by Sam Rutherford

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California’s decision denying habeas relief to a prisoner who, after invoking his right to remain silent and to counsel, was interrogated in his jail cell by an undercover informant posing as a fellow prisoner. The court determined that habeas relief was not warranted because no Supreme Court decision “clearly established” that the interrogation in this case was unconstitutional.

Background

In 2014, Christopher Grimes was involved in a minor collision in the parking lot of a Los Angeles strip mall. Grimes forgot to put his car in park or set the emergency brake, so it rolled into another vehicle occupied by Marrisha Robinson and her infant daughter. Adrian Dawson, Robinson’s fiancé, came running out and sucker punched Grimes several times. Both parties got in their respective vehicles and left.

A few minutes later, Robinson notice Grimes following them. Grimes drove up next to Robinson’s vehicle and fired four or five shots from his driver-­side window into the passenger side of Robinson’s car, striking Dawson in the abdomen. Dawson described Grimes and his vehicle to police before dying from his wounds later that day.

Based on Dawson’s description, Grimes was arrested several days later. Robinson identified Grimes from a photo montage, and bullet casing from the gun that killed Dawson were found in Grimes’ home and car. Grimes’ cellphone records also showed that he made numerous calls and sent a series of text messages immediately after the shooting, one of which read, “I left the area and did my shit. It’s kill or be killed. Not fight for no reason.”

Police also attempted to interrogate Grimes after informing him of his Miranda rights, but Grimes said he would not talk without his lawyer present. However, instead of immediately ending the interrogation, police continued talking to him, saying that he was about to be arrested for a murder. In response, he asked why and then volunteered that he had an altercation with Dawson but denied shooting him.

Police then placed Grimes in a holding cell with an undercover informant posing as a prisoner. The informant had been provided information about the crime. Although Grimes maintained he was not the shooter throughout his conversations with the informant, he did make several incriminating statements. For example, he corrected the informant about which side of the vehicle the gun had been fired from and expressed concern about gun residue and bullet casings being found in his vehicle.

Grimes was convicted at trial and was sentenced to 40 years to life in prison. The prosecution relied heavily on Grimes’ statements to the informant, which had been recorded and were played to the jury during trial. Grimes timely appealed through the California state courts, arguing that his statements were unconstitutionally obtained because he had invoked his right to counsel. He argued that the informant was the functional equivalent of a police officer and that the interrogation was therefore illegal.

Citing Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292 (1990), the California Court of Appeal ruled the police were not required to provide Miranda warnings to Grimes prior to placing him in a jail cell with an undercover informant, reasoning that the whole purpose of Miranda is to “protecting a suspect from coercion inherent in the ‘police-­dominated atmosphere’ of a custodial interview,” which is not implicated when an informant posing as a prisoner conducts the questioning. That court therefore held that Grimes’ constitutional rights were not violated. The California Supreme Court denied review without comment.

Grimes then sought relief in federal court, filing a petition for writ of habeas corpus. He raised the same interrogation related claim he pursued in state court. The District Court, like the state courts, held that Grimes was not entitled to relief. The District Court explained that no U.S. Supreme Court decision has ever held that Miranda applies to a defendant’s custodial statements to an undercover informant, so there is not “clearly established” federal law supporting Grimes’ claim, as required for relief under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Grimes timely appealed to the Ninth Circuit, arguing that the California Court of Appeal misapplied Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981), which requires law enforcement to stop custodial interrogation when a suspect invokes his right to counsel unless the suspect subsequently waives the right.

Analysis

The Court began its analysis by noting that neither Perkins nor Edwards clearly answers the specific question presented by this case: “whether the Fifth Amendment requires the suppression of a defendant’s statements made to an undercover informant after the defendant invoked his Miranda right to counsel during a custodial interrogation.”

