by Douglas Ankney

The Supreme Court of Tennessee abrogated the common law accomplice-corroboration rule on a prospective basis and dismissed the murder conviction of Laronda Turner due to insufficient evidence.

Turner, along with codefendants Tony Thomas and Demarco Hawkins, were involved in the triple homicide of Anthony Isom, Chastity Springfield, and Michael Glover. Turner and Thomas were tried together on murder and related charges. Hawkins’ trial was severed, and he became a cooperating witness.

Relevant to this review, Hawkins testified that he, Thomas, and Turner drove to Isom’s home with the intent to kill Isom. He and Thomas knocked on the door of Isom’s residence while Turner remained in the vehicle. When Isom answered the door, Thomas and Hawkins shot him. He fell to the floor dead, and when Glover ran to the back of the house to escape, Thomas shot Glover, killing him. Springfield then tried to escape through a window. Hawkins fired shots at her, and she fell to the floor. Turner then entered the home and saw the three bodies. She asked Hawkins if Springfield was dead. Hawkins answered, “I guess so.” Hawkins said Turner then used his gun to fire a shot into Springfield.

The jury convicted Turner and Thomas of three counts of first-degree premeditated murder, and the trial court-imposed life sentences on each count. Turner and Thomas timely appealed.

The Criminal Court of Appeals of Tennessee (“CCA”) affirmed, deciding five issues. Of relevance here, a majority of the CCA affirmed that the evidence was sufficient to convict both Turner and Thomas, citing “adequate corroboration, however slight.” One judge dissented, contending that the record did not reflect significant corroboration. The Tennessee Supreme Court granted an appeal on the issue of, inter alia, the sufficiency of the evidence.

The Court first addressed the State’s urging the abrogation of the court-made rule requiring accomplice corroboration to sustain a conviction. The Court observed “[i]t has long been a common law rule in our state that ‘evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction’ when the conviction is ‘solely based upon the uncorroborated testimony of one or more accomplices.’” State v. Collier, 411 S.W.3d 886 (Tenn. 2013). “An accomplice is one who knowingly, voluntarily, and with common intent participates with the principal offender in the commission of a crime.” State v. Bough, 152 S.W.3d 453 (Tenn. 2004). “A witness qualifies as an accomplice if that witness ‘could be indicted for the same offense charged against the defendant.’” Collier.

The Tennessee Supreme Court previously described the accomplice-corroboration rule as follows:

“[T]here must be some fact testified to, entirely independent of the accomplice’s testimony, which, taken by itself, leads to the inference, not only that a crime has been committed, but also that the defendant is implicated in it; and this independent corroborative testimony must also include some fact establishing the defendant’s identity. This corroborative evidence may be direct or entirely circumstantial, and it need not be adequate, in and of itself, to support a conviction; it is sufficient to meet the requirements of the rule if it fairly and legitimately tends to connect the defendant with the commission of the crime charged. It is not necessary that the corroboration extend to every part of the accomplice’s evidence. The corroboration need not be conclusive, but it is sufficient if this evidence, of itself, tends to connect the defendant with the commission of the offense, although the evidence is slight and entitled, when standing alone, to but little consideration.” State v. Bigbee, 885 S.W.2d 797 (Tenn. 1994).

However, after Maryland abolished a similar judicially-created rule in State v. Jones, 216 A.3d 907 (Md. 2019), Tennessee became the sole state employing such a rule on a common-law basis. In Jones, a man was shot several times and left to die beside his vehicle. One defendant was identified solely by his accomplices and was ultimately convicted of conspiracy to commit armed carjacking. A panel of the Appellate Court of Maryland reversed the judgment, “holding that the testimony of the accomplices was not independently corroborated by further evidence, and the remaining evidence was largely insufficient to sustain the conviction.” The appellate court invited the Maryland Supreme Court to reconsider Maryland’s accomplice-corroboration rule, opining that “we are skeptical that the accomplice-corroboration rule strikes the best balance between potential dangers of accomplice testimony and its potential value.”

The Maryland Supreme Court granted the State’s petition for writ of certiorari and affirmed the judgment of the appellate court. Addressing abrogation of the rule, the Maryland Supreme Court criticized the rule for “operat[ing] indiscriminately regardless of the apparent credibility of the accomplices’ testimony.” Jones.

The Maryland Supreme Court reasoned in Jones that under the accomplice-corroboration rule, “a factfinder’s consideration of evidence she or he might conclude is highly reliable can be forbidden in one case, while in a different case the same factfinder may be permitted to weigh a much lesser quantum of much more suspect evidence.” An additional criticism of the accomplice-corroboration rule was that there is no similar rule for other interested witnesses such as expert witnesses paid to testify, jailhouse informants, and accessories after-the-fact. Significantly, the rule tended to undermine the “fundamental principle ... that, in a criminal case tried before a jury, assessing a witness’s credibility is a matter solely for the jury.” Jones. The Maryland Supreme Court reasoned that the accomplice-corroboration rule intruded too far into the “jury’s constitutional role as factfinder and unnecessarily and arbitrarily deprives the jury of the opportunity to assess and decide the credibility of potentially highly relevant evidence.” The Jones Court held that the risks peculiar to accomplice testimony could be cured by giving a cautionary instruction to the jury when weighing the evidence.

The Court in the present case agreed with the Maryland Supreme Court and abrogated Tennessee’s accomplice-corroboration rule, announcing: “we conclude that a trial court need only issue a cautionary jury instruction after accomplice testimony is presented.” Until the Tennessee Judicial Conference adopts a pattern jury instruction, the Court issued the following cautionary instruction to be given in applicable cases:

“The prosecution has presented a witness who claims to have been a participant with the defendant in the crime charged. While you may convict upon this testimony alone, you should act upon it with great caution. Give it careful examination in the light of other evidence in the case. You are not to convict upon this testimony alone, unless you are convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that it is true.”

The Court further held that abrogation of the accomplice-corroboration rule applies on a prospective basis only, meaning the rule continued to be applicable to the instant case and to all cases not yet final on appeal as of the date of the opinion, viz., March 7, 2024. The Court noted: “[W]hen a change to a common law rule is ‘unexpected and indefensible by reference to the law which had been expressed prior to the conduct in issue,’ changes to such rules in criminal cases need be applied on a prospective-only basis so as to avoid violation of due process protections.” Rogers v. Tennessee, 532 U.S. 451 (2001).

The Court then applied the still applicable accomplice-corroboration rule to the present case. Examining the record, the Court concluded that no evidence in Turner’s trial independently corroborated Hawkins’ story that she participated in the crime of murder. Thus, the Court held that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the convictions and dismissed the charges against Turner.

Accordingly, the Court reversed the CCA and dismissed the charges against Turner. See: State v. Thomas, 687 S.W.3d 223 (Tenn. 2024).

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