Ninth Circuit Announces ‘Hate Crime’ Sentence Enhancement Under Guidelines § 3A1.1(a) Requires Finding Defendant Motivated by Hate or Animus
by Sam Rutherford
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit clarified the circumstances under which a U.S. District Court may impose a “hate crime” enhancement pursuant to U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual (“USSG”) § 3A1.1(a), holding that the court must find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was motivated by hate or animus toward the victim based on the victim’s inclusion within a protected class, e.g., the victim’s race, gender, sexual orientation, etc.
Derrick Patterson pleaded guilty to one count of Hobbs Act robbery and one count of identity theft in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California. Patterson met the victim on Grindr, a location-based social networking and dating app for the LGBTQ+ community. Patterson took the victim’s phone and used it to withdraw money from the victim’s bank account.
At sentencing, the District Court applied a three-level increase for hate crime motivation based on USSG § 3A1.1(a), rejecting Patterson’s argument that the enhancement required the court to find that his conduct was motivated by hate for the victim based on the victim’s sexual orientation. The court imposed a 111-month sentence. Patterson timely appealed.
The Court began its analysis by noting that USSG § 3A1.1 is entitled “Hate Crime Motivation or Vulnerable Victim.” The Guideline provides: “If the finder of fact at trial or, in the case of a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, the court at sentencing determines beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant intentionally selected any victim or any property as the object of the offense of conviction because of the actual or perceived race, color, religion, national origin, ethnicity, gender, gender identity, disability, or sexual orientation of any person, increase by 3 levels.” USSG § 3A1.1(a).
To interpret Sentencing Guidelines like § 3A1.1(a), the Court stated that courts rely on “traditional rules of statutory construction.” United States v. Scheu, 83 F.4th 1124 (9th Cir. 2023). This includes the Guideline’s “text, structure, history, and purpose.” Rubalcaba v. Garland, 998 F.3d 1031 (9th Cir. 2021) (quoting Kisor v. Wilkie, 588 U.S. 558 (2019)). Courts may also consider “the structure of the guidelines as a whole to understand the provision in context … [and] may also consider the provision’s history, purpose, and the reasons for any relevant amendments.” United States v. Herrera, 974 F.3d 1040 (9th Cir. 2020).
The District Court in Patterson’s case concluded that § 3A1.1(a) does not require proof the defendant was motivated by hate of the victim based on the victim’s inclusion in a protected group. The Court, however, flatly rejected this contention, reasoning that “[e]ven though the word ‘motivation’ is not in the guideline, the title, history, and purpose of the guideline all support the conclusion that application of the enhancement requires a finding that the defendant was motivated by hate.”
Consequently, the Court instructed that before a District Court may impose the “hate crime” enhancement under § 3A1.1(a), it must find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was motivated by animus or hate toward the victim based on the victim’s actual or perceived race, color, religion, national origin, ethnicity, gender, gender identity, disability, or sexual orientation. It is not enough that the defendant selected the victim based on his or her inclusion in the protected group for reasons not related to hate or animus, e.g., because the defendant believed the victim’s inclusion in the protected class may make them an easier target or less likely to report the crime, the Court explained.
The Court stated that Patterson used Grindr to find people willing to meet him alone, so he could rob them. The victim’s “membership in the protected group was a proxy for other information about them—their willingness to agree to meetings where he knew they would be alone.” The Court ruled that this motivation is insufficient to impose the hate crime enhancement because there was no evidence that “Patterson was motivated by hatred or animus of the victims because of their membership in the protected group.” Thus, the Court held that the District Court erred by concluding it could apply the enhancement absent a finding that Patterson was motivated by hate or animus towards the victim.
Accordingly, the Court vacated Patterson’s enhanced sentence and remanded the case for resentencing. See: United States v. Patterson, 119 F.4th 609 (9th Cir. 2024).
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