Ninth Circuit Announces That Asking About Parole Status During Traffic Stop Does Not Violate Fourth Amendment
by Sam Rutherford
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that police may ask whether a person stopped for a traffic infraction is on parole without violating the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures.
Background
Victor Ramirez was stopped for speeding in a residential neighborhood. A police officer immediately asked Ramirez if he was on probation or parole. Ramirez responded that he was on parole for a firearm conviction. Based on this answer and the fact that Ramirez had noticeable gang tattoos, the officer asked him whether he was “strapped.” Ramirez answered that he had a pistol in the glove box. Ramirez was subsequently indicted in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California for being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition.
Ramirez filed a motion to suppress the firearm and his statement confirming he possessed, arguing that the officer violated his Fourth Amendment rights by asking him whether he was on parole because the question exceeded the scope of the traffic stop. The officer testified that he asked the question to confirm his suspicion that Ramirez was on parole and for officer safety. He explained that the question relates to officer safety because “someone who is on parole has been to prison…. [A]nd whatever that crime was could be a violent crime, a weapons possession or something of that nature.” The District Court denied the suppression motion, and Ramirez pleaded guilty, preserving his right to appeal the suppression issue.
Analysis
The Fourth Amendment prohibits “unreasonable searches and seizures.” A traffic stop “exceeding the time needed to handle the matter for which the stop was made violates the Constitution’s shield against unreasonable seizures.” Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348 (2015). However, a police officer may make ordinary inquiries related to the stop such as checking the status of a driver’s license, registration, proof of insurance as well as determining whether the person stopped has outstanding warrants. Id. Additionally, before investigating the traffic offense, police may attend to “related safety concerns.” Id. However, questions related to officer safety must be “negligibly burdensome.” Id.
Consistent with this authority, the Ninth Circuit previously held that police may extend a traffic stop to conduct criminal history checks because they are a “negligibly burdensome precaution required for officer safety.” United States v. Hylton, 30 F.4th 842 (9th Cir. 2022). But police may not extend a traffic stop to determine whether the driver is properly registered as an ex-felon under state law because such verification in no way relates to officer safety. United States v. Evans, 786 F.3d 779 (9th Cir. 2015).
According to the Court, the question presented in Ramirez’s case is whether inquiring about the driver’s parole status is more analogous to conducting a criminal history check, which is permissible under Hylton because it relates to officer safety, or whether the inquiry is more like determining whether the driver is properly registered as an ex-felon, which is impermissible under Evans because it does not relate to officer safety.
The Court easily determined that the Hylton rationale applies even more forcefully to questioning someone about his parole status. “If anything, parole status may reveal more about potential danger than a criminal background check: a parolee has committed a serious enough crime to warrant prison time and has likely been released recently, while a criminal history check may yield a stale history of minor offenses committed years ago,” the Court reasoned. Evans is inapposite because “whether someone complied with a procedural reporting law (for a crime that may have been committed years ago) does not ‘advance[] officer safety,’” the Court stated. Quoting Evans.
Ramirez also argued that questioning him about his parole status was merely a pretext completely unrelated to officer safety because the officer who stopped him knew that parolees are subject to a search without reasonable suspicion, probable cause, or a warrant. (See Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843 (2006) (holding the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit police from conducting a suspicionless search of a parolee)). The Ninth Circuit rejected this argument because the officer’s subjective intent is irrelevant under Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. Rather, the question is whether the officer’s conduct was “objectively reasonable in light of the facts and circumstances confronting [him], without regard to [his] underlying intent or motivation.” Quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989).
Thus, the Court held that “asking someone about his parole status during a traffic stop does not offend the Fourth Amendment.”
Conclusion
Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit affirmed Ramirez’s conviction and his 63-month prison sentence. See: United States v. Ramirez, 98 F.4th 1141 (9th Cir. 2024).
As a digital subscriber to Criminal Legal News, you can access full text and downloads for this and other premium content.
Already a subscriber? Login
Related legal case
98 F.4th 1141
| Year | 2024 |
|---|---|
| Cite | 98 F.4th 1141 (9th Cir. 2024) |
| Level | Court of Appeals |
| Appeals Court Edition | F.4th |
