Colorado Supreme Court Holds Defendant Was in ‘Custody’ for Miranda Purposes Because She Had Hands Bagged and Zip Tied, Commanded Not to Remove Them, and Questioned Alone in Interrogation Room With Door Closed
by Anthony W. Accurso
The Supreme Court of Colorado held that a defendant who had her hands bagged and secured with zip ties to preserve any evidence of gunpowder residue without her consent at the police station and was confined to an interrogation room with the door closed was in police custody for Miranda purpose, so her statements made during the custodial interrogation must be suppressed because the requisite Miranda warnings were not given.
Craig, Colorado, police were called to a motel room on the evening of October 4, 2017, regarding a gunshot wound. Officers found Rachel Ann Niemeyer crouched in front of her husband, M.F., holding his head. M.F. had suffered a gunshot wound to the head, which would ultimately proved fatal.
Niemeyer was visibly distressed and intoxicated. During a brief interview on scene, Niemeyer told Officer Roland that “M.F. had frequently threatened suicide, that they were experiencing financial and relationship issues, and that M.F. struggled with alcohol abuse.”
M.F. was transported to the hospital, while Niemeyer was transported to the police station in the back of a squad car, though she was not handcuffed. Niemeyer repeatedly asked to be transported to the hospital, but each time, Roland responded, “We gotta go down to the [police station] first, okay?” Once at the station, she was placed in an interrogation room with Roland and a victim advocate. Roland also placed plastic bags around Niemeyer’s hand and secured them with a zip tie. He did so without her consent and instructed her not to remove them. She attempted to remove the bags on multiple occasions but was told by both Roland and the victim advocate that the bags must remain on her hands.
After she had been at the station for an hour, the victim advocate was dismissed and replaced by Detective Rimmer, who directed Niemeyer to repeat her version of events multiple times. She appeared confused and unsure about her recollection of events and whether M.F. had shot himself, or she had done so. At one point, after nearly two hours of questioning, Niemeyer stated, “Oh my God, I shot him.” At this point, Rimmer left the room for a few minutes, and upon his return, Niemeyer was officially arrested and finally provided with Miranda warnings. She immediately invoked her right to counsel and was later arraigned for first degree murder.
During pretrial proceedings, Niemeyer sought to suppress statements she made during the interview, arguing that her interrogation was custodial and her statements were made absent Miranda warnings. The trial court denied her motion, ruling the interview was not custodial. The jury found Niemeyer guilty of “second-degree murder, second-degree assault, and two counts of prohibited use of a weapon.”
Niemeyer timely appealed, but the appeals court ruled that while a reasonable person in Niemeyer’s position would not have considered herself free to leave, her freedom of action was not curtailed to the degree associated with a formal arrest. She then timely appealed to the state Supreme Court.
On review, the Court noted that “[t]o protect an individual’s Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, police must provide individuals with certain warnings prior to a custodial interrogation.” Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Further, “Miranda prohibits the prosecution from introducing statements in its case-in-chief procured by custodial interrogation unless the police administer these warnings before the interrogation.” Importantly, these protections apply only to “custodial” interrogations, not voluntary conversations with police. Effland v. People, 240 P.3d 868 (Colo. 2010).
The Court stated that in order for a person to be deemed in custody for Miranda purposes, a reasonable person in the same situation would believe that their freedom of movement was restricted to a degree associated with a formal arrest. People v. Cline, 439 P.3d 1232 (Colo. 2019). This determination is based on the totality of the circumstances, People v. Willoughby, 524 P.3d 1186 (Colo. 2023), and it focuses on the objective circumstances of the questioning, not the subjective beliefs of the police or the defendant, People v. Davis, 449 P.3d 732 (Colo. 2019).
