by Sam Rutherford

The Supreme Court of South Carolina held that a defendant’s confession was involuntary in violation of due process where the interrogating officer provided Miranda warnings but then assured the defendant that his statements would be confidential. This error, moreover, was not harmless because the defendant’s confession was the key evidence linking him to the crime.

Background

On March 29, 2014, fire fighters responded to a fire at Marissa Cohen’s mobile home in Andrews, South Carolina. A neighbor informed fire fighters that he believed the home was vacant because he had seen Cohen recently remove all her belongings. However, upon forcibly entering the locked home and extinguishing the fire, the firefighters discovered the body of a 12-year-old boy – Cohen’s youngest son – who had died from smoke inhalation.

            The fire marshal quickly determined the fire was set using an accelerant found in kerosene that had been poured on the floor. Investigators subsequently learned that Cohen purchased $20 worth of kerosene the night before the fire, recently obtained a $25,000 renter’s insurance policy, and had filed an insurance claim just a week after her son’s death.

            Georgetown County Sheriff’s Office Investigator Melvyn Garrett received an anonymous tip stating that Randy Collins was involved in setting the fire with Cohen. Investigator Garrett subsequently questioned Collins who denied any involvement and claimed he was at a club with his nephew, James Miller, when the fire started. Miller gave a similar statement. Garrett became suspicious, however, after speaking to the bartender and other patrons who were at the club on the night of the fire.

            South Carolina Law Enforcement Division Senior Agent Scott Hardee subsequently obtained warrants authorizing the seizure and search of Collins and Cohen’s cellphones. Hardee discovered that the two had spoken three times just prior to the fire and again three times immediately after the fire. When Collins went to the police station to retrieve his phone, Garrett and Hardee confronted Collins and asked to interview him. Collins agreed.

            The officers took Collins to a small room in the police station and went over a form entitled “Miranda Rights.” The form stated that Collins had the right to remain silent, the right to have an attorney present during questioning, and the right to have an attorney appointed if he could not afford one. The form also included the following warning: “Anything you say can be used in court as evidence against you.” Collins placed his initials on the form next to each right as it was read to him and then signed a section of the form entitled “Waiver of Rights,” indicating that he understood his rights and was willing to speak with the officers without an attorney present.

            The interview lasted approximately three hours and was recorded on a small video camera placed in plain sight. Collins initially denied any involvement in the fire and again stated that he was at a club with his nephew. During the interview, the officers told Collins “word on the street” was that he knew something about the fire, the investigation was focused solely on Cohen, and Collins would be allowed to go home if he cooperated with the interview. If he refused, however, the officers said he could spend up to 30 years in prison.

Hardee asked Colins if he believed the fire was intentionally set. Collins responded that he did not want to “say the wrong thing.” Hardee then said: “Well, you’re not going to say the wrong thing. Whatever you tell me, it ain’t gonna leave this room. This, um, tape is going into my file. And I’m gonna, I’m gonna burn a copy for him [Garrett]. And we’ll have a copy of this tape. And it ain’t gonna go any further than this room. That’s why we got the door shut, the blinds pulled, there’s no sound device in here. I want you to be honest with me and tell me what you think.”

Following this colloquy, Collins acknowledged that Cohen asked him to burn down her home. Collins claimed that he and Miller were at the mobile home the night it burned down but that he did not start the fire. Collins subsequently signed a written statement that began, “I DID NOT DO it.” The statement went on to explain that Cohen offered Collins $5,000 to burn down the trailer, Collins told Miller about the offer at the club, Miller drove with Collins to the mobile home, Miller threw a burning piece of paper through an open window while Collins waited in the car, and Miller drove around the mobile home several times but did not “see anything lit.” Miller then drove Collins home. Cohen and Miller later contacted Collins to tell him Cohen’s son died in the fire.

Collins was subsequently indicted for first-degree arson and criminal conspiracy to commit arson with Cohen and Miller. His written and recorded statements were admitted at trial over defense counsel’s objection. Collins was convicted as charged and sentenced to 30 years in prison. The Court of Appeals reversed Collins’ convictions and remanded for a new trial, ruling that Hardee’s assurances that Collins’ statements were confidential rendered his confession involuntary. The State sought and obtained discretionary review by the South Carolina Supreme Court.

Analysis

The Court explained that the precise legal question at issue is whether “a false promise of confidentiality give rise to coercion and, thus, a lack of voluntariness, because it intentionally misleads a suspect about the law, i.e., the legal consequences and risks of proceeding with an interview with law enforcement, as distinguished from misleading a suspect about the facts in an investigation?” The Court held that this “intentional misrepresentation of the law” violates due process.

The analysis of this issue presents a mixed question of fact and law, meaning that the circuit court’s factual findings regarding the issue are reviewed for evidentiary support while the ultimate legal conclusion – whether, based on those facts, the confession was voluntary – is subject to de novo review. State v. Miller, 893 S.E.2d 306 (S.C. 2023).

