REPORT ON FAILURE OF COMPLIANCE WITH ARTICLE 20
PROHIBITING PROPAGANDA FOR WAR
prepared for the
UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHT COMMITTEE
Eighty-seventh session
for its review of the
Second and Third Periodic Report of the United States of America under the
International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights
June 2006

INTRODUCTION
This report regarding United States violations of Article 20, paragraph one, is
submitted to the Committee to inform and support its consideration of the
paramount issues the Committee requested the United States to address in its
written and oral presentation to the Committee in July, 2006. Article 20 of the
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights implicitly recognizes that the condition of
war jeopardizes the integrity and exercise of all of the political and civil rights
elsewhere declared in the Covenant.
The Committee has expressed concern and requested clarification of actions and
policies of the United States which are in apparent violation of even the core,
non-derogable protections States Parties undertake to assure under the treaty.
The US government has sought to justify its actions and policies on the basis of
the “war on terror” and the exigencies of its illegal war in Iraq. Because of the
pervasive impact of war the propaganda campaign prohibited by Article 20, the
fear and xenophobia it stoked, and the resulting illegal war have all contributed to
violations, both here and abroad, of many other rights protected by this Covenant
including articles 1, 2, 6, 7, 9, 10, 13, 14, 17, 19, 21, 24, 26 and 27.
The non-governmental organizations which have prepared this report regarding
US violation of Article 20 are filing it with the Committee in order to bring greater
visibility and attention to the full significance and implications of the Covenant’s
prohibition of propaganda for war. We are women’s human rights groups, [peace
and justice coalitions, and civil liberties and media advocacy organizations]
concerned to insure the democratic imperative: that public discourse relating to
international conflicts be based on information and knowledge free from distortion
by governmental propaganda for war.
.

SUMMARY
This report discusses the centrality of Article 20, the civil and political rights
consequences of the United States violation, the illegality of the war in Iraq, the
inapplicability of the United States reservation to Article 20, and the propaganda
campaign waged by the United States government that produced the Iraq War. It
concludes with recommendations to the Committee suggesting actions the
United States government should take to prevent such violations in the future.
The Centrality of Article 20
There is no clearer example of the significance of Article 20’s prohibition than
that most of the violations the Committee is examining in this review, including
violations of the right to life, to be free from torture and to due process committed
by the United States in relation to the war in Iraq as well as the life- and healththreatening cutbacks in social programs in the United States, have their roots in
the propaganda campaign which produced this illegal war. Examination of this
issue by the Committee is particularly urgent as the course of U.S. Administration
statements as to Iran over many months suggests a repetition of the same
process.
Through a campaign of unsubstantiated, inflated and sometimes clearly false
propaganda, the Bush administration mobilized domestic and some international
support for the illegal invasion of Iraq.
The war has taken the lives of over 2,450 U.S. soldiers and an estimated
minimum of 35,000 Iraqi civilians, with an additional 18,000 U.S. military and
untold Iraqi casualties and trauma; it destroyed the infrastructure of a nation and
is tearing a society apart; it provides excuse for stripping away protections of civil
and political rights in the United States; and it has cost approximately 280 billion
dollars while federal spending cuts announced in February, 2006 will affect
health care, education, environmental protection and other social programs with
consequent harm to the rights of the poor, people of color, women, children,
elderly, disabled, and the working people of the United States.
The Illegality of the War
The Committee’s General Comment 11 states “The prohibition under paragraph
1 of article 20 extends to all forms of propaganda threatening or resulting in an
act of aggression or breach of the peace contrary to the Charter of the United
Nations,”
The United States’ invasion of Iraq was an illegal act of aggression, declared by
Secretary-General Kofi Annan as in violation of the Charter of the United Nations.
The consensus of international experts is in accord. The invasion of Iraq was
never authorized by the Security Council though the United States has asserted

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that the invasion was based on Security Council resolutions, including Nos. 678
and 1441. Neither was it justifiable under the narrow exception allowed for selfdefense under Chapter 51 of the Charter. Accordingly, ”any propaganda for
war,” promoting the invasion, as by the U.S. government here, was illegal under
Article 20. In addition, the government’s propaganda was inflated, misleading
and, in numerous critical respects, groundless.
The United States Reservation
Despite the Committee’s enjoining States parties in General Comment 11 to
provide sufficient information to evaluate their compliance with Article 20, the
United States in its current report merely reiterates the one sentence also in its
1994 report citing its reservation to Article 20 "that Article 20 does not authorize
or require legislation or other action by the United States that would restrict the
right of free speech and association protected by the Constitution and laws of the
United States." (paragraph 330)
This reservation in no way affects the applicability of Article 20 to actions of the
United States government. The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized that the
rights of free speech and association under the first amendment to the U.S.
Constitution protect the people, not the government.1 The animating concern of
the first amendment is government censorship, not restrictions on what
government may wish to say.2 Where as here, the propaganda campaign is
initiated by the government, depends upon government-generated information,
and is carried out by the highest governmental officials, it is potentially the most
effective and the most lethal form of the prohibited conduct.
General Comment 11 makes it clear that article 20 prohibits governmentpromulgated propaganda as well as from other sources, concluding that States
parties which have not yet taken “the measures necessary to fulfil the obligations
contained in article 20, . . .should themselves refrain from any such propaganda
or advocacy.” (emphasis added).
The freedom of speech of private parties protected by the first amendment is,
furthermore, not absolute. Federal courts have held that "libel, obscenity, and
incitement are excluded from First Amendment's protective cloak."3 Thus, there
is room under the first amendment for false propaganda promoting an aggressive
war to be prohibited, for example, as incitement to a dangerous breach of peace.