Colorado courts consider the following non-exhaustive list of factors set forth in People v. Matheny, 46 P.3d 453 (Colo. 2002), when determining whether an interview was custodial: “(1) the time, place, and purpose of the encounter; (2) the persons present during the interrogation; (3) the words spoken by the officer to the defendant; (4) the officer’s tone of voice and general demeanor; (5) the length and mood of the interrogation; (6) whether any limitation of movement or other form of restraint was placed on the defendant during the interrogation; (7) the officer’s response to any questions asked by the defendant; (8) whether directions were given to the defendant during the interrogation; and (9) the defendant’s verbal or nonverbal response to such directions.”
Turning to the present case, the Court observed that several of the Matheny factors weighed against a determination of custody: the words spoken by the officers to Niemeyer (open-ended questions), the officers’ tone and general demeanor (measured, conversational tones), and the length of the interrogation (short interrogation).
However, the Court determined that these were outweighed by six factors weighing in favor of custody, which included: “the time, place, and purpose of the encounter; the persons present during the interrogation; limitations of the defendant’s movement or other forms of restraint; the officers’ response to any questions asked by the defendant; directions given to the defendant during the interrogation; and the defendant’s verbal or nonverbal response to those directions.”
First, interrogations that take place at night and in “police-dominated” locations weigh in favor of custody. See Willoughby. The Court noted that Niemeyer was interrogated at the police station just before midnight. Second, when the defendant is alone with the police, that fact weighs in favor of custody. Id. Rimmer dismissed the victim advocate and proceeded to question Niemeyer when the two of them were alone, weighing in favor of custody. Third, restrictions on a defendant’s movements indicate custody. Id.; People v. Minjarez, 81 P.3d 348 (Colo. 2003). Niemeyer was in an interrogation room with the door closed and her hands were covered by bags that were zip tied, which weigh in favor of custody. Fourth, the police failed to provide a straight answer to Niemeyer repeatedly asking when she could visit M.F. in the hospital, which a reasonable person could interpret to mean their freedom of movement was restricted, i.e., in custody. Fifth, police officers commanding the defendant weighs in favor of custody. People v. Bohler, 545 P.3d 509 (Colo. 2024). The Court stated that the police gave Niemeyer several commands during their interactions—commanding her not to take bags off numerous times—which weigh in favor of custody. Finally, compliance with police directions by the defendant indicates custody. Id. Niemeyer complied with every command and instruction given by Roland and Rimmer, which weighs in favor of custody.
After reviewing the Matheny factors, the Court held that “a reasonable person in Niemeyer’s position would consider themselves to be deprived of their freedom of action to a degree associated with a formal arrest.” Because she was in police custody when questioned by Rimmer, she should have been read her Miranda warnings prior to questioning. Thus, the Court further held that the trial court erred by not granting her motion to suppress.
The Court explained that its determination that Niemeyer’s statements were improperly admitted into evidence does not end the analysis. It must determine whether the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Hagos v. People, 288 P.3d 116 (Colo. 2012). Under the harmless error standard, the Court must reverse if there is a reasonable possibility that the error might have contributed to the conviction. Id.
The Court stated that the only time Niemeyer affirmatively said that she shot M.F. was during her interrogation by Rimmer, and no other properly admitted evidence “was nearly as inculpatory as” her statements to Rimmer. Thus, the Court held that there was at least a reasonable possibility that the trial court’s error contributed to her conviction.
Accordingly, the Court vacated her conviction, ordered her suppression motion granted, and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. See: Niemeyer v. Colorado, 555 P.3d 607 (Colo. 2024).
