by Sam Rutherford

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri erred by concluding that a defendant forfeited his right to represent himself in a criminal case based solely on the defendant’s repeated assertion of frivolous “sovereign citizen” arguments prior to trial. The Court ruled that although recognizing that such legal arguments are unquestionably frivolous and would likely lengthen the trial, the defendant’s assertion of these so-­called rights, without more, is not the type of serious and obstructionist behavior necessary for the revocation of the right to self-­representation.

Background

On July 19, 2021, in St. Louis, Missouri, police observed Anthony Willis commit a traffic infraction. He fled when they attempted to initiate a traffic stop. A high-­speed chase ensured. Willis crashed his car when police used a spike strip to disable it. He fled on foot but was apprehended. Police found a Glock 22 pistol on the passenger seat of Willis’ car. Because Willis had multiple prior armed robbery convictions, he was charged in federal district court with being a felon in possession of a firearm. His prior convictions made him eligible for enhanced penalties for being an armed career criminal.

An attorney with the Federal Public Defender was initially appointed to represent Willis. However, in January 2022, Willis wrote a letter to the magistrate judge assigned to his case that appointed counsel was not providing representation “under my guidance” and that he wanted to exercise his “option to go Pro Se.”

The magistrate judge conducted a hearing on the request, asking Willis if he still wanted to represent himself. Willis responded, “Yes, ma’am…. I’m here on special appearance. I’m the beneficiary. I don’t have a need for no type of legal representation. I’m a third-­party intervener myself, so—I’m here to represent the defendant. I don’t need no representation myself.”

The magistrate judge concluded that Willis was sufficiently competent to waive his right to counsel and granted his request. The court also appointed standby counsel and warned Willis that any obstructionist or disruptive behavior that interferes with the trial process could result in revocation of his right to self-­representation.

Willis then engaged the court is a bizarre colloquy, stating the he did not believe that he was the defendant charged in the case “just by how my name’s spelled on all the paperwork. It’s all in capital letters…. [T]here’s ramifications to it that people don’t understand…. I don’t want to speak my side and then be punished for it….”

Willis continued by asking whether the court could tell him “who the defendant is or what the defendant is? Is it true that the defendant is not anything of flesh and blood?” He then asked whether he had the “right to subrogation.” The court responded, “I don’t even understand what that means.” Willis explained that it means he has the “right to be separated from … the person—‘person’ in legal terms don’t mean human flesh and blood. ‘Person’ in legal terms means entity or corporation or things of that nature.”

He further clarified that the proceedings against him resounded in “commercial law” and then asked the court about documents he had filed. The court acknowledge receiving various letters from him “that don’t mean anything to me. If you’re asking the Court to rule on something, then you have to file a motion asking the Court to actually make a ruling.”

Willis continued filing various legal pleadings with the court, seeking to have the indictment against him dismissed based on supposed legal claims that he described as “conditional acceptance” and “unconscionable contract.” His requests were denied.

At a subsequent status conference the day before trial, the district judge assigned to the case took up the issue of Willis’ self-­representation. Willis responded to the court’s inquiries by stating that “the prosecutor … what he is to the United States, that’s what I am to Anthony Willis…. If I was to say that [standby counsel] was my lawyer … that will be me saying that I am Anthony Willis. And I don’t need the representation. I am the representer.” Willis concluded his remarks by noting that he was not trying to be “belligerent or combatant, but once you know something, you can’t not know it….”

The District Court recognized that Willis had “been pleasant and respectful…. But if you are essentially saying that you are a sovereign citizen and the Court doesn’t have jurisdiction over you or the like, that’s something that the Supreme Court and the United States court system has rejected for decades; and so that’s not a legal basis … for not proceeding against you.” The District Court strongly encouraged Willis to allow standby counsel to represent him, but he declined, insisting that he was “going to represent my property” and that “I have your defendant right here and I would like to exercise my right to subrogation in surrendering him to you for you to handle this claim.”

The District Court cautioned Willis again that his supposed sovereign citizen arguments were patently frivolous and that he would forfeit his right to self-­representation if he continued making them. Unsurprisingly, Willis did persist, so the District Court ordered standby counsel to represent him at trial. Willis was convicted as charged and sentenced to 228 months’ imprisonment.

Analysis

The sole issue on appeal was whether the District Court properly held that Willis had forfeit his right to self-­representation on the day before trial by persisting in arguing his “sovereign citizen” theories. The U.S. Supreme Court has long held that a defendant has a Sixth Amendment right “to conduct his own defense” without the assistance of counsel if he “knowingly and intelligently” waives the right to counsel after being “made aware of the dangers and disadvantages of self-­representation.” Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975). This right, however, is not absolute. “[S]elf-­representation can be disallowed or terminated when the defendant ‘engages in serious obstructionist misconduct.’” United States v. Mosley, 607 F.3d 555 (8th Cir. 2010) (quoting United States v. Myers, 503 F.3d 676 (8th Cir. 2007)).

