by Sam Rutherford

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit overturned a sentence imposed by the U.S. District Court for the District of Puerto Rico, holding that the District Court’s one-­sentence explanation for a sentence nearly 10 years above the recommended sentencing Guidelines range was insufficient to justify such a significant upward variance above the recommended maximum sentence.

Background

In the late-­night hours of March 31, 2019, Ricardo Perez-­Delgado (“Perez”) and three other men decided to rob a local businessman’s home. The four of them approached the home, pepper-­sprayed his dogs, and broke the fence to enter his yard. They entered the home through a kitchen window, but the noise woke the victim. The four men exited the home to avoid being caught.

The victim, however, pursued them outside, so one of Perez’s accomplices rushed him with a baseball bat but missed his mark. The victim, fearing for his safety, retrieved a rifle from his vehicle and began shooting at the four men. Perez’s three compatriots abandoned him, fleeing inside the victim’s home to hide. The victim stumbled upon Perez hiding in the dark and a fight ensued. The victim bit a chunk out of Perez’s cheek during the melee, but Perez eventually gained the upper hand, ultimately subduing the victim and beating him with both the baseball bat and rifle. Perez’s accomplices joined the fray, and all four took turns beating the victim. Perez then shot the victim six times with his own gun, killing him. The men proceeded with the robbery, stealing two safes, multiple firearms, two cars, and over $20,000 in cash. They divvied up the loot and went their separate ways.

Perez was ultimately apprehended and agreed to plead guilty to the use and carry of a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence resulting in death in exchange for the Government dropping other charges associated with the crime. The parties also agreed to jointly recommend a sentence of imprisonment of 300 months. The probation office then prepared a presentence report indicating a Guidelines sentencing range of 292-­365 months. The report also noted that Perez had no prior criminal history, and there were no factors warranting a sentence outside the Guidelines range.

At sentencing, the District Court adopted the presentence report and sentencing range, which the parties agreed to, but nonetheless imposed an upward variant sentence of 480 months, a full 115 months above the maximum Guidelines sentence. The District Court offered a single sentence to justify the variance: “The Court finds that the sentence recommended by the parties does not reflect the seriousness of Mr. Perez’[s] offense, does not promote respect for the law, does not protect the public from additional crimes by Mr. Perez, and does not address the issues of deterrence and punishment.”

The District Court failed to even acknowledge its chosen sentence exceed the maximum Guidelines range by nearly 10 years or otherwise justify such a significant variance from the recommended sentence. Moreover, the District Court simply ignored defense counsel’s objection to the sentence as being substantively and procedurally unreasonably. Following the sentencing hearing, the District Court filed a statement of reasons to justify the variant sentence, which amounted to nothing more than a simple check-­the-­box form tracking the court’s one-­sentence oral pronouncement at sentencing. Perez timely appealed.

Analysis

Before the First Circuit, Perez’s appeal followed what the Court labeled as the “now familiar ‘two-­step framework’ for sentencing.” United States v. Colon-­Cordero, 91 F.4th 41 (1st Cir. 2024). In the first step, the reviewing court determines whether the sentence is procedurally reasonable. See United States v. Melendez-­Hiraldo, 82 F.4th 48 (1st Cir. 2023). Examples of procedural irregularity include: “failing to calculate (or improperly calculating) the Guidelines range, treating the Guidelines as mandatory, failing to consider the § 3553(a) factors, selecting a sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, or failing to adequately explain the chosen sentence—including an explanation for any deviation from the Guidelines range.” Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007). The second step involves determining whether the sentence is substantively reasonable, which is defined as a sentence based on a “rationale [that] is plausible and resulted in a defensible outcome.” United States v. De La Cruz, 91 F.4th 550 (1st Cir. 2024).

Whether a District Court’s sentence satisfies this two-­step framework is typically reviewed for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Carrasquillo-­Vilches, 33 F.4th 36 (1st Cir. 2022). However, if the defendant or his lawyer fails to object at sentencing, then the sentence is reviewed under the more demanding plain error standard. See United States v. Montero-­Montero, 817 F.3d 35 (1st Cir. 2016).

