by Sam Rutherford

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit ruled that District Courts have discretion to reduce sentences for both covered and noncovered offenses under the First Step Act if the sentences were originally imposed as part of a package.

Background

Following a jury trial involving six co-defendants on a multi-count indictment, Nathaniel Richardson was ultimately sentenced on one count of engaging in a continuing criminal enterprise (“CCE”), one count of distribution and possession with intent to distribute crack cocaine, and two counts of money laundering. The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia assigned an offense level of 46 to the CCE and crack cocaine convictions. Richardson’s criminal history placed him in Category V, resulting in mandatory sentencing of life sentences for these offenses. The District Court therefore sentenced him to two concurrent life terms on the CCE and crack cocaine counts, as well as concurrent 20-year sentences on the money laundering convictions.

In 2019, Richardson petitioned for relief under the First Step Act because his crack cocaine conviction is a covered offense, yielding an adjusted advisory sentencing range of 360 months to life in prison. He cited to his rehabilitative efforts while incarcerated and pointed out that he had been in prison for more than half his life (Richardson was 24 when convicted and 50 when he petitioned for resentencing). The Government opposed the request, citing Richardson’s extensive criminal history and the severity of the crimes, which it alleged included “not just drugs, but a long series of violent acts, including assaulting people, shooting people, threatening them, and offering money to kill a witness.” Despite agreeing with Richardson that his crack cocaine offense qualified him for resentencing, the District Court declined to exercise its discretion and denied the motion.

Richardson timely appealed and obtained reversal. While his appeal was pending, the Fourth Circuit decided United States v. Collington, 995 F.3d 347 (4th Cir. 2021), which held that a “district court’s overall sentencing authority is constrained by the retroactively applicable statutory maximums in [21 U.S.C.] § 841, such that the district court abuses its discretion in letting stand a sentence that was made illegal under the Fair Sentencing Act.” The Fair Sentencing Act modified the sentencing range for Richardson’s crack cocaine conviction from a mandatory life sentence to 5 to 40 years’ imprisonment. The Court remanded with instructions for the District Court to reconsider Richardson’s motion and impose no more than a 40-year sentence on the crack cocaine conviction.

On remand, the District Court again found that Richardson was eligible for resentencing under the First Step Act on only his crack cocaine conviction. This time, the District Court took a more favorable view of Richardson’s postconviction rehabilitative efforts and the length of his incarceration and decided to impose a 360-month sentence on the crack cocaine conviction. The court, however, concluded that Richardson’s CCE conviction was not a covered offense under the First Step Act and declined to reduce the previously imposed life sentence. Richardson again sought review in the Fourth Circuit.

Analysis

Richardson’s second appeal turned on the application of the “sentencing package doctrine” to motions brought pursuant to the First Step Act. The doctrine holds that when an appellate court “vacates a sentence and remands for resentencing, the sentence becomes void in its entirety and the district court is free to revisit any rulings it made at the initial sentencing.” United States v. Ventura, 864 F.3d 301 (4th Cir. 2017) (cleaned up). The doctrine recognizes that sentencing multiple counts is an “inherently interrelated, interconnected, and holistic process.” Ventura. The Fourth Circuit therefore held that district courts have the “discretion to reduce both covered and noncovered offenses under the First Step Act if they function as a package.”

The Court reached this conclusion for three reasons. First, the Court previously applied the doctrine when granting relief on some but not all sentences in federal habeas cases brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255, “and resentencing under the First Step Act similarly provides district courts with broad discretion to fashion a remedy.” Second, applying the doctrine to First Step Act motions “is in line with how district judges practically sentence defendants … especially in light of the changing landscape of new statutory schemes.” Third, the Court explained that there is “textual support” in the First Step Act for applying the doctrine since “the statute did not constrain its application to grouped and noncovered offenses.”

Despite the Government’s argument to the contrary, Richardson was entitled to another resentencing proceeding at which the District Court could determine in the first instance whether to reduce his sentence on the CCE offense under the sentencing package doctrine, the Court stated. It was clear from the record that the District Court had previously refused to consider Richardson’s request for a sentence reduction in connection with the CCE offense based solely on its determination that it was prohibited from doing so because CCE is not an offense covered under the First Step Act. In light of the fact that the District Court had reduced Richardson’s crack cocaine sentence from life to 360 months based on its consideration of resentencing factors mandated by the Act, the Court stated that it is likewise plausible that the District Court might have also reduced the CCE sentence had it known the sentencing package doctrine granted it discretion to do so.

The Government also argued that resentencing was unnecessary since in its view, the record established that Richardson’s sentences “do not function as a package.” The Court, however, rejected this argument because “[i]t would be inapposite to defer to the judge’s holistic process by which she sentences in one instance, and in another determine as a reviewing court that multiple counts are not interconnected.” In short, the Court concluded that the District Court should determine in the first instance whether Richardson’s crack cocaine and CCE sentences are sufficiently interrelated for application of the sentencing package doctrine or whether they were intended to be free-standing punishments.

While the Court expressed no opinion on how the District Court should resolve this issue, it noted that “there are some hints in the record these counts do not represent freestanding sentences distinct from each other.” These “hints” included the fact that Richardson’s indictment stated that the crack cocaine and CCE offenses were “interconnected” and that the two offenses were grouped together under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines.

Conclusion

Accordingly, the Court vacated Richardson’s sentence and remanded the case “to the district court with instruction that its discretion under Section 404 of the First Step Act includes the authority to use the sentencing package doctrine.” See: United States v. Richardson, 96 F.4th 659 (4th Cir. 2024).

Writer’s note: With its decision in Richardson, the Fourth Circuit has joined several other Courts of Appeals in holding that the sentencing package doctrine applies to First Step Act resentencing proceedings. United States v. Baker, 2022 U.S. App. LEXIS 28024 (6th Cir.) (sentencing package doctrine permitted district court to reconsider noncovered offense when resentencing on interrelated, covered offense); United States v. Curtis, 66 F.4th 690 (7th Cir. 2023) (holding district court could issue a reduction for noncovered offense if it was grouped with covered offenses); United States v. Spencer, 998 F.3d 843 (8th Cir. 2021) (holding a modification of crack cocaine could permit sentence reduction on powder cocaine based on First Step Act if defendant was sentenced under a “sentencing package”).

Other Courts of Appeals, however, have rejected this approach. United States v. Young, 998 F.3d 43 (2d Cir. 2021) (rejecting defendant’s argument that he was eligible for resentencing on noncovered offense because it was grouped with and formed an interdependent sentencing package with covered offense); United States v. Gladney, 44 F.4th 1253 (10th Cir. 2022) (holding the First Step Act prohibits a district court from reducing the sentence on a noncovered offense even if it was grouped together under the Sentencing Guidelines); United States v. Files, 63 F.4th 920 (11th Cir. 2023) (holding First Step Act does not authorize a reduction based on sentencing package doctrine).

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