by Sam Rutherford

The Supreme Court of Oregon clarified the “Guilty Except for Insanity” (“GEI”) defense, holding that the defendant’s mental disease or defect may combine with another condition to cause the lack of capacity to form the requisite criminal intent and the mental disease or defect need not be sufficient on its own to cause the lack of capacity. This is the second time in as many years—and in the same case—the Court has been called upon to clarify the elements of the GEI defense.

Background

Erik John Meiser was charged with multiple crimes, including aggravated murder and burglary, for an incident in 2012. The trial court found Meiser unfit to stand trial by reason of mental incapacity, and he spent nearly four years at the Oregon State Hospital before finally proceeding to trial. Meiser waived his right to a jury and was tried by the court. He did not dispute that he committed the charged offenses, but he raised a GEI defense. Meiser called a psychologist and three psychiatrist as expert witnesses in support of the defense.

The experts all testified that Meiser has both schizophrenia and a co-­occurring diagnosis of antisocial personality disorder. One psychiatrist testified that the schizophrenia caused Meiser to hear “command auditory hallucinations.” Two others testified that Meiser lacked capacity to conform his conduct to the law and that, but for the psychosis, he would not have committed the charged offenses. Both experts said Meiser’s co-­occurring disorders were “active” at the time of the murder but that the schizophrenic psychosis was “the predominate driver of his behaviors.” One of the experts specifically rejected the suggestion that Meiser’s conduct was “a result of antisocial personality disorder rather than schizophrenia.” State v. Meiser, 481 P.3d 375 (Or. Ct. App. 2021) (“Meiser I”).

Prior to the verdict, the parties disputed what Meiser was required to show in order to establish the elements of GEI. The trial court did not resolve the dispute or determine whether Meiser’s evidence was sufficient. Instead, the court found him not guilty of some offenses based on GEI but guilty of lesser included offenses on the murder and burglary charges. These verdicts were handed down “without elaboration, as a jury does in the absence of a special verdict form.”

Meiser timely appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in rejecting his GEI defense. The Court of Appeals held that the trial judge correctly rejected the defense because Meiser failed to show that his lack of capacity to commit the charged offenses resulted solely from his schizophrenia rather than in combination with his antisocial personality disorder.

The Oregon Supreme Court granted review and reversed because the Court of Appeals erred in holding that “defendant could prevail on his GEI defense only if he proved that his co-­occurring personality disorder played no part in causing the requisite lack of substantial capacity.” State v. Meiser, 506 P.3d 402 (Or. 2022) (“Meiser II”). The Supreme Court remanded the case to the appellate court for it to determine in the first instance whether the Legislature intended for a mental defect such as schizophrenia to be “sufficient, on its own” to bring about the requisite lack of capacity, or whether it intended a “lesser degree of causal contribution.” Meiser II.

On remand, the Court of Appeals again affirmed Meiser’s convictions, this time holding that he failed to show that his “schizophrenia was sufficient—independent of his antisocial personality disorder—to bring about his lack of substantial capacity at the time of the act.” State v. Meiser, 524 P.3d 130 (Or. Ct. App. 2023) (“Meiser III”). The Oregon Supreme Court granted review and again reversed.

Analysis

The issue before the Oregon Supreme Court was what connection “a defendant must establish between their mental disease or defect and their lack of capacity in order to prove the GEI defense.” Resolution of this issue turned on reviewing the plain meaning of the GEI statute to ascertain legislative intent. SAIF v. Ward, 506 P.3d 386 (Or. 2022). To do so, courts look first to the “text of the provision, in context, which is the best evidence of the legislature’s intent” and “then look to the legislative history of the provision.” State v. Gaines, 206 P.3d 1042 (Or. 2009).

The GEI is an affirmative defense, ORS 161.305, meaning a defendant bears the burden of proving the elements of the defense by a preponderance of the evidence. ORS 161.055(2). To prove the GEI defense, a defendant must prove three elements: (1) they suffered from a mental disease or defect (2) that resulted in (3) a lack of substantial capacity either (a) to appreciate the criminality of their conduct or (b) to conform their conduct to the requirements of the law. ORS 161.295(1). But “mental disease or defect” does not “include an abnormality manifested only by repeated criminal or otherwise antisocial conduct, nor do they include any abnormality constituting solely a personality disorder.” ORS 161.295(2).

The issue in this case turned on the meaning of “result” as used in the statute. As the Court explained, ORS 161.295(1) requires a defendant to “show that, ‘as a result of’ a mental disease or defect, they lacked the substantial capacity to appreciate the criminality of their conduct or to conform their conduct to the requirements of the law.” However, the word “result” is not defined in the statute, so it must be given its “plain and ordinary meaning,” which is derived from “dictionaries for guidance in determining what the legislature would have understood a term to mean.” Kinzua Resources v. DEQ, 468 P.3d 410 (Or. 2020).