1 1

See, e.g., Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Democratic National Committee, 412 U.S.
94, 102 (1973).
2
See, Columbia Broadcasting, 412 U.S. at 139 (Stewart, J. concurring) (“[T]he first amendment
protects the press from governmental interference; it confers no analogous protection on the
government.”).
3
Thomas v. Board of Education, 607 F.2d 1043, certiorari denied, 444 U.S. 1081 (1979); see also
Beauharnais v. People of State of Ill., 343 U.S. 250 (1952).

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The Campaign of Propaganda for War
This administration propagated to the U.S. public, the U.S. Congress, the United
Nations, and the international community two major claims, which were not only
unsubstantiated but also in overt contradiction to valid intelligence information.
They were: (1) that Iraq had or was developing weapons of mass destruction,
including nuclear weapons; and (2) that Iraq had ties to Al-Qaeda and the
September 11, 2001 attacks in the United States.
A recent publication by the Center for Constitutional Rights4 documents the
trajectory of this propaganda campaign. Below are some highlights from it and
other sources:
Even before taking office, persons who would become Bush Administration
officials advocated and planned the use of “preemptive” force against Iraq.
• Early, 2002: The President, in his State of Union Address, asserted the
necessity of using of “preemptive” force against nations that seek to
acquire weapons of mass destruction or assist terrorism and named Iraq
as part of the “Axis of Evil.”5 Vice-President Cheney also visited the
Central Intelligence Agency to discuss intelligence regarding Iraq.
• June 1, 2002: The President declared in a formal address at the U.S.
Military Academy at West Point: “Containment is not possible when
unbalanced dictators with weapons of mass destruction can deliver those
weapons on missiles or secretly provide them to terrorist allies.”6
• July 23, 2002: The “Downing Street Memo” summarizing a meeting
involving Prime Minister Tony Blair and British intelligence, said of
Washington: "Military action was now seen as inevitable. Bush wanted to
remove Saddam, through military action, justified by the conjunction of
terrorism and Weapons of Mass Destruction. But the intelligence and facts
were being fixed around the policy. The NSC had no patience with the UN
route….” (emphasis added). 7

4

Articles of Impeachment Against George W. Bush, Art. II (Melville House Publishing, 2d ed.
February 2006). Available at www.ccr-ny.org/v2/home.asp. A copy of Article II respecting
propaganda for war is attached to paper copies of this statement.
5
State of the Union Address, January 29, 2002,
www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/-2002/01/200229-11.html/
6
See, www.whitehouse.gov/new/releases/2002/0620020601-3.html.
7
The Downing Street Memo was published in the British Sunday Times on 1 May 2005,. The
article can be viewed at: http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,2087-1593607,00.html

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• August, 2002: the White House Iraq Group is created to build public
support for the war.8
• September, 2002: The White House released its National Security
Strategy which stated the United States "must be prepared to stop rogue
states...before they are able to threaten or use weapons of mass
destruction against the United States and our allies and friends." Such
states “are determined to acquire weapons of mass destruction, …
sponsor terrorism around the globe, … reject basic human values and
hate the United States and everything for which it stands."9
• September, 2002: President Bush and nearly all his top officials
blanketed the airwaves, talking about the dangers posed by Iraq, including
the knowingly unsubstantiated claim that Iraq was acquiring material for
and developing nuclear weapons.10 By the fall of 2002, 69% of the U.S.
public believed that Saddam Hussein was responsible for the 9/11 attacks.
• October 10, 2002: the President obtained the Congressional resolution
entitled “Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of
2002,” H.J. Res. 114, permitting war against Iraq upon his determination
that Iraq remained a threat that could not be dealt with diplomatically and
by peaceful means.
• October 14, 2002: President Bush said of Saddam "This is a man that
we know has had connections with al Qaeda. This is a man who, in my
judgment, would like to use al Qaeda as a forward army.”11
• January 28, 2003: President Bush, in his State of the Union address,
repeated that Iraq was attempting to obtain uranium tubes from Niger for