            “There are two constitutional bases that require statements admitted into evidence to be voluntarily made: (1) the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and (2) the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination,” the Court explained. Miller (citing Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000)). The fact that police officers administered Miranda warnings “does not, of course, dispense with the voluntariness inquiry.” Dickerson.

            A defendant is entitled to a reliable pretrial determination of the voluntariness of his or her confession. Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964); State v. Fortner, 222 S.E.2d 508 (S.C. 1976). In South Carolina, as in many states, this determination is made by the trial judge, who must decide based on “the totality of the circumstances, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused,” State v. Saltz, 551 S.E.2d 240 (S.C. 2001), whether the “defendant’s confession was given freely, knowingly, and voluntarily” or whether the “defendant’s will was overborne.” State v. Moses, 702 S.E.2d 395 (S.C. Ct. App. 2010). “If a suspect’s will is overborne and his capacity for self-determination critically impaired, use of the resulting confession offends due process.” Saltz (citing Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973)).

            The Court noted that the police are permitted to use some psychological tactics in an effort to elicit incriminating statements or a confession from a suspect. State v. Parker, 671 S.E.2d 619 (S.C. Ct. App. 2008). Nevertheless, particular “interrogation techniques, either in isolation, or as applied to the unique characteristics of a particular suspect, are so offensive to a civilized system of justice that they must be condemned under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104 (1985). Importantly, “[c]oercion is determined from the perspective of the suspect.” State v. Goodwin, 683 S.E.2d 500 (S.C. Ct. App. 2009).

            The Court turned to authority from other jurisdictions to determine whether Hardee’s false assurances of confidentiality rendered Collins’ confession involuntary. In State v. Parker, 999 A.2d 314 (N.H. 2010), and State v. McDermott, 554 A.2d 1302 (N.H. 1989), the New Hampshire Supreme Court determined that such assurances by law enforcement will almost always render a confession involuntary. This is so because “the false promise of confidentiality, in itself, violated due process because this type of promise is uniquely coercive and egregious.” McDermott. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reached a similar conclusion in the related context of a false promise of leniency used to obtain a confession. See Grades v. Boles, 398 F.2d 409 (4th Cir. 1968). The Grades Court based its conclusion on the U.S. Supreme Court’s recognition of “the inherent difficulty of calibrating the effect of an unconstitutional inducement … ‘and therefore excludes the declaration if any degree of influence has been exerted.’” Quoting Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532 (1897).

Turning to the present case, the Court agreed with these authorities and concluded that a police officer’s “false statement of confidentiality can be conclusive on the issue of voluntariness, regardless of the existence or negation of Miranda warnings (or the need to examine the totality of the circumstances).” It stated: “Although Collins was assured that he would be going home that day regardless of what he said and that he was not the focus of the investigation, the unspoken truth was that law enforcement could – and did – later seek to use Collins’s uncounseled, ‘confidential’ statements against him in a court of law, to his detriment, despite these assurances to the contrary. This misstatement of the law and false assurance by law enforcement regarding Collins’s constitutional rights violated due process.” The fact that Collins received proper Miranda warnings before confessing did not change this conclusion because Hardee’s false assurances of confidentiality negated the effectiveness of those warnings and “undermine[d] the fundamental fairness that every defendant is entitled to under the law,” the Court explained. Thus, the Court ruled that the circuit court erred in admitting Collins’ confession into evidence at trial.

The final question was whether the admission of Collins’ involuntary statement into evidence was harmless error. The erroneous admission of a defendant’s confession at trial will not require reversal if it is “harmless beyond a reasonable doubt in view of the entire record.” Citing State v. Pagan, 631 S.E.2d 262 (S.C. 2006). This doctrine “should be employed guardedly, however, and on a case by case basis.” State v. Morris, 345 S.E.2d 477 (S.C. 1986). “Whether an error is harmless depends on the particular circumstances of the case.” State v. Reeves, 391 S.E.2d 241 (S.C. 1990).

The Court reasoned that the error in this case “clearly [was] not harmless because Collins’s statement was the key evidence placing him at the scene of the fire and linking him to Cohen’s arson scheme.” Additionally, the erroneously admitted confession was not cumulative of other, properly admitted evidence pointing toward his guilt.

Conclusion

Accordingly, the Court affirmed the appellate court, reversed Collin’ convictions, and remanded for a new trial at which the State will be prohibited from admitting his oral or written confessions into evidence. See: State v. Collins, 900 S.E.2d 426 (S.C. 2024).

Writer’s note: Randy Collins’ critical mistake in this case was agreeing to speak with police at all. On the day of the interview, the only evidence police had linking Collins to the arson scheme was a few suspicious phone calls between him and Cohen. Collins could have simply collected his cellphone from the police station and gone about his business, but instead, he agreed to a voluntary interview. Not only did he subsequently implicate himself in the crime, but he also sealed his nephew’s fate by shifting blame to him. This case servers as a stark reminder that nothing good ever comes from agreeing to speak with police without the presence of qualified legal counsel.

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