
time of writing.
While litigation continues on the question of whether "war on terror" victims of abuses
by US forces can file for monetary damages in the US courts, the Detainee Treatment Act
of 2005 denies the Guantánamo detainees access to the federal courts to complain about
their ongoing treatment or conditions of confinement. The relevant section states:
"...no court justice or judge shall have jurisdiction to hear or consider (1) an application
for a writ of habeas corpus filed by or on behalf of an alien detained by the Department
of Defense at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba; or (2) any other action against the United States

or its agents relating to any aspect of the detention by the Department of Defense" (Sec.
1005) .
This could deny the detainees, among other things, the right to seek federal court
injunctions to stop torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, or complain about
conditions of detention. In the USA such court oversight has been an important remedy
against ill-treatment. The denial of such protection in the case of "war on terror"
detentions leaves detainees even more vulnerable to torture and ill-treatment, and the US
government unaccountable. As noted above, the US government is seeking to have the
Act applied retroactively which could affect more than 200 lawsuits on behalf of over
300 Guantánamo detainees which are currently pending before the US courts. The cases
include complaints about conditions of confinement and treatment, as well as petitions
for habeas corpus.
As AI noted in its preliminary submission, the US authorities have an obligation to
ensure that anyone who has suffered torture or ill-treatment in US custody has access to,
and the means to obtain, full reparations wherever they may reside, and this should
include rehabilitation as well as monetary damages. In its report to the Committee the US
government describes the system for handling claims from victims of abuse by U.S.
military personnel in Iraq, citing in particular the Foreign Claims Act and the role of the
Foreign Claims Commission in investigating, adjudicating and settling claims arising out
of an individual’s detention. However, AI has received first hand testimony from former
detainees who were allegedly among those tortured or ill-treated in Abu Ghraib and other
detention facilities and who as late as March 2006 had not received any compensation
and were apparently unaware of the system of making claims. While little detailed
information on reparations appears to be publicly available, it has been alleged that many
Iraqis injured through the negligent or criminal conduct of U.S. soldiers are not
compensated for their injuries and face various obstacles to presenting claims.(98)
The US does not mention in its report any system for handling claims with respect to
abuses by U.S. personnel in Afghanistan or Guantánamo Bay, although applications for
compensation in Afghanistan under the Foreign Claims Act may reportedly be made via
the office of Judge Advocate General. AI has received several reports of victims of abuse
in Afghanistan being paid ex gratia and possibly arbitrarily determined sums which
appear paltry compared to the injury received. For example, the family of an 11-year-old
boy shot in the shoulder by US soldiers as he tried to run home after hearing gunfire
outside his village, told AI that US troops flew him and his uncle to the military hospital
in Kandahar where he was operated on and discharged. A US official gave them $100
and they were left to make their own way home, some 60 Km away.(99) Some relatives
of victims who died in US custody have reported to AI not receiving compensation or of
being uncertain on how to proceed(100), while others who received the discretionary ex
gratia payments (called salatia payments) complained that it was not clear how US
forces determined the amount and that it was, invariably, far less than the earnings or
potential earnings lost. AI is concerned that people without access to legal representation
may find it particularly difficult to proceed with claims. AI hopes that the US government
will provide further clarification of this issue.

7. Admissibility in proceedings of statements extracted under torture (Article 15)
One of AI’s many concerns about the military commissions, established under a military
order by President Bush in November 2001 to try foreign "enemy combatants for war
crimes and related offences", is that the rules for the commisions did not exclude
statements extracted under torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment. On 24
March 2006, the Department of Defense issued a formal instruction barring military
commissions prosecutors from offering as evidence statements obtained as a result of
torture.(101) The Instruction was issued shortly before a hearing before the US Supreme
Court on the constitutionality of the commissions. On explaining why such a ban had not
been issued earlier, the Department of Defense stated that "President Bush has been clear
that the United States does not condone torture" and that "The Department of Defense, of
course, abides by that admonition and had believed that a specific commission rule was
unnecessary and would erroneously suggest that torture had actually occurred".(102)
Amnesty International is concerned that the Instruction, while being a step in the right
direction, still falls far short of the requirements of the Convention. The Instruction
portrays the ban as a matter of US policy rather than a binding legal prohibition; it
includes the same restricted definition of torture based on the US reservations,
declarations and understandings which the Committee called on the US to withdraw; and
it does not exclude statements obtained by the use of cruel, inhuman or degrading
methods. Amnesty International is concerned that the combination of the admissibility of
"evidence" extracted by ill-treatment and the US administration’s limited definition of
what constitutes torture will render this ban meaningless.
Furthermore, Section 1005 of the Detainee Treatment Act allows evidence obtained
under coercion, and thereby possibly torture, provided it has "probative value," to be
considered by the Combatant Status Review Tribunals in Guantánamo. This is the first
time the USA has legalized the use of evidence obtained by torture in military
proceedings, in violation of its obligations under constitutional standards and
international law.
AI is also concerned by the circumstances in which a recent trial court in the USA
admitted evidence which the defendant alleged was extracted under torture. AI concluded
that the trial -- of Ahmed Omar Abu Ali, convicted in a US federal court in November
2005 on charges of conspiracy to commit acts of terrorism(103) -- was flawed as the jury
was not allowed to hear evidence supporting the defendant’s claim that his videotaped
confession, on which the prosecution had relied almost exclusively, had been obtained as
a result of torture in Saudi Arabia. Ahmed Abu Ali told the court that he was flogged and
beaten by the Saudi Arabian Ministry of Interior’s General Intelligence while held in
prison in Saudi Arabia, with the apparent knowledge of the USA. Coerced statements are
inadmissible in trials in the USA. However, during the trial, general statements on the
treatment of detainees from Saudi Arabian officials were used to undermine Abu Ali’s
allegations, while the defence lawyers were not allowed to present any evidence
pertaining to Saudi Arabia’s general record on torture, not even from the US State
Department’s reports. AI is seriously concerned that the trial may set a precedent in US

courts by which statements obtained by torture and ill-treatment are accepted as evidence.
AI is further concerned that failure to allow the defence to present its evidence, while
accepting general claims from Saudi officials denying torture, breached the fundamental
fair trial principle of "equality of arms".
VIOLATIONS OF THE CONVENTION UNDER US DOMESTIC LAW (including
violations of Article 16)
8. Measures to prevent or remedy violations of the Convention (Articles 2, 12, 13,)

Since the Committee’s consideration of the USA’s initial report, Amnesty International
has documented numerous cases of ill-treatment of individuals by US law enforcement
officials, in some instances amounting to torture, as well as cruel, inhuman or degrading
conditions of confinement. The US system provides a range of remedies for torture and
ill-treatment at state and federal level. The US Justice Department, through its Civil
Rights Division, has the power to bring criminal prosecutions against state or federal
officials as well as to seek injunctions to change systemic practices which violate US
civil or constitutional rights. While the latter have led to major improvements in some
custodial facilities and police departments, such actions focus on individual jurisdictions,
are lengthy to undertake, and are limited in practice to a relatively small number of police
or custody agencies. Few states have independent, external monitoring bodies authorized
to conduct regular inspections of jails or prisons and to report on conditions and
investigate abuses. Some police oversight bodies also lack scope, independence or
resources, and complaints against the police are not always dealt with adequately. While
victims of abuses can seek compensation through civil actions in the courts, litigation is
costly and without serious injury liable to result in substantial damages such a remedy is
not available to all victims in practice. Furthermore, the Prison Litigation Act of 1996,
although not preventing litigation, has made it more difficult for prisoners to file lawsuits
and reduces the compensation for attorneys who represent inmates in civil rights cases.
Athough many acts constituting torture or ill-treatment are liable to prosecution under
state and federal penal laws and federal civil rights acts, greater protection would exist if
the US enacted a crime of torture for offences within US territory in line with its
obligations under the Convention. AI is further concerned that the USA has not made a
declaration under Article 22, recognizing the competence of the Committee to receive
and consider individual communications. As the US has also declared the treaty to be
non-self-executing, individuals under US jurisdiction cannot take cases of violations of
the Convention to their own domestic courts or to the international protection body set up
under the treaty – thereby depriving them of some of the essential guarantees under the
treaty.
AI is particularly concerned by the US reservation to article 16, the serious impact of
which has already been shown with regard to the treatment of aliens in US custody
overseas who the US government has argued have no legal protection against "cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment", a position which remains open to question despite the

Detainee Treatment Act.(104) Within the USA, the reservation signals the USA’s
willingness to accept the treaty only insofar as it meets the definition of "cruel and
unusual" punishment under the US constitution and requires no change to existing US
law. This is of concern because there are laws and practices in the USA which are not
unconstitutional (e.g. use of stun belts, electro-shock weapons, conditions in isolation
units, holding juveniles with adults) but which fall short of international standards or are
of concern to the Committee and other human rights bodies. There are also no binding,
national standards or training in the USA with regard to certain practices which
commonly lead to abuses (for example, use of restraints, electro-shock weapons).
The following updates or expands upon areas of concern raised in our preliminary
briefing.
9. Ill-treatment and excessive force by law enforcement officials
While statistics show that US police resort to force in only a small proportion of
incidents, there continue to be disturbing reports of police ill-treatment or use of
excessive force in jurisdictions across the USA. They include cases of physical abuse
sometimes amounting to torture and ill-treatment and cases where unarmed suspects are
shot in circumstances which do not appear to involve an immediate threat to life. In
practice officers are rarely prosecuted for on-duty force and inquiries have found that
disciplinary action has often been inadequate.(105) While a number of police
departments have improved their policies in recent years others still do not have adequate
systems for monitoring police abuses, such as tracking officers involved in repeated
complaints.
There is evidence that racial minorities are disproportionately the victims of police illtreatment, including physical and verbal abuse and questionable shootings(106)
Discriminatory treatment during police stops and searches – sometimes leading to other
abuses such as excessive force – has often been reported. A survey published by the
Justice Department’s Bureau of Justice Statistics in 2005 found, for example, that black
or Hispanic residents were more likely to be searched or issued with tickets after being
stopped by police and more likely to report that police had used excessive force.(107)
However, national legislation to prohibit "racial profiling" in law enforcement (the
targeting of individuals on account of their race, religion, national origin or ethnicity) at
federal, state and local levels, and to provide monitoring and enforcement mechanisms,
has yet to be enacted. (108)
Lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender (LGBT) people are also at risk of discrimination
and ill-treatment by police. In September 2005 Amnesty International published a report:
Stonewalled: police abuse and misconduct against lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender
people in the United States. (109) The report found that, although progress had been
made in the recognition of the rights of LGBT people, serious police abuses, including
gender-based violence amounting to torture and ill-treatment, against the LGBT
community persist. The abuses described in AI’s report included use of sexually explicit,
abusive language, humiliating and unnecessary body searches, threats, physical abuse and

rape. Amnesty International’s research showed that within the LGBT community,
transgender individuals, people of colour, youth, immigrants, homeless individuals and
sex workers experienced a heightened risk of abuse. The report also found that police fail
to respond adequately to "hate crimes" committed against LGBT people. The report
makes a number of recommendations for better police training and accountability as well
as improved procedures for the investigation of complaints.
9.1. Electro-shock weapons:
Despite the concerns expressed by the Committee in its concluding observations to the
USA’s initial report,(110) there has been a substantial increase in the use of electro-shock
weapons by law enforcement officials in the past five years. More than 7,000 US local
police and jail agencies, as well as the US military, currently deploy new generation high
powered tasers: dart firing electro-shock weapons which can also be used close-up as
traditional "touch" stun guns. Police departments deploying tasers claim they reduce
injuries and save lives by providing officers with an alternative to using their firearms or
batons. AI acknowledges the importance of developing non-lethal or "less lethal" force
options to decrease the risk of death or injury inherent in the use of firearms or other
impact weapons. However, AI’s research shows that tasers are often used in situations
where police use of lethal force – or even batons – would never be justified. In many US
police departments tasers have become a routine force tool deployed at a relatively low
level on the "use of force" scale. (111)
More than 150 people are now reported to have died in the USA after being struck with
tasers, with the numbers continuing to rise. While coroners have usually attributed the
deaths to factors such as drug intoxication, in at least 23 cases coroners have found the
taser shock to have directly caused or contributed to the death. Studies have raised
concern that taser shocks may exacerbate a risk of heart failure in cases where people are
under the influence of drugs or have underlying health problems: factors applying in
many of the cases where people have died.(112) Most of those who died were unarmed
men who did not appear to pose a serious threat when they were electro-shocked. Many
were given multiple or prolonged shocks, another potential risk factor cited in recent
studies.(113) The rising death toll heightens Amnesty International’s concerns about the
safety of stun weapons and the lack of rigorous, independent testing of their medical
effects.
Apart from health concerns, electro-shock weapons are particularly open to abuse as,
portable and easy to use, they can inflict severe pain at the push of a button without
leaving substantial marks. Despite such risks, there is little independent scrutiny of taser
use in the USA, and no consistent or binding national standards or guidelines. AI has
documented many cases where the use of such weapons has constituted cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment in violation of Article 16 of the Convention as well as breaching
international guidelines on the use of force. They include use of tasers on children;
elderly people; mentally disabled or intoxicated individuals involved in disturbed but
non-life-threatening behaviour; pregnant women; unarmed suspects fleeing minor crime
scenes; people already in restraints; and people who argued with officers or failed to