In the present case, Perez’s lawyer objected at sentencing, so the Court reviewed the District Court’s decision for an abuse of discretion. The Court acknowledged that defense counsel’s objection was somewhat vague, but “exquisite precision” is not necessary to preserve a sentencing error for review. United States v. Rivera-­Berríos, 968 F.3d 130 (1st Cir. 2020).

Having determined the governing standard of review, the Court turned to what it called the “A, B, C’s of Adequate Sentencing Explanations.” To begin with, Congress specifically requires a District Court to “state in open court the reasons for its imposition of the particular sentence.” 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c). As the U.S. Supreme Court has explained, this statutory requirement is critically important because it provides both the defendant and the public with an understanding of why a particular sentence was handed down, allows for meaningful appellate review, and promotes the perception of fair sentencing. Gall.

The Court noted that “explaining the reasons for a particular sentence is more of an art than a science.” The level of precision with which a District Court must explain a sentence depends upon context. See Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338 (2007) (“[t]he appropriateness of brevity or length, conciseness or detail, when to write, what to say, depends on the circumstances”). A sentence well within the Guidelines range requires little explanation, while a sentence outside the range requires more. United States v. Murphy-­Cordero, 715 F.3d 398 (1st Cir. 2013).

The Court explained that a District Court is not required to follow a specific format at sentencing, but any variant sentence must be sufficiently supported by an explanation why the defendant’s case “differ[s] from the norm” or “the mine-­run of” cases covered by the applicable sentencing Guidelines range. United States v. Serrano-­Berríos, 38 F.4th 246 (1st Cir. 2022). Importantly, a variant sentence’s explanation must be “case-­specific” because generic or boilerplate explanations “will not do,” according to the Court. See, e.g., United States v. Reyes-­Correa, 81 F.4th 1 (1st Cir. 2023); United States v. Carrasquillo-­Sanchez, 9 F.4th 56 (1st Cir. 2021).

The District Court’s one-­sentence justification for its nearly 10-­year upward variance failed to satisfy the requirements for such an upward variance, the Court ruled. As the Court explained, “Nothing in this one sentence is specific to Perez’s case, highlights which aspects of the crime were particularly troubling to the district court, or explains why an extra ten years in prison is the magic number. Rather, this explanation is boilerplate. And we use the term ‘boilerplate’ literally because the explanation the district court gave here tracks almost word-­for-­word the same explanations we have deemed inadequate in many other cases.”

Perhaps recognizing that it was fighting a losing battle trying to defend the District Court’s write explanation, the Government nonetheless contended that the sentencing court’s reasons for its upward variance could be inferred “from the sentencing colloquy and the parties’ arguments (oral or written) in connection with sentencing.” Montero-­Montero. But all the District Court did at sentencing was review the presentence report, the facts of the crime, Perez’s socioeconomic background, and make mention of the fact that it had considered the § 3553(a) factors. On this record, the Court concluded that “nothing that comes close to an adequate explanation for a sentence with a variance of this magnitude (nearly a decade over the top-­line of the [sentencing range]).”

“In sum, what we have here is a one-­sentence, generic explanation, a factual summary of the crime, and a sentencing record from which we cannot infer an adequate rationale,” the Court summarized. The Court declined to “bend over backwards” to shore up an otherwise inadequate record. Thus, the Court ruled that the “district court’s explanation (or more accurately, lack thereof) was an abuse of discretion.”

Conclusion

Accordingly, the Court reversed Perez’s sentence and remanded for resentencing, at which the District Court must “base its sentence on the existing factual record, supplemented by any facts that occurred after the prior date of sentencing, to the extent those facts are offered and admissible.” See: United States v. Perez-­Delgado, 99 F.4th 13 (1st Cir. 2024).   

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