by Sam Rutherford

The Supreme Court of Indiana held that a trial court’s failure to explain the basis for its denial of a defendant’s motion for discharge based on a speedy trial violation was erroneous. The defendant objected to the trial court continuing his trial beyond the speedy trial period based on court congestion and presented evidence showing that no such congestion existed, but the trial judge denied the motion without comment and without rebutting the defendant’s evidence. This was error and entitled the defendant to dismissal of the charges against him.

Background

In September 2022, William R. Grimes was charged with multiple crimes following a violent altercation with Matthew Pirtle. Grimes requested a speedy trial under Indiana Criminal Rule 4 (“Rule 4”) at his initial appearance on November 13. The trial court granted the request, meaning that Grimes’ trial had to start no later than “seventy calendar days from the date” his motion was granted, which in this case was December 22, 2022. Rule 4(B). Grimes remained in jail throughout pretrial proceedings.

In November, the State obtained two separate continuances—first, because it added more charges and, second, due to an annual conference the prosecutor was required to attend. The trial court granted the request and moved the trial to December 19, which was still within the 70-day limit.

However, in early December, the Sullivan County Circuit Court judge, the only judge on that court, discovered he had a conflict of interest because he had been the prosecutor in one of Grimes’ previous cases, so he transferred the current case to the Sullivan County Superior Court. The new judge promptly issued an order continuing the trial to January 25, 2023, “[d]ue to Court congestion.” The new trial date was 37 days beyond the speedy trial period.

After Grimes’ trial was continued for court congestion, the State moved for appointment of a special prosecutor because the prosecuting attorney then assigned to Grimes’ case participated as a magistrate judge in one of his prior felonies. The trial court granted the motion. The State did not suggest that the appointment of the special prosecutor required an additional continuance.

On December 21, just one day before the speedy trial clock expired, Grimes’ attorney filed a motion for discharge, challenging the superior court’s finding of court congestion. Defense counsel attached a copy of the court’s docket showing that no jury trials were scheduled between December 19 and 21 and that no jurors had been summoned for those days. A bench trial was scheduled for December 20, but the defendant in that case was not in custody and had not requested a speedy trial. The court denied the motion without explanation.

Grimes’ case went to trial on January 25, 2023. He renewed his speedy trial objection at the start of trial, which the court again denied without comment. The jury convicted Grimes as charged, and he received a sentence of 40 years in prison. He timely appealed the denial of his motion for discharge, but the Indiana Court of Appeals affirmed in an unpublished opinion, holding that Grimes failed to present any evidence that the trial judge’s congestion finding was clearly erroneous.

Grimes sought and was granted transfer to the Indiana Supreme Court, which vacated the appellate court opinion and remanded the case to the trial court with instructions to grant discharge.

Analysis

The Court observed that the sole issue on appeal was whether Grimes was entitled to discharge under Rule 4, which “places the onus on the State to bring defendants to trial and gives them a procedure to invoke their speedy-trial right.” Austin v. State, 997 N.E.2d 1027 (Ind. 2013). Rule 4 provides that a defendant “may move for an early trial” that, once filed, requires the defendant be tried “no later than seventy calendar days from the date of such motion” or else the “criminal charge against the defendant must be dismissed.” Rule 4(B). But a court may continue a trial date beyond this limit due to “congestion of the court calendar or emergency.” Rule 4(B)(1).

Both exceptions were at issue in this case because the trial court continued Grimes’ trial based on congestion, and the State asserted an emergency as an alternative basis for upholding the order. The Court evaluated both issues in turn.

Court Congestion

The Court explained that it uses “a burden-shifting test to evaluate a trial court’s decision to reschedule a trial past the seventy-day deadline for calendar congestion,” which “starts with the trial court’s order finding the court’s schedule is congested and continuing the trial date.” The trial court may continue a trial date for congestion without explanation, which is presumed correct. Austin. The “burden then shifts to the defendant to object and rebut the court’s congestion finding,” according to the Court.

A defendant must meet two criteria to satisfy his burden. First, the defendant must object to the new trial date at the “earliest opportunity” and must present evidence to convince the trial court that it must set the trial date within the 70-day limit. Smith v. State, 477 N.E.2d 857 (Ind. 1985); Brown v. State, 725 N.E.2d 823 (Ind. 2000). Second, the defendant must move for dismissal once the 70-day deadline passes and show that the trial court’s congestion finding was “factually and legally inaccurate.” Clark v. State, 659 N.E.2d 548 (Ind. 1995).

The Court stated that the “level” of a defendant’s burden under both criteria turns on whether the trial court gave “a factual basis” for its congestion finding. If no explanation is given, “the defendant need only make a prima facie case for discharge,” which is “a low bar.” Clark. Once the defendant makes this showing, “the burden then shifts back to the trial court to explain its congestion finding.” If the court fails to offer an explanation, the defendant is entitled to dismissal. Austin. But, if the court explains its congestion finding, a defendant will be entitled to dismissal only after showing that the finding was clearly erroneous. Clark.