comply immediately with police commands.(114) In most of the cases documented,
officers were not found to have violated their departments’ policies.
Amnesty International has called on US state, federal and local authorities to suspend all
transfers and use of tasers and other electro-shock weapons pending a rigorous,
independent inquiry into their use and effects.
In some US jurisdictions (including the federal system) electro-shock stun belts continue
to be used on high security prisoners during transportation, hospital visits or court
hearings. Although AI does not have comprehensive data on their use, more courts have
reportedly started using stun belts following an incident in Atlanta, Georgia, in March
2005, in which a prisoner overpowered a deputy in court and killed three people, and
because visible shackles have been found to undermine defendants’ right to a fair
trial.(115) Agencies which deploy stun belts include the US Marshal’s Service, a federal
agency. AI has condemned such devices as inherently cruel and degrading because the
wearer is under constant fear of being subjected to an electric shock at the push of a
remote control button by officers for the whole time the belt is worn.
9.2. Other restraint devices/techniques leading to breaches of the Convention
Many US police and prison agencies authorize the use of Oleoresin Capsicum (OC) spray
(also known as "pepper spray"), an inflammatory agent derived from cayenne peppers.
OC spray inflames the mucous membranes, causing coughing, gagging, choking,
shortness of breath and an acute burning sensation on the skin and exposed areas. OC
spray has been promoted as a safer alternative to weapons such as chemical mace or
batons. However, since its introduction in the early 1990s, there have been many reported
instances of abuse. These have included reports of prisoners being indiscriminately
exposed to large quantities of OC spray during cell extractions. In Florida, for example,
prisoners have alleged being sprayed in their cells with pepper spray for minor offences,
causing burning and blistering to their skin.(116) Since the early 1990s, more than 100
people are reported to have died after being exposed to pepper spray during their arrest
by police. While most deaths have been attributed by coroners to other causes, there is
concern that OC spray could be a factor in some cases, especially when combined with
other restraints, as it affects the respiratory system. AI has expressed concern that, as with
tasers, OC spray is usually placed at a relatively low level on the police use-of-force
scale, for example, in cases of individuals who, although resisting officers, do not pose a
serious threat. However, there is evidence in some departments of a decline in the use of
OC spray as this is substituted by the taser. AI remains concerned that there are not
enough stringent guidelines regulating the use of chemical sprays by US police and in
prisons.
During the past decade many suspects in US custody have died from "positional
asphyxia" after being placed in dangerous restraint holds such as a "hogtie" or "hobble
restraint", with their wrists or elbows bound behind them to their shackled ankles. This
form of restraint is considered to be a particularly dangerous and potentially lifethreatening procedure, especially if the subject is in a prone position. The National

Institute of Justice has issued guidelines warning of the dangers of hogtying and advising
against placing a suspect in a prone position while in restraints.(117) However, AI is
disturbed that many agencies continue to use the procedure in some form.(118)
In recent years, at least 18 people have died in US detention facilities after being
immobilized in four-point restraint chairs, including several people who had also been
pepper-sprayed and shocked with stun weapons. AI has documented cases in which
people have been strapped into the chairs as punishment, or have been left immobilized
in them for prolonged periods without adequate safeguards, in violation of international
standards on use of restraints and standards prohibiting ill-treatment.(119) As described
above, detainees in Guantánamo have also reportedly been subjected to cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment through use of restraint chairs (see 2.4. above). AI remains
concerned about the safety of restraint chairs and the lack of clear regulations or
monitoring of their use. Although the Committee has previously recommended that the
USA should abolish restraint chairs as methods of restraining those in custody, on the
ground that they lead to breaches of Article 16,(120) they continue to be used in a wide
range of US custody facilities including local jails, federal immigration detention centres
and juvenile detention facilities.
10. Long term isolation in super-maximum security confinement.
Thousands of prisoners, many of them mentally ill, continue to be held in long-term
isolation in "super-maximum security" facilities, sometimes referred to as Security
Housing Units (SHU Units) or Extended Control Units (ECU).(121) At least 30 states
and the federal government operate more than 50 such facilities which include entire
prisons or units within prisons. As noted above, the US has also constructed similar
facilities to house "war on terror" detainees held outside the USA, for example, Camp V
in Guantánamo.
While prison authorities have always been able to segregate prisoners who are a danger to
themselves or others, or to impose fixed terms of segregation as a penalty for disciplinary
offences, super-maximum security facilities differ in that they are designed to house large
numbers of prisoners in long-term, or even indefinite, isolation as an administrative
control measure. Prisoners in the most restrictive units are typically confined for 23-24
hours a day in small, sometimes windowless, solitary cells with solid doors, with no
work, training or other programs(122); their out-of-cell time is limited to no more than 35 hours a week. The facilities are designed to minimize contact between staff and inmates
and prisoners are often subjected to regimes of extreme social isolation and reduced
sensory stimulation. The length of time inmates are assigned to such facilities varies, but
many spend years, and some their whole sentence, in such units. Many units continue to
breach specific standards under the UN Standard Minimum Rules for the treatment of
Prisoners: for example standards specifying the need for windows, natural light, fresh air
and daily outdoor exercise.
Studies have shown that prolonged isolation in conditions of reduced sensory stimulation
can cause severe physical and psychological damage. However, mentally ill or disturbed

prisoners continue to be held in super-maximum facilities in some states, without
adequate treatment or monitoring. In a few jurisdictions, as a result of litigation brought
on behalf of prisoners, courts have ordered changes to conditions in super-maximum
security units, for example, the removal of the severely mentally ill. However, such
rulings are confined only to the specific jurisdiction where the litigation has taken place,
and there have been only a few such court decisions. No court to date has found that
long-term super-maximum security confinement per se violates the US Constitution. In
general, US courts have given broad leeway to states to impose harsh conditions of
segregated custody on security grounds.
In some states, children under 18 are placed in super-maximum security units, in
violation of international standards. Youthful offenders in general tend to be more unruly
than older inmates and may be frequently punished with isolation when in adult prisons.
A joint report published by AI and Human Rights Watch in September 2005 described
how child-offenders serving life without parole were often placed in long-term isolation
as punishment for disruptive or disturbed behaviour. In Colorado, 13 out of 24 child
offenders contacted for the report had spent time in Colorado’s super-maximum
prison.(123)
Some prisoners held on terrorism-related charges in the federal system have been held in
prolonged isolation in punitive conditions while awaiting trial. For example, AI raised
concern with the US government that the pre-trial conditions of Dr Sami Al-Arian (held
on charges of alleged support for Palestinian Islamic Jihad), which included isolation,
inadequate exercise and heavy shackling during visits with his attorney, were
unnecessarily punitive and inhumane.(124) AI has also reported on cruel, inhuman and
degrading conditions under which detainees arrested after 11 September 2001 were held
in the Security Housing Unit of the Metropolitan Detention Center in New York, where
they were held in prolonged solitary confinement, with 24 hour lighting in their cells and
inadequate exercise.(125)
11. Women prisoners remain vulnerable to sexual abuse
As the US government states in its report to the Committee, US states and the federal
jurisdiction have taken a number of measures to address the problem of sexual abuse in
prisons, including the sexual abuse of women prisoners by male guards. 49 states now
have laws which criminalize all forms of sexual contact between staff and inmates.(126)
The Prison Rape Elimination Act (PREA) of 2003, drafted primarily to combat inmateon–inmate sexual assaults, also covers staff sexual misconduct. Although the federal
government has yet to adopt national standards as called for under the PREA
(consultations to implement this process are currently underway), several states have
implemented the provisions through state legislation.(127)
However, many women in prison remain vulnerable to sexual abuse by staff, and victims
may be subject to retaliation for reporting incidents of abuse.(128) According to a recent
AI survey of state policies on custodial sexual misconduct, four states (Arizona,
California, Delaware and Nevada) still permit holding an inmate criminally liable for

engaging in sexual misconduct with a prison official and one state (Arizona) does not
take into account the inmate’s lack of consent, so even an inmate who is raped could be
charged under the law.(129) In addition to rape, which is a form of torture, other types of
sexual abuse in prisons commonly include sexually offensive language; male staff
intimately touching female prisoners while conducting searches, and male staff watching
women while they are naked. Not all such practices may be covered under state sexual
misconduct laws. Some jurisdictions continue to allow practices which AI considers are
inherently cruel and degrading or are open to abuse: these include allowing male staff to
conduct pat down searches of clothed women prisoners; allowing male staff to patrol
areas where women may be viewed in their cells while dressing or washing or when
taking showers.(130)
In most US jurisdictions, male guards continue to have unsupervised access to female jail
and prison inmates, contrary to international standards which provide that female
prisoners should be attended and supervised only by female officers. In some states, male
guards make up the majority of custodial staff in women’s prisons.(131) AI believes such
policies make women prisoners especially vulnerable to abuse by officials: unlike in male
prisons, most complaints of sexual abuse by women prisoners involve abuses by male
staff.
The US has argued that anti-discrimination employment laws in the USA mean that they
cannot refuse to employ male guards in women’s prisons (or female guards in men’s
prisons). However, some jurisdictions have placed certain restrictions on male duties in
women’s prisons (often in response to abuse reports) and US courts have upheld such
restrictions as lawful. International standards provide that measures which are designed
solely to protect the right and special status of women are not considered
discriminatory.(132)
12. Shackling of pregnant women
AI is concerned that many states continue to use restraints (including chains and leg
shackles) on sick and pregnant women when they are transported to and kept in hospital,
regardless of their security status. Thirty-eight US state departments of corrections and
the Federal Bureau of Prisons may use restraints on pregnant women in the third
trimester. In some jurisdictions women are kept in restraints while in labour up until the
moment of birth and shackled again shortly afterwards. (133) For example, Shawanna
Nelson, a prisoner in Arkansas, had her legs shackled together throughout more than 12
hours of labour in September 2003; they were removed only at the point of delivery after
repeated requests from nurses and a doctor.(134) In September 2005, Samantha Luther, a
prisoner in Wisconsin, was allegedly taken in handcuffs and leg shackles to the local
hospital and informed that labour was going to be induced (she was two weeks away
from the due date of birth). Reportedly, her handcuffs were taken off while her leg
shackles remained on, providing 18 inches between her ankles. She was reportedly left in
the shackles until just before birth. (135) The Wisconsin Department of Corrections
reported in January 2006 that staff had been directed to end the use of restraints on
pregnant inmates during labour, delivery and recovery.

The routine use of restraints in such circumstances is cruel and degrading and
contravenes international standards which require that restraints should be used only
when "strictly necessary". Medical experts have also reported that shackling of women
while in labour may endanger the health of the woman and her child. While 17
departments of correction told AI they have adopted policies prohibiting restraints during
labour and delivery or do not restrain women "in practice", other states do not have
guidelines or policies prohibiting such practices.(136) 23 state corrections departments
and the federal Bureau of Prisons have policies that expressly allow restraints during
labour.(137)
13. Ill-treatment of children and youth in detention
Most youth offenders are tried in state and federal juvenile justice systems, the
underlying aim of which is rehabilitation and reform. However, serious abuses have been
reported in some juvenile detention facilities, including beatings, cruel punishments,
overcrowding, neglect and inadequate rehabilitation or educational programs. In the past
decade, the US Department of Justice has investigated and ordered reforms or closure of
a number of facilities. However, allegations of ill-treatment persist, including the cruel
use of restraints and use of solitary confinement, despite the latter being prohibited under
international standards. There is concern over the use of "boot camps" where children are
subjected to particularly harsh regimes.
In January 2006 a 14-year-old boy died hours after being admitted to the Bay County
Sheriff’s boot camp in Florida. A videotape reportedly showed staff kicking, punching
and choking him. There had been previous complaints of abuse at the facility. However,
it was revealed that boot camps were exempt from rules introduced in 2004 which
restricted use of restraints and force in Florida’s juvenile facilities.(138) In California, in
August 2005, an 18-year-old mentally disturbed youth committed suicide after spending
eight weeks alone locked in his cell, prompting renewed calls for reform of the state’s
juvenile detention facilities, many of which failed to provide adequate safeguards for
vulnerable youth. Extended 23-hour lockdown is now reportedly banned in California
youth facilities. However, the practice still exists elsewhere. (139)
13.1. Holding children with adults
In its report to the Committee, the USA states that in federal prisons juveniles are not
regularly held in prison with the regular prison population and that "Federal law prohibits
juvenile offenders held in custody of federal authorities from being placed in correctional
institutions or detention facilities in which they could have regular contact with adult
offenders". However, as the USA acknowledges, practice varies at the state level.
Furthermore, under federal and state laws children under 18 may be tried and sentenced
as adults for certain offences, in which case they could be held in adult facilities and
incarcerated alongside adults (see also the section on life without parole, below). Since
1980 there has been a growing trend in the USA to try and sentence children as adults
and to hold them in adult facilities. By 1997 all but three states (Nebraska, New York and
Vermont) had changed their laws to make it easier for child offenders to stand trial and be

sentenced in adult criminal courts.(140) A national survey by the US Department of
Justice found that, as of 1998, approximately 14,500 youthful offenders (most aged 16 or
17) were in adult facilities (9,100 in jails and 5,400 in prisons).(141) The same survey
found that only 13 per cent of institutions maintained separate units for youthful
offenders. The Justice Department study also found that 39% of the child offenders in
adult prisons had been sentenced for non-violent crimes, such as property or drugs
offences. Young people in adult prisons often face harsh conditions and inadequate
educational or rehabilitation, and they can be particularly vulnerable to rape or sexual
assault by other inmates. As noted above, young offenders in adult prisons are also at risk
of being placed in isolation or super-maximum security confinement.
13.2. Child offenders serving life without parole
A joint study published in October 2005 by AI and Human Rights Watch reported that, as
of 2004, at least 2,225 child offenders under 18 at the time of the crime were serving
sentences of life without parole in the USA.(142) 42 US states and the federal system
permit children prosecuted as adults to be sentenced to life-without-parole. In 27 of the
42 states, the sentence is mandatory for anyone, child or adult, found guilty of certain
enumerated crimes. AI considers such a sentence to constitute cruel, inhuman or
degrading punishment in the case of child offenders, who are still developing physically,
mentally and emotionally. It is also prohibited under the Convention on the Rights of the
Child, signed but not ratified by the USA. One third of the youth offenders identified by
the study as serving life without parole entered prison while still children, in violation of
international human rights standards which prohibit the incarceration of children with
adults.
Of the cases examined, 16 per cent of the offenders (most of whom were sentenced for
homicides) were aged between 13 and 15 at the time of the crime and 59 per cent
received the sentence for their first ever conviction. Many were convicted of "felony
murder" based on evidence of their participation in a crime during which a murder took
place, but without direct evidence of their involvement in the killing. Once in prison,
even when still under 18, they were commonly denied access to vocational or other
programs because of their whole life sentence. The study found that black youth
nationwide were serving life without parole sentences at a rate ten times higher than for
white youth (and constituted 60% of all child offenders serving life without parole). The
study was unable to draw conclusions on the available data as to the cause of the racial
disparity. However, it reflected research studies which have found that minority youths
receive harsher treatment than similarly situated white youths at every stage of the
criminal justice system in the USA.(143)
Although nearly all of the cases in the study involved children sentenced under state
laws, the researchers were contacted by one youth offender, who was 15 at the time of his
crime and is serving life without parole in the federal system for his role as a lookout in a
conspiracy to commit murder.(144) The federal Bureau of Prisons had earlier told AI that
it had no prisoners serving life without parole who were sentenced as children and AI is
currently seeking information on whether there are others in the system.