8

Barton Gellman and Walter Pincus, Depiction of Threat Outgrew Supporting Evidence,
Washington Post, August 10, 2003, p. A01. Available at www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wpdyn/A39500-2003Aug9?language=printer.
9
National Security Agency, September 17, 2002 www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.html
10
On NBC’s “Meet the press”, Vice President Dick Cheney accused Saddam Hussein of moving
aggressively to develop nuclear weapons over the past 14 months to add to his stockpile of
chemical and biological arms. (http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/3080244/), On CNN, Secretary of
State Condoleezza Rice acknowledged that "there will always be some uncertainty" in
determining how close Iraq may be to obtaining a nuclear weapon but said, "We don't want the
smoking gun to be a mushroom cloud." (http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wpdyn?pagename=article&contentId=A51224-2003Jul26&notFound=true), On CBS, President Bush
said that before they were denied access to Iraq in l998, that U.N. weapons inspectors had
concluded that Saddam Hussein was "six months away from developing a weapon." He also cited
satellite photos released by a U.N. agency Friday that show unexplained construction at Iraq sites
that weapons inspectors once visited to search for evidence Saddam was trying to develop
nuclear arms. "I don't know what more evidence we need," Bush said.
(http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2002/09/08/terror/main521177.shtml)
11
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/10/20021014-2.html

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nuclear weapons despite internal reports to the contrary12 and the January
27 statement of the IAEA that the inspectors “found no evidence that Iraq
has revived its nuclear weapons programme” and that the tubes were
consistent with the asserted non-nuclear use and would, in any event,
need to be modified to be suitable for nuclear use.13
• January 31, 2003: A second “Downing Street memo,” confirmed in late
March, 2006, summarized a conversation between President Bush and
Prime Minister Blair indicating President Bush’s desire to create a pretext
for war and his intent to go to war even if the effort to “twist arms” and
“even threaten” failed to achieve UN approval.14
• February 5, 2003: Secretary of State Colin Powell addressed the United
Nations Security Council, stating that there was "no doubt in my mind" that
Saddam was working to obtain key components to produce nuclear
weapons notwithstanding an effort from within the CIA to stop it. In
September, 2005 Mr. Powell told the press that it was “devastating” to
learn later that some intelligence agents knew and did not inform him that
the information he had was unreliable.15
• March 17, 2003: Bush asserted that “intelligence…leaves no doubt that
the Iraq regime continues to possess and conceal some of the most lethal
weapons ever devised...[and] has aided, trained, and harbored terrorists,
including operatives of Al Qaeda.” 16
• March 18, 2003: President Bush sent a letter to Congress expressing his
“determination,” as required by Congressional resolution H.J. Res. 114,
that war was necessary, and made a statement again linking the use of
force against Iraq to the 9/11 attacks.17 It was later revealed that the
National Intelligence Estimate, which was presented to Congress several
days before the October, 2002 vote on war “was sanitized to remove
dissent and make conjecture seem like fact.”18
12

http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A38459-2004Jul9?language=printer

13

The status of nuclear inspections in Iraq, Statement to the United Nations Security
Council, by Mohamed El Baradei, Director General, IAEA, New York (27 January
2003). Available at http://www.un.org/News/dh/iraq/elbaradei27jan03.htm>.
13 Don Van Natta, Jr., Bush Was Set on Path to War, British Memo Says, NY Times,
March 27, 2006. Available at
www.nytimes.com/2006/03/27/international/europe/27memo.html?ei=5088&en=be1868
87fe0c83a2&ex=1301115600&partner=rssnyt&emc=rss&pagewanted=print.
15

International Herald Tribune, www.iht.com/articles/2005/09-09/news/powell.php.
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/03/20030317-7.html
17
Text of the Presidential letter: http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/03/200303191.html
18
NY times article: 11/15/05 N.Y. Times A26; 2005 WLNR 18424453: Decoding Bush’s denial
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/11/15/opinion/15tue1.html?ex=1289710800&en=d341df71c8d7c04
1&ei=5088&partner=rssnyt&emc=rss
16