Turning to the present case, the Court determined that the trial court met its initial burden by continuing Grimes’ trial based on congestion. As the Court noted, “this summary finding was enough to shift the burden to Grimes to object at the outset and then show in a discharge motion that the finding was legally or factually inaccurate.” Clark; Smith. Although it is “preferrable” that a trial court state the basis for its congestion finding when continuing a case, that is not required to shift the burden to the defendant to rebut the finding. But if the trial court does explain its congestion finding, the “defendant’s burden to challenge the ruling in a later motion for discharge increases significantly,” the Court stated.

The Court concluded that Grimes met his burden. First, he satisfied the requirement that he object to the continuance based on court congestion at his “earliest opportunity” by filing an objection “the same day he received notice of the continuance.” Second, he met his burden to establish a prima facie case for dismissal. Prima facie means “such evidence as is sufficient to establish a given fact and which will remain sufficient if uncontradicted.” Johnson v. State, 283 N.E.2d 532 (Ind. 1972). But a prima facie showing does not require “conclusive” evidence. Earl v. Am. States Preferred Ins. Co., 744 N.E.2d 1025 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001).

In this case, Grimes presented a copy of the trial court’s docket showing an opening in the court’s schedule. Even though the docket was dated from a few days after the continuance order, this “post-dated docket obtained before the seventy-day speedy-trial deadline can be enough to make a prima facie case.” The Court did note that presenting a docket entry from the day of the continuance order is the best practice but is not mandatory for a prima facie showing. This is so because “[i]f the court’s schedule often changes, and its schedule on the continuance date had no openings, then the court can provide this information after the defendant presents his prima facie case. But the defendant need not in the first instance prove conclusively that the docket reflects the court’s schedule on the continuance date.”

Nor was Grimes required to present the testimony of a court clerk concerning the court’s schedule to rebut the congestion finding with prima facie evidence. While this type of testimony may be required to challenge a congestion ruling supported by an explanation under the clear error standard, it is not required when the court offers no explanation for its congestion finding when continuing a trial date, the Court stated. See, e.g., Truax v. State, 856 N.E.2d 116 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (discussing clear error standard for congestion rulings supported with explanation).

Having determined that Grimes presented prima facie evidence to rebut the trial court’s congestion finding, the next question was whether that evidence did in fact show that the court’s finding was erroneous. “To show an opening on the court calendar, a defendant must show that no other cases with priority were scheduled before the defendant’s seventy-day deadline to prevent the defendant’s trial from taking place.” Clark. Criminal cases always take precedence over civil cases unless the civil case “involves a long-scheduled, complex trial that poses extenuating circumstances to litigants and witnesses.” Austin. As for other criminal cases, “one with a defendant who filed a speedy-trial motion takes priority over one with a defendant who did not, and a criminal case with a longer-incarcerated defendant takes priority over one with a more recently charged defendant.” Austin.

The Court ruled that Grimes easily satisfied this test. The docket he presented showed that only one other criminal case was scheduled for trial around the date on which his speedy trial period expired—the bench trial set for December 20. But the defendant in that case was out of custody and had not requested a speedy trial, so “Grimes’s trial should have received priority.” This showing “returned the burden to the trial court to explain its congestion finding.” Because the trial judge offered no explanation whatsoever to support its congestion finding, Grimes was “entitled to discharge,” the Court ruled.

Emergency Exception

Perhaps realizing that it was fighting an uphill battle defending the superior court’s unexplained congestion finding, the State argued that the continuance was nonetheless appropriate under Rule 4’s emergency exception. The State contended that the need for a special prosecutor was an “exigent circumstance” requiring a continuance that resulted from Grimes’ refusal to waive the prosecutor’s conflict. But the State did not raise this argument in response to Grimes’ motion for discharge, so it was waived on appeal. See Harris v. State, 165 N.E.3d 91 (Ind. 2021). Finding waiver in this case was particularly appropriate because the State has a duty, independent of the trial court, to ensure that a defendant’s trial is not delayed in violation of Rule 4. Austin.

Conclusion

Accordingly, the Court vacated the opinion of the Court of Appeals, reversed the trial court’s judgment, and remanded with instructions to discharge Grimes. See: Grimes v. State, 235 N.E.3d 1224 (Ind. 2024).

Writer’s note: The Court noted that it had amended Rule 4 effective January 1, 2024, to modify the remedy for a speedy trial violation from “discharged” to “dismissed.” The purpose of this change was likely to reflect the fact that not all defendants are confined yet still entitled to a speedy trial and a remedy when they don’t receive one. The Court instructed that although it reviewed Grimes’ appeal under the former version of Rule 4, its opinion “applies with equal force to the current version of Criminal Rule 4.” This article, therefore, quotes and cites the current version of the Rule, but the terms “discharge” and “dismissal” are used interchangeably.   

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