by Sam Rutherford

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit granted an Ohio death row prisoner habeas relief on his claims that the trial judge who sentenced him to death was unconstitutionally biased and improperly excluded mitigation evidence during resentencing proceedings. Notably, the Court observed at the outset of its opinion that the writ of habeas corpus is an “extraordinary remedy that ‘guard[s] against extreme malfunctions in the state criminal justice systems,” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86 (2011), and it took the unusual step of characterizing the current case as “the epitome of such and extreme judicial malfunction.”

Background

Nathaniel Jackson and Donna Roberts conspired to kill Roberts’ former husband, Robert Fingerhut, in 2001. They were both convicted of aggravated murder and related offenses and, in 2002, were sentenced to death. Jackson’s convictions and sentence were affirmed on appeal, and his state court petition for postconviction relief was denied.

Roberts fared better on appeal. Her lawyer discovered that the trial judge, Trumbull County Court of Common Pleas Judge John M. Stuard, had multiple ex parte communications with the prosecutor concerning Roberts’ sentence and had the prosecutor draft an opinion on the judge’s behalf imposing the death penalty. This was a violation of Ohio law, which requires that judges independently weigh and consider aggravating and mitigating evidence before imposing the death penalty, so the Ohio Supreme Court overturned Roberts’ death sentence.

Judge Stuard subsequently admitted he followed the same procedure in Jackson’s case but nonetheless refused to grant him a new sentencing hearing. Jackson then requested that the Ohio Supreme Court remove Judge Stuard from his case, but the request was denied. Meanwhile, Jackson appealed Judge Stuard’s order denying a new sentencing hearing. The Ohio Court of Appeals reversed Jackson’s death sentence and ordered Judge Stuard to “personally review and evaluate the appropriateness of the death penalty, prepare an entirely new sentencing entry … and conduct whatever other proceedings are required by law and consistent with this opinion.”

On remand, Judge Stuard permitted Jackson to make an allocution but excluded three volumes of mitigation evidence not previously considered at the first sentencing proceeding. This mitigation evidence consisted of statistics on Ohio death-row prisoners, affidavits from Jackson’s family members, his own affidavit expressing dissatisfaction with his trial counsel, psychological information showing his intellectual disabilities, his school records, and his criminal history. Despite the substantial amount of new mitigation evidence, Judge Stuard reviewed only the stale, 10-year-old record made during Jackson’s first mitigation hearing.

Judge Stuard again imposed the death penalty and, just a few hours after the sentence was pronounced, issued a written opinion nearly identical to the one found invalid by the Ohio appellate court. The only differences between the original and new order were a few introductory paragraphs explaining the additional procedural history, the correction of some typographical and grammatical errors, and slight alterations to paragraphs describing the trial evidence. In fact, the new order did not even mention Jackson’s new allocution or his request to admit additional mitigation evidence.

Jackson again appealed, arguing that Judge Stuard was biased and erred in denying him the opportunity to present additional mitigation evidence. The Ohio Supreme Court rejected these claims and affirmed the death sentence. State v. Jackson, 73 N.E.3d 414 (Ohio 2016) (“Jackson II”).

Jackson then filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Ohio, raising 37 grounds for relief. The District Court granted relief on one claim, ruling that Judge Stuard violated Jackson’s Eighth Amendment right to present mitigation evidence at his resentencing hearing and that the Ohio Supreme Court’s rejection of this claim was an unreasonable application of U.S. Supreme Court case law. Jackson and the State timely appealed.

Analysis

The Court granted habeas relief on two claims, holding that: (1) Judge Stuard was unconstitutionally biased in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment and (2) Jackson was denied the opportunity to present additional, relevant mitigation evidence at his resentencing hearing in violation of the Eighth Amendment.

The Court observed that, typically, state prisoners are only entitled to habeas relief when the last reasoned state court opinion rejecting their federal constitutional claims resulted in a decision that “was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). A state court decision is contrary to Supreme Court case law when it applies a rule different from the law set forth in controlling Supreme Court cases, or if it decides a case differently than the Supreme Court on materially indistinguishable facts. Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685 (2002). Furthermore, a state court decision is an unreasonable application of Supreme Court case law if it identifies the correct legal standard governing a constitutional claim but unreasonably applies it to the facts of a prisoner’s case. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000).

The Court held that Jackson was entitled to relief on his judicial bias claim because the Ohio Supreme Court opinion rejecting it was contrary to federal law. The Fourteenth Amendment has long guaranteed litigants the right to a fair, unbiased judge, i.e., it’s “clearly established.” See Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. 868 (2009); Bracy v. Gramley, 520 U.S. 899 (1997); Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455 (1971); In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133 (1955). The standard for assessing the risk of judicial bias under federal law is an “objective” one, requiring recusal when “the probability of actual bias on the part of the judge or decisionmaker is too high to be constitutionally tolerable.” Caperton. In making this determination, the court “asks not whether the judge is actually, subjectively biased, but whether the average judge in his position is likely to be neutral, or whether there is an unconstitutional potential for bias.” Id.

