by Anthony W. Accurso

The Supreme Court of Arkansas held that courts have jurisdiction to hear habeas motions authorized by Act 1780 of 2001, in which a defendant may request new scientific testing of evidence to establish their actual innocence claim, even if the defendant has been released from custody or otherwise completed his sentence.

Damien Echols was one of the “West Memphis Three”—three teens who had been convicted of the murder of three eight-year-olds in 1993. All were originally sentenced to death. By September 2007, retesting of DNA evidence ruled out Echols and his codefendants as the perpetrators, and DNA from hair found at the scene was consistent with the father of one of the victims.

Echols filed a motion for a new trial in 2008, and after a deal was reached with the State, he entered an Alford plea in accordance with North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970). On August 19, 2011, the day he entered his plea, he received “a time-served sentence plus an additional ten years’ suspended imposition of sentence.” Because of the nature of an Alford plea, Echols was free to maintain his claim of innocence despite agreeing to the deal. The Court explained that under an Alford plea, the defendant determines that his interests are best served by entering a guilty plea based on the strong evidence of actual guilt that’s likely sufficient for a conviction at trial but still maintains his innocence. See Alford.

On January 24, 2022, Echols filed a petition to conduct additional DNA testing under Act 1780 of 2001, as amended by Act 2250 of 2005 and codified at Arkansas Code Annotated sections 16-112-201 to -208 (Repl. 2016) (“Act 1780”). He sought testing of certain evidence using the M-Vac wet-vacuum-based collection method, a new DNA-collection method that was not available when DNA testing had previously been conducted in the case.

On June 28, 2022, the circuit court entered a written order denying Echols’s Act 1780  petition. The circuit court reasoned that the provisions of Act 1780 are incorporated in the state’s habeas corpus rules, and “[w]hen a petitioner is not in custody, the circuit court does not have jurisdiction to grant habeas corpus relief.” Citing Curtis v. Hobbs, 2015 Ark. 127.

The circuit court reasoned that, had the Legislature intended for Act 1780 to apply to defendants who are no longer imprisoned or had otherwise completed their sentences, it wouldn’t have written the provisions into the habeas corpus portion of the state’s code.

Echols timely appealed, arguing that this interpretation contradicts the plain language of Act 1780.

The Court began its analysis by reviewing the text of Act 1780. Arkansas Code Annotated § 16-112-103 provides, in pertinent part, that “(a)(1) The writ of habeas corpus shall be granted … to any person who shall apply for the writ by petition showing, by affidavit or other evidence, probable cause to believe he or she is detained without lawful authority, is imprisoned when by law he or she is entitled to bail, or who has alleged actual innocence of the offense or offenses for which the person was convicted.” (emphasis supplied)

While the first two circumstances apply only to petitioners who are still in custody, the third circumstance requires only that the petitioner has been “convicted” and has “alleged actual innocence,” the Court observed. Further, § 16-112-201 provides that “(a) Except when direct appeal is available, a person convicted of a crime may commence a proceeding to secure relief by filing a petition in the court in which the conviction was entered to vacate and set aside the judgment and to discharge the petitioner or to resentence the petitioner or grant a new trial or correct the sentence or make other disposition as may be appropriate….” This provision allows for a petition at any time, “[e]except when a direct appeal is available.”

The Court stated that, “[w]hen reviewing issues of statutory interpretation, the first rule in considering the meaning and effect of a statute is to construe it just as it reads, giving the words their ordinary and usually accepted meaning in common language.” Magness v. State, 386 S.W.3d 390 (Ark. 2012). And “[w]hen the language is plain and unambiguous, there is no need to resort to rules of statutory construction, and the analysis need go no further.” Treat v. State, 588 S.W.3d 10 (Ark 2019). Finally, “[w]hen a statute is clear … it is given its plain meaning, and this court will not search for legislative intent; that intent must be gathered from the plain meaning of the language used.” Magness; Treat.

Turning to the present case, the Court concluded: “Here, the plain language in sections 16-112-201 and -202 unambiguously permits ‘a person convicted of a crime’ to petition for additional DNA testing to demonstrate the person’s actual innocence pursuant to Act 1780.” It added: “This language imposes no requirement that a petitioner must be in state custody to seek relief pursuant to Act 1780, and we decline to read such a requirement into the statutes.” Thus, the Court held that the circuit court erred in dismissing Echols’ petition for lack of jurisdiction.

Accordingly, the Court reversed the circuit court’s ruling and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. See: Echols v. State, 686 S.W.3d 790 (Ark. 2024). 

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