The report called on the US and state governments to propose and urge legislators to
enact legislation abolishing the sentence of life without parole for children, to suspend the
sentence pending its abolition and to grant child offenders serving such sentences
immediate access to parole procedures. It also recommended that prosecutors cease
seeking such sentences and, instead of filing charges against child offenders directly in
criminal court, refer all child offenders to juvenile court.
14. The Death Penalty
Amnesty International opposes the death penalty as a violation of fundamental rights: the
right to life and the right not to be subjected to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment. The cruelty of the death penalty is manifest not only in the execution but in
the time spent under sentence of death. When the USA ratified the Convention, it did so
on the understanding that the Convention did not restrict or prohibit it from applying the
death penalty, "including any constitutional period of confinement" prior to execution.
In the USA death row inmates typically spend more than a decade awaiting execution,
some more than 20 years. For example, Clarence Ray Allen was executed in California
on 17 January 2006 after 23 years on death row. A 77-year-old Native American, he was
blind, confined to a wheelchair and suffered from serious heart disease and diabetes. One
of the US Supreme Court judges, Justice Stephen Breyer, wrote a dissenting opinion to
the Supreme Court’s decision not to grant a stay of execution in his case stating that he
believed, in the circumstances, that it "raises a significant question as to whether his
execution would constitute cruel and unusual punishment".(145) Several courts outside
the USA have held that long periods of confinement on death row renders the punishment
cruel, inhuman or degrading, as has the Human Rights Committee.(146)
While the length of stay on death row is related (at least in part) to the appeals system, an
essential safeguard against wrongful conviction, this does not reduce the cruel, inhuman
or degrading nature of confinement on death row. Constitutional challenges and changes
to death penalty laws at various points have also put many cases on hold, increasing the
time spent in cruel conditions and in a state of uncertainty. Most death row prisoners’
living conditions are extremely bleak. They are typically confined to small cells for most
of the day often in conditions of extreme deprivation and isolation, and are excluded from
prison educational and employment programs. Added to this is the cruelty of not knowing
if and when they will be executed.
The US takes the position that methods of execution currently employed in the United
States do not constitute cruel and unusual punishment under the US Constitution.(147)
However, in January 2006, the US Supreme Court agreed to decide whether it would hear
appeals filed by three inmates arguing that lethal injection (the method used by most
states) was unconstitutional because the mix of drugs used caused excessive pain. The
appeals were based on a study reported in the medical journal, the Lancet, on 16 April
2005, which said that 21 of 49 inmates executed by lethal injection in Arizona, Georgia,
North Carolina and South Carolina may have been conscious and feeling pain.(148) AI

has also documented cases in which individuals given lethal injection were moving and
apparently conscious and in pain for part of the procedure. A decision by the court on
whether to accept the case for appeal is due in April 2006.
In recent years the US has abolished the death penalty for child offenders(149) and the
mentally retarded. However, the AI retains many concerns about how the US death
penalty is implemented, including execution of the seriously mentally ill and borderline
mentally disabled; racial disparities; lack of access of indigent defendants to adequate
legal counsel and fair trial concerns - practices which breach international standards,
including those set out in the ECOSOC guidelines.(150) These and other concerns have
been documented in numerous AI reports.(151)
APPENDIX 1. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL’S PRELIMINARY BRIEFING TO
THE UN COMMITTEE AGAINST TORTURE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:
Amnesty International’s preliminary briefing
to the Committee against Torture (August 2005)

In advance of the adoption by the Committee against Torture (the Committee) of its list
of issues in relation to the second periodic report submitted by the United States of
America (USA),(152) Amnesty International wishes to outline in this preliminary
briefing its principal concerns regarding the implementation by the USA of its obligations
under the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment
or Punishment (the Convention). The key issues presented here will be developed in more
detail in the briefing which will be submitted by Amnesty International in advance of the
Committee’s examination of the US report at its 36th session in May 2006.
Since the submission of its initial report, the US administration has continued to assert its
condemnation of torture and ill-treatment and its commitment to what it calls the "nonnegotiable demands of human dignity".(153) However, these statements run counter to
what has been happening in practice. Since the atrocious attacks of 11 September 2001,
the USA has taken the lead in pursuing what it terms a "global war on terror". Amnesty
International is deeply concerned that, while the USA has a duty to protect the security of
its citizens, many of the measures taken in this context have shown a disregard for
international human rights and humanitarian law and standards, including the
fundamental rights set out under the Convention.
Foremost among these concerns are reports of the widespread use of torture and other
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment (hereinafter ill-treatment) of detainees held in US
custody in Afghanistan, Iraq, Guantánamo Bay in Cuba, and other locations outside the
USA.(154) As Amnesty International has argued in recent reports, many of these

violations are a direct result of government policy, including moves by the administration
to narrow its interpretation of the definition of torture under Article 1 of the Convention;
the authorization of methods of interrogation prohibited under the Convention as cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment; holding detainees incommunicado; "disappearances";
and generally the removal of detainees from the protection of the law, thereby creating a
climate in which torture and other ill-treatment can flourish. The government has also
failed to show leadership or to take action to ensure that those responsible for violations
at the highest levels are held accountable.
On the domestic front, the USA retains many laws, institutions and mechanisms to
address human rights violations and provide redress for victims of violations. However,
practices identified by the Committee as incompatible with the provisions of Article 16 of
the Convention, including the use of electro-shock devices and "excessively harsh"
conditions of solitary confinement in "supermaximum" security prisons,(155) remain in
force. Some of these practices have been exported for use by US forces abroad and/or
have informed the treatment of detainees in US custody in the context of the "war on
terror". Amnesty International will address these and other domestic human rights
violations in its detailed briefing.
The USA’s ratification of the Convention came with various "reservations, interpretative
understandings and declarations", the effect of which was to limit the application of the
Convention by ensuring that it offered no greater protection than already existed under
US law. Far from withdrawing them, as recommended by the Committee in 2000,(156)
government officials have cited those same reservations, declarations and understandings
to advise that harsh interrogation techniques employed in the context of the "war on
terror" could be lawfully authorized and applied with impunity.
While the USA has long taken a selective approach to international standards, Amnesty
International believes that the US government has taken unprecedented steps in recent
years to withdraw from, or disregard, its obligations under international treaties, a
development which threatens to undermine the whole framework of international human
rights law, including the consensus on the absolute prohibition of torture and other cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. This is an extremely disturbing
development which we hope the Committee will take into account when considering the
US report.
Articles 1 and 16: The use of torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment
As Amnesty International has documented in various reports, there has been a pattern of
torture and other ill-treatment of detainees held in US custody in Afghanistan, Iraq,
Guantánamo Bay in Cuba, and other locations outside the USA, both pre-dating and postdating the torture and other ill-treatment in Abu Ghraib. Evidence derives from a wide
range of sources, including official investigations, information from agents who
witnessed interrogations and victim testimony.

Allegations of ill-treatment in Abu Ghraib and elsewhere include acts which fall clearly
within the definition of torture under Article 1 of the Convention. Other forms of illtreatment violate the prohibition against cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment under
Article 16 and may amount to torture when imposed over a prolonged period or used in
combination, which was often the case. Reported methods of torture and other illtreatment include prolonged incommunicado detention; "disappearances"; beatings; death
threats; threats of torture; electric shocks; forcing shackled detainees into painful stress
positions; sexual humiliation; threats of rape; forced nudity; exposure to extreme heat or
cold; denial of food or water; immersion in water; use of dogs to inspire fear; racial and
religious insults; sensory deprivation techniques such as hooding and blindfolding, sleep
deprivation, exposure to loud music and prolonged isolation.
Many of the measures taken were specifically for the purposes of interrogation, or to
"soften up" detainees for interrogation, as found by several official inquiries. Government
memoranda also authorized techniques specifically to break down "high value detainees"
during interrogation.
Conditions of detention such as those in Guantánamo, specifically prolonged isolation
and indefinite detention, have been part of the ill-treatment of detainees and themselves
amount to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment.
At least 27 detainees who died in US custody had their deaths listed as "homicides", in
some cases after substantial evidence of torture. For example, records from an
investigation carried out into the deaths of two detainees held incommunicado at the US
airbase in Bagram, Afghanistan, in December 2002, indicated that they were severely
beaten over several days; one was beaten more than 100 times with blows to the leg and
was kept hooded and chained to a ceiling.(157)
When ratifying the Convention, the USA entered an "understanding" regarding Article 1
which arguably restricts the scope of the definition of torture provided in this article. A
Justice Department memorandum prepared in August 2002, reportedly in response to a
CIA request for legal protections for its agents, concluded inter alia that interrogators
could cause a great deal of pain before crossing the threshold to torture. Specifically, it
suggested that torture would only occur if the pain rose to the level "that would ordinarily
be associated with a sufficiently serious physical condition or injury such as death, organ
failure, or serious impairment of bodily functions".(158) This memorandum came to light
only in June 2004, after the Abu Ghraib scandal broke, and has subsequently been
withdrawn (see below).
The panel appointed in May 2004 by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld to review
the Pentagon’s detention operations (the Schlesinger Panel) also took an apparently
narrow definition of torture. Releasing the panel’s report on 24 August 2004, Chairman
John Schlesinger said "There is a problem in defining torture. We did not find cases of
torture, however".(159) In the actual report, the panel suggested a definition of torture as
"any treatment that causes permanent harm", reflecting the language in the USA’s

reservation to the Convention against Torture and in 18 U.S.C. 2340, which refers to
"prolonged mental harm".(160)
In order to avoid any further moves to narrow the definition of torture, and to
demonstrate its commitment to the prohibition of torture, the US government must
withdraw its understanding to Article 1 and ensure that any domestic legislation
criminalising torture strictly follows this Article’s definition.
Article 2:
In its second periodic report to the Committee against Torture, the USA asserts its
unequivocal opposition to the use or practice of torture under any circumstances,
including war or public emergency. While this assertion is welcome, there are serious
concerns about the government’s commitment in practice to taking effective measures to
prevent acts of torture or other ill-treatment in the context of its "war on terror". For
example:


The US government has made similar assertions in the past, at a time when secret
memoranda (later published) in which senior administration officials advised the
government on how to avoid its obligations under international law, including
treaties prohibiting torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment were
in force. These documents were apparently government policy during a period
(2002-2004) when detainees in Afghanistan, Guantánamo and other locations, and
later Iraq, were subjected to widespread torture and other ill-treatment.



The Justice Department memorandum of August 2002, narrowing the definition
of torture, stating that the US President had authority, in wartime, to override
international treaties prohibiting torture and that the defences of "necessity" and
"self-defense" were available to officials who torture,(161) was replaced in late
December 2004.(162) The replacement memorandum, while undoubtedly an
improvement on its predecessor, leaves numerous questions unanswered and the
door open to possible future abuses. Specifically, it sets aside (as "unnecessary"
for discussion) rather than rejects both the notion that the President has the
authority to order torture and that torturers can be immune from prosecution or
conviction through the use of the defences of "necessity" and "self-defense".(163)



The US administration has sanctioned interrogation techniques that, even if, used
in isolation or for a limited time, may not amount to torture, constitute cruel,
inhuman and degrading treatment and have been used for prolonged periods and
in combination, causing pain and suffering - physical, mental or both - that is
"severe".(164) These techniques have included stripping, hooding, stress
positions, isolation, "sleep adjustment" and the use of dogs in interrogations.



The December 2004 memorandum does not address the question of cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment, despite the fact that its August 2002 predecessor
claims that these are "acts… that states need not criminalize", which leaves this

position the only one which the U.S. administration has so far offered. This
ignores the fact that such treatment is absolutely prohibited under international
human rights and humanitarian law, even in time of war or public emergency. The
Justice Department has recently asserted that it is not legally bound to apply
Article 16 of the Convention to those held outside the USA (see below).