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• March 20, 2003: The United States invaded Iraq.
In March 2004, a report of U.S. House of Representatives Committee on
Governmental Reform Minority Office concluded that, in the march to war, five (5)
leading administration officials made 237 misleading statements in 125 public
appearances. All 237 were statements characterized as “misleading based on
what was known to the administration at the time the statements were made.” 19
It has been officially concluded that at the time of making these statements,
administration officials knew or should have known that its claims were based on
unreliable informants, inflated claims, and faulty interpretations of available
documentation. For example, the first phase of the Report of the US Senate
Intelligence Committee concluded that “[m]ost of the major key judgments in the
Intelligence Community’s October 2002 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE),
Iraq’s Continuing Programs for Weapons of Mass Destruction, either overstated,
or were not supported by, the underlying intelligence reporting.”20
The Senate Committee’s conclusions rested upon and have been substantiated
by numerous accounts of both current and former administration officials.
Warnings as to the lack of support for the key claims were made by IAEA officials
as well as by officials in the intelligence agencies.21 The second phase of the
Senate Committee’s investigation, which was to address the way senior
policymakers used intelligence, was delayed until after the election of 2004 and
has not been completed. 22
The propaganda record is also replete with examples in which the administration
ignored, sanctioned or punished dissident views from within the administration
and the intelligence agencies. Richard Kerr, a former Deputy Director of the
Central Intelligence Agency, has stated that there was significant pressure on the
intelligence community in 2003 to find evidence that supported a connection
between Al-Qaeda and Iraq. He told the Senate Intelligence Committee that the
administration’s “hammering” on Iraq was harder than he had seen in his 32
years at the Agency.23
There was, in the end, no evidence found in fact of any weapons of mass
destruction, chemical and biological weapons labs, acquisition of materials for a
nuclear bomb or any ties to Al-Qaeda.
19

Committee on Government Reform Minority Office, U.S. House of Representatives, Iraq on the
Record Report: The Bush Administration’s Public Statements on Iraq (March 16, 2004).
http://democrats.reform.house.gov/IraqOnTheRecord/ (last visited March 15, 2006).
20
Select Committee on Intelligence United States Senate: Report on the U.S. Intelligence
Community’s Prewar intelligence assessment on Iraq: Conclusions:
http://intelligence.senate.gov/conclusions.pdf:
21
http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A38459-2004Jul9?language=printer
22
http://www.hillnews.com/thehill/export/TheHill/News/Frontpage/042506/news4.html
23
Decoding Bush’s denial, supra, fn. 18.

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The propaganda record continues in the effort to justify continued U.S. military
involvement in Iraq. The Chicago Tribune recently reported on a media
saturation campaign planned by a right wing organization “closely aligned with
the white house” to utilize photos of the 9/11, Madrid, and London attacks to
justify continuing the de facto occupation of Iraq. There are indications that a
similar propaganda campaign may be beginning with respect to Iran. The U.S.
Ambassador to the United Nations, John Bolton, has threatened that the U.N.
Security Council should issue a "vigorous response" to Iran's nuclear ambitions
“or the United States might have to consider other steps.”(emphasis added) 24
The Bush administration’s violations of Article 20’s prohibition on “any
propaganda for war” have thus resulted in the gravest breaches of international
law and at the same time it continues to stoke the fears of the U.S. public to
garner support for continuing and further illegal military action.
We emphasize that this propaganda, the war it produced, and the
administration’s aggressive advocacy of “preemptive strike” is at the root of many
of the violations of the rights of people in the U.S. and subject to its jurisdiction
abroad secured by the Convention on Civil and Political Rights. It thus urgently
deserves the attention of the Committee in its questioning and concluding
observations.
RECOMMENDATIONS
Accordingly, we urge the Committee to examine the applicability of Article 20 to
the past and current conduct of the United States, and to inquire into what the
United States is doing to investigate and punish these violations, including by top
administration officials, and to prevent such misinformation and propaganda for
war in the future, including:
a. what measures exist to ensure vigorous debate in the
intelligence agencies, including protection of whistleblowers;
b. what measures exist to ensure transparency in the
communication of intelligence information to the U.S. Congress,
the U.S. public, and the United Nations;
c. what laws exist pursuant to which those who knowingly
instigate, pressure, condone, or use false or inflated information
as propaganda for war can be prosecuted and what
investigations or prosecutions are underway;
d. what legislation is or will be proposed to prevent and punish
governmental and private propaganda for war in the future.

24

Available at
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2006/03/09/AR2006030900993.html>.

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We ask the Committee to incorporate into its concluding observations an
expression of concern regarding the United States’ limited interpretation of the
applicability of Article 20 and to request that it address the issues raised in this
report in any follow-up to the review process of the United States Second and
Third Combined Report.
We thank the Committee for its consideration of these issues.

Submitted by:
THE INTERNATIONAL WOMEN’S HUMAN RIGHTS LAW CLINIC OF THE CITY
UNIVERSITYOF NEW YORK SCHOOL OF LAW
WOMEN’S INTERNATIONAL LEAGUE FOR PEACE AND FREEDOM, UNITED
STATES SECTION
THE CENTER FOR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
MADRE
IINTERNATIONAL FEDERATION FOR HUMAN RIGHTS (FIDH)
WOMEN’S ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT ORGANIZATION (WEDO)
NATIONAL LAWYERS GUILD
AMERICAN HUMANIST ASSOCIATION

Contact information:
Gillian Gilhool
Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom
1213 Race Street
Philadelphia, PA 19107
grgilhool@verizon.net

June 1, 2006

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