by Douglas Ankney

In a case of first impression, the Supreme Court of Minnesota affirmed a Court of Appeals (“COA”) decision holding that a defendant has no duty to retreat when claiming that he used reasonable force in defense of another under Minnesota Statutes § 609.06(1)(3). The Court then announced the framework for reviewing such claims.

Julian Valdez, his stepbrother, and Pablo Gutierrez were playing pool and drinking alcohol in Valdez’s garage. Gutierrez became enraged when he believed the other two men were talking badly about him. Gutierrez threatened to kill the stepbrothers, and Valdez retrieved his gun while yelling at Gutierrez to leave. Valdez did not point the gun at Gutierrez but made it visible to him. Gutierrez continued threatening Valdez.

Gutierrez then lunged at the stepbrother, tackling him. The two men were on the ground, with the stepbrother on his back, and the much larger Gutierrez atop him—choking, smothering, and punching the stepbrother. The stepbrother, believing his life to be in danger, pleaded with Valdez to shoot Gutierrez.

Valdez shot Gutierrez once in the side. The wound proved to be fatal. Valdez was charged with multiple offenses, including second-degree unintentional felony murder. At trial, Valdez testified he could have retreated while Gutierrez assaulted his stepbrother. The stepbrother testified that he could have run away before Gutierrez began his attack.

After the defense rested, the district court determined that Valdez had met his burden to have the jury instructed on defense of others. But over the defense’s objections, the district court included in the instructions that the “Defendant has a duty to retreat or avoid the danger if reasonably possible.” The jury returned a verdict of guilty, and the district court imposed a sentence of 150 months’ imprisonment.

Valdez timely appealed. The COA concluded that the jury instruction was inconsistent with the statutory right to use reasonable force in the defense of others (the “practical effect” of retreat would have been Valdez abandoning his stepbrother and leaving him in danger of bodily harm or death). The COA reversed and remanded for a new trial. The Minnesota Supreme Court granted the State’s petition for review.

The Court observed that “reasonable force may be used upon another without the other’s consent ‘when used by any person in resisting or aiding another to resist an offense against the person.’” Minnesota Statutes § 609.06(1)(3). The state Supreme Court had previously ruled that the self-defense provision of the statute includes four elements:

“(1) the absence of aggression or provocation on the part of the defendant; (2) the defendant’s actual and honest belief that he or she was in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm; (3) the existence of reasonable grounds for that belief; and (4) the absence of a reasonable possibility of retreat to avoid the danger.” State v. Basting, 572 N.W.2d 281 (Minn. 1997). Once a “defendant meets the burden of presenting evidence to support a self-defense claim, ‘the State bears the burden to disprove, beyond a reasonable doubt,’ at least one of the elements of self-defense.” State v. Devens, 852 N.W.2d 255 (Minn. 2014).

While the Supreme Court instructed in Basting that “a person is required to retreat if reasonably possible before acting in self-defense,” it had not yet decided if a duty to retreat is similarly required when a person acts in defense of another person. The Court explained that a “defendant’s duty to retreat creates inherent tension with the statutory right to defend another. Even if a defendant can retreat, the person in need of help (the person in peril) may not be able to do so. Imposing a duty to retreat on the defendant in those circumstances would require the defendant to abandon the person in peril, defeating the very purpose of a defense-of-others claim.”

The Court noted that appellate courts in Connecticut, Massachusetts, and Texas “have likewise concluded that it is not sensible to focus on a defendant’s own ability to retreat when they assert that they used force in defense of others and have instead reasoned that the focus should be on the person in peril’s ability to retreat.” See Commonwealth v. Allen, 48 N.E. 3d (Mass. 2016) (noting “the incompatible nature of intervention and retreat” with respect to defense of others); State v. Silveira, 503 A.2d 599 (Conn. 1986) (“requiring a defendant acting in defense of another to retreat, without regard to the ability to retreat of the person defended, would be inconsistent with the general right to defense of others”); Cleveland v. State, 700 S.W.2d 761 (Tex. App. 1985) (“if the actor is acting in defense of third persons, it is the position of the third person that is relevant”).

Additionally, the state Supreme Court previously held that the duty to retreat is incompatible when a person uses force in defense of his home because it would “force people to leave their homes by the back door while their family members are exposed to danger.” State v. Carothers, 594 S.W.2d 897 (Minn. 1999). Turning to the present case, the Court concluded that “[s]imilarly, the right to defend another is incompatible with imposing a duty to retreat on the defendant.” Thus, the Court held that “the district court abused its discretion by instructing the jury that Valdez himself had a duty to retreat before acting in defense of his stepbrother.”

The Court then announced the framework for reviewing claims of use of reasonable force in defense of another. The Court emphasized that the defendant’s actions must be reasonable—that is, reasonableness is the “touchstone of the analysis.” In order for “a defendant’s use of force in defense of another to be reasonable, the person in peril must not have had a reasonable possibility of safe retreat…. [T]he person in peril’s ability to retreat must be assessed from the perspective of the defendant.” The Court summarized its newly announced framework as follows: “a defendant must subjectively believe that the person in peril has no reasonable possibility of safe retreat, and that belief must be objectively reasonable based on the information available to the defendant at the time that they used force to defend the person in peril.”

Accordingly, the Court affirmed the judgment of the COA. See: State v. Valdez, 121 N.W.3d 191 (Minn. 2024).  

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