There is evidence that the decision not to apply the Geneva Convention to
detainees in Afghanistan or Guantánamo (or to grant them protections under other
international treaties or US law) created a climate of impunity that transferred to
Iraq. The US government continues to assert that "enemy combatants" are not
entitled to such protections. In a central policy document, which has not been
rescinded, President Bush has stated that some detainees "are not legally entitled
to such [humane] treatment".(165)



Thousands of detainees remain in US custody in Iraq, Afghanistan, Guantánamo
and other locations, many in conditions conducive to torture and other illtreatment. These include incommunicado detention; denial of access to lawyers,
families or the courts; "disappearances" and detentions in secret locations. Some
conditions, for example prolonged isolation and incommunicado detention may in
themselves constitute ill-treatment.



Allegations of torture and other ill-treatment continue to be reported. For
example, an Afghan detainee released from five months’ detention in March 2005
told the BBC that, while detained in a US Forward Operating base in Afghanistan,
he had been stripped naked during interrogation and deprived of food and
sleep.(166) Amnesty International is currently investigating other reports of
torture and other ill-treatment.

The USA must clarify to the Committee, in no uncertain terms, that under its laws
no one, the President included, has the right or the authority to torture or ill-treat
detainees or to order their torture or ill-treatment, under any circumstances
whatsoever; that every one, the President included, who does so will have committed
a crime; and that the defences of "necessity," "self-defence" and "superior orders"
are categorically not available to those who torture or ill-treat detainees. Amnesty
International is deeply concerned that anything short of this clarification will
indicate that there are "grey areas" in US law, policy and practice where torture
and other ill-treatment are considered acceptable.
Article 3:
There is evidence that the USA has engaged in "renditions" (secret transfers) of detainees
to third countries with a record of torture and other ill-treatment, in grave disregard of its
obligations under Article 3. Indeed, there is disturbing evidence that the US has
deliberately "outsourced" torture by specifically selecting countries with a record of
torture to receive certain "war on terror" detainees for interrogation.(167) In March 2005,
based on interviews with current and former government officials, the New York Times

reported that the CIA had been given expansive authority to conduct renditions shortly
after 11 September 2001 and had since flown 100 to 150 "war on terror" suspects to
various countries, including Egypt, Jordan, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Syria.
While the practice is shrouded in secrecy, several individuals transferred from US
custody (or with US collusion) to third countries have testified to having been
tortured.(168)
In its second periodic report to the Committee, the US government states that it "does not
transfer persons to countries where the United States believes that it is ‘more likely than
not’ that they will be tortured", adding that "The United States obtains assurances as
appropriate, from the foreign government to which a detainee is transferred that it will
not torture the individual being transferred".(169) The "more likely than not" standard
places a higher burden on the individual opposing his or her return or transfer than under
the Convention against Torture. Amnesty International considers diplomatic assurances
to be unacceptable as evidence that no substantial risk of torture or ill-treatment exists in
the receiving state, especially given the record of torture and lack of legal protections in
many of the countries concerned. Such assurances are both evasive of and erosive of the
absolute prohibition on torture and other ill-treatment in general and on refoulement in
particular, in addition to being inherently unreliable.
Articles 4 and 5:
The US government has not made torture a distinct crime under federal law, except with
regard to acts committed outside US territory (the Anti-Torture Act, 18.U.S.C. section
2340, enacted in 1994). Despite mounting evidence that war crimes and other
international crimes, including torture, in some cases resulting in death, have been
committed by US forces in the "war on terror", no US agent has been prosecuted for
"torture" or "war crimes" under available legislation. Indeed, during key periods, as noted
above, senior administration officials were advising the government on how to immunize
US agents from criminal liability for torture and war crimes.
Following exposure of torture and other ill-treatment at Abu Ghraib and elsewhere, a
relatively small number of low-ranking soldiers have been court-martialled for offences
under the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). High ranking officers, including
commanders who may have been responsible for authorizing or turning a blind eye to
torture and other ill-treatment, have not been prosecuted. Although the UCMJ does not
expressly criminalize "torture", there are several offences recognized under it which can
be used to punish acts of torture or ill-treatment, including "cruelty", "maltreatment" and
"assault", as well as manslaughter or murder. However, in many cases the punishments
do not appear to have been commensurate with the grave nature of the offence as
required under Article 4 (2). In over 70% of announced official investigations conducted
in response to substantiated allegations of abuse, the punishment has been non-judicial or
administrative.

Only one civilian contractor, but no CIA agent, has so far been charged with an offence,
despite allegations of abuse involving such personnel. The only civilian contractor to be
charged so far was a contractor working with the CIA accused of beating a detainee so
severely during interrogations that he died of his injuries. The contractor was charged
with assault under the Patriot Act rather than for torture or war crimes. The Military
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act of November 2000 (MEJA), which can be applied to
civilian contractors working for the US abroad, was not used in this instance.(170)
Failure to recognize and punish torture and other ill-treatment outlawed under
international law can lead to a climate of impunity which encourages such crimes. The
USA must ensure that its criminalization of torture covers all the conduct prohibited by
the USA’s international obligations and is applicable to all detention centres.(171)
Amnesty International believes that greater protection would exist were the US to enact
legislation specifically criminalising torture under US domestic law. This should include
amending the UCMJ expressly to outlaw torture. This would send a clear message at all
levels that acts falling within the definition of Article 1 will not be tolerated or prosecuted
under the guise of a lesser offence, and would serve to strengthen the deterrence as well
as punishment of such crimes.
Article 10:
The US government has failed to ensure that education and information regarding the
prohibition of torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment has been fully
included in the training of relevant personnel involved in "war on terror" detentions and
interrogations. Rather, through its selective application of international standards, the
government has sought to circumvent its obligations in this regard. The administration
has also been silent during public debates on torture initiated by prominent individuals in
the USA on various occasions in the past few years.
Official inquiries have pointed to the gross deficiencies in training and supervision of
personnel involved with detainees in Iraq and Afghanistan during critical periods,
including soldiers, medical personnel and civilian contractors. A Schlesinger Panel
member has stated for example that the "extreme lack of resources [and] the policy
failure at all levels to assure a clear and stable set of rules for treatment and interrogation
… opened the door to abuse" at Abu Ghraib, adding that the situation was "compounded
by inadequate training". The Army Inspector General’s report in July 2004 also noted
numerous instances where interrogations in Afghanistan and Iraq were carried out by
soldiers, contractors and medical personnel without the relevant training. The Fay report
into abuses in Abu Ghraib noted evidence that "little, if any, training on Geneva
Conventions was presented to contractor employees".(172) There is ample testimony that
the administration’s decision to reject the applicability of the Geneva Conventions to
"war on terror" detainees in Afghanistan and Guantánamo ended up causing confusion to
interrogators in Iraq, contributing to torture and other ill-treatment. There was also a lack
of cultural awareness training with regard to detainees.(173)

While military training manuals have been revised (see below), these do not apply to the
CIA. Continued failure to apply the Geneva Conventions to those the administration
designates as "enemy combatants" could still leave the door open to torture and other illtreatment. President Bush’s statement in 2002, quoted above, that some detainees are not
legally entitled to humane treatment – a document which has not been rescinded remains cause for concern.
Article 11:
In Section 1.2 of Human dignity denied (pages 57-73), Amnesty International describes
in detail the various interrogation techniques authorized for use by US forces in
Afghanistan and Guantánamo, and later exported to Iraq. The techniques were listed in a
series of official documents and memoranda, including directives signed by Secretary of
Defense Rumsfeld and the then Commander of the US Forces in Iraq, Lieutenant General
Ricardo Sanchez. They include many of the interrogation techniques recommended in the
April 2003 final report of the Pentagon’s Working Group on Detainee Interrogations in
the Global War on Terrorism (a document which has never been rescinded), some of
which went beyond standard US army interrogation doctrine and include: hooding; mild
physical contact; dietary manipulation; environmental manipulation (e.g. adjusting
temperature); sleep adjustment and sleep deprivation; threat to transfer to a third country
(where the subject is likely to fear he would be tortured or killed); isolation; prolonged
standing; increasing anxiety by use of aversions (e.g. presence of dogs).
According to reports, a revised version of the 1992 military interrogation field manual
(FM 34-52), which was in final draft form in June 2004, will expressly prohibit the use of
dogs in interrogations and other practices such as stress positions, stripping and sleep
deprivation. However, it will reportedly include methods which amount to cruel, inhuman
and degrading treatment even when applied strictly, notably treatment described as "fearup harsh," and whose application in the past has led to torture and even death.(174) In
addition, the field manual would only govern interrogations by Department of Defense
personnel and not, for example, those conducted by the CIA (although it would
reportedly prohibit other agencies such as the CIA from holding unregistered detainees in
DOD-controlled facilities).
The current director of the CIA, Porter J. Goss, has told the US Senate Armed Services
Committee that all current interrogation methods being used by the CIA are legal and
none constitute torture.(175) However, Goss referred to the methods of "water boarding,"
in which a detainee is strapped down, forcibly pushed under water and made to believe he
might drown, as "what I will call professional interrogation techniques…".(176) This,
despite the fact that similar methods have been described by human rights monitoring
bodies as amounting to torture.(177) The reluctance of the government (and official
agencies investigating abuses) to call certain practices "torture", or to assert an absolute
prohibition in law and practice against all forms of cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment, continues to give cause for concern about legal guidance provided.(178)

In December 2002, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld authorized stripping, isolation,
sensory deprivation, hooding, stress positions and the use of dogs in interrogations in
Guantánamo. While he subsequently rescinded the order, in April 2003 he signed a
further memorandum authorizing techniques which included isolation and "sleep
adjustment" on a case-by-case basis; he also reserved the right to authorize any
"additional interrogation techniques" in individual cases. This has not been withdrawn.
The door remains open, therefore, for the government to authorize techniques, including
those which may amount to torture, on a discretionary basis in individual cases.
The USA continues to run a network of detention facilities in which detainees are
deprived of basic legal safeguards, a situation in which torture and other ill-treatment can
occur. While Guantánamo detainees now have limited access to the US courts and legal
counsel (despite legal submissions by the US government arguing against such access),
detainees in Afghanistan, where some of the worst cases of torture and other ill-treatment
are alleged to have occurred, have no such access. The ICRC continues to be denied
access to a number of detainees or facilities in Afghanistan, including Forward Operating
Bases. (179) Many of the thousands of detainees in US custody in Iraq are also held for
various periods in incommunicado detention, deprived of access to lawyers, their families
or the courts.
Furthermore, an unknown number of so-called "high-value detainees" – perhaps several
dozen – are allegedly being held in CIA custody in secret locations in Afghanistan and
elsewhere, leaving them outside the protection of the law in what therefore constitutes
"disappearances", itself a crime under international law. Their conditions and treatment
remain unknown and are not subject to any outside scrutiny.(180) "Disappearances" have
been found by human rights monitoring bodies to constitute torture.(181)
Articles 12 and 13:
In its report to the Committee on the treatment of detainees held by US forces outside its
territory, the USA states that it "has taken and continues to take all allegations of abuse
very seriously" and cites the extensive investigations which have taken place. However,
the criminal and administrative inquiries to date have lacked the necessary independence
and scope to address the extent of torture and other ill-treatment. The Church Committee,
for example (which the US government has described in its report as "the most
comprehensive [investigation] to date") found "no link between approved interrogation
techniques and detainee abuse",(182) despite many of these violating international
standards prohibiting torture or other ill-treatment. The Church investigation did not
interview a single detainee or former detainee, nor did it interview Secretary Rumsfeld.
Most of the investigations to date have consisted of the military investigating itself, and
none has investigated the higher echelons of the administration, or the USA’s
involvement in secret transfers to and secret detentions in other countries. The
involvement of the CIA in these and other cases has not been scrutinized. No criminal
investigation has been conducted into the role of senior government officials who may
have engaged in a conspiracy to sanction acts which constitute torture and other war

crimes and/or to immunize officials from criminal liability for torture and other illtreatment.(183)
The administration has also failed to adequately investigate evidence of torture and other
ill-treatment in Afghanistan, Guantánamo and Iraq pre-dating the Abu Ghraib scandal,
raised by organizations including the ICRC and Amnesty International. Its investigations
into deaths in custody also raise issues of concern, including delays and cover-ups and/or
an absence of autopsies in some cases which have hindered investigations.(184)
Article 14:
As noted in the USA’s report to the Committee, there are a range of mechanisms by
which persons within the USA and foreign nationals outside the USA can seek
compensation for violations by US officials. The onus is on the victim to initiate lawsuits
for financial compensation. Amnesty International is concerned that foreign nationals
held outside the USA in the context of the "war on terror" lack the means and resources
to access these procedures and thus are without an effective remedy.
As emphasized by the draft Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy
and Reparation for Victims of Violations of International Human Rights and
Humanitarian Law,(185) the issue of reparation should focus not only on monetary
compensation, but consider restitution, satisfaction, guarantees of non-repetition and
rehabilitation.
Rehabilitation is an important form of reparation in the case of torture survivors. There
are undoubtedly people who have suffered physical and psychological sequelae as a
result of their treatment in US custody during the "war on terror". Some, as noted, have
died. The ICRC has reported detainees held in Iraq "presenting signs of concentration
difficulties, memory problems, verbal expression difficulties, incoherent speech, acute
anxiety reactions, abnormal behaviour and suicidal tendencies", symptoms which
"appeared to have been caused by the methods and duration of interrogation".(186)
Amnesty International has spoken to former Guantánamo detainees who have described
ongoing physical and mental problems as a result of their treatment in US custody, but
who have received no assistance after being peremptorily removed back to their home
countries.(187)
The US authorities should ensure that anyone who has suffered torture or ill-treatment
while in US custody has access to, and the means to obtain, full reparations wherever
they may reside.
Article 15:
The US report to the Committee states that US law provides strict rules regarding the
exclusion of coerced statements and the inadmissibility of illegally obtained evidence in
criminal trials.

