by Douglas Ankney

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida’s grant of habeas relief to Florida state prisoner Jimmie L. Bowen, holding that the state court’s decision was not “so obviously wrong that its error lies beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.”

Sixteen-year-old Bowen and his 17-year-old fellow gang member, Bernard Jones, were involved in the shooting deaths of two people and wounding another. Bowen was the triggerman, and Jones was the driver. After the two were arrested, they were questioned separately. Bowen and his mother invoked his right to counsel under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Jones waived his Miranda rights and spoke with Detective Jean Solis that same day. During their conversation, Solis observed that Bowen was calling Jones’ cellphone. Jones did not answer.

Solis then moved Solis and Jones into an interrogation room together, telling them they would remain there until being transported to the Juvenile Assessment Center. He also activated audio and video recording equipment in the room. Left alone, the two teenagers began talking immediately. The microphone captured Bowen acknowledging that he was the shooter, describing the crime scene, and wondering how the police had “the two right motherfuckers.”

The State initiated prosecution, and Bowen moved to suppress his statements to Jones, arguing that although he talked to Jones because he “wanted to,” Solis violated his federal and state constitutional rights by placing Jones in the interview room with him – effectively “interrogating” him in violation of the Fifth Amendment.

The trial court issued a short oral ruling and denied the motion. Bowen was found guilty by jury of all charges, and he was sentenced to life in prison with judicial review after 25 years. The Florida district court of appeal, without an opinion, denied his appeal of the trial court’s denial of his suppression motion.

Bowen ultimately petitioned the U.S. District Court for habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Because the trial court’s oral ruling contained no reasoning that supported the opinion denying the suppression motion, the District Court theorized – per Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86 (2011), and Pye v. Warden, Georgia Diagnostic Prison, 50 F.4th 1025 (11th Cir. 2022) (en banc) – that the trial court had concluded that placing Bowen and Jones together did not amount to custodial interrogation. The District Court then determined that the state court ruling was “patently unreasonable” and found that “clearly established Supreme Court precedent left no fairminded dispute about the alleged Miranda violation.” The District Court granted the habeas petition, and the instant appeal followed.

The Eleventh Circuit began its analysis by commenting that “the Supreme Court’s cases are – at best – murky on when putting two suspects in a room together qualifies as interrogation under Miranda.”

The Court observed that under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, “a federal court may not grant habeas relief to a state prisoner ‘with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court,’ unless the adjudication (1) ‘resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved and unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States,’ or (2) ‘resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.’” § 2254(d).

The Court was guided by the “unreasonable application” of federal law of prong (1), which is defined as a decision that is “so obviously wrong that its error lies beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.” Shinn v. Kayer, 592 U.S. 111 (2020) (per curiam). To justify habeas relief under this standard, “a Supreme Court precedent must ‘clearly require the state court’ to have adopted a different result.” Kernan v. Cuero, 583 U.S. 1 (2017) (per curiam). The Court stated that the “unreasonable-application standard is thus significantly higher than a showing that the state court was incorrect, or even that it clearly erred. Shinn.

The Court observed the “Fifth Amendment provides that no person ‘shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.... In service of this privilege, the Supreme Court held in Miranda v. Arizona that the government may not use statements offered while a suspect was in ‘custodial interrogation’ unless the suspect was informed of his rights.”

“Custodial interrogation” is defined as “questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way,” according to the Court. Miranda. Interrogation includes both “express questioning” and “its functional equivalent.” Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980). “The functional equivalent of express questioning ... encompasses ‘any words or actions’ by the police that they ‘should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect.’” Id.

In the present case, Solis placed Jones and Bowen alone together in a room and activated audio and video recording equipment – revealing his intent was to capture incriminating evidence. But “‘interrogation’ is more than just ‘subtle compulsion.’” Innis. For example, the Supreme Court found no error in Arizona v. Mauro, 481 U.S. 520 (1987), where the police allowed a suspect to speak with his wife after he invoked his Miranda rights – even though the police admitted they knew it was “possible” that Mauro would incriminate himself and “refused to allow the conversation unless it was recorded and an officer was present.”

While the state court granted relief in Mauro under Innis, the Mauro Court reversed, emphasizing that Mauro was not subjected to “compelling influences, psychological ploys, or direct questioning.”

Similarly, in Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292 (1990), police placed an undercover agent in a jail cell with instructions to “engage a suspect in casual conversation and report back anything he heard about a murder they were investigating.” The agent asked the suspect if he had ever “done” anybody, and the suspect then made incriminating statements. The Supreme Court reasoned that “[c]onversations between suspects and undercover agents do not implicate the concerns underlying Miranda” because the “essential ingredients of a police-dominated atmosphere and compulsion are not present.” Id.

The Court in the present case concluded that “[a] fairminded jurist, applying the Innis-Mauro-Perkins trio of cases, could conclude that Solis’s decision to place Bowen in an interrogation room with Jones was not a Miranda violation. These cases certainly do not ‘clearly require the state court’ to have reached the opposite conclusion.” See Kernan. Thus, the Court concluded that “the facts place Bowen’s challenge in a gray area that is not unambiguously dictated by Supreme Court precedent. That is the exact type of case where § 2254 relief is inappropriate.”

Accordingly, the Court reversed the District Court’s judgment and remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with its opinion. See: Bowen v. Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections, 92 F.4th 1328 (11th Cir. 2024).

Editor’s note: This opinion serves as a reminder that one should always assume that any conversation in an interrogation room with anyone other than the police is still being monitored and recorded, even after the invocation of one’s right to counsel and privilege against self-incrimination.

Subscribe today

Already a subscriber? Login

Related legal case