by Sam Rutherford

The Supreme Court of Washington prohibited trial courts from placing defendants in what it described as an “in-court holding cell” without first conducting an individualized, on-the-record hearing to determine the necessity of its use, explaining that routine use of this cell—which is essentially a cage in the corner of the courtroom—violates defendants’ due process right under both the state and federal constitutions absent compelling facts justifying such restraint.

Background

The Cowlitz County Superior Court in Kelso, Washington, routinely conducts short criminal proceedings not requiring witnesses for detained defendants in a small courtroom in the county jail. In the back corner of the courtroom, there is a cage that is roughly five feet wide, five feet deep, and eight feet long, with a “mesh window” on the right to allow defendants to speak with their attorney and a glass window on the left. This cage, which the Court described as an in-court holding cell, is located some distance away from the defense’s table.

Defendants are brought directly into the cell for court appearances through a door leading from a secure area within the jail. In other words, defendants never step foot inside the actual courtroom; they are moved directly from the jail into the cage. A jail guard is present inside the cage throughout court proceedings. Defendants have no direct access to their attorney, who is situated some distance away at the defense’s table.

In 2021, Cassandra Luthi pleaded guilty to delivery of heroin within a school zone and was given a mental health sentencing alternative (“MHSA”) of 36 months’ community custody. After Luthi violated the conditions of her MHSA sentence twice in 2022, the State filed a petition to revoke the sentencing alternative and incarcerate her. Luthi was arrested and held without bail from December 2022 until her revocation hearing in February 2023.

Before the revocation hearing, Luthi’s attorney filed a motion “to appear in court without restraints,” arguing that “[t]here [was] no reason to place Ms. Luthi inside of a cage and for her to be physically separated from the court proceedings” because she was “not a flight risk, [and] she [was] not going to harm herself or others.” Counsel pointed out that the cage is a “dehumanizing” restraint comparable to shackling, which could not be imposed “absent evident necessity determined on an individualized basis by the court.” See State v. Jackson, 467 P.3d 97 (Wash. 2020).

The trial court, however, ignored the motion, so Luthi appeared at the revocation hearing from the in-court holding cell, with a jail guard standing next to her. Her attorney again objected to the use to the cage, but the court denied the motion. The court ruled that the cage was not “at the same level as shackling” and that it did not “really see any prejudice to Ms. Luthi.” Notably, the court did not conduct an individualized inquiry to determine whether Luthi presented any courtroom security concerns.

Luthi admitted to the two supervision violations and asked for credit for time served, so she could resume mental health and chemical dependency treatment as part of her MHSA sentence. It appeared from the record that she attempted to personally inform the trial court about her struggles with mental illness and substance abuse as well as her desire to seek treatment, but because she was in the cage, numerous sections of the revocation hearings transcripts were marked “inaudible” and “indiscernible.”

The trial court denied the State’s motion for revocation and imposed a sanction of 45 days. Luthi was released based on credit for time served. After the hearing, she sent her attorney an email explaining that being in the cage made it “almost impossible to speak” to her attorney. She also said she felt like she was “on display” and “not part of [her] own court hearing.”

The Washington Supreme Court granted direct review of Luthi’s appeal and reversed the superior court.

Analysis

The sole issue before the Court was whether confining Luthi in the cage, or in-court holding cell, violated her right to due process of law under the state and federal constitutions. See U.S. Const., amend. XIV, § 1; Wash. Const., art. I, § 3. “A defendant’s right to appear in court free from unjustified restraints is well established as a matter of federal and state due process law,” according to the Court. Citing Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622 (2005); State v. Jackson, 467 P.3d 97 (Wash. 2020). Well-settled Washington case law holds that defendants may not be physically restrained in court “unless some impelling necessity demands the restraint.” State v. Williams, 50 P. 580 (Wash. 1897). This prohibition applies not only to proceedings before a jury but also to pretrial proceedings and sentencing hearings. Deck; Jackson.

Although much of the case law concerning unjustified restraints deals with shackling defendants, courts have extended due process protections to requiring defendants to wear jail cloths in front of a jury. Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501 (1976). Courts have also said that defendants may not stand trial in jailhouse courtrooms. State v. Jaime, 233 P.3d 554 (Wash. 2010). And at least one U.S. Court of Appeals has also prohibited requiring defendants to appear for hearings in a “prisoner’s dock.” Young v. Callahan, 700 F.2d 32 (1st Cir. 1983); Walker v. Butterworth, 599 F.2d 1074 (1st Cir. 1979).

Based on the foregoing discussion of the case law on the issue, the Court reasoned that all these types of restraints violate a defendant’s due process rights because they undermine the presumption of innocence, interfere with a defendant’s right to meaningfully participate in court proceedings, impeded a defendant’s ability to communicate with defense counsel, and “undermine [the] symbolic yet concrete objectives” of courtroom dignity and decorum, “which includes the respectful treatment of defendants.” Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337 (1970); State v. Finch, 975 P.2d 967 (Wash. 1999) (plurality opinion).Thus, the Court concluded that a defendant may not be restrained during court appearances unless the trial court conducts an individualized, on-the-record inquiry and determines that “extraordinary circumstances” require “measures that implicate courtroom security, including whether to restrain a defendant in some capacity in order to prevent injury.” Jackson. The Court stated that a general policy of restraining all defendants who appear in court from jail violates due process, and it is a failure by the trial court to exercise discretion. Id.

Although the Washington Supreme Court had never considered whether the routine practice of confining all jailed defendants in a cage or in-court holding cell during nonjury hearings violates due process, the Court had little trouble concluding that it does because the practice “is a restraint on defendants that undermines the presumption of innocence, the ability to consult with counsel, and the dignity of the proceedings.” These concerns do not “vanish” just because a jury is not present, declared the Court. Thus, the Court ruled that “the superior court may not impose a blanket policy requiring defendants to appear for any type of hearing from the in-court holding cell, absent an individualized inquiry justifying the use of such restraint.”

“Cowlitz County Superior Court’s routine practice of confining defendants to an in-court holding cell for nonjury hearings, without any individualized inquiry, violates the constitutional right to due process.” The Court emphasized that “trial courts must engage in an individualized inquiry before every hearing to determine whether there are extraordinary circumstances justifying courtroom restraints for security reasons.”

Because the superior court did not conduct an individualized, on-the-record hearing to determine whether confining Luthi to the in-court holding cell during her revocation hearing was necessary for courtroom safety, her right to due process was violated, the Court concluded. She was entitled to a new revocation hearing unless the State is able to demonstrate that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The Court noted that this inquiry begins with a “presumption of prejudice.” Jackson. The State failed to overcome this presumption by not “meaningfully” addressing the harmless error standard and instead “offering only perfunctory arguments that do not satisfy its burden,” according to the Court.

Conclusion

Accordingly, the Court reversed Luthi’s 45-day sanction and remanded the case for a new revocation hearing. See: State v. Luthi, 549 P.3d 712 (Wash. 2024).

Writer’s note: In a concurring opinion, Judge Schubert, who was sitting by designation, astutely observes that requesting a new revocation hearing may not be in Luthi’s best interest. She only received a 45-day sanction but could have had her MHSA sentence revoked and been sent to prison for 88-144 months. A new revocation hearing exposes her to these risks again. Moreover, she was nearly done with her 36-month term of community supervision and will soon be entitled to a termination hearing at which the DOC will not be permitted to appear and offer an opinion on whether her supervision should be terminated. Judge Schubert therefore cautioned the parties as to the “necessity or advisability” of holding a new revocation hearing on remand.  

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