by Sam Rutherford

The Supreme Court of the United States held that whether a state court drug conviction counts as a “serious drug offense” under the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”) is determined by comparing the state and federal statutes defining the controlled substance in effect at the time of the state court proceedings, not by comparing subsequently amended definitions in federal statutes in effect at the time of sentencing in federal court.

Background

Justin Rashaad Brown and Eugene Jackson were both convicted in unrelated cases in different federal District Courts of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. Brown had four prior Pennsylvania convictions for possessing marijuana with intent to distribute. When he was convicted in state court of the marijuana offenses, both state and federal law defined that drug identically. However, while Brown’s federal firearm charge was pending, Congress changed the definition of marijuana by excluding a variety of Cannabis sativa L.

Jackson had several prior Florida convictions for possession and distribution of cocaine. Federal and state law defined cocaine identically at the time of Jackson’s state court proceedings, but Congress subsequently changed the federal definition of the drug by eliminating a radioactive cocaine derivative called [123I]ioflupane because it is used in medical testing.

At their respective sentencing hearings, the Government contended that both men should receive enhanced punishments based on their prior state court drug offenses. The ACCA requires that federal court defendants convicted of possession of a firearm by a felon receive mandatory minimum 15-year prison sentences whenever their criminal histories include, among other things, “three previous convictions” for “a serious drug offense.”18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1). For a state court conviction to qualify as a “serious drug offense,” it must carry a maximum possible sentence of at least 10 years and involve a controlled substance “as defined in section 102 of the Controlled Substances Act.” 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(e)(1), (2)(A)(ii). A state drug offense counts as an ACCA predicate only if the state’s definition of the drug in question “matche[s]” the definition under federal law. Shular v. United States, 589 U.S. 154 (2020).

Brown and Jackson argued that the ACCA’s enhanced penalties did not apply to them because, although the respective state and federal definitions of the drugs at issue in their state court cases matched when they were convicted in state court, the definitions no longer matched by the time they were sentenced in federal court for felon firearm possession. The District Courts rejected this argument and sentenced both men under the ACCA.

Brown and Jackson timely appealed their enhanced sentences to the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Third and Eleventh Circuits, respectively, arguing that the ACCA did not apply to them because Congress had changed the definitions of the controlled substances at issue in their state court drug offenses so that the state and federal statutes defining the drugs no longer matched. The Third and Eleventh Circuits rejected this approach, concluding that the definitions in effect at the time of the state court proceedings controlled, not the subsequently amended federal definitions. United States v. Brown, 47 F.4th 147 (3d Cir. 2022); United States v. Jackson, 55 F.4th 846 (11th Cir. 2022). The Supreme Court granted certiorari review and consolidated the cases.

Analysis

The question before the Supreme Court was “whether the federal and state definitions of a drug must match when the state crime is committed or at some later point in time.” The Government contended that the controlling definitions are those in effect at the time of the state court conviction. Jackson, on the other hand, asserted that the definitions in effect when the federal felon-in-possession offense is committed control, while Jackson argued that the definitions must match at sentencing for the federal firearm offense.

The relevant provision of the ACCA – that a state court drug conviction counts as a serious drug offense if it involved a controlled substance “as defined in section 102 of the Controlled Substances Act” – does not directly answer the question, according to the Court. However, in McNeill v. United States, 563 U.S. 816 (2011), the Court interpreted a related provision of the ACCA, holding that whether a state court drug offense qualifies as a predicate under the statute because it carries a maximum possible sentence of at least 10 years must be determined by examining the state law in effect when the defendant committed the state drug offense. This “backward looking” approach in McNeil supported the Government’s position in this case.

Similarly, the manner in which the ACCA interprets prior federal drug offenses also supported the Government’s position concerning interpretation of prior state court drug charges. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(A)(i) defines a “serious drug offense” to include certain federal drug crimes, namely, “offense[s] under the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. § 801 et seq.).” Whenever a federal defendant is convicted of a crime under the Controlled Substances Act, that fact is listed on his or her federal judgment, “and a later change in a federal drug schedule cannot change that fact.” The Court reasoned that adopting the Government’s position is more reasonable because it treats state court drug convictions involving controlled substances “as defined in section 102 of the Controlled Substances Act” like federal offenses “under the Controlled Substance Act.”

Finally, the Court explained that it adopted the Government’s interpretation because it best fulfills the purpose of the ACCA. “Because defendants who have repeatedly committed ACCA predicate offenses are ‘especially likely to inflict grave harm when in possession of a firearm,’ ACCA imposes a higher punishment when they do so.” Quoting Wooden v. United States, 595 U.S. 360 (2022). “It therefore makes sense to ask, as the Government does, whether a prior offense met ACCA’s definition of seriousness – and thus suggested future danger – at the time it was committed.” This potential for dangerousness, the Court reasoned, “does not cease to exist” simply because the federal drug schedules defining marijuana and cocaine no longer exactly match the state statutory definitions at issue in Brown and Jackson’s predicate offenses.

Conclusion

Accordingly, the Court affirmed the Third and Eleventh Circuit decisions in Brown and Jackson’s cases and upheld their enhanced sentences under the ACCA. See: Brown v. United States, 144 S. Ct. 1195 (2024).

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