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Related legal cases
People v. Bohler
| Year | 2024 |
|---|---|
| Cite | 545 P.3d 509 (Colo. 2024) |
| Level | State Supreme Court |
| Conclusion | Bench Verdict |
Niemeyer v. Colorado
| Year | 2024 |
|---|---|
| Cite | 555 P.3d 607 (Colo. 2024) |
| Level | State Supreme Court |
| Conclusion | Bench Verdict |
People v. Willoughby
| Year | 2023 |
|---|---|
| Cite | 524 P.3d 1186 (Colo. 2023) |
| Level | State Supreme Court |
| Conclusion | Bench Verdict |
People v. Davis
| Year | 2019 |
|---|---|
| Cite | 449 P.3d 732 (Colo. 2019) |
| Level | State Supreme Court |
| Conclusion | Bench Verdict |
People v. Cline
| Year | 2019 |
|---|---|
| Cite | 439 P.3d 1232 (Colo. 2019) |
| Level | State Supreme Court |
| Conclusion | Bench Verdict |
Hagos v. People
| Year | 2012 |
|---|---|
| Cite | 288 P.3d 116 (Colo. 2012) |
| Level | State Supreme Court |
| Conclusion | Bench Verdict |
Effland v. People
| Year | 2010 |
|---|---|
| Cite | 240 P.3d 868 (Colo. 2010) |
| Level | State Supreme Court |
| Conclusion | Bench Verdict |
People v. Minjarez
| Year | 2003 |
|---|---|
| Cite | 81 P.3d 348 (Colo. 2003) |
| Level | State Supreme Court |
| Conclusion | Bench Verdict |
People v. Matheny
| Year | 2002 |
|---|---|
| Cite | 46 P.3d 453 (Colo. 2002) |
| Level | State Supreme Court |
| Conclusion | Bench Verdict |
Miranda v. Arizona
| Year | 1966 |
|---|---|
| Cite | 384 U.S. 436 (U.S. Supreme Court 1966) |
384 U.S. 436; 86 S. Ct. 1602; 16 L. Ed. 2d 694
ERNESTO A. MIRANDA v. ARIZONA
No. 759
February 28, 1966-March 1, 1966, Argued
June 13, 1966, Decided *
* Together with No. 760, Vignera v. New York, on certiorari to the Court of Appeals of New York and No. 761, Westover v. United States, on certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, both argued February 28-March 1, 1966; and No. 584, California v. Stewart, on certiorari to the Supreme Court of California, argued February 28-March 2, 1966.
PRIOR HISTORY:
CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT OF ARIZONA.
DISPOSITION: 98 Ariz. 18, 401 P. 2d 721; 15 N. Y. 2d 970, 207 N. E. 2d 527; 16 N. Y. 2d 614, 209 N. E. 2d 110; 342 F.2d 684, reversed; 62 Cal. 2d 571, 400 P. 2d 97, affirmed.
SYLLABUS:
In each of these cases the defendant while in police custody was questioned by police officers, detectives, or a prosecuting attorney in a room in which he was cut off from the outside world. None of the defendants was given a full and effective warning of his rights at the outset of the interrogation process. In all four cases the questioning elicited oral admissions, and in three of them signed statements as well, which were admitted at their trials. All defendants were convicted and all convictions, except in No. 584, were affirmed on appeal. Held:
1. The prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way, unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the Fifth Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination. Pp. 444-491.
(a) The atmosphere and environment of incommunicado interrogation as it exists today is inherently intimidating and works to undermine the privilege against self-incrimination. Unless adequate preventive measures are taken to dispel the compulsion inherent in custodial surroundings, no statement obtained from the defendant can truly be the product of his free choice. Pp. 445-458.
(b) The privilege against self-incrimination, which has had a long and expansive historical development, is the essential mainstay of our adversary system and guarantees to the individual the "right to remain silent unless he chooses to speak in the unfettered exercise of his own will," during a period of custodial interrogation as well as in the courts or during the course of other official investigations. Pp. 458-465.
(c) The decision in Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, stressed the need for protective devices to make the process of police interrogation conform to the dictates of the privilege. Pp. 465-466.
(d) In the absence of other effective measures the following procedures to safeguard the Fifth Amendment privilege must be observed: The person in custody must, prior to interrogation, be clearly informed that he has the right to remain silent, and that anything he says will be used against him in court; he must be clearly informed that he has the right to consult with a lawyer and to have the lawyer with him during interrogation, and that, if he is indigent, a lawyer will be appointed to represent him. Pp. 467-473.