Here, the District Court revoked Willis’ right to self-­representation based solely on his repeated assertion of sovereign-­citizen-­type arguments and its belief that he would present them to a jury resulting in inordinate delay and confusion during trial. But the District Court’s decision “was not based on any defiant or disruptive pretrial conduct that compromised or reflected an intent to delay timely completion of the criminal proceedings against Willis,” according to the Court. Although recognizing that his arguments were unquestionably frivolous, “[c]ourts have repeatedly concluded that ‘sovereign citizens’ may represent themselves despite their frivolous beliefs about the law.” United States v. Taylor, 21 F.4th 94 (3d Cir. 2021) (collecting cases).

For example, in United States v. Smith, 830 F.3d 803 (8th Cir. 2016), the court reversed the denial of the right to self-­representation based on the defendant’s pursuit of frivolous “sovereign citizen” arguments. The Smith Court specifically noted that the right to self-­representation may sometimes require trial judges “to tolerate ‘numerous nonsensical pleadings,’ even ‘occasionally wacky’ behavior, so long as the defendant is not disruptive or defiant.” Smith (quoting United States v. Johnson, 610 F.3d 1138 (9th Cir. 2010)). The Smith Court went on to explain that “[r]epeated, frivolous challenges to the court’s jurisdiction, to the government’s authority to prosecute, or to the validity of the federal laws defendant is charged with violating, are not disruptive or defiant in this sense—unless they threaten to forestall pretrial or trial proceedings.”

In contrast, the court in United States v. Atkins, 52 F.4th 745 (8th Cir. 2022), affirmed the revocation of a defendant’s right to self-­representation where he not only made repeated frivolous sovereign citizen arguments but also “consistently demonstrated his unwillingness to participate in the proceedings by interrupting and arguing with the court, refusing to provide responsive answers, and insisting that the trial is not going to happen.” The defendant’s behavior was so disruptive that he was removed from the courtroom at least once, providing the trial judge ample reason to believe he would engage in similar disruptive behavior if allowed to continue representing himself. See Atkins.

Turning to the present case, the Court stated that Willis’ behavior was more like that of the defendant in Smith than in Atkins. Willis was never belligerent, disrespectful, or obstructive. Both the District Court and the Government on appeal seemed to believe that the annoyance of having to deal with frivolous “sovereign citizen” arguments is itself sufficiently “serious and obstructionist misconduct” to merit revoking a defendant’s right to self-­representation. But the Eighth Circuit rejected this argument, noting that it had long held that “defendants have the right to represent themselves and go down in flames if they wish, a right the district court is required to respect.” Smith (cleaned up).

Thus, although the District Court was understandably frustrated with Willis’ continued assertion of frivolous legal arguments that would do him no good, it nonetheless erred in revoking his right to self-­representation absent “defiant or physically disruptive pretrial conduct,” the Court ruled. Rather, the Court explained that the correct remedy was to simply continuing denying Willis’ frivolous sovereign citizen arguments and impose lesser sanctions if absolutely necessary. The impermissible denial of the right to self-­representation can never be harmless error. Smith.

Conclusion

Accordingly, the Court reversed Willis’ conviction and remanded the case for further proceeds consistent with its opinion. See: United States v. Willis, 101 F.4th 577 (8th Cir. 2024).

Writer’s note: Anyone interested in understanding the so-­called “sovereign citizen” movement should visit the Sothern Poverty Law Center’s web page on the topic. In short, “Sovereign citizens believe that by setting up th[e] Treasury Direct Account (TDA), every newborn’s rights are split between those held by the flesh-­and-­blood baby and the ones assigned to his or her corporate shell account, evidenced, they claim, by the fact that most certificates use all capital letters to spell out a baby’s name, JOHN DOE, for example. They falsely attribute this all-­capital version to the actual the name of the corporate shell identity, also called a ‘straw man,’ while ‘John Doe’ without all caps is the baby’s ‘real,’ flesh-­and-­blood name. The bogus belief continues that as the child grows older, most of his legal documents will utilize capital letters, which means that his state-­issued driver’s license, marriage license, car registration, criminal court records, cable TV bill and correspondence from the IRS all will pertain to his corporate shell identity, not his real, sovereign identity.”

This writer has witnessed defendants attempt to present “sovereign citizen” arguments in both state and federal courts in response to criminal charges for nearly 30 years. Essentially, the argument goes that because the indictment or charging information spells out the defendant’s name in all capital letters, the court is prosecuting the “straw man,” not the living person, and that the living person therefore may not be convicted and incarcerated. These arguments are NEVER successful. Not only do such legal arguments fly in the face of logic, they risk seriously undermining viable factual defenses and legal claims the defendant might actually have.  

Subscribe today

Already a subscriber? Login