However, the Committee should be aware that the rules for military commissions,
introduced by President Bush by Military Order on 13 November 2001 to try non-US
nationals designated as "enemy combatants", do not exclude statements extracted under
torture or other coercive methods. A February 2002 memorandum from the Justice
Department to the Pentagon, made public by the administration on 22 June 2004, states
that "incriminating statements may be admitted in proceedings before military
commissions even if the interrogating officers do not abide by the requirements of
Miranda".(188)
Amnesty International is concerned that any guilty pleas or detainee testimony (including
witness testimony) brought before the military commissions could be the result of the
conditions in which detainees have long been held without any legal process, and which
amount to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, as well as interrogation techniques
which may amount to torture or other ill-treatment.
Amnesty Intentional has called for trials by military commissions to be abandoned as
they are in flagrant violation of international law and standards for a fair trial on a
number of grounds.(189)
Article 16:
The Committee may wish to examine the link between the USA’s reservation to Article
16 and abuses that have been authorized or alleged in the "war on terror".(190) In January
2005, then White House Counsel Alberto Gonzales reported to the Senate that the Justice
Department "has concluded that under Article 16 [of the Convention against Torture]
there is no legal prohibition under the Convention against Torture on cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment with respect to aliens overseas". (191)
This conclusion was based on the fact that the USA’s reservation to Article 16 limited the
application of Article 16 only to conduct already prohibited by the Fifth, Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments to the US Constitution, and that these amendments were
themselves limited and did not provide rights for aliens ill-treated by US officials outside
the USA.(192)
The argument that no alien in US custody outside the USA has any legal protection from
"cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment" is untenable and incompatible with human rights
and humanitarian law. The USA should abandon this position and withdraw its
reservation to Article 16.
Article 16 and US domestic law:
The USA has failed to amend its laws or practices in areas of concern raised by the
Committee after its consideration of the USA’s initial report in May 2000. Amnesty
International has particular concerns about the following:



Supermaximum security (supermax) prisons: Thousands of prisoners are held
in supermax facilities in long-term solitary confinement under conditions which
may constitute cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. Prisoners
assigned to such facilities include the mentally ill and juveniles. Although courts
have ordered improvements to conditions in some supermax units, these decisions
are limited in application. Conditions remain extremely harsh in many states and
often the review procedures for assignment to supermax confinement are
deficient.



Sexual abuse of female detainees and prisoners: The Committee expressed
concerns on this issue in its concluding observations on the USA’s initial
report.(193) While some measures have been taken (for example, the Prison Rape
Elimination Act), (194) Amnesty International is concerned that male guards
continue to have unsupervised access to female prisoners in many states, in
contravention of international standards and in circumstances which can make
such prisoners vulnerable to sexual abuse. Cases of sexual assault of female
prisoners by male guards continue to be reported.



Electro-shock weapons and other restraint devices: The Committee expressed
concerns on this issue in its concluding observations on the USA’s initial
report.(195) In its second periodic report to the Committee, the USA states that
the use of electro-shock stun belts, restraint chairs and other restraint devices such
as stun guns, chokeholds and pepper spray, is not prohibited per se by the US
Constitution, but that there are recommended limits on their use. However, there
are no consistent, binding standards for the use of such devices, and in many
instances they are deployed in a way that amounts to cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment. Amnesty International is particularly concerned by
tasers: dart-firing electro-shock weapons used by more than 5,000 local US police
and jail agencies. Since 2001, more than 130 people are reported to have died in
police custody in the USA and Canada after being struck with tasers, raising
serious concern about the safety of such weapons.(196) Apart from health
concerns, electro-shock weapons are particularly open to abuse as they can inflict
severe pain at the push of a button without leaving substantial marks. Amnesty
International’s research has shown that tasers have been widely used against
individuals who do not pose a serious threat, including children, the elderly and
people under the influence of drink or drugs. At least two people have died after
being stunned and strapped into restraint chairs.(197)



Police brutality: The Committee expressed concerns on this issue in its
concluding observations on the USA’s initial report.(198) Amnesty International
continues to receive reports of police brutality and unjustified shootings, although
some large departments have improved their procedures following federal
investigations into systematic problems of excessive force. Lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender (LGBT) individuals are particularly at risk of police abuse
in some areas, as a forthcoming Amnesty International report will document.



Children in prison: The Committee expressed concerns on this issue in its
concluding observations on the USA’s initial report.(199) Children under the age
of 18 continue to be housed with adults in some facilities, in violation of
international standards. More than 2,000 juvenile offenders in the USA, sentenced
as adults for serious crimes, are currently serving sentences of life without parole,
a sentence Amnesty International believes is cruel, inhuman and degrading
punishment when imposed on child offenders.

APPENDIX 2: CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE AND OTHER CRUEL,
INHUMAN OR DEGRADING TREATMENT OR PUNISHMENT- PART I,
ARTICLES 1 TO 16.
Adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accession by
General Assembly resolution 39/46 of 10 December 1984
entry into force 26 June 1987, in accordance with article 27 (1)
(Relevant Articles)
PART I

Article 1
1. For the purposes of this Convention, the term "torture" means any act by which severe
pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for
such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession,
punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of having
committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on
discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation
of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an
official capacity. It does not include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or
incidental to lawful sanctions.
2. This article is without prejudice to any international instrument or national legislation
which does or may contain provisions of wider application.
Article 2
1. Each State Party shall take effective legislative, administrative, judicial or other
measures to prevent acts of torture in any territory under its jurisdiction.
2. No exceptional circumstances whatsoever, whether a state of war or a threat of war,
internal political in stability or any other public emergency, may be invoked as a
justification of torture.

3. An order from a superior officer or a public authority may not be invoked as a
justification of torture.
Article 3
General comment on its implementation
1. No State Party shall expel, return ("refouler") or extradite a person to another State
where there are substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being
subjected to torture.
2. For the purpose of determining whether there are such grounds, the competent
authorities shall take into account all relevant considerations including, where applicable,
the existence in the State concerned of a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass
violations of human rights.
Article 4
1. Each State Party shall ensure that all acts of torture are offences under its criminal law.
The same shall apply to an attempt to commit torture and to an act by any person which
constitutes complicity or participation in torture.
2. Each State Party shall make these offences punishable by appropriate penalties which
take into account their grave nature.
Article 5
1. Each State Party shall take such measures as may be necessary to establish its
jurisdiction over the offences referred to in article 4 in the following cases:
(a) When the offences are committed in any territory under its jurisdiction or on board a
ship or aircraft registered in that State;
(b) When the alleged offender is a national of that State;
(c) When the victim is a national of that State if that State considers it appropriate.
2. Each State Party shall likewise take such measures as may be necessary to establish its
jurisdiction over such offences in cases where the alleged offender is present in any
territory under its jurisdiction and it does not extradite him pursuant to article 8 to any of
the States mentioned in paragraph I of this article.
3. This Convention does not exclude any criminal jurisdiction exercised in accordance
with internal law.
Article 6
1. Upon being satisfied, after an examination of information available to it, that the
circumstances so warrant, any State Party in whose territory a person alleged to have
committed any offence referred to in article 4 is present shall take him into custody or
take other legal measures to ensure his presence. The custody and other legal measures
shall be as provided in the law of that State but may be continued only for such time as is
necessary to enable any criminal or extradition proceedings to be instituted.

2. Such State shall immediately make a preliminary inquiry into the facts.
3. Any person in custody pursuant to paragraph I of this article shall be assisted in
communicating immediately with the nearest appropriate representative of the State of
which he is a national, or, if he is a stateless person, with the representative of the State
where he usually resides.
4. When a State, pursuant to this article, has taken a person into custody, it shall
immediately notify the States referred to in article 5, paragraph 1, of the fact that such
person is in custody and of the circumstances which warrant his detention. The State
which makes the preliminary inquiry contemplated in paragraph 2 of this article shall
promptly report its findings to the said States and shall indicate whether it intends to
exercise jurisdiction.
Article 7
1. The State Party in the territory under whose jurisdiction a person alleged to have
committed any offence referred to in article 4 is found shall in the cases contemplated in
article 5, if it does not extradite him, submit the case to its competent authorities for the
purpose of prosecution.
2. These authorities shall take their decision in the same manner as in the case of any
ordinary offence of a serious nature under the law of that State. In the cases referred to in
article 5, paragraph 2, the standards of evidence required for prosecution and conviction
shall in no way be less stringent than those which apply in the cases referred to in article
5, paragraph 1.
3. Any person regarding whom proceedings are brought in connection with any of the
offences referred to in article 4 shall be guaranteed fair treatment at all stages of the
proceedings.
Article 8
1. The offences referred to in article 4 shall be deemed to be included as extraditable
offences in any extradition treaty existing between States Parties. States Parties undertake
to include such offences as extraditable offences in every extradition treaty to be
concluded between them.
2. If a State Party which makes extradition conditional on the existence of a treaty
receives a request for extradition from another State Party with which it has no
extradition treaty, it may consider this Convention as the legal basis for extradition in
respect of such offences. Extradition shall be subject to the other conditions provided by
the law of the requested State.
3. States Parties which do not make extradition conditional on the existence of a treaty
shall recognize such offences as extraditable offences between themselves subject to the
conditions provided by the law of the requested State.

4. Such offences shall be treated, for the purpose of extradition between States Parties, as
if they had been committed not only in the place in which they occurred but also in the
territories of the States required to establish their jurisdiction in accordance with article 5,
paragraph 1.
Article 9
1. States Parties shall afford one another the greatest measure of assistance in connection
with criminal proceedings brought in respect of any of the offences referred to in article
4, including the supply of all evidence at their disposal necessary for the proceedings.
2. States Parties shall carry out their obligations under paragraph I of this article in
conformity with any treaties on mutual judicial assistance that may exist between them.
Article 10
1. Each State Party shall ensure that education and information regarding the prohibition
against torture are fully included in the training of law enforcement personnel, civil or
military, medical personnel, public officials and other persons who may be involved in
the custody, interrogation or treatment of any individual subjected to any form of arrest,
detention or imprisonment.
2. Each State Party shall include this prohibition in the rules or instructions issued in
regard to the duties and functions of any such person.
Article 11
Each State Party shall keep under systematic review interrogation rules, instructions,
methods and practices as well as arrangements for the custody and treatment of persons
subjected to any form of arrest, detention or imprisonment in any territory under its
jurisdiction, with a view to preventing any cases of torture.
Article 12
Each State Party shall ensure that its competent authorities proceed to a prompt and
impartial investigation, wherever there is reasonable ground to believe that an act of
torture has been committed in any territory under its jurisdiction.
Article 13
Each State Party shall ensure that any individual who alleges he has been subjected to
torture in any territory under its jurisdiction has the right to complain to, and to have his
case promptly and impartially examined by, its competent authorities. Steps shall be
taken to ensure that the complainant and witnesses are protected against all ill-treatment
or intimidation as a consequence of his complaint or any evidence given.
Article 14
1. Each State Party shall ensure in its legal system that the victim of an act of torture
obtains redress and has an enforceable right to fair and adequate compensation, including
the means for as full rehabilitation as possible. In the event of the death of the victim as a
result of an act of torture, his dependants shall be entitled to compensation.
2. Nothing in this article shall affect any right of the victim or other persons to
compensation which may exist under national law.

Article 15
Each State Party shall ensure that any statement which is established to have been made
as a result of torture shall not be invoked as evidence in any proceedings, except against a
person accused of torture as evidence that the statement was made.
Article 16
1. Each State Party shall undertake to prevent in any territory under its jurisdiction other
acts of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment which do not amount to
torture as defined in article I, when such acts are committed by or at the instigation of or
with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official
capacity. In particular, the obligations contained in articles 10, 11, 12 and 13 shall apply
with the substitution for references to torture of references to other forms of cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.
2. The provisions of this Convention are without prejudice to the provisions of any other
international instrument or national law which prohibits cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment or which relates to extradition or expulsion.

(1) UN Doc. CAT/C/48/Add.3/Rev.1, 13 January 2006.
(2) Interrogation techniques Secretary Rumsfeld authorized for use at Guantánamo in
memos dated December 2002 and April 2003 included 20 hour interrogations; stress
positions; isolation; sensory deprivation; use of phobias (dogs); hooding, removal of
clothing, forced shaving, "dietary manipulation" and "environmental manipulation"
(adjustment of temperature). Similar techniques were authorized in September 2003 by
then Commander of US Forces in Iraq General Ricardo Sanchez.
(3) There is ample evidence in detainee accounts, reports to inquiries and court
documents of detainees in Afghanistan, Guantánamo and Iraq being hooded, shackled
and often stripped during interrogations, as well as being intimidated by military dogs.
The Schlesinger Panel found stripping was routine practice during interrogations at Abu
Ghraib. Many Guantánamo detainees have described being held in prolonged isolation in
harsh conditions as punishment for not providing information during interrogations; in
occupied Iraq, the ICRC expressed concern about the USA’s systematic resort to keeping
uncooperative detainees "completely naked in totally empty concrete cells and in total
darkness" for days. (ICRC report February 2004)
(4) For example, detainees in Bagram airbase, Afghanistan, were forced to remain
standing for days, naked and hooded, chained to ceilings and deprived of sleep, food and
water; Guantánamo detainees have described being subjected to prolonged sleep
deprivation, threats from dogs, sexual humiliation, exposure for days or hours to extreme
temperatures, painful "short-shackling" for hours during interrogations (in which they
had to squat with their hands and feet chained to the floor).
(5) See for example a recent report by Human Rights First: Command’s Responsibility,
February 2006 listing cases and concerns about investigations.

