by Anthony W. Accurso

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed the convictions of the unwitting passenger of a drug mule on the ground that the Government failed to present evidence of her knowledge of the drugs and instead relied solely on unreasonable inferences.

Tony Garcia agreed to transport about 29 pounds of methamphetamine from California to Oklahoma. He obtained a Chevy Malibu that had been altered with hidden panels to facilitate the transport.

Due to the length of the trip (roughly 1,300 miles in 21 hours each way), Garcia had planned to bring (and pay) a passenger. However, at the last minute, he told the original intended passenger the trip was cancelled and invited the mother of his three children and former partner, Juanita Viridiana Garcia-­Rodriguez, to serve as the passenger for the trip. During a traffic stop in Oklahoma, Garcia told the officers that they had $200 and planned to gamble at a casino. Finding this end-­goal for such a lengthy trip to be implausible, officers searched the vehicle. When one officer attempted “to see if there was any wiggle room at all, like it had been manipulated,” the interior panel of the passenger-­ride rear door fell off, revealing bundles of meth. Further, Garcia-­Rodriguez “had a small amount of methamphetamine hidden inside her bra and appeared increasingly nervous throughout the traffic stop.”

Garcia-­Rodriguez went to trial and was convicted of conspiracy to possess methamphetamine with intent to distribute (21 U.S.C. §§ 841(b)(1)(A), 846) and interstate travel in aid of a drug-­trafficking enterprise (18 U.S.C. § 1952(a)(3)). Importantly, just after the prosecution rested its case, her attorney filed for a motion of acquittal, arguing that there was a lack of evidence, though this motion was denied.

On review by the Tenth Circuit, the Court considered whether the Government had met its burden to establish Garcia-­Rodriguez had been sufficiently aware of the large quantity of drugs to part of the conspiracy and whether she possessed the requisite intent to engage in illegal interstate travel. See United States v. Corrales, 608 F.3d 654 (10th Cir. 2010) (knowledge is an element of the crime of conspiracy to possess cocaine with intent to distribute); United States v. Polowichak, 783 F.2d 410 (4th Cir. 1986) (such a conviction requires “knowledge of the load they were carrying”).

Garcia-­Rodriguez traveled about 1,300 miles in a vehicle laden with meth, but the Court observed that “mere presence, as a passenger, in a car found to be carrying drugs is insufficient to implicate the passenger in the conspiracy.” United States v. Jones, 44 F.3d 860 (10th Cir. 1995).

Jones is similar in another respect to the present case because, though the passenger had traveled for a considerable time in the vehicle, “the cocaine wasn’t in plain view and did not carry an odor.” The Jones Court concluded “that the jury would need to speculate in order to infer the passenger’s knowledge of the cocaine.” Thus, Garcia-­Rodriguez’s mere presence as a passenger in the vehicle isn’t sufficient to establish that she had the necessary intent, the Court concluded.

The Government had also implied that Garcia-­Rodriguez was complicit because she suspected Garcia of being involved in criminal activity. In fact, during the stop, when asked by an officer if she was committing a crime, she responded, “Not me.”

Again, the Jones Court addressed this issue and “concluded that ‘suspicion of illegality’ wasn’t enough ‘to prove participation in a conspiracy.’” Thus, Garcia-­Rodriguez’s mere suspicion about Garcia is also insufficient to establish the necessary intent, the Court concluded.

The Government also relied on the recognized assumption “that someone wouldn’t plant expensive drugs in a car without informing the occupants.” United States v. Hooks, 780 F.2d 1526 (10th Cir. 1986); United States v. Pulido-­Jacobo, 377 F.3d 1124 (10th Cir. 2004). However, the Court distinguished these cases by pointing out that in both cases, the passenger had other reasons to suspect drug activity.

In Hooks, the vehicle “reeked from the smell of PCP,” and the passenger “had slurred speech and had bloodshot eyes (though he didn’t smell of alcohol).” In Pulido-­Jacobo, the passenger had been paid $1,210 for the trip, he had paid for “repairs” to the vehicle, and the vehicle could only carry a suspiciously small amount of gas—because the gas tank had a secret compartment to store drugs.

In contrast to Hooks and Pulido-­Jacobo, there were no other facts or circumstances present in this case that would have reasonably alerted Garcia-­Rodriguez to the contraband. As such, the Court cited United States v. Aponte, 619 F.3d 799 (8th Cir. 2010) (stating that “we are unaware of any case in which the drugs’ value was the only circumstantial evidence to indicate the occupants were aware of drugs in their vehicle”).

The Government pointed to the ease with which the officer discovered the rear doors didn’t work and contained a false panel. Nevertheless, the Court noted that the Government hadn’t presented any evidence that Garcia-­Rodriguez actually interacted with the rear doors. She had no apparent property stored on the rear seats, nor had she attempted to jostle the panel.

The Court also rejected the inference of knowledge of the drugs based on a text conversation where Garcia-­Rodriguez asked Garcia which car they would be taking, and he responded that they were taking the Malibu. Without “saying anything more,” the Government could not establish that this was a “coded text message.”

Finally, the Court dismissed her nervousness as proof of participation in the conspiracy, because any passenger would have anxiety during a custodial police detention lasting nearly two hours with a small amount of meth on her and finding herself with “no money and about to lose her mode of transportation” more than 1,200 miles from home. Thus, under these circumstances, the Court concluded that her nervousness “didn’t constitute evidence that she knew about the secret compartments filled with methamphetamine.”

Ultimately, the Court concluded that the “jury could infer that Ms. Garcia-­Rodriguez had reason to suspect some crime,” but “there wasn’t any evidence that [she] had known that the crime involved a large amount of methamphetamine.” Therefore, the Court held that there was insufficient evidence to convict her.

Accordingly, the Court vacated her convictions and remanded the case with instructions to enter a judgement of acquittal. See: United States v. Garcia-­Rodriguez, 93 F.4th 1162 (10th Cir. 2024).  

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