by Jo Ellen Nott

A digital world that never sleeps and the proliferation of surveillance devices in the 21st century have irrevocably altered spycraft. The modus operandi of spies before the technological revolution, concocting cover identities or moving about unobserved, is now virtually impossible in the universe of information available to most anyone. 

Consider that in the always-on digital universe, Russian counterintelligence can sniff out CIA agents working in U.S. embassies by scrutinizing prior postings in certain countries or pay bumps for hazardous work or salary mismatches for personnel with similar titles. These red flags are easily accessed through open-source information found on government sites and platforms like LinkedIn. Any details not gleaned from scraping those sources are most likely filled in by information stolen in the massive 2014 hack of the Office of Personnel Management.

Then consider that surveillance tech has become even more intrusive as governments and private citizens are installing more cameras and monitoring other people’s activities more frequently. The Wall Street Journal reported on three international plots in which surveillance technology played a key role:

In 2010, suspected operatives of Israel’s Mossad killed a Palestinian militant living in Dubai but were caught on closed-circuit cameras that captured their every move, including the before and after of putting on disguises.

In 2017, a U.S. intelligence officer and Kim Yong Un’s half-brother met in secret just days before he was assassinated, and the encounter became public knowledge thanks to hotel security cameras.

In 2020, Bellingcat used phone and travel data to track three operatives from the Russian Federal Security Service (“FSB”) who shadowed and then attempted to kill Russian opposition politician Aleksey Navalny.  Bellingcat named the three FSB operatives and published their photographs. 

New CIA director William Burns said during his February confirmation hearing that the agency’s covert work was much more difficult to perform but expressed confidence the agency would figure out a way to work around these millions of technology inconveniences.

One solution is to do away with the fakery of traditional espionage. Instead of adopting personas as needed, agents will be expected to exist as someone else – a role that requires far more commitment than acting as someone else to gather intelligence. The spying will be done in “true name” and with no obvious connection to the U.S. government. “A cover identity that would have been almost bulletproof only 20 years ago can now be unraveled in a few minutes” according to Edward Lucas in Foreign Policy. Another solution, and one which is already in use, is having teams perform covert work. Part of the team is on the ground and the rest of the team steers the operative clear of surveillance cameras in the area. 

It’s not all bad for the 007s of the world. The same surveillance that renders covert operations so difficult also makes it easier for them to track their targets. Despite this, the overall tone of recent spycraft reporting is that undercover work must undergo an extensive overhaul or watch its effectiveness erode to nothing.

If professionally trained intelligence operatives find it so difficult to elude the watchful eye of the modern surveillance state, what hope does the average person have.

Sources: techdirt.com, wsj.com, foreignpolicy.com

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