(6) New York Times, 8 August 2005
(7) Tim Golden Years after 2 Afghans Died, Abuse Case Falters, New York Times 13
Feb 2006
(8) New York Times, 26 March 2005
(9) Army criminal investigators outline 27 confirmed or suspected detainee homicides for
Operation Iraqi Freedom, Operation Enduring Freedom. United States Army Criminal
Investigation Command, 25 March 2005.
(10) The case, with others, is described on pages 111-116 of Guantánamo and Beyond,
May 2005 (AMR 51/063/2005)
http:/web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGAMR510632005?open&of=ENG-USA
(11) Armed Forces Institute of Pathology, Autopsy No. ME 04-309 (name not given).
The report is one of 44 autopsy reports obtained under the Freedom of Information Act
and posted on the ACLU website: http://action.aclu.org/torturefoia/released/102405/
(12) AI’s critique of these inquiries is given on pages 97-102 of Guantánamo and Beyond
(op cit)
(13) See Josh White, "Military Lawyers Say Tactics Broke Rules," Washington Post, 16
March 2006.
(14) Army Regulation 15-6: Final Report. Investigation into FBI Allegations of Detainee
Abuse at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba Detention Facility 1 April 05 (Amended 9 June 05).
The approved techniques included stripping detainees; use of yelling, loud noise and
strobe lights; isolation; sleep deprivation; use of dogs to exploit detainees’ phobias; use
of female interrogators to exploit the gender sensitivities of male Muslim detainees. The
investigation did not evaluate the legality of otherwise of these methods, although it
recommended that the military authorities in command of Guantánamo stop using
females to provoke or humiliate detainees; clarify their policy on sleep deprivation and
that certain other techniques, such as subjecting detainees to loud music and strobe lights
should be "conducted within clearly prescribed limits". The investigation found there
were no substantiated allegations of "serious abuse of detainees" at Guantánamo, but
listed 10 substantiated "incidents" of "misconduct", listed in the US report to the
Committee. (Update to Annex One, B, 2.)
(15) As included in the Defence Appropriation Act, 2006 (H.R.2863), Title X, signed by
President Bush on 30 December 2005. It is also included in the Defense Authorization
Act (Sections 1402-1405).
(16) "Waterboarding" involves strapping a detainee to a board and submerging him in
water until he believes he is drowning.

(17) In a classified report written in 2004, the findings of which were leaked in
November 2005, the CIA’s then inspector general John L. Helgerson, while not
concluding that it constituted torture, expressed concern that waterboarding would violate
the "cruel, inhuman and degrading" provisions under the Convention against Torture
(Report Warned on CIA’s Tactics in Interrogation, The New York Times 9 November
2005)
(18) Sec. 1005 of the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, entitled "Procedures for Status
Review of Detainees Outside the United States."
(19) The amendment provides that "…no court justice or judge shall have jurisdiction to
hear or consider (1) an application for a writ of habeas corpus filed by or on behalf of an
alien detained by the Department of Defense at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba; or (2) any other
action against the United States or its agents relating to any aspect of the detention by the
Department of Defense" (Sec. 1005 (e) (2)). The amendment provides that Guantánamo
detainees can have access to the courts only to appeal their enemy combatant status
determinations and convictions by military commissions.
(20) The UN Special Procedures also found methods of force-feeding Guantánamo
hungers strikers to constitute torture (see 2, 4. below)
(21) J. White and C.D. Leonnig, US Cites Exception in Torture Ban, Washington Post, 3
March 2006
(22) www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/12/20051230-8.html
(23) So far the position of the executive remains ambiguous, see for example Reuters, 20
January 2006: Retired military leaders express concern after the president made
ambiguous remarks on the new ban last month.
(24) It should be noted that a White House memorandum of 7 February 2002 entitled
Humane Treatment of al Qaeda and Taliban Detainees, in which the government states
that some detainees are not entitled to humane treatment has never been withdrawn, thus
raising further questions about the US government’s position in this regard ("our values
…call for us to treat detainees humanely, including those who are not legally entitled to
such treatment.").
(25) Maher Arar v. John Ashcroft et al., Civil Action No. CV-04-0249 (DGT)(VVP),
United States District Court, Eastern District of New York, Memorandum and Order, 16
February 2006, per David G. Trager J, p. 55. In a footnote (no. 10), the Court
distinguishes Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980) as it "does not address
the constitutionality of torture to prevent a terrorist attack." The Court also states that the
relevant international obligations could be "repudiated" by "congressional legislation to
the contrary." Ibid.

(26) Resolution: 2004/41. para 8, 19 April 2004
(27) Human Rights Committee General Comment 20, Article 7 (Forty-fourth session,
1992), para. 11.
(28) Human Rights Committee General Comment 20. Committee against Torture : UN
Doc. A/52/44 (1997), para. 121 (d).
(29) There were reports in early 2005 of detainees being held for up to two months in
such facilities (see AI report: USA:US detentions in Afghanistan: an aide-mémoire for
continued action (AI Index: AMR 51/093/2005)
(30) As the US report to the Committee states, there is an initial review of the designation
of "enemy combatant" status by a Commander or designee within 90 days of detention
after which the detainee will "remain under DOD control" with an annual review by the
"detaining combatant commander" thereafter. Detainees "remain under DOD control until
they no longer present a threat". Update to Annex One D. 2.
(31) An Afghan Prison Expands, Filling Guantánamo’s Role, Tim Golden and Eric
Schmitt, New York Times 26 February 2006
(32) More than 14,000 security internees were in US custody as of November 2005:
http://www.mnf-Iraq.com/TF134/Numbers.htm.
(33) The Combined Review and Release Board, composed of six representatives of the
Iraqi government and three from the MNF. The final approval for release rests with the
Deputy Commanding General of the MNF.
(34) Amnesty International’s detailed concerns regarding the current detention system in
Iraq are outlined in its report: Beyond Abu Ghraib: detention and torture in Iraq. AI
Index: MDE 14/001/2006, 6 March 2006, hereinafter referred to as Beyond Abu Ghraib.
http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGMDE140012006
(35) See MNF website, http://www.mnf-Iraq.com/TF134/Numbers.htm
(36) CPA Memorandum No 3 (revised): Criminal Procedures, 27 June 2004
(37) Letter of 19 February 2006 to AI by Major General Gardner, Commanding Officer,
MNF Task Force 134.
(38) ibid
(39) Under the definition of torture in Article 1(1) of the UN Declaration on the
Protection of All Persons from Being Subjected to Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment and the UN Convention against Torture,
respectively. Reports in recent years on persons held in indefinite detention in the context

of the "war on terror" have shown the severe psychological effects of such detention. For
instance, in October 2004, in a report on the mental health of detainees held at the time
indefinitely in Belmarsh high security prison, in the UK, under the Anti-Terrorism Crime
and Security Act (2001), eminent psychiatrists concluded that the detainees had become
seriously clinically depressed and were suffering from anxiety, some of them becoming
psychotic as a result of their indefinite detention. (Professor Ian Robbins, Dr James
MacKeith, Professor Michael Kopelman, Dr Clive Meux, Dr Sumi Ratnam, Dr Richard
Taylor, Dr Sophie Davison and Dr David Somekh, The Psychiatric Problems of
Detainees under the 2001 Antiterrorism Crime and Security Act, 13 October 2004,
http://www.statewatch.org/news/2004/nov/belmarsh-mh.pdf ).
(40) Human Rights Committee, Annual Report, vol.1 (1998), UN Doc. A/53/40,
para.317.
(41) Concluding observations of the Committee against Torture: Israel, UN Doc.
A/53/44. 16 September 1998, para. 238(b).
(42) The Detainee Treatment Act, Section 1005, limits US courts to considering appeals
against decisions by the Combatant Status Review Boards to confirm an "enemy
combatant" status and to appeals against death sentences or sentences of ten years of
more imposed by military commissions (with other appeals against commission sentences
being discretionary)..
(43) Annex One of the Second Periodic Report of the USA to the Committee against
Torture, 21 October 2005, B: Status of Detainees at Guantánamo Bay and in Afghanistan
(44) The international armed conflict in Afghanistan is deemed to have ended with the
conclusion of the Emergency Loya Jirga and the establishment of a Transitional
Authority on 19 June 2002.
(45) See for instance, Situation of detainees at Guantánamo Bay, report of UN experts
(UN Doc.E/CN.4/2006/120, 27 February 2006, para 54, cited below at page 18, note 62).
See page 12 of Guantánamo and Beyond for a summary of the relevant international legal
framework.
(46) They include six Algerians seized in Bosnia-Herzegovina in January 2002 whose
removal was found by the Human Rights Chamber of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the
UN High Commissioner for Human Rights to have been in violation of international law
(see Amnesty International document: USA: Beyond the Law, page 4, note 5 (AI Index
AMR 51/184/2002).
(47) www.ccr-ny.org/\/2/reports/report.asp?ObjlD=JbXOoOpVig&Content=708-19K:
Some cases are described in AI’s report Guantánamo: Lives Torn Apart, The impact of
indefinite detention on detainees and their families, published 6 February 2006 (AMR
51/007/2006), hereafter referred to as Lives Torn Apart.

(48) See for example Center for Constitutional Rights: Graham Myths (http://www.crny.org/v2/reports/report.asp?ObjID-V9mCOgUtSh&Content=666 ) Amnesty
International provides accounts of the histories of some individual Guantánamo detainees
in case sheets entitled: Who are the Guantánamo Detainees?
(http://web.amnesty.org/pages/guantanamobay-library-eng#cases)
(49) Associated Press, Jeremiah Marqez, California Guard sergeant gets year in Iraq
detainee abuse case, 10 September 2005; Los Angeles Times, Scott Gold and Rone
Tempest: More Tumult besets guard unit in Iraq, 15 October 2005
(50) BBC News 8 December 2004
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/4080761.stm
(51) See AI report Beyond Abu Ghraib: Detention and Torture in Iraq.
http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/engmde140012006
(52) Letter to Amnesty International from Major General John D. Gardner, Deputy
Commanding Genera, Detainee Operations, Multi-National Force-Iraq, 17 January
2006.The original photograph was by John Moore of Getty Images.
(53) Testimony to a BBC radio broadcast on 2 June 2005 of detainees released in March
2005, reported in Amnesty International’s report: USA US detentions in Afghanistan: an
aide-mémoire for continued action (AMR 51/093/2005).o
(54) New York Times, 26 February 2006, op cit. (note 31).
(55) Ibid
(56) See Guantánamo and Beyond
(57) Conclusions and Recommendations of the Committee against Torture: United States
of America. 15/05/2000. UN Doc. A/55/44
(58) David Rose, Vanity Fair, January 2004
(59) On 1 December 2005 the US Department of Defense estimated the number of longterm hunger strikes - described among the guards as "voluntary fasting" – to be between
thirty to thirty-three, although some of the detainees’ lawyers have given much higher
numbers.
(60) These and other cases are described in Amnesty International’s report Guantánamo:
Lives torn apart, The impact of indefinite detention on detainees and their families, 6
February 2006, AI Index AMR 51/007/2006
(61) http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Dec2005/20051201_3504.html

(62) Situation of detainees at Guantánamo Bay, Report of the Chairperson of the
Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, Ms. Leila Zerrougui; the Special Rapporteur on
the independence of judges and lawyers, Mr. Leandro Despouy; the Special Rapporteur
on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, Mr. Manfred
Nowak; the Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief, Ms. Asma Jahangir and
the Special Rapporteur on the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable
standard of physical and mental health, Mr. Paul Hunt, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2006/120, 15
February 2006, para. 54.
(63) AI is concerned that, in October 2005, the US refused to allow the Special
Rapporteur on the right of everyone to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of
physical and mental health and the Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and
lawyers to visit Guantánamo. While it extended an invitation to the Special Rapporteur
on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment; to the Special
Rapporteur on freedom of religion and belief and to the Chair-person-Rapporteur of the
Working Group on Arbitrary detention, this was on strictly limited terms and they were
not allowed to interview detainees.
(64) These are among a range of safeguards set out under the UN Standard Minimum
Rules for the Administration of Juvenile Justice which reflect several provisions of the
ICCPR. The rules state that the same principles for the protection of children in the
juvenile system should guide the treatment of children in the adult criminal justice
system. Similar safeguards are set out under the Convention on the Rights of the Child,
signed but not ratified by the USA.
(65) AI’s concerns about military commissions are set out in many publications including
Guantánamo and Beyond and a March 2006 fact sheet: Military commissions for "war on
terror" detainees (http://web.amnesty.org/library/print/ENGAMR510502006).
(66) The USA has ratified the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the
Child on the involvement of children in armed conflict, which provides inter alia that
State Parties shall take all feasible measures to ensure children in their jurisdiction
recruited or used in hostilities are demobilised and shall, when necessary, accord to such
persons all appropriate assistance for their physical and psychological recovery and their
social reintegration (Article 6(3)).
(67) El-Megreisi v. Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Communication No. 44/1990, UN. Doc.
CCPR/C.50/D/440/1990 (1994): the Human Rights Committee determined that the
"disappearance" in circumstances not unlike those in US undisclosed locations
("prolonged incommunicado detention in an unknown location") amounted to torture. See
also the statement by the UN Commissioner for Human Rights Louise Arbour, 7
December 2005: undisclosed detention "amounts to disappearance", which in and of itself
has been found to amount to torture or ill-treatment of the disappeared person or of the
families and communities deprived of information about the missing person".
(68) This is believed to be a Memorandum of Notification signed by Bush on 17