To obtain relief in a federal habeas proceeding, the prisoner must show that the state court decision rejecting his constitutional claim was either “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” § 2254(d)(1). “Clearly established Federal law” means “the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of [the Supreme] Court’s decisions at the time of the relevant state-­court decision.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000). Federal law is “clearly established” if the Supreme Court has “squarely addresse[d]” a claim and provided a “clear answer.” Wright v. Van Patten, 552 U.S. 120 (2008). But “if a habeas court must extend a rationale before it can apply to the facts at hand, then by definition the rationale was not clearly established at the time of the state-­court decision.” White v. Woodall, 572 U.S. 415 (2014).

Grimes lost his habeas petition because his claim was not based on any clearly established federal law under this test. The Supreme Court in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), held that police must inform suspects that they have the right to remain silent and to an attorney before subjecting them to custodial interrogations. And in Edwards, the Supreme Court held that officers must stop questioning a suspect who previously waived his or her Miranda rights but then unequivocally requests counsel. In this situation, police may only resume the interrogation once counsel is present or if the suspect reinitiates the interrogation himself. Finally, the Supreme Court has held that an agent posing as a fellow prisoner may interrogate a suspect in custody on an unrelated offense without providing Miranda warnings because when suspects “boast about their criminal activities in front of persons whom they believe to be their cellmates,” those statements are considered voluntary.” Perkins.

The California Court of Appeal rejected Grimes’ Miranda argument, reasoning that “neither the United States Supreme Court nor the California Supreme Court has addressed the application of Miranda in a case where the defendant has invoked his or her Miranda rights prior to the Perkins interview.” The court further reasoned that the policy underlying Miranda and Edwards—that a suspect not be subjected to a custodial police interrogation after invoking his rights due to its potential for coercion—was simply not implicated by questioning from someone Grimes believed was another prisoner. 

Thus, because neither “Edwards nor Perkins provides a ‘clear answer’ to the issue presented by Grimes, the Court ruled that the District Court correctly rejected Grimes’ habeas petition. At best, Grimes’ constitutional claim sought to extend Edwards and Perkins to a new factual scenario, but this is not permitted on habeas review, according to the Court. White. Furthermore, the Court explained that the state appellate court’s reliance on Perkins instead of Edwards was not “objectively unreasonable” because Edwards “does not apply to all interactions with the police—it applies only to custodial interrogation.” Martinez v. Cate, 903 F.3d 982 (9th Cir. 2018).

Conclusion

Accordingly, the Court affirmed the District Court’s judgment denying Grimes federal habeas relief. Grimes v. Phillips, 105 F.4th 1159 (9th Cir. 2024).

Editor’s note: For readers who may be confused by the discussion of the Fifth Amendment right to counsel, it’s important to understand that this right is separate and distinct from the Sixth Amendment right to counsel. The Fifth Amendment itself does not expressly guarantee the right to counsel. Instead, in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), the U.S. Supreme Court explained that the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-­incrimination includes the right to counsel. It is a prophylactic rule intended to safeguard against compelled self-­incrimination. In contrast, the Sixth Amendment explicitly guarantees the right to counsel—“in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall … have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense.”

There are important differences between the two rights. For example, the Fifth Amendment right is triggered once the suspect is taken into custody; whereas, the Sixth Amendment right attaches only when a suspect is charged, i.e., when a suspect becomes a defendant. Additionally, the Fifth Amendment right applies to any and all offenses once custodial interrogation begins. The Sixth Amendment right is offense-­specific, i.e., it applies only to the offense with which the defendant is charged. There are several other critical distinctions based on (1) whether the person is in custody, (2) perceptions of the suspect versus police intentions, (3) questioning by undercover agent or informant—which was the focus of Grimes; notably, had the Sixth Amendment right been at issue, the questioning by the informant would have violated that right, (4) consequences for violations—fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine applies to Sixth Amendment violations but not violations based on the Fifth Amendment right, and (5) use for impeachment purposes.

For anyone interested in a deeper understanding of the differences between these two rights, a careful reading of McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171 (1991), is an excellent place to start. The McNeil Court explains the distinctions in considerable detail between the Fifth Amendment right to counsel based on the privilege against self-­incrimination and the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.   

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