(e) If the individual indicates, prior to or during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease; if he states that he wants an attorney, the questioning must cease until an attorney is present. Pp. 473-474.
(f) Where an interrogation is conducted without the presence of an attorney and a statement is taken, a heavy burden rests on the Government to demonstrate that the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his right to counsel. P. 475.
(g) Where the individual answers some questions during incustody interrogation he has not waived his privilege and may invoke his right to remain silent thereafter. Pp. 475-476.
(h) The warnings required and the waiver needed are, in the absence of a fully effective equivalent, prerequisites to the admissibility of any statement, inculpatory or exculpatory, made by a defendant. Pp. 476-477.
2. The limitations on the interrogation process required for the protection of the individual's constitutional rights should not cause an undue interference with a proper system of law enforcement, as demonstrated by the procedures of the FBI and the safeguards affordeၤ in other jurisdictions. Pp. 479-491.
3. In each of these cases the statements were obtained under circumstances that did not meet constitutional standards for protection of the privilege against self-incrimination. Pp. 491-499.
COUNSEL: John J. Flynn argued the cause for petitioner in No. 759. With him on the brief was John P. Frank. Victor M. Earle III argued the cause and filed a brief for petitioner in No. 760. F. Conger Fawcett argued the cause and filed a brief for petitioner in No. 761. Gordon Ringer, Deputy Attorney General of California, argued the cause for petitioner in No. 584. With him on the briefs were Thomas C. Lynch, Attorney General, and William E. James, Assistant Attorney General.
Gary K. Nelson, Assistant Attorney General of Arizona, argued the cause for respondent in No. 759. With him on the brief was Darrell F. Smith, Attorney General. William I. Siegel argued the cause for respondent in No. 760. With him on the brief was Aaron E. Koota. Solicitor General Marshall argued the cause for the United States in No. 761. With him on the brief were Assistant Attorney General Vinson, Ralph S. Spritzer, Nathan Lewin, Beatrice Rosenberg and Ronald L. Gainer. William A. Norris, by appointment of the Court, 382 U.S. 952, argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent in No. 584.
Telford Taylor, by special leave of Court, argued the cause for the State of New York, as amicus curiae, in all cases. With him on the brief were Louis J. Lefkowitz, Attorney General of New York, Samuel A. Hirshowitz, First Assistant Attorney General, and Barry Mahoney and George D. Zuckerman, Assistant Attorneys General, joined by the Attorneys General for their respective States and jurisdictions as follows: Richmond M. Flowers of Alabama, Darrell F. Smith of Arizona, Bruce Bennett of Arkansas, Duke W. Dunbar of Colorado, David P. Buckson of Delaware, Earl Faircloth of Florida, Arthur K. Bolton of Georgia, Allan G. Shepard of Idaho, William G. Clark of Illinois, Robert C. Londerholm of Kansas, Robert Matthews of Kentucky, Jack P. F. Gremillion of Louisiana, Richard J. Dubord of Maine, Thomas B. Finan of Maryland, Norman H. Anderson of Missouri, Forrest H. Anderson of Montana, Clarence A. H. Meyer of Nebraska, T. Wade Bruton of North Carolina, Helgi Johanneson of North Dakota, Robert Y. Thornton of Oregon, Walter E. Alessandroni of Pennsylvania, J. Joseph Nugent of Rhode Island, Daniel R. McLeod of South Carolina, Waggoner Carr of Texas, Robert Y. Button of Virginia, John J. O'Connell of Washington, C. Donald Robertson of West Virginia, John F. Raper of Wyoming, Rafael Hernandez Colon of Puerto Rico and Francisco Corneiro of the Virgin Islands.
