by Sam Rutherford

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed a sentence imposed by the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania because the district judge erroneously concluded he could not consider evidence offered by the defendant in support of a downward variance under 18 U.S.C.S. § 3553(a) because those grounds were already accounted for by the downward adjustments under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines for safety-valve eligibility, minor role, and acceptance of responsibility.

Background

Victor Cora-Alicea pleaded guilty to several drug related offenses for his minor role in a large drug trafficking conspiracy in Philadelphia and Lancaster, Pennsylvania. Cora-Alicea’s only role in the conspiracy was to sit at a table and bag drugs all day long. Cora-Alicea pleaded guilty to violations of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846; 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A), and (b)(1)(C); and 18 U.S.C. § 2 without the benefit of a plea bargain.

At sentencing, Cora-Alicea received base offense level reductions for his safety-valve eligibility, minor role, and acceptance of responsibility, resulting in a total offense level of 24. He had no criminal history, yielding a criminal history category of I. This resulted in a Guidelines range of 51–63 months in prison. The Government took no position on the sentence the District Court should impose, but Cora-Alicea requested a variance below the Guidelines range pursuant to § 3553(a).

Cora-Alicea offered significant mitigation evidence in support of his request. First, he presented the testimony of Dr. Adriana Flores, a licensed clinical and forensic psychologist, who interviewed and evaluated Cora-Alicea. Flores noted that Cora-Alicea is illiterate and has an IQ of only 82. Flores also testified that Cora-Alicea had a traumatic childhood, growing up extremely poor in Puerto Rico where he was often bullied and abused based on his low IQ, speech impediment, and other disabilities. Flores testified that Cora-Alicea was clinically depressed at the time of the offense due to COVID-19 pandemic related unemployment and the stress it caused him and his family. She testified that these factors, and in particular his low IQ, made him “more likely to be talked into doing something, that may not, necessarily, be in his best interests.” She further opined that his risk of reoffending was “really low.”

Cora-Alicea also offered testimony from family averring to his overall good character and dedication them, particularly to his son with special needs. Cora-Alicea’s brother assured the District Court that he would have employment upon release. Finally, Cora-Alicea made brief tearful remarks at sentencing, taking full responsibility for his actions and assuring the court that “this will not happen again.”

Based on this mitigation evidence, Cora-Alicea’s attorney requested a downward variance sentence of 24 months, which would have resulted in his immediate release from custody. The District Court, however, rejected the defense request, reasoning that much of the mitigation evidence Cora-Alicea had presented was already taken “into account” under the Guidelines when his base offense level was adjusted downward from 31 to 24 based on his safety value eligibility, minor role, and acceptance of responsibility. The District Court therefore granted him only a slight variance below the Guidelines range pursuant to § 3553(a) and imposed a 45-month sentence. Cora-Alicea timely appealed.

Analysis

Although Cora-Alicea raised numerous issues challenging the procedural correctness of the District Court’s sentence, the Third Circuit found only one dispositive—whether the District Court erred by discounting his mitigation evidence by concluding it was already considered when adjusting his sentencing range downward under the Guidelines.

The Court noted that sentencing under the Guidelines “involves a three-step process.” First, the District Court must calculate the initial Guidelines range. Second, the court must rule on any motions to depart from the initial range and then state a final sentencing range. And third, the court must exercise discretion to choose a sentence within or outside the final range based on the sentencing factors in § 3553(a). United States v. Gunter, 462 F.3d 237 (3d Cir. 2006). At step two, deviations from the initial Guidelines range—called “departures”—are based on specific Guidelines provisions. Id. At step three, deviations from the final sentencing range—called “variances”—are based on the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Id.

The Court noted that “[t]hings went awry” during step three in Cora-Alicea’s case. Step three requires the “true, considered exercise of discretion.” Quoting United States v. Friedman, 658 F.3d 342 (3d Cir. 2011). This means that the record must disclose that the District Court gave “meaningful consideration” to the factors in § 3553(a) and exercised independent judgment after weighing those factors when imposing a sentence, the Court explained. United States v. Kluger, 722 F.3d 549 (3d Cir. 2013) (quoting United States v. Grier, 475 F.3d 556 (3d Cir. 2007) (en banc)).

The District Court in this case failed to carry out its responsibility in this regard, according to the Court. While it is true that certain factors must be taken into consideration when determining whether a defendant is entitled to a downward “departure” from his or her base offense level at step two, these factors have nothing to do with whether the defendant is entitled to a “variance” below the sentencing range under § 3553(a). But “even if they had a connection of some sort, district courts must nevertheless demonstrate meaningful consideration of the mitigation evidence rather than summarily dismissing it as accounted for by the Guidelines,” the Court stated. Citing United States v. Begin, 696 F.3d 405 (3d Cir. 2012).

Because the District Court’s “erroneous legal conclusion” that Cora-Alicea’s “variance grounds [were] accounted for by the downward adjustments for safety-valve eligibility, minor role, and acceptance of responsibility,” its sentence was procedurally incorrect and had to be reversed, the Court ruled. Furthermore, the Court ruled that this procedural error was prejudicial because it “preempted any weighing of the mitigation evidence against the Guidelines range or the other sentencing factors.” Citing Grier and Friedman.

Conclusion

Accordingly, the Court reversed Cora-Alicea’s sentence and remanded the case for resentencing at which the District Court must fully reconsider the mitigation evidence he offered in support of a variance below the sentencing range under § 3553(a). See: United States v. Cora-Alicea, 100 F.4th 478 (3d Cir. 2024).

Writer’s note: Cora-Alicea was sentenced by U.S. District Judge John Milton Younge. Judge Younge responded to Cora-Alicea’s tearful allocution by stating that he should “[b]e the man [] you’re supposed to be” and “stop sitting up here crying.” Although the Third Circuit did not reverse Cora-Alicea’s sentence based on these comments, it nonetheless took the opportunity to “remind all involved that these hearings are solemn occasions in which judges are tasked with crafting ‘individualized sentence[s].’ United States v. Ward, 732 F.3d 175, 181 (3d Cir. 2013)…. By definition, gross generalizations or stereotypes—whether they be about race or gender—do not produce individualized sentences. And they are inappropriate for several reasons, not the least of which is how they prejudge people rather than allowing them to speak for themselves.”   

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