September 2001, see Human Dignity Denied, pages 107-116.
(69) See Human Dignity Denied; Torture and Accountability in the ‘war on terror’ (AI
Index AMR 51/145/2004), pages 107-114. Guantánamo and Beyond, pp 118-122
(70) Human Rights Watch: US Operated Secret "Dark Prison" in Kabul, 19 December
2005, http://hrw.org/english/docs/2005/12/19/afghan12319.htm. see also AI report
Guantánamo and Beyond, p.122 reference to Khaled El Masri, kept in secret detention in
the "Salt Pit" in Kabul, even after the CIA realised it had the wrong man in a case of
mistaken identity.
(71) The three men were Muhammad Abdullah Salah al-Assad, detained in Tanzania and
handed over to US custody in December 2003, and Muhammad Bashmilah and Sala Qaru
who were arrested in Jordan and transferred to US custody in October 2003. All three
were returned to Yemen in May 2005. Their accounts are given in AI’s Report:
USA/Yemen: Secret Detention and CIA "Black Sites" (AI Index AMR 51/177/2005; and
updated in AI’s report: Below the Radar: Secret Flights to Torture and ‘Disappearance’,
published on 5 April 2006 (AI Index AMR 51/051/2006).
(72) Jose Padilla, the only other person formerly detained as an "enemy combatant in the
USA was indicted on federal criminal charges in November 2005 and has since been
transferred to the jurisdiction of the federal criminal justice system.
(73) Preliminary Statement in the case of Ali Saleh Kahla al-Marri v Donald H Rumsfeld
and Commander C. T. Hanft, in the US District Court for the District of South Carolina, 8
August 2005.
(74) Ali Saleh Kahlah Al-Marri v Donald Rumsfeld: government’s Motion to Dismiss the
Complaint, Civil Action No. 2:05-cv-02259-HFF-RSC, United States District Court for
the District of South Carolina (filed 27 October 2005).
(75) Since filing a complaint in federal court in August 2005, Al-Marri has had access to
library items where previously he was denied all books and news and religious items with
the exception of the Qu’ran. His lawyers maintain his immediate environment, from
adjusting the lights and turning the water supply on and off in his cell, has been
"deliberately manipulated to degrade him" and that his prolonged isolation "has
irreparably harmed his mental health and wellbeing and continues to do so" and, further,
that "no rules or regulations govern" his treatment in custody, and that his treatment
changes with each new shift. (Ali Saleh Kahlah Al-Marri v Donald Rumsfeld, Plaintiff’s
Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the Complaint":
C/A No. 2: 05-v-02259-HFF-RSC, United States District Court for the District of South
Carolina)
(76) He has also been visited several times by the ICRC during his detention
(77) His conditions also breach minimum standards under the UN Body of Principles for

the Protection of All Persons under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment, which
reflect and elaborate on Convention provisions. For instance, Principle 19 which provides
that a detained or imprisoned person "shall have the right to be visited by and to
correspond with, in particular, members of his family and shall be given adequate
opportunity to communicate with the outside world, subject to reasonable conditions and
restrictions as specified by law or lawful regulation".
(78) See, for example, cases cited on pages 20-22 and 122-124 of Guantánamo and
beyond, and pages 182-183 of Human Dignity Denied. Such cases include Australian
national Mamdouh Habib, who was allegedly transferred from Pakistan with US
involvement to Egypt where he was allegedly subjected to severe torture, and Osama
Nasr Mostafa Hassan, abducted in Milan and allegedly driven to a US airbase in Italy,
where he was interrogated and drugged before being taken to a US base in Germany and
then flown to Egypt, where he was allegedly tortured, including with electric shocks. In
June 2005 an Italian judge ordered the arrest of 13 CIA agents for their alleged
involvement in his abduction.
(79) A number of Guantánamo detainees have said they were threatened with transfer to
countries such as Jordan, Egypt and Morocco where they were told they would be
tortured, see page 20 of Guantánamo and Beyond.
(80) Op cit, at note 71
(81) Report of the Special Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment, UN Doc. A/60/316, 30 August 2005, paras. 51-2.
(82) Conclusions and Recommendations of the Committee Against Torture: United States
of America, UN Doc. A/55/44 (2000), para. 180(a).
(83) Transfer of detainees completed. Department of Defense news release, 18 September
2005
(84) http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGEUR460412005
(85) In its preliminary submission, AI referred to the Pentagon Working Group report of
April 2003 (which recommended interrogation techniques going beyond the Army Field
Manual) and stated that the document had never been rescinded. In its updated Annex to
its Second Periodic report, "the Department of Defense determined that the Report of the
Working Group on Detainee Interrogations is to be considered as having no standing in
policy, practice, or law to guide any activity of the Department of Defense". See UN Doc.
CAT/C/48/Add.3/Rev.1, 13 January 2006, para. 78.
(86) Sources include M. Gregg Bloche, M.D., J.D., and Jonathan H. Marks, M.A.,
B.C.L., "When Doctors Go to War," New England Journal of Medicine, Volume 352(no.
1) January 6, 2005, pp. 3-6 and documents obtained by the ACLU under the Freedom of
Information Act as well as interviews with military and medical personnel. A confidential

report by the ICRC released in late 2004 referred to the participation of medical
personnel in interrogations, in what it called "a flagrant violation of medical ethics"
(reported by New York Times, 13 January 2005: "US doctors tied to torture at
Guantánamo, Abu Ghraib")
(87) See for example: Iraq – Torture of detainees at Abu Ghraib, MDE 14/032/2004, June
2004.
(88) Medical Program Principles and Procedures for the Protection and Treatment of
Detainees in the Custody of the Armed Forces of the United States. HA Policy: 05-006,
issued June 2005.
(89) UN Principles of Medical Ethics relevant to the Role of Health Personnel,
particularly Physicians, in the Protection of Prisoners and Detainees against Torture and
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (adopted by General
Assembly resolution 37/194 of 18 December 1982).
(90) Letter from Physicians for Human Rights to William Winkenwerder, Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Health Affairs, 17 June 2005.
(91) H.R. 1815, Section 750.
(92) These and other cases are described on pages 157-158 of Human Dignity Denied
(web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGAMR511462004)
(93) page 156 of Human Dignity Denied gives examples of such cases. As of May 2005,
in over 70% of announced official actions taken in response to substantial allegations of
abuse, the punishment was non-judicial or administrative (Guantánamo and Beyond, p.
4).
(94) Command’s Responsibility: Detainee Deaths in US Custody in Iraq and
Afghanistan, Human Rights First, February 2006: www.humanrightsfirst.info/pdf/06221etn-hrf-dic-rep-web.pdf
(95) The report suggests that such a plan might include implementation of a single, highlevel convening authority across the service branches for allegations of torture or abuse
which would bring more independent oversight to the process to discipline and
punishment.
(96) http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/us_law/etn/lawsuit/index/asp
(97) Arkan Mohammed Ali, et al, v Rumsfeld, Defendant’s and the United States’
Motion to Dismiss, in the US District Court for the District of Columbia, Civ. No. 051378 (TFH).
(98) See, for example, Borrowman, Scott J, Brigham Young University Law Review,

2005, Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain and Abu Ghraib-Civil Remedies for Victims of
Extraterratorial Torts by U.S. Military Personnel and Civilian Contractors:
http://www,findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa3736/is_200501/ai_n1535317#continue
(99) http:/web.amnesty.org/wire/March 2006/Afghanistan
(100) This was the case with the family of Dilawar, who died after being tortured in
Bagram base in December 2002, until they obtained the assistance of a lawyer. They had
still not received compensation at the time of writing but the case was being pursued.
(101) Department of Defense, Military Commission Instruction No. 10, 24 March 2006,
available on
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Mar2006/d20060327MCI10.pdf.
(102) US Department of Defense, American Forces Information Service, News Articles,
22 March 2006.
(103) United States v. Ahmed Omar Abu Ali, US District Ct. for Eastern District of
Virginia.
(104) See above 2,1 and AI’s Preliminary Briefing to the Committee, p. 10, note 40
(August 2005)
(105) AI’s reports of police ill-treatment include: USA: Rights for All, chapter 3 (AI
Index AMR 51/35/98); Race, Rights and Police Brutality (AI Index AMR 51/147/99);
Amnesty International renews call for investigation into homophobic abuse by Chicago
police officers (AI Index AMR 51/092/2001); Amnesty International’s Concerns on
Police Abuse in Prince George’s County, Maryland (AI Index AMR 51/126/02); USA:
Excessive and lethal force? Amnesty International’s concerns about deaths and illtreatment involving tasers (AI Index: AMR 51/139/2004); USA: Amnesty International’s
continuing concerns about taser use (AI Index: AMR 51/030/2006).
(106) While national data is not available, this is borne out in local statistics, reports of
Justice Department investigations into specific departments and other data. See also
reference to the Bureau of Justice Statistics report, below
(107) Contacts between Police and the Public: Findings from the 2002 National Survey,
Justice Department, Bureau of Justice Statistics, April 2005
(http:www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/cpp02.pdf) The national found the likelihood of
being stopped by police did not differ proportionately among white, black or Hispanic
drivers and that the differential treatment occurred afterwards; it also noted that further
research was needed to analyse the data. However, other research into specific
jurisdictions has shown proportionately more black drivers are stopped by police
compared to whites, with similar findings with regard to other types of police stops and
searches.

(108) The End Racial Profiling Act (ERPA) of 2004 was reintroduced into Congress in
2005 and is still pending. An earlier version of the act was first introduced in 2001 with
bipartisan support but lapsed in the aftermath of September 11 2001. There has been a
reported increase in incidents of people being stopped, searched or detained on the basis
of their religious origin since 11 September 2001. See Amnesty International USA:
Threat and Humiliation: Racial Profiling, Domestic Security and Human Rights in the
United States, op cit
(109) Stonewalled, Police Abuses against lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender people
in the USA, September 2005: web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGAMR511222005
(110) Conclusions and Recommendations of the Committee against Torture: United
States of America, UN Doc. A/55/44 (2000), paras. 175-180, at para. 179 (f).
(111) AI’s concerns regarding use of tasers are described in: USA: Excessive and lethal
force? Amnesty International’s concerns about deaths and ill-treatment involving tasers
(AMR 51/139/2004) and USA: Amnesty International’s continuing concerns about taser
use, March 2006 (AI Index AMR 51/030/2006).
web:amnesty.org/library/index/engamr510302006
(112) Such studies are outlined in AI’s reports, ibid
(113) e.g. Eric Hammock died in April 2005 after being tasered more than 20 times by
Fort Worth, Texas, police officers when he tried to run away while being questioned for
alleged trespassing; Patrick Lee was tasered 19 times by Nashville police in September
2005 and became unconscious at the scene; Ronald Hasse died after being tasered twice
by Chicago police, one of the shocks lasting for 57 seconds: the medical examiner ruled
he died from taser shocks, with metamphetamine being a contributory factor; Jeffrey
Turner was tasered four times in a jail in Ohio in January 2005 for banging repeatedly on
his cell window: the coroner ruled the death a homicide, with the taser a contributory
factor.
(114) Cases include: a women 8 months pregnant, shocked when she refused to sign a
speeding ticket; two boys tasered for refusing to leave a shopping mall; a 12-year-old
tasered after he had already been placed in restraints; a 15-year-old autistic boy shocked
while he was pinned to the ground; a mentally ill woman tasered between 9 and 15 times
while in jail; a 13 year old girl weighing 65 1bs who was in handcuffs in a patrol car
when shocked.
(115) J. Lambet: Stun belts are replacing shackles in court, security is literally shocking,
The Kansas City Star, 28 January 2006
(116) Lawsuit filed by Florida Institutional Legal Services in September 2003 claiming
that correctional officers in four Florida prisons "maliciously and sadistically" used
pepper spray and teargas on prisoners, some of whom were mentally ill.

(117) National Institute of Justice (NIJ) Advisory Guidelines for the Care of Subdued
Subjects (June 1995) and NIJ Bulletin on Positional Restraint, October 1995.
(118) See, for example AI’s report: USA Excessive and Lethal Force, op cit, pages 56-61
(119) AI report: The Restraint Chair: How Many More Deaths? (AI Index AMR
51/31/2002)
(120) Conclusions and Recommendations of the Committee against Torture: United
States of America, UN Doc. A/55/44 (2000), paras. 175-180, at para. 179 (f).
(121) At the end of 1998 about 20,000 prisoners, or 1.8% of all those serving sentences
of 1 year or more in state and federal prisons, were housed in such facilities (King, R.D.
(1999) The rise and rise of supermax: An American solution in search of a problem?
Punishment and Society, 1, 163-186) See also Collins W.C., Supermax Prisons and the
Constitution, Liability Concerns in the Extended Control Unit Department of Justice
National Institute of Corrections (NIC), November 2004 ; Pizarro J., Stenius, V.M.K.
Supermax Prisons: Their Rise, Current Practices, And Effect on Inmates, The Prison
Journal Vol 84.No.2. June 2004 248-264.
(122) While some units provide in-cell programs through TV these are limited and rarely
interactive. Many prisoners are not provided with any programs and remain idle and in
complete isolation.
(123) The Rest of Their Lives: Life without Parole for Child Offenders in the United
States, Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, p. 58
(124) He was tried and acquitted of most charges in December 2005 after nearly three
years of detention.
(125) See USA: Amnesty International’s concerns regarding post September 11
detentions in the USA (AMR 51/044/2002) pages 28-30. The detainees were held for
months without charge before being released or deported. They have also alleged they
were physically abused by guards, allegations which were sustained by a subsequent
Office of Inspector General investigation.
(126) Vermont is the now the only state not to have enacted such legislation, compared
with five states in 2001 and 14 in 1999. Rape and sexual assault have always been crimes
under US law. Sexual misconduct laws prohibit all sorts of sexual contact even those
which have sometimes been claimed were "consensual".
(127) The PREA, passed in September 2003, provides inter alia for the gathering of
national statistics about rape in prison of both male and female prisoners by staff or other
inmates; the creation of a national review pane; and grants for state and local authorities
to establish more effective programs to tackle the problem.