Duane R. Nedrud, by special leave of Court, argued the cause for the National District Attorneys Association, as amicus curiae, urging affirmance in Nos. 759 and 760, and reversal in No. 584. With him on the brief was Marguerite D. Oberto.
Anthony G. Amsterdam, Paul J. Mishkin, Raymond L. Bradley, Peter Hearn and Melvin L. Wulf filed a brief for the American Civil Liberties Union, as amicus curiae, in all cases.
JUDGES: Warren, Black, Douglas, Clark, Harlan, Brennan, Stewart, White, Fortas
OPINION: [*439] [***704] [**1609] MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WARREN delivered the opinion of the Court.
The cases before us raise questions which go to the roots of our concepts of American criminal jurisprudence: the restraints society must observe consistent with the Federal Constitution in prosecuting individuals for crime. More specifically, we deal with the admissibility of statements obtained from an individual who is subjected to custodial police interrogation and the necessity for procedures which assure that the individual is accorded his privilege under the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution not to be compelled to incriminate himself.
[*440] We dealt with certain phases of this problem recently in Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 [**1610] (1964). There, as in the four cases before us, law enforcement officials took the defendant into custody and interrogated him in a police station for the purpose of obtaining a confession. The police did not effectively advise him of his right to remain silent or of his right to consult with his attorney. Rather, they confronted him with an alleged accomplice who accused him of having perpetrated a murder. When the defendant denied the accusation and said "I didn't shoot Manuel, you did it," they handcuffed him and took him to an interrogation room. There, while handcuffed and standing, he was questioned for four hours until he confessed. During this interrogation, the police denied his request to speak to his attorney, and they prevented his retained attorney, who had come to the police station, from consulting with him. At his trial, the State, over his objection, introduced the confession against him. We held that the statements thus made were constitutionally inadmissible.
This case has been the subject of judicial interpretation and spirited legal debate since it was decided two years ago. Both state and federal courts, in assessing its implications, have arrived at varying conclusions. n1 A wealth of scholarly material has been written tracing its ramifications and underpinnings. n2 Police and prosecutor [*441] have speculated on its range and desirability. n3 We granted [**1611] certiorari in these cases, 382 U.S. 924, 925, 937, [***705] in order further to explore some facets of the problems, thus exposed, of applying the privilege against self-incrimination to in-custody interrogation, and to give [*442] concrete constitutional guidelines for law enforcement agencies and courts to follow.
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - Footnotes - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
n1 Compare United States v. Childress, 347 F.2d 448 (C. A. 7th Cir. 1965), with Collins v. Beto, 348 F.2d 823 (C. A. 5th Cir. 1965). Compare People v. Dorado, 62 Cal. 2d 338, 398 P. 2d 361, 42 Cal. Rptr. 169 (1964) with People v. Hartgraves, 31 Ill. 2d 375, 202 N. E. 2d 33 (1964).
n2 See, e. g., Enker & Elsen, Counsel for the Suspect: Massiah v. United States and Escobedo v. Illinois, 49 Minn. L. Rev. 47 (1964); Herman, The Supreme Court and Restrictions on Police Interrogation, 25 Ohio St. L. J. 449 (1964); Kamisar, Equal Justice in the Gatehouses and Mansions of American Criminal Procedure, in Criminal Justice in Our Time 1 (1965); Dowling, Escobedo and Beyond: The Need for a Fourteenth Amendment Code of Criminal Procedure, 56 J. Crim. L. C. & P. S. 143, 156 (1965).