The Court stated: “The term ‘result,’ when used as a noun, as it is in ORS 161.295(1), is defined as ‘something that results as a consequence, effect, issue, or conclusion.’ Webster’s Third New Int’l Dictionary 1937 (unabridged ed 2002). That definition uses the verb form of ‘result,’ which means ‘to proceed, spring, or arise as a consequence, effect, or conclusion.’ Id. Neither definition indicates that a ‘result’ must be attributable to a single cause or an independently sufficient cause.” These definitions support the interpretation that the GEI defense applies whenever a defendant proves that they lacked capacity as a “consequence” or “effect” of their mental disease or defect, according to the Court. Thus, the Court concluded that the plain language of the statute does not require a showing that the lack of capacity was “solely attributable to the mental disease or defect; a ‘set of conditions’ can combine to result in the lack of capacity.”

This plain language understanding of the statute is also supported by the context of the statutory scheme as a whole, the Court explained. For example, ORS 161.295(1) does not say that a GEI defense must be based “solely” on the defendant’s mental disease or defect or that their incapacity must be caused “primarily” by that disease or defect. These exclusions establish that the Legislature was aware that a mental abnormality can result from a combination of conditions and further establish that it only intended to exclude abnormalities such as psychopathy and personality disorders from serving as the “sole” basis for a GEI defense. But they do not show that the Legislature intended to prohibit “a combination of conditions from being the basis of a GEI defense,” according to the Court.

Legislative history also supports the Court’s interpretation. As the Court explained in Meiser II, when ORS 161.295 was first enacted in 1971, subsection (2) excluded from the definition of mental disease or defect any abnormality manifested “only” by repeated criminal or antisocial conduct. The purpose of this provision was to prevent recidivist offenders from qualifying for the GEI defense merely by being labeled as psychopaths. Meiser II. In 1983, the Legislature also excluded from the definition of mental disease or defect abnormalities resulting “solely” from a personality disorder, again for the purpose of preventing recidivists from qualifying for the defense.

The Court reasoned that nothing in this history establishes that the Legislature intended to make the GEI defense “so narrow as to require that a person who can demonstrate the requisite lack of substantial capacity ‘as a result of mental disease or defect’ also prove that a co-­occurring personality disorder in no part contributed to the incapacity.” Meiser II. Similarly, nothing in the legislative history showed “the legislature intended a defendant’s mental disease or defect to be an independently sufficient cause of their lack of capacity.”

The broader context in which ORS 161.295 was enacted provides further guidance, the Court stated. The statute was enacted as part of the Oregon Criminal Code of 1971. The Oregon Supreme Court previously construed similar causation requirements in other provisions of the Code. For example, in both State v. Murray, 162 P.3d 255 (Or. 2007), and State v. Turnidge (S059155), 374 P.3d 853 (Or. 2016), the Supreme Court held that the term “cause” as used in other criminal statutes must be given its plain meaning and ruled that “where multiple acts combine to bring about a result, each act is a ‘cause.’”

The Court explained that because the terms “cause” and “result” are similar, the plain language of the criminal code as a whole demonstrates that “the legislature did not intend to impose a quantitative requirement on the connection between a defendant’s mental disease or defect and their lack of capacity.” In other words, there may be multiple “causes” that combined to bring about a defendant’s incapacity. But “whether a factor is a ‘cause’ does not depend on its relative contribution to bringing about the result.” All that ORS 161.295 requires is that one of the causes of a defendant’s incapacity be a mental disease or defect even if another exists—just as long as in combination, they result in an incapacity sufficient to prove GEI. Thus, the Court held that the Court of Appeals erred in concluding that ORS 161.295 requires “a defendant’s mental disease or defect must be ‘sufficient by itself’ to bring about the requisite lack of capacity.”

Conclusion

Accordingly, the Court reversed the Court of Appeals and remanded the case to that court for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. See: State v. Meiser, 551 P.3d 349 (Or. 2024).

Writer’s note: This case appears to have far-­reaching implications. While the Court focused on whether the defendant’s schizophrenia and co-­occurring antisocial personality disorder could be considered in combination to determine whether they lacked the requisite capacity to commit the charged offenses, the decision opens the door for other defendants to argue that their diagnosed mental disorder in combination with some other factor establishes the GEI defense.

For example, a defendant with schizophrenia (or some other mental defect that is not a personality disorder) who simultaneously abuses methamphetamine (or suffers from post-­traumatic stress) and is in psychosis at the time of their criminal act may now be able to assert the GEI defense, even if expert witnesses cannot determine to a medical certainty that the defendant’s mental disorder by itself rendered them incapable of appreciating the criminality of their conduct or conforming their conduct to the requirements of the law.

This is significant because it’s often difficult for psychologists to testify to a medical certitude that one mental disorder or another was the primary cause of a defendant’s conduct. Under this opinion, that type of certainty is no longer necessary. It is now enough that an expert testify that the defendant has a mental disorder or defect as defined by statute and that that disorder was at least one of several causes for their incapacity.   

Subscribe today

Already a subscriber? Login