Jackson contended that he was denied a fair and impartial judge under this objective standard based on Judge Stuard’s improper ex parte communications and collaboration with the prosecutor; refusal to recuse himself; statements on the record expressing disagreement with the necessity of resentencing; refusal to consider Jackson’s mitigating evidence at resentencing; and issuance of a second sentencing opinion mirroring the original, tainted one mere hours after the resentencing hearing. The Ohio Supreme Court rejected his judicial bias claim under Ohio law’s subjective standard for determining judicial bias. Under Ohio’s subjective standard, Jackson was required to show “that Judge Stuard had actual bias and acted with ‘ill will’ or formed ‘a fixed anticipatory judgment’ against him.” Jackson II (quoting State ex rel. Pratt v. Weygandt, 132 N.E.2d 191 (Ohio 1956)). However, the Court held that “Ohio law’s subjective judicial-bias standard is contrary to clearly established federal law.”

The Court stated that because the Ohio Supreme Court applied governing law that is contrary to U.S. Supreme Court case law, the state court’s decision is contrary to clearly established federal law. See § 2254(d)(1); see also Bell. Because the Ohio Supreme Court applied the wrong legal standard to Jackson’s judicial bias claim, the Court was free to review it de novo. See Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930 (2007); Issa v. Bradshaw, 904 F.3d 446 (6th Cir. 2018).

Turning to the merits, the Court had little trouble concluding that Judge Stuard violated the Fourteenth Amendment. As the Court explained, Judge Stuard engaged in multiple ex parte communications with the prosecutor and had him “ghost write” an opinion imposing the death penalty. The judge then downplayed his conduct and refused to accept responsibility for it. Years later, he expressed disagreement with the need for a resentencing hearing, re-imposed the death penalty on Jackson without permitting him to present any new evidence, and then re-issued a nearly identical, tainted opinion originally authored by the prosecutor. The Court concluded that the foregoing facts established sufficient bias under an objective standard because “Judge Stuard essentially allowed the prosecution to ‘act[] as both accuser and judge in [Jackson’s] case.’” Williams v. Pennsylvania, 579 U.S. 1 (2016).

The Court also determined that the Ohio Supreme Court’s opinion rejecting Jackson’s mitigation evidence claim is both contrary to and an unreasonable application of Supreme Court case law. As the Sixth Circuit previously recognized, the decisions in Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978), Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982), Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1 (1986), and their progeny establish that defendants must be permitted to present and courts must consider any and all relevant mitigating evidence that is available at capital resentencing hearings, including new evidence developed since the initial sentencing hearing. Davis v. Coyle, 475 F.3d 761, 774 (6th Cir. 2007). Here, Jackson attempted to present three volumes of such evidence, but Judge Stuard refused to consider it at all.

The Ohio Supreme Court rejected Jackson’s mitigation claim by reasoning that the Eighth Amendment does not guarantee a capital defendant the “categorical constitutional right to introduce new mitigation evidence that is discovered after a sentencing hearing in which the defendant was given an opportunity to present all the mitigation evidence he desired.” However, the Court declared that this decision is completely inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s “purposely broad” Eighth Amendment jurisprudence and “violates the principle clearly defined by Lockett, Eddings, and Skipper.” It held that the Lockett line of cases “clearly established that capital defendants have a right to present during their sentencing proceedings ‘any and all relevant mitigating evidence that is available.’”

Based on the foregoing clearly established federal law, Jackson was entitled to present any and all relevant mitigation evidence at his resentencing hearing, but Judge Stuard categorically refused to allow him to do so. The fact that Jackson had been previously sentenced to death was irrelevant because that sentence had been vacated. The Court stated that at the new hearing, “Judge Stuard was tasked with determining whether the death penalty or life in prison was the appropriate sentence, given all the relevant circumstances—both aggravating and mitigating. But Judge Stuard refused to allow Jackson to present all the relevant mitigating circumstances.” Thus, the Court held that Jackson’s Eighth Amendment rights were violated and is entitled to habeas relief on his mitigating-evidence claim.

Conclusion

Accordingly, the Court affirmed the District Court’s grant of habeas relief on the mitigating-evidence claim, reversed its denial of the judicial-bias claim, and remanded for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. See: Jackson v. Cool, 111 F.4th 689, rehearing en banc denied, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 22733 (6th Cir. 2024).

The Sixth Circuit subsequently granted Ohio’s motion to stay the mandate, so it could seek certiorari review in the U.S. Supreme Court. The Court ruled that the mandate should issue promptly once the “Supreme Court disposes of the case.” Jackson v. Cool, 2024 U.S. App. LEXIS 25389 (6th Cir. Oct. 7, 2024).

Editor’s note: Anyone interested in either mitigating-evidence claims or judicial-bias claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 is encouraged to read the Court’s full opinion, which contains extensive discussions of both types of claims as a basis for habeas relief.    

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