The complex problems also prompted discussions by jurists. Compare Bazelon, Law, Morality, and Civil Liberties, 12 U. C. L. A. L. Rev. 13 (1964), with Friendly, The Bill of Rights as a Code of Criminal Procedure, 53 Calif. L. Rev. 929 (1965).
n3 For example, the Los Angeles Police Chief stated that "If the police are required . . . to . . . establish that the defendant was apprised of his constitutional guarantees of silence and legal counsel prior to the uttering of any admission or confession, and that he intelligently waived these guarantees . . . a whole Pandora's box is opened as to under what circumstances . . . can a defendant intelligently waive these rights. . . . Allegations that modern criminal investigation can compensate for the lack of a confession or admission in every criminal case is totally absurd!" Parker, 40 L. A. Bar Bull. 603, 607, 642 (1965). His prosecutorial counterpart, District Attorney Younger, stated that "It begins to appear that many of these seemingly restrictive decisions are going to contribute directly to a more effective, efficient and professional level of law enforcement." L. A. Times, Oct. 2, 1965, p. 1. The former Police Commissioner of New York, Michael J. Murphy, stated of Escobedo: "What the Court is doing is akin to requiring one boxer to fight by Marquis of Queensbury rules while permitting the other to butt, gouge and bite." N. Y. Times, May 14, 1965, p. 39. The former United States Attorney for the District of Columbia, David C. Acheson, who is presently Special Assistant to the Secretary of the Treasury (for Enforcement), and directly in charge of the Secret Service and the Bureau of Narcotics, observed that "Prosecution procedure has, at most, only the most remote causal connection with crime. Changes in court decisions and prosecution procedure would have about the same effect on the crime rate as an aspirin would have on a tumor of the brain." Quoted in Herman, supra, n. 2, at 500, n. 270. Other views on the subject in general are collected in Weisberg, Police Interrogation of Arrested Persons: A Skeptical View, 52 J. Crim. L., C. & P. S. 21 (1961).
- - - - - - - - - - - - End Footnotes- - - - - - - - - - - - - -
We start here, as we did in Escobedo, with the premise that our holding is not an innovation in our jurisprudence, but is an application of principles long recognized and applied in other settings. We have undertaken a thorough re-examination of the Escobedo decision and the principles it announced, and we reaffirm it. That case was but an explication of basic rights that are enshrined in our Constitution -- that "No person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself," and that "the accused shall . . . have the Assistance of Counsel" -- rights which were put in jeopardy in that case through official overbearing. These precious rights were fixed in our Constitution only after centuries of persecution and struggle. And in the words of Chief Justice Marshall, they were secured "for ages to come, and . . . designed to approach immortality as nearly as human institutions can approach it," Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264, 387 (1821).
Over 70 years ago, our predecessors on this Court eloquently stated:
"The maxim nemo tenetur seipsum accusare had its origin in a protest against the inquisitorial and manifestly unjust methods of interrogating accused persons, which [have] long obtained in the continental system, and, until the expulsion of the Stuarts from the British throne in 1688, and the erection of additional barriers for the protection of the people against the exercise of arbitrary power, [were] not uncommon even in England. While the admissions or confessions of the prisoner, when voluntarily and freely made, have always ranked high in the scale of incriminating evidence, if an accused person be asked to explain his apparent connection with a crime under investigation, the ease with which the [*443] questions put to him may assume an inquisitorial character, the temptation to press the witness unduly, to browbeat him if he be timid or reluctant, to push him into a corner, and to entrap him into fatal contradictions, which is so [***706] painfully evident in many of the earlier state trials, notably in those of Sir Nicholas Throckmorton, and Udal, the Puritan minister, made the system so odious as to give rise to a demand for its total abolition. The change in the English criminal procedure in that particular seems to be founded upon no statute and no judicial opinion, but upon a general and silent acquiescence of the courts in a popular demand. But, however adopted, it has become firmly embedded in English, as well as in American jurisprudence. So deeply did the iniquities of the ancient system impress themselves upon the minds of the American colonists that the States, with one accord, made a denial of the right to question an accused person a part of their fundamental law, so that a maxim, which in England was a mere rule of evidence, became clothed in this country with the impregnability of a constitutional enactment." Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 596-597 (1896).
In stating the obligation of the judiciary to apply these constitutional rights, this Court declared in Weems v. United States