(128) Protective measures are not always taken or, if they are, this may result in the
woman being placed into solitary confinement while the case is under investigation.
(129) Abuse of Women in Custody: Sexual Misconduct and the shackling of pregnant
women, AIUSA, March 2006. http://www.amnestyusa.org/women/custody/custody
all.pdf (hereinafter cited as Abuse of Women in Custody)
(130) More than half of state statutes allow for cross-gender "pat-down" searches under
certain circumstances according to AI’s survey.
(131) Rule 53(2) of the Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners states
that no male member of staff shall enter the part of the institution set aside for women
unless accompanied by a woman officer. Rule 53(3) states that women prisoners shall be
attended and supervised only by women officers.
(132) Principle 5(2), Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons Under Any
Form of Detention or Imprisonment.
(133) At least 23 states and the Federal Bureau of Prisons have policies or practices
allowing women to be restrained during labour ( Abuse of Women in Custody, op cit)
(134) Adam Liptak: Prisons Often Shackle Pregnant Inmates in Labor, New York Times
2 March 2006
(135) Amnesty International USA. Excessive Use of Restraints on Women in US Prisons:
Shackling of Pregnant Prisoners,
(http://www.amnestyusa.org/women/custody/shackling.html)
(136) Only six correctional departments have told AI they have written policies
prohibiting use of restraints on inmates during labour and birth (Connecticut, DC,
Florida, Rhode Island, Washington and Wyoming); Hawaii, Iowa and Kansas reported
they have no policy but that practice is not to restrain women during labour and birth;
Alabama, California, Missouri, Montana, New Mexico, New York, South Dakota and
Texas told AI they did not use restraints during labour and delivery but it was unclear if
this was based on policy or practice.: Overview of State Laws on Custodial Sexual
Misconduct and Restraints: www amnestyusa.org/women/custody/abuseincustody.html (
March 2006)
(137) ibid
(138) The camp was later closed and the Justice Department is investigating, but others
exist around the country.
(139) For example, a report released by the Nevada ACLU in July 2005 criticised a Clark
County juvenile facility in Las Vegas for isolating unruly teenagers in their rooms for

long periods when they were not a threat, as well as for improper use of pepper spray and
restraint chairs.
(140) Juvenile Offenders and Victims: 1999 National Report, p. 89
(141) Juveniles in Adult Prisons and Jails: a National Assessment, US Department of
Justice, Office of Justice Programs, October 2002
(142) The Rest of Their Lives: Life without Parole for Child Offenders in the United
States, Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch,
web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGAMR511622005
(143) See, e.g. Eileen Poe-Yamagata and Michael A. Jones, And Justice for Some
(Building Blocks for Youth Initiative for the National Council on Crime and
Delinquency, 2000), available online at:
http://www.buildingblocksforyouth.org/justiceforsome/jfs.html
(144) The Rest of Their Lives, page 120.
(145) Allen v Ornoski 06-0091
(146) e.g. the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council decision in 1993 in Pratt and
Morgan, Jamaica. The Supreme Court of Canada ruled in 2001 that the potential for long
incarceration before execution was a "relevant consideration" in making the extradition of
2 Canadian citizens to the US conditional on death sentences not being imposed (US v
Burns, S.C.R. 283,353,123). The Human Rights Committee has expressed concern about
the long stay on death row which "in specific instances, may amount to a breach of article
7 of the Covenant" (Concluding observations of the Human Rights Committee: United
States of America, 03/10/95. CCPR/C/79/Add.50;A/50/40, paras. 266-304 )
(147) This was stated, for example in the USA’s combined second and third periodic
report to the Human Rights Committee on implementation of the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights, submitted on 21 October 2005
(www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/55504.htm)
(148) The study found that sodium thiopental, which is used as anaesthesia in lethal
injections, may not work properly, and that a second drug which induced paralysis would
mean the condemned person "would experience suffocation and excruciating pain
without being able to move or communicate that fact".
(149) AI is concerned, however, that child offenders who are non-US nationals and who
may be classed as "enemy combatants" might still be named to be tried before military
commissions and possibly sentenced to death (no such child offender has yet been so
charged).
(150) Safeguards guaranteeing protection of the rights of those facing the death penalty,

adopted by the Economic and Social Council in Resolution 1984/50 adopted on 25 May
1984 and Resolution 1989/64, adopted on 24 May 1989
(151) AI’s most recent major report on the death penalty is USA: ‘People are seeing you
do this’: The execution of mentally ill offenders (AI Index: AMR 51/003/2006, January
2006, http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGAMR510032006
(152) UN Doc. CAT/C/48/Add.3/Rev.1, 6 May 2005.
(153) U.S. President’s statement on the United Nations International Day in Support of
Victims of Torture, 26 June 2004, see Annex 2, ibid.
(154) See Amnesty International’s reports, Human dignity denied: Torture and
accountability in the ‘war on terror’ (AI Index: AMR 51/145/2004, October 2004)
(hereinafter Human dignity denied) and Guantánamo and beyond: The continuing pursuit
of unchecked executive power (AI Index: AMR 51/063/2005, May 2005) (hereinafter
Guantánamo and beyond). Official inquiries have found ill-treatment went beyond a few
isolated cases, as the government initially claimed.
(155) Conclusions and Recommendations of the Committee against Torture: United
States of America, UN Doc. A/55/44 (2000), paras. 175-180, at para. 179(f).
(156) See ibid., para. 180(a).
(157) Deaths in US custody in Afghanistan and Iraq are described on pages 109-116 and
in Appendix 1 of Guantánamo and beyond.
(158) Memorandum for Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, from Jay S.
Bybee, Assistant Attorney General, U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Legal
Counsel, Re: Standards of Conduct for Interrogation under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A,
August 1, 2002, p. 6.
(159) Press Conference with members of the Schlesinger Panel, Department of Defense
News Transcript, 24 August 2004.
(160) Final Report of the Independent Panel to Review Department of Defense Detention
Operations, August 2004. http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Aug
2004/d20040824finalreport.pdf
(161) See pages 59-60 of Human dignity denied.
(162) Daniel Levin, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Memorandum for James B.
Comey, Deputy Attorney General, Regarding Legal Standards Applicable Under 18
U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A, 30 December 2004.
(163) See pages 107-108 of Guantánamo and beyond.

(164) See Conclusions and Recommendations of the Committee against Torture: Special
report of Israel, UN Doc. A/52/44 (1997), para. 257, where the Committee concluded that
methods of interrogation not dissimilar to those used by the USA constituted torture, and
that "[T]his conclusion is particularly evident where such methods of interrogation are
used in combination".
(165) Memorandum for the Vice President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of
Defense, the Attorney General, the Chief of Staff to the President, the Director of Central
Intelligence, the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, the Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Subject: Humane treatment of al Qaeda and Taliban detainees,
The White House, 7 February 2002.
(166) See Amnesty International’s report, US detentions in Afghanistan: An aidemémoire for continued action (AI Index: AMR 51/093/2005, June 2005).
(167) See page 20 of Guantánamo and beyond and pages 182-183 of Human dignity
denied.
(168) See, for example, cases cited on pages 122-124 of Guantánamo and beyond, and
recent testimony provided to Amnesty International from Yemeni detainees allegedly
tortured in Jordan before being transferred to US custody in an undisclosed location (See
Amnesty International’s report, USA/Jordan/Yemen: Torture and secret detention:
Testimony of the ‘disappeared’ in the ‘war on terror’ (AI Index: AMR 51/108/2005,
August 2005)).
(169) US second periodic report, para. 27.
(170) See pages 158-160 of Human dignity denied.
(171) As Amnesty International has described in Human dignity denied (page 140), the
Pentagon Working Group Report on Detainee Interrogations in the Global War on
Terrorism: Assessment of Legal, Historical, Policy, and Operational Considerations (4
April 2003) advised the government in 2003 that 18 U.S.C 2340 did not apply to the
conduct of US personnel at Guantánamo on the ground that the naval base fell within US
territory (the opposite of what the government was at that time claiming before the US
courts on the applicability of the US Constitution). This is yet another example of
attempts to avoid criminal liability for possible acts of torture by US agents outside the
USA.
(172) See pages 164-166 of Human dignity denied.
(173) See page 22 of Human dignity denied.
(174) See for instance in the case of the death during interrogation of Iraqi Maj. Gen.
Abed Hamed Mowhoush, on 26 November 2003. Official documents on the trial of those

suspected of killing him were released by The Washington Post, and are available on
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpsrv/nation/documents/mowhoush_court_document.pdf, accessed 5 August 2005.
(175) See page 127 of Guantánamo and beyond.
(176) Hearing of the Senate Armed Services Committee. Subject: Threats to U.S.
National Security. 17 March 2005. The Transcript is available at
<http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/us_law/etn/docs/fedwires125g.htm>, accessed 9 April
2005.
(177) See for instance Ann Maria Garcia Lanza de Netto v. Uruguay, on behalf of Beatriz
Weismann de Lanza, Communication No. 8/1977 (3 April 1980), UN Doc.
CCPR/C/OP/1 at 45 (1984), para. 9. The Human Rights Committee describes similar
method (immersion of the victim’s head in dirty water, near to asphyxia, and ‘submarino
seco’) consistently, alongside other methods, as "torture," the only question being
whether they actually took place, and found a violation of Article 7 of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (para. 16).
(178) Neither the government nor official inquiries have found any of the approved
interrogation techniques amounted to torture even if alone or in combination they would
fall into this category. For example, at Senate confirmation hearings, neither Mr Gonzales
or Ms Rice were willing to describe "waterboarding" as torture (see page 128 of
Guantánamo and beyond). Mr Gonzales has also asserted that the USA is not bound by
Article 16 in regard to treatment of prisoners held outside the USA.
(179) Recent reports that the US intends to transfer several hundred detainees currently in
US custody in Afghanistan and Guantánamo to the custody of their home countries does
not allay concern that prisoners will continue to be held in US custody without access to
legal safeguards. There is also concern that new prisons being proposed to house Afghan
detainees may be modelled on US supermaximum security prisons, in which conditions
of prolonged isolation may amount to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment.
(180) See pages 100-116 of Human dignity denied.
(181) See Human Rights Committee, El-Megreisi v. Libyan Arab Jamahiriya,
Communication No. 440/1990, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/50/D/440/1990 (1994).
(182) Unclassified executive summary of review of Department of Defense interrogation
operations, conducted by the Naval Inspector General, Vice Admiral Albert T. Church,
III, 10 March 2005, http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Mar2005/d20050310exe.pdf, p. 13.
(183) See Chapter 12 of Guantánamo and beyond.
(184) See, for example, pages 146-152 of Human dignity denied and Chapter 13 of
Guantánamo and beyond.

(185) UN Doc. E/CN.4/2005/59, 21 December 2004, Annex I.
(186) Report of the ICRC on the Treatment by the Coalition Forces of Prisoners of War
and Other Protected Persons by the Geneva Conventions in Iraq during arrest, internment
and interrogation, February 2004. The leaked report can be found at
http:/www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/2004/ICRC_report_Iraq_feb2004.ht
m.
(187) See, for example, interviews cited on pages 13-20 of Amnesty International’s
report, USA: The threat of a bad example: Undermining international standards as "war
on terror" detentions continue (AI Index: AMR 51/114/2003, August 2003,
http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/engamr511142003)
(188) Memorandum for William J. Haynes, II, General Counsel, Department of Defense.
Re: Potential legal constraints applicable to interrogations of persons captured by US
Armed Forces in Afghanistan. Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal
Counsel, US Department of Justice, 26 February 2002. In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.
436 (1966), the Supreme Court established the right to remain silent and the right to legal
counsel prior to any interrogation.
(189) See page 69 of Guantánamo and beyond.
(190) See pages 170-172 of Human dignity denied.
(191) Responses of Alberto R. Gonzales, Nominee to be Attorney General, to the written
questions of Senator Dianne Feinstein, January 2005.
(192) See page 7 of Guantánamo and beyond.
(193) See para. 179(d).
(194) The Act, passed in September 2003, provides inter alia for the gathering of national
statistics about rape in prison of both male and female prisoners by staff or other inmates;
the creation of a national review panel; and grants for state and local authorities to
establish more effective programs to tackle the problem.
(195) See para. 179(e).
(196) See Amnesty International’s report, USA: Excessive and lethal force? Amnesty
International’s concerns about deaths and ill-treatment involving tasers (AI Index: AMR
51/139/2004, November 2004, http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/engamr511392004).
The report documents 74 deaths, the vast majority occurring in the USA. At least 58
more people have died in taser-related incidents since the report was published in
November 2004. Although the deaths have usually been attributed to factors such as drug
intoxication or heart disease, coroners have found taser shocks directly contributed to

deaths in at least 15 cases. Questions remain in other cases and some medical experts
believe taser shocks can exacerbate a risk of heart failure in cases where people are
agitated, under the influence of drugs or have underlying health problems.
(197) Ibid, pages 52 and 57.
(198) See para. 179(c).
(199) See para. 179(i).

********
AI Index: AMR 51/061/